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Abstract 
France through its three Pacific entities is a resident sovereign neighbour in Australia's 
region. It has been a benign influence in recent years, with strategic benefits for 
Australia and the region. But this has not always been the case, and its accepted future 
presence may not be assumed. This thesis analyses France's history in the region to 
derive indicators for its future policies and regional security, at a time of global change. 
France has earned a Pacific presence over more than four hundred years. Part 1 reviews 
its early history and motivations, which included a spirit of inquiry, internecine rivalry, 
national prestige and assertion of power, broadening to protection of its civil, 
missionary and convict populations. Economic considerations were secondary. New 
Caledonia's role in the American-led Pacific victory in World War II and the 
establishment of nuclear testing in French Polynesia enhanced the significance of the 
Pacific territories for France's national identity and strategic interests. These factors 
also catalysed the territories' demands for independence. Generous French financial 
and political inputs were accompanied by fitful and ambiguous responses. By the 
1980s, France had left a poor legacy over Vanuatu's independence, unmet Kanak 
decolonization demands in New Caledonia had degenerated into civil war, and nuclear 
testing was increasingly opposed by new Pacific island states. Cosmetic efforts to 
counter regional opposition failed, undermined by France's bombing of an anti-nuclear 
vessel in New Zealand. By the end of the 1990s France was obliged to cease its nuclear 
testing and negotiate the Matignon/Noumea Accords deferring decisions about New 
Caledonia's status. 
Part II addresses France's recent management of its entities' demands for more 
autonomy and independence, and its efforts to engage in the wider region, albeit as an 
outside power. Its record is mixed, and unfinished, as New Caledonia will vote on its 
future status after 2014. France has made impressive economic and political 
investments in its territories and the region. But it has resisted on matters fundamental 
to pro-independence forces. In New Caledonia, France has been slow to resolve 
differences over defining electorates, has encouraged French immigration to dilute 
indigenous numbers, has obfuscated ethnic censuses, has sought to pre-empt 
agreements on deferred defence and currency questions, and has been unclear about 
future immigration and mining responsibilities, while scheduled handovers and 
economic rebalancing have slipped. In French Polynesia, France has shown a lack of 
tolerance for a pro-independence elected majority. 
Part III argues that France wants to retain sovereignty over its Pacific collectivities to 
enhance its international weight and for new economic reasons, as the world's second 
largest maritime nation through its Pacific coastlines, and given New Caledonia's 
nickel and hydrocarbon potential. Its ability to achieve this with regional acceptance 
will depend largely on peaceful democratic outcomes in its territories, particularly New 
Caledonia. Such outcomes are not assured. Some options for the future are identified. 
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Map 3 Location of Hydrocarbons off New Caledonia 
Shaded areas indicate areas of recent petroleum prospectivity assessment by the 
Geological Survey of New Caledonia and Geoscience Australia, targeting known areas 
of comparatively thick sedimentary accumulations with likely petroleum potential 
Source: Nouze 2009; Geoscience Australia 
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Glossary 
Broussard European long-term resident of New Caledonia living mainly on farms 
or in rural villages 
Caldoche European long-term resident of New Caledonia, often second and third 
generation 
btdigenat ("native code") system confining Kanaks to designated areas, taxing 
them, subjecting them to punishment by administrators rather than 
judges, and requiring them to work on government projects, from 1887 
to 1946 
Evenements ("events") term used by the French for the civil disturbances in New 
Caledonia from 1984 to 1988 
Kanak indigenous people of New Caledonia, Melanesians 
Mwd Kd ("big house") totemic monument in central Noumea 
Outre-mer ("Overseas France") collective expression referring to all French 
Departments, Territories and Collectivities overseas 
Regalieu ("regalian") sovereign, pertaining to the French sovereign state, often 
referred to in the Noumea Accord context as the five powers retained 
solely by the French State by the end of the Accord (2018), i.e. defence, 
foreign affairs, currency, justice and public order 
Acronyms 
French and Historic Institutions 
ADECAL 
AFD 
CEP 
CFP 
COM 
Agence de Developpement Economique de la Nouvelle-Caledonie - New 
Caledonia Economic Development Agency 
Agence Frangaise de Developpement - French Development Agency 
Centre d Experimentation du Pacifique - Pacific Experimentation 
Centre, name for the French nuclear testing facility in French Polynesia 
Currency of the French Pacific entities, variously translated as ""Colonies 
Franqaises du Pacifique'" or "French Pacific colonies", in early years; 
"'Change Frangais du Pacifique" from 1947; and in recent years 
""Cours'' or "Comptoir" ""Frangais Pacifique''. It has a fixed value 
relative to the Euro, 1 CFP = .00838 Euro 
CoUectivites d'Outre-Mer - Overseas collectivities 
COMSUP Commandant Superieur - Commander of French Armed Forces 
DOM-TOM Departements d 'Outre-Mer, Territoires d 'Oiitre-Mer - Overseas 
Departments and Territories 
EFO Etablissements Frangais d'Oceanie - French Pacific Establishments, the 
former name for French Polynesia 
EUR Euro 
FANC Forces Armees de la NouveUe-Caledonie - New Caledonian Armed 
Forces (French) 
IFREMER Institut Frangais de Recherche pour I 'Exploitation de la Mer - French 
Research Institute for Marine Exploitation 
INCO now Vale INCO - multinational nickel company operating in New 
Caledonia 
INERIS Institut national de I 'environnement industriel et des risques - National 
Instimte for Industrial Environment and Risk 
INS EE Institut national de la statistique et des etudes economiques - National 
Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies 
Institut agronomique de Nouvelle-Caledonie New Caledonian Agronomic Institute 
Institut Pasteur Pasteur Institute, a French medical research instimte 
IRD Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement - Institute for 
Development Research 
ISEE/ ITSEE Institut de la statistique et des etudes economiques/Institut territorial de 
la statistique et des etudes economiques - Institute for Statistics and 
Economic Smdies/Territorial Institute for Statistics and Economic 
Studies (New Caledonia) 
ISPF Institut de la statistique de Polynesie Frangaise - Statistics Institute of 
French Polynesia 
LMS London Missionary Society 
RFO Radio France Outre-Mer - France's overseas broadcasting service 
SLN Societe le Nickel - The Nickel Company, French-owned nickel company 
in New Caledonia 
STSEE Service Territorial de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques -
Territorial Service for Statistics and Economic Studies (Wallis and 
Futuna) 
Regional Pacific 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
CRISP Protection of Coral Reefs in the South Pacific Program 
CROP Council of Regional Organizations of Pacific 
EDF Economic Development Fund, regional funding arrangement of EU 
FFA Forum Fisheries Agency 
FRANZ France, Australia, New Zealand Arrangements to cooperate in maritime 
surveillance and regional disaster management 
MSG Melanesian Spearhead Group 
OCO Oceanic Customs Organization 
PACER Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations 
PECC Pacific Economic Cooperation Council 
PICTA Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement 
PIDP Pacific Islands Development Program 
PIF Pacific Islands Forum (fonnerly South Pacific Forum, SPF, 1971 to 
2000) 
PITA Pacific Islands Telecommunications Association 
PPA Pacific Power Association 
PREPARE Pacific Regional Endeavour for an Appropriate Response to Epidemics 
RAMSI Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands 
SOPAC South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission 
SPC Secretariat for the Pacific Community (formerly South Pacific 
Commission from 1947 to 1998) 
SPF South Pacific Forum 
SPNWFZ South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone 
SPREP South Pacific Environment Program 
SPTO South Pacific Tourism Organization 
International and Australian Institutions 
ACP EU Africa-Caribbean-Pacific developing country assistance program 
ANSTO Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization 
C24 Committee of 24, or Decolonization Committee within the Fourth 
(Political) Committee of the United Nations 
CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization 
EC European Commission 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
EU European Union 
FAUST French Australian Seismic Transect - program exploring offshore 
resources around New Caledonia 
FEAST French Australian Science and Technology program 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
OCT Overseas Countries and Territories of the EU members 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
STABEX EU support for agricultural exports 
SYSMIN EU financing for mining products 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
A'^ M' Caledonian institutions 
ADCK Agence de Developpement de la Culture Kanak - Agency for Kanak 
Cultural Development 
ADRAF Agence de Developpement Rural et d Ameriagement Fancier - Rural 
Development and Land Management Agency 
ALK Academie des Langues Kanak - Academy of Kanak Languages 
Cadres dAvenir ( 'Tuture Executives") or 400 cadres ("400 executives") positive 
action program for training and placement of Kanak executives 
NMC Nickel Mining Company, company involved in nickel mining in the 
north of New Caledonia 
SLN Societe le Nickel - The Nickel Company, French-owned nickel company 
in New Caledonia 
SMSP Societe Miniere du Sud Pacifique - South Pacific Mining Company 
SNNC Societe du Nickel de la Nouvelle-Caledonie - New Caledonian Nickel 
Company, company involved in nickel mining in the north of New 
Caledonia 
SOFINOR Societe d 'Ecommie Mixte de Developpement Controlee par la Province 
Nord - Mixed Economy and Development Company of the Northern 
Province 
SPMSC Societe de Participation Miniere du Sud Caledonien - South [New] 
Caledonian Mining Participation Company 
STCPI Societe Territoriale Caledonienne de Participations Industrielles -
[New] Caledonian Territorial Company for Industrial Participation 
Zoneco Program for resource assessment of New Caledonia's EEZ 
Vanuatu Political Groupspre-independence 
UPNH Union de la Population des Nouvelles-Hehrides - Union of the New 
Hebrides Population 
MANH Mouvement Autonomiste des Nouvelles-Hehrides - Autonomist 
Movement of New Hebrides 
UCNH Union des Communautes des Nouvelles-Hehrides - Union of the 
Communities of New Hebrides 
New Caledonian Political Groups 
AE Avenir Ensemble - Future Together - pro-France 
AlCLF Association des Indigenes Caledoniens et Loyaltiens Frangais -
Association of Indigenous Caledonians and French Loyalty Islanders -
1946-1953 
APLC Alliance Pour la Caledonie - Alliance for [New] Caledonia - pro-France 
CE Caledonie Ensemble - [New] Caledonia Together - pro-France 
CNDPA Conseil National des Droits du Peuple Autochtoue - National Council 
for Indigenous Peoples Rights - Kanak rights party 
FCCI Federation des Comites de Coordination des Independantistes -
Federation of the Independentist Coordination Committees - grouping of 
pro-independence parties 
FI Front Independantiste - Independence Front - pro-independence 
FLNKS Front de Liberation Nationale Kanak et Socialists - National Kanak 
Socialist Liberation Front - pro-independence 
FN Front National - National Front - pro-France 
FNSC Front National pour une Nouvelle Societe Caledonienne - National 
Front for a New Caledonian Society - pro-France 
FULK Front Uni de Liberation Kanak - United Kanak Liberation Front - pro-
independence 
LKS Liberation Kanak Socialiste - Socialist Kanak Liberation - pro-
independence 
MCF Mouvement Caledonien Frangais - French Caledonian Movement - pro-
France 
MDD Mouvement de la Diversite - Diversity Movement - pro-France 
Palika Parti de Liberation Kanak - Kanak Liberation Party - pro-independence 
PSC Parti Socialiste Caledonie - [NewJCaledonian Socialist Party - pro-
independence 
PT Parti Travailliste - Labour Party - pro-independence 
RDO Rassemblement Democratique Oceanien - Democratic Oceanic Party -
pro-independence 
Rheebu Nhuu ("eye of the land") Kanak-based movement to protect the environment 
in the wake of nickel production 
RPC Rassemblement Pour la Caledonie - Rally for [New] Caledonia - pro-
France party formed by Jacques Lafleur in 2006 
RPCR Rassemblement Pour la Caledonie dans la Republique - Rally for 
[New] Caledonia within the Republic - pro-France party formed by 
Jacques Lafleur in 1977 and re-named Rassemblement-UMP in 2004 
R-UMP Rassemblement-UMP - Rally-Popular Union Movement - pro-France 
UC Union Caledonienne - Caledonian Union - pro-autonomy from 1953 to 
1977; pro-independence from 1977 
UC Renouveau Union Caledonienne Renouveau - Renewed Caledonian Union - pro-
independence 
UICALO Union des Indigenes Caledoniens Amis de la Liberie dans I'Ordre -
Union of Indigenous Caledonian Friends of Liberty in Order, from 1946 
to 1953 
UNI Union Nationale pour I 'Independance - National Union for 
Independence - pro-independence 
UPAE Union Pour un Avenir Ensemble - Union for a Future Together - pro-
France 
UPM Union Progressiste Melanesiemie - Melanesian Progressive Union - pro-
independence 
USTKE Union Syndicate des Travailleurs Kanaks et des Explodes - Federation 
of Unions of Kanak Workers and the Exploited 
French Polynesian Political Groups and Expressions 
Ai 'a Api New Homeland Party of Emile Vemaudon - pro-autonomy, in various 
alliances 
Fetia Api New Star Party of Philip Schyle - pro-France 
Front de Liberation de la Polynesie Polynesian Liberation Front (FLP) - pro-
independence party precursor to Oscar Temaru's Tavini 
Here Ai 'a Centre-left party 
la Mana Te Nunaa Power to the People - early pro-independence party 
lorea Te Femia Land and Heart Party of Jean-Christophe Bouissou - pro-France 
O Porinetia to Tatou Ai 'a Polynesia is Our Country Party of Gaston Song - pro-
France 
Rautahi Unity Party of Jean-Christophe Bouissou - pro-France 
Tahiti Nui Greater Tahiti, name of proposal for a Noumea-type Accord for French 
Polynesia, and proposed alternative name for French Polynesia 
Tahoeraa Huira 'atira People's Assembly led by Gaston Flosse - pro-France 
Tavini Huiraatira - Serviteur du Peitple - People's Servant Party led by Oscar Temaru • 
pro-independence 
Te Aia Api New Fatherland - early pro-autonomy party 
Te E 'a Api New Way - early pro-autonomy party 
Te Here Ai 'a Love of Fatherland - early pro-autonomy party 
Te Tiaraina Pro-France party - Tahoeraa dissidents 
To Tatou Ai'a Our Land - pro-France coalition led by Gaston Song 
UPLD Union pour la Democratie - Union for Democracy coalition led by 
Oscar Temaru - comprising pro-independence and pro-autonomy parties 
Union Tahitienne-Unionpour la Defense de la Republique - Tahitian Union-Union for 
the Defence of the Republic (UT-UDR) - early pro-France party 
precursor to Flosse's Tahoeraa 
Union Tahitienne-Union pour la Nouvelle Republique - Tahitian Union-Union for the 
New Republic (UT-UNR) - early pro-France party 
France in the South Pacific: Power and Politics 
''Nous devons gerer les resolutions que nous ne pouvons pas ^iter "' 
Introduction 
The study and awareness in Australia of France's presence and influence in the South 
Pacific have waned since France ended its controversial nuclear testing in French 
Polynesia in 1996 and seriously addressed Kanak demands for independence in New 
Caledonia through the Matignon and Noumea Accords from 1988 to 1998. 
Few Australians are aware of the fact that France, present in its South Pacific entities 
New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna, ^ is one of Australia's closest 
neighbours. New Caledonia is just two and a half hours flying time from Brisbane, but 
its name is less familiar to most Australians than the names of the Solomon Islands, 
Fiji, or even Tonga much further away. In recent years nightly regional Australian 
televised weather reports of the multi-ethnic government-subsidized channel, SBS, 
regularly omitted New Caledonia from their forecasts, presenters moving directly from 
pointing to Sydney across to Fiji, without reference to the long cigarette shaped main 
island of New Caledonia they traversed along the way. Including their maritime zones 
(Exclusive Economic Zones or EEZ), the three French Pacific entities stretch from east 
of Queensland to well over halfway across the Pacific. New Caledonia^ and French 
Polynesia respectively virtually bookend the South Pacific region, with Wallis and 
Futuna at the centre. France also possesses Clipperton Island, an uninhabited atoll 
southwest of Mexico, which is administered by the French authorities in French 
Polynesia. 
For the last two decades, relative calm and stability have prevailed in the three French 
South Pacific entities. But in the two principal French Pacific collectivities. New 
Caledonia and French Polynesia, there are inherent instabilities. Administered by 
posted French officials side by side with elected local governments, they each have 
large indigenous populations and a history of protest and violence, and are inexorably 
anchored in their geographic region with links to neighbouring populations. Managing 
expectations of increasing autonomy within France and the region has called for 
innovation and flexibility. By the 1990s, the French were providing such a response, 
but only after serious opposition, including violence, in New Caledonia; a prolonged 
campaign in French Polynesia against nuclear testing there; and concerted regional 
' "We must manage those revolutions we can' t avoid", Edgard Pisani, interview with Hugh White, 
Sydney Morning Herald reporter, 1985. 
' With a constitutional change in 2003, under Article 74 of the French Constitution, French Polynesia and 
Wallis and Futuna became overseas collectivities or collectivites d'outre-mer (COM), and New 
Caledonia has a sui generis status as coIleclivUe specifique by virtue of section XIII of the Constitution 
(Faberon and Ziller, 2007 p.3). They will collectively be referred to as entities or collectivities. The 
South Pacific region will be considered to represent the regions encompassed by the members of the 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community and the Pacific Islands Forum. Translations of French terms will be 
the author 's own. 
^ which includes the islands of Walpole, Matthew and Hunter (or Feam), Belep, Huon, Surprise, 
Chesterfield, Astrolabe and Bellone. 
action and international criticism. Since it stopped nuclear testing in French Polynesia 
in 1996, and negotiated a renewed agreement, the Noumea Accord, transferring some 
autonomy and deferring a vote on independence in New Caledonia, France has 
generally maintained a creative, innovative approach for most of the last two decades. 
As regional leader and close neighbour, Australia has supported and encouraged France 
in these efforts. 
But cracks are appearing, histability in government has characterized French 
Polynesian governance since 2004. Critical deadlines are approaching in New 
Caledonia, Australia's near neighbour. There is a new generation of leaders in France, 
and given the priority France traditionally gives to its role in Europe, and its other 
domestic political and economic challenges, it is not certain that the solutions of the 
past will provide continued predictability and stability in the future. Nor even that 
France will remain in the region or, if so, on what terms. 
Generally, very little has been written about the recent evolution of France's 
engagement in the South Pacific region. Strong views about the pros and cons of 
France's controversial engagement in nuclear testing and the decolonization of New 
Caledonia generally formed the basis of English and French language academic 
writings in the 1980s and 1990s. Since then, much of the commentary and academic 
literature on contemporary France in the South Pacific has emanated from the French 
Pacific collectivities themselves, or metropolitan France, and most is in the French 
language."* In general, Australian academics and journalists writing on the South 
Pacific are restricted by language from exploring the French-language resources. This 
means that the complexities surrounding the French entities, and their role in the 
region, risk being overlooked by Australian policymakers. It also means that for 
French readers, some regional perspectives, including Australian perspectives, have 
been represented generally from a French viewpoint. Moreover, in the recent French-
language literature, the voice of the indigenous people is notably absent.^ Thus this 
literature tends to favour, or assume, the continued presence of France, and to paint an 
unalloyed positive picture of France and its policies in its collectivities and in the wider 
region. The general consensus in the recent French literature is that the bad old days are 
behind France, and France, with its reformed policies, is now a welcome, unreservedly 
"'A decade of analysis in English in the 1980s by Australian-based writers including journalist Nic 
Maclellan (often in collaboration in both languages with French academic Jean Chesneaux), John 
Connell, Robert Aldrich, Stewart Firth, Stephen Henningham, Stephen Bates, and Helen Fraser, abated 
by the mid 1990s. While Nic Maclellan continues to write on the subject, along with Hawaii-based 
David Chappell and Quebec-based Eric Waddell, most recent writings are primarily in French, including 
by Paul de Deckker, Alain Christnacht, Jean-Pierre and Francois Doumenge, Isabelle Cordonnier, Jean-
Yves Faberon, Mathias Chauchat, Pierre Cadeot, Nathalie Mrgudovic, Jean-Marc Regnault, and Frederic 
Angleviel. 
^ Indigenous views are not prolific. They are generally reported through publications such as the daily 
Nonvelks Caledoniennes and La Depeche de Tahiti or New Caledonia's cultural periodical \h\ a Vee; 
party websites such as Palika's joumal.kanal.org; or through cultural writings such as those by poet and 
politician, Dewe Gorodey. Even the views of Kanak leaders Jean-Marie Tjibaou and Paul Neaoutyine 
are recorded primarily in collections of their interviews (see References and Bibliography). 
positive influence in the region.^ With its diplomatic attention focused in troublespots 
elsewhere in the Pacific, the Australian government tends to concur in this view7 
This thesis will question this assumption. It is written by a former Australian diplomat 
with a focus on broad strategic positions and practical policy. The work is based on an 
examination of the available literature, particularly the contemporary literature. It also 
draws on interviews conducted by the author with key figures in Paris, the French 
collectivities and in Australia, not only during the course of research, but also during a 
three-year posting as Australia's Consul-General in the French Pacific collectivities, 
based in Noumea, from 2001 to 2004. It starts with a review of the history and 
rationale underpinning France's South Pacific presence, and considers future directions 
and challenges, in the broad context of regional security. It will present for the English 
language reader some of the thinking evident in recent French language literature to 
add to understanding of contemporary French policy. Finally, it may signpost areas for 
further attention by Australian students of international relations, in an area that has 
generally been neglected but that offers significant rewards in terms of its direct 
relevance to Australian interests. 
As set out in Chapters 1 and 2, history suggests that France has as much right to be 
present in the region as Australia does (an assertion that was much disputed during the 
1980s and early 1990s when France's policies were opposed in the region). France has 
been in the region as long as any other European power. It has invested significant 
financial, political and human resources in ensuring a continued presence. Securing the 
Matignon/Noumea Accords in New Caledonia and statutory reform in French Polynesia 
enabled France to claim, as did Louis Le Pensec, then Minister for Overseas France,^ 
that its presence is based on the democratic will of the people in its Pacific 
collectivities, including their indigenous peoples (Le Pensec, 1990). In recent years 
France has sought to improve its image and engagement in the broader region. 
One weakness in this argument is that the democratic will of the people in its Pacific 
collectivities is yet to be flilly tested on the subject of their future status relative to 
France. Ideas about independence, decolonization and emancipation are still evolving 
in the Pacific collectivities. Both French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna look to New 
Caledonia to set the pace of their own future status. In French Polynesia, increasing 
support for pro-independence parties seeking, at the least, the autonomy measures 
accorded to New Caledonia, has been frustrated by pro-France pressure and marked by 
outbursts of violence and ongoing political instability. The tiny collectivity of Wallis 
and Futuna, ruled by an alliance of Kings, Church and State, is dependent on the 
Evident in the assertion by former Prime Minister Michel Rocard in a forward to Nathalie Mrgudovic's 
work, La France dans le Pacifiqite Siid: Les enjeia de la puissance (2008) that France had passed "from 
the ranks of detested power.. . to one more like that of big sister" (p. 13). 
'Then Parliamentary Secretary for Pacific Affairs Duncan Kerr, on 18 November 2008, spoke of 
Australia's "strong appreciation for the role of France in the region supporting the region's security and 
developmenf and said he was "convinced... that genuine integration is the key to a stable and 
prosperous future here [in New Caledonia]", Media Release, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
18 November 2008. 
^ The term "Overseas France" will be used as an equivalent to France's use of the term L Outre-mer, or 
overseas dependencies. 
continued prosperity of New Caledonia where most of its people work. And in New 
Caledonia, the democratically-endorsed Noumea Accord and its suite of irreversible 
provisions for increased autonomy is yet to be fully implemented and is a transition 
measure only, on the future of which critical votes have yet to be cast. 
This work will argue that central to France's continued positive influence and 
acceptance in its collectivities, and in the region, will be democratic governance there, 
particularly France's ability to find a long-term democratic solution to the status of 
New Caledonia by 2018. The provisions of the Noumea Accord come to an end by 
2018, with votes to be held on the future status of New Caledonia between 2014 and 
2018 (ahhough one senior French adviser has already suggested the vote could 
technically be held as late as 2023, Christnacht 2011). 
Regional leaders as a whole remain wary of France. Many remember the failed policies 
of the 1980s and early 1990s, when France was a force for instability in the region. 
While cautiously welcoming France's recent positive engagement, they hold high 
expectations for France's treatment of its collectivities, and its contribution to the 
economic development of the region. Paradoxically, the many post-colonial 
instabilities within the independent island countries of the Pacific seem to sharpen their 
leaders' expectations of France and its entities. This is particularly true of leaders of 
the Melanesian countries of Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, and Fiji. 
In these Melanesian countries, important developments relating to the assertion of 
indigenous claims are evolving in parallel with New Caledonia's transition processes 
and deadlines under the Noumea Accord, creating their own uncertainties and potential 
for ongoing instability. Fiji, prey to government by military coup, is seeking a 
workable long-term democratic process to address the claims of all elements of its 
population, a population as ethnically divided as New Caledonia's. In the wake of 
internal division, the future of the Solomon Islands and the Regional Assistance 
Mission there is yet to be resolved permanently. Papua New Guinea has managed 
violent opposition to government policies in Bougainville by drawing partly upon the 
Noumea Accord model, providing for progressive autonomy with its own electoral 
deadlines falling due from 2011 to 2016, coincident with the Noumea Accord 
deadlines. West Papuan claims for independence from Indonesia remain a fractious 
issue for many regional Melanesians. 
All these countries are members of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), which 
was formed to support Kanak claims in New Caledonia. The MSG has shifted its focus 
to economic issues in recent years, but it remains a forum for Melanesian expression on 
regional issues, and it remains watchful of outcomes in New Caledonia.*^ The Pacific 
Islands Forum (PIF) and the United Nations Committee on Decolonization, while 
relatively dormant on the issue in recent years, retain a watching brief over New 
Caledonia. The positive relationships France has fostered in the region, and by 
extension the role of Europe and the effectiveness of the EU in the South Pacific, which 
France has led, are all at stake as the future of New Caledonia unfolds. 
' The MSG sent a visiting mission to New Caledonia in June 2010 to assess the implementation of 
France's promises under the Noumea Accord. 
Strategic benefits for France 
France's Pacific presence represents a global strategic asset. Its Pacific entities, as will 
be shown, are a key link in its worldwide chain of overseas possessions, with the 
potential for mismanagement to set off domino reactions elsewhere along the chain. 
Retaining a physical global presence has lent weight to France's claim to continue as 
one of only five powerful Permanent Members of the UN Security Council wielding a 
veto in the UN, at a time when the composition of that group is under discussion. Its 
sovereignty in the Pacific, and naval presence there, though small, mean France can 
bring a unique perspective to its NATO membership including its renewed participation 
in the High Command. As a leading EU nation, France's Pacific possessions provide 
an important support basis for activities such as the European space program. 
Within the Pacific, the resident presence of France enables it to play a significant 
strategic role complementary to that of regional allies - the US, Australia, New 
Zealand, and Japan - and potentially balancing newcomers such as China at a time of 
global power shifts. 
For France, New Caledonia represents a source of significant strategic resources such 
as nickel (it is believed to represent 30-40% of the world's nickel and the third largest 
world's reserves) and potentially petroleum (there are signs of hydro-carbons in the 
basins off New Caledonia and Australia). New Caledonia, along with French Polynesia 
and Wallis and Futuna, offer France the potential resources of their vast Pacific 
maritime EEZ. Together, they contribute 7.6 m. sq. km. of France's total of 11.57 m. 
sq. km. of EEZ. Controlling these existing and potential assets positions France at the 
forefront of the global marketplace, at a time when new long-temi supplies of resources 
and energy are in demand. 
Strategic benefits for Australia and the region 
These region-wide and global dimensions of France's presence have specific security 
implications for the region, particularly for Australia as leading power of the region. 
France's responsibility for the smooth administration of its three collectivities in the 
Pacific has meant that, for the last two decades, Australia could devote its diplomatic 
and development cooperation effort elsewhere in the Pacific. Broadly, as noted by the 
Australian government's White Paper on Foreign Affairs and Trade, "instability in the 
South Pacific negatively affects Australia's ability to protect its eastern approaches" 
(Foreign Affairs and Trade 2003, p. 20). In crude terms, if the French were to leave, 
there would be three more potentially fragile island economies on Australia's doorstep, 
with all the diplomatic energy and resources required of Australia to ensure their 
development and stability appropriate for its security. 
Australia and New Zealand together could never match the $A 4.5 b. a year France puts 
into its entities. Without these inputs, there would be an inevitable weakening of these 
economies, with resultant security vulnerabilities for the region, and Australia. Whereas 
the populations of the French Pacific collectivities represent only less than 6% of the 
population of the South Pacific countries in the Secretariat for the Pacific Community 
(SPC), or 515,000 of a total population of 9.1 million of all SPC island member 
countries, they currently represent the highest standard of living of the Pacific island 
entities, with per capita incomes exceeding those of New Zealand (from Secretariat for 
the Pacific Community October 2006 figures, website www.spc.in accessed December 
2008), due largely to significant French financial inflows. An unstable New Caledonia 
on its doorstep would impose particularly urgent demands on Australia, within the 
already tenuous Melanesian "arc of instability" embracing its northeast shores. Weak 
independent states of French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna would add fiirther to the 
demands, not only on Australia and New Zealand, but on regional Pacific 
organizations, the PIF, Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), and the multiple 
regional organizations under the Council of Regional Organizations of the Pacific 
(CROP). 
A second related factor is the regional burdensharing that France has provided, 
especially in recent years. For Australia, in whose charge the main weight of 
development and security of the island states remains, the political and economic 
resources of a major European state with a regional presence accepted by the wider 
region are welcome contributions to the region. Apart from up to $A 163 m.'° it 
provides annually to numerous regional agencies and bilaterally, France, as a founding 
EU member, has been a prime instigator of the EU"s Pacific island development 
assistance programs. France is well-placed to improve the effectiveness and size of EU 
contributions to the region. 
France's presence carries strategic significance in the region. While the importance of 
the French collectivities in protecting sea routes and providing re-supply bases has 
diminished with global and technological change, that role remains. Noumea provided 
an important staging point for Australian ships during the 2006 Fiji coup and in the 
evacuation of injured servicemen when a Blackhawk helicopter crashed into a destroyer 
at that time. The presence of several thousand skilled and trained military personnel of 
a western ally, at the western and eastern ends of the Pacific in Noumea and Papeete, is 
a regional security asset for Australia. The French were the first physically to respond 
to Australia's call for support in East Timor in 1999, being able to send a vessel that 
was already in the region. 
And the future presence of France in the collectivities, made on a clear basis of choice 
governed by democratic principle, would constitute a belt of western and European 
interest and values in the region at a time when northern Asian interests are changing, 
with resource-hungry China turning its attention to the South Pacific. 
Global security is now determined by more than military might, as it also involves good 
governance, successful environmental management and a predictable resource and 
energy supply. The French entities currently enjoy generally democratic government 
and a French justice system which accommodates local custom. They are a potential 
vehicle for French and local scientific and technical research and collaboration 
See Chapter 7 for figures on French aid to the Pacific region 
addressing major global environmental issues. Their extensive maritime zones, backed 
by French investment, represent potentially valuable albeit unchartered seabed 
resources at a time when the world is re-thinking its long-term future energy and 
mineral needs. 
In the broader Pacific region the predictabilities of the past are giving way to the 
challenges of the future. The immediate post-colonial period is behind it, and the 
effects of globalization, while they present opportunities, also highlight weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities, as the global financial crisis has shown. Environmental issues present 
unique challenges for the island states. Concerns of traditional donors about 
governance problems, with their negative impact on the effectiveness of development 
cooperation that leave the island states open to the import of terrorism, raise complex 
security concerns. All of these factors have heightened the stark reality of the region's 
poverty and dependence on patron states. Meeting these challenges region-wide 
requires flexible approaches to cooperation and governance. 
The conjunction of political and economic change within France, the effects of 
developments such as the global financial crisis and climate change on the wider 
Pacific region, and Australia's own growing strategic interest in France's 
democratically-based presence, has led to a narrowing of the difference between the 
interests of France and those of Australian and other regional governments, providing 
scope for closer cooperation in new areas and new ways 
This thesis will argue that, with much depending on the democratic presence of France 
in the region, France's securing a successful, democratic outcome in New Caledonia 
will be the key, both to France continuing to derive strategic benefits in the region, and 
for Australia's ongoing regional security interests. Addressing ongoing instabilities in 
French Polynesia and ensuring continued tranquility in Wallis and Futuna, whose 
statutory framework dates from 1961, will be important. But these two collectivities 
look to New Caledonia as a model. And New Caledonia is in the midst of an agreed 
transition process, with specific deadlines for a democratic outcome, which is being 
watched by regional leaders. With its mineral wealth, status as France's regional base 
for its military and scientific research presence, and its proximity to the largest regional 
power, Australia, New Caledonia represents a significant strategic investment for 
France. As French academic Xavier Pons so eloquently put it when writing in 1991, 
New Caledonia's importance is that of "its potential as a powder keg, which, if it were 
to explode, might contribute to destabilize the whole region" (in Aldrich 1991 p. 145). 
This remains as true now as it was then. 
After the Noumea Accord? 
In seeking a long-term solution to the future status of New Caledonia, French and local 
leaders have a range of alternatives to consider, including by drawing from the options 
already in operation in the Pacific island countries. Independence is not the only 
option, and indeed is seen as unlikely by many, in view of the demographic and 
economic realities in New Caledonia. But it is an option which some in New Caledonia 
will not give up lightly, having been willing to shed blood for it only twenty years ago. 
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With the future arrangements in New Caledonia, its pre-eminent Pacific entity, to be 
decided from 2014 to 2018, it is a propitious time to review elements of France's 
presence in the South Pacific, its official actions and policies, motivations, and its 
relationship with the wider region; and to reflect on ftiture challenges, risks and 
options. To set this analysis in context. Part I will present an overview of the history 
of France's presence in the Pacific, from the time of the first French pirates with names 
like Halleharde (after the ancient weapon of that name) and Passe Partout ("Go-
anywhere") in the early 17th century, to the establishment of its colonial presence which 
could have easily included both Australia and New Zealand. It will then consider the 
World War II period, when Australia played a prime role in establishing the Gaullist 
French government in New Caledonia, in one of its first acts of national diplomatic 
independence; and the troubled post-war years when France's view of its presence as a 
projection of its worldwide middle power status reinforced its pursuit of policies 
overriding local sensitivities, creating problems to which it was required to respond. 
Part II will examine the period after France's cessation of its nuclear tests (1996) and 
the conclusion of the Noumea Accord in 1998, a time when significant statutory change 
has been implemented in both French Polynesia and New Caledonia, a transition which 
is still in process, it will also survey France's policy towards the region as a whole, 
including the greater engagement of the EU there. 
Part III will identify France's continuing motivations for staying in the region; some of 
the risks and uncertainties surrounding those interests; and the challenges for the future, 
including options for New Caledonia, and for how France might work with Australia 
and other regional countries to advance shared objectives. 
Part I - France in the Pacific to 1990s 
Chapter 1 
The French Pacific presence to World War II 
The image of the French in AustraUa is a complex mix of impressions. Australians see 
the French as a highly cultivated people, with a passion for perfection in knowledge 
and in the day-to-day elements of life whereby clothing becomes haute couture and 
food haute cuisine, a finely tuned sense of the romantic and the amorous, a healthy not 
to say excessive suspicion of all things Anglo-Saxon, an uncompromisingly juridical 
approach to life, an almost manic respect for the ambiguities and inflections of their 
own language, and a strong sense of religiosity associated with the Catholic church. 
There is a quixotic element to Australians' idea of the French, in whom Latin emotions 
are perceived to take over and at times inveterate stubbornness can give way to a 
disarming desire to right wrongs. 
At the same time, in foreign policy circles, the image of France is that of a country 
single-minded in its pursuit of its national interests, to the extent that it can ride 
apparently roughshod, and unapologetically, over the interests of others. To the more 
initiate Australian, the French maintain such a pride for their own culture and their 
civilizing mission that they have coined a phrase, rayoimement de la culture frangaise, 
which is untranslatable in other languages but which conveys a sense of transfiguring 
radiation of their culture, as if from a divine presence. 
And ultimately France represents, for most Australians, the notions of liberie, egalite et 
fraternite, a semantic trinity which it first coined, to which Australians, often 
unwittingly, owe the basis of their own national institutions, and by which values 
France is held, often to higher standards than others. 
In the long stretch of the history of France's presence in the South Pacific region all of 
these qualities in their contradictoriness and ambiguity are present in abundance. The 
story is one of courage, endurance, failure, at times brilliant success, stubbornness, and 
overall, of extensive financial and cultural investment. To examine this history, even in 
a cursory way, is to embark on an adventure as gripping as the history of Australia's 
British ancestors in its region, and just as important for Australians to understand 
because it has contributed to Australia's own national character and security. 
Earliest French contact with the Pacific 
For many French historians, serious French interest in the Pacific dates from the 
venturing of the great French explorer Bougainville, from 1766 to 1769. But France's 
very early contacts are of some interest as they embody the complex features of the 
later presence. The great Pacific historian, John Dunmore, has provided a detailed 
record of the evolution of France's presence including from their earliest travellers (see 
Dumnore 1978 and 1997). This review draws heavily from his work but skims only 
lightly through the highlights of French discovery to define characteristics which 
inform understanding of current French policies. 
Dunmore records the first French speculation about a southern land as being posed by a 
French monk, Lambert, in the 11"' century. In 1503, a French explorer, Paulmyer de 
Gonneville arrived in a southern land, bringing back to France one of the locals, called 
Essomeric. But because de Gonneville was shipwrecked on his return after an 
encounter with pirates in the English Channel, losing all records of where he navigated, 
it is only largely conjecture that he landed either in Africa or Madagascar, or more 
probably in Brazil. But an important consequence was that his mysterious voyage set 
off further French and other efforts to find the southern land (see also Sankey 1991). 
Seventeenth and early Eighteenth Century: the Spanish lake 
In the 16* and 1?"' centuries the Spanish and Dutch led the quest in the Pacific. But 
Frenchmen were also present. There were nineteen French crew on Ferdinand 
Magellan's expedition which passed around the southern tip of South America to the 
Pacific in 1520. In 1608, Pierre-Olivier Malherbe travelled through Mexico and into 
the Pacific and the Solomon Islands. Less is known of the voyages of Jean-Baptiste de 
la Feuillade, who may have reached the Moluccas before being shipwrecked at the 
southern tip of South America. In the 1680s French pirates were active primarily in the 
Caribbean, but there are reports that they reached the Pacific coast (Dunmore 1997 p. 
17). They had names like Passe-partout ("able to go anyw here"), Hallebarde 
("halberd", a lethal 16''' century weapon), and Vent-en-panne ("reviving wind"). There 
is evidence that one of these, Ravenau de Lussan, crossed the Isthmus of Panama into 
the Pacific in 1685, along with a group of other French and English buccaneers (which 
included William Dampier). Another French buccaneer, Massertie, travelled along the 
Pacific coast from 1683 to 1693. 
The British and French group fell out after a number of years, partly because of 
differences between the Catholic French and the Protestant British in their numbers, a 
sign of conflicts to come. Massertie's return to France in 1693 sparked the interest of 
Jean-Baptiste de Gennes, who in 1695 led a fleet of 6 ships with official French 
Government support, in search of wealth and to assert a French presence in competition 
with that of Spain. But the expedition turned back at the southern tip of South 
America, defeated by bad weather. 
By the 1 a n d early 1S"' century, French exploration in the Pacific was characterized 
by conjecture, patriotism marked by rivalry with other nationalities, shipwrecks, a 
missionary spirit, and later, by a certain commercial interest. But this period was not to 
see the effective establishment of a French presence. 
After De Gennes' efforts, there followed a period when only privately funded French 
vessels travelled to the Pacific, leading to increasingly commercial activity." The 
French India Company operated in the Pacific from 1706, and one of its ships, the 
Saint-Louis, was the first to sail around Cape Horn at the Southern American tip, and 
then across to and around the Cape of Good Hope, in 1707, establishing a critical new 
southern route between America and Africa. The first French circumnavigation of the 
globe was undertaken in this commercial environment, by Sebastien Dufresne in 1711, 
in the Grand-Dauphin. 
This growing activity entailed difficulties with the dominant power, Spain, with whom 
France had to negotiate delicately. French officially-sanctioned trade ostensibly 
ceased, after the Treaty of Utrecht brought an end to the Spanish War of Succession in 
1713, although the rules were honored in the breach and some activity continued. But 
with renewed hostilities against Spain in the Quadruple Alliance (with Britain, the 
Netherlands and Austria), French merchant ships revived their trade. By 1720, the 
French India Company had been rejuvenated and controlled 300 ships. Between 1698 
and 1725, over 168 French ships were known to have sailed the Pacific, of which 12 
were wrecked and 13 captured (Dunmore 1997 p 33). 
The nature of French merchant activity in the Pacific in these early years, affected by 
European treaty and alliance relationships, showed the primordial effect of European 
political events and policy which, as will be shown, was to be a hallmark of France's 
presence in the South Pacific into the 21®' century. 
This period also saw the beginnings of scientific and strategic interest in the Pacific. 
The scientist Louis Feuillet visited the Pacific and taught astronomy in Peru from 1707 
to 1712. Amedee-Fran9ois Frezier, an army defence specialist, was sent by Louis XIV 
to South America to report on Spanish defences. He pursued his astronomy, botany 
and navigation interests there from 1711 to 1717 and drew the first reliable map of 
South America (Dunmore 1997 pp. 34 and 35). He was the first to emphasize the 
strategic importance of the South Pacific. 
It was the scientific spirit of inquiry which prevailed following the early days of 
intensive commercial voyages in the eighteenth century. This was the time of the 
philosophes in Paris, who debated issues of the day in private salons informally 
sanctioned by the King. In 1756 the Histoire des navigations aux terres australes 
("History of navigation in the southern lands"), the ideas put forward by Charies de 
Brosses, a shareholder of the French India Company, proved more durable and 
influential than his own visits to the Pacific. He argued for exploration, knowledge and 
commerce rather than conquest; for colonial establishments to provide bases for French 
fleets; and even suggested penal settlement as a substitute for penal punishment, all 
features to be taken up in subsequent years. It is de Brosses who first coined the terms 
"Australasia"and "Polynesia" (Bachimon 1990 p. 18). Dunmore noted that much of de 
" These traders included Jacques Gouin de Beauchesne (1698), Noel Danycan (1701), Julien Bourdas 
(1701), Nicolas de Frondat (1707) and Michel-Joseph du Socage de Bleville (who discovered Ciipperton 
Island in 1711, which remains French today) . 
Brasses' work was controversially pirated by Englishman John Callander in his 1768 
Terra Australia Cognita, a precursor of the rivalries and one-upmanship which was to 
characterize, and advance, the opening up of the South Pacific. 
Eighteenth Century: From exploration to staking French claims 
The voyage by Louis-Antoine Bougainville to the South Pacific from 1766 to 1769 is 
seen as a turning-point for the French. It embodied many of the features of ftiture 
French exploration. This French aristocrat, who had studied science and mathematics, 
had a complicated history with the British. He had served as a diplomat at the French 
embassy in London and was elected as a member of the London Royal Society after 
publishing a treatise on calculus. With the outbreak of the Seven Year War, 
Bougainville served as aide-de-camp to Montcalm, the French commander in Canada, 
and negotiated the French evacuation after their defeat by the British. 
Bougainville turned his mind to establishing a French South Pacific settlement to 
compensate France for the loss of Canada, setting a trend whereby French action in the 
Pacific would be motivated by balancing losses elsewhere (for example in Algeria and 
Indo-China, see Chapter 2). First he successfully installed a French colony in the 
Falkland Islands at the southern tip of South America, to control the gateway to the 
Magellan Straits and act as a bulwark against British ambitions in the eastern Pacific. 
In doing so he provoked concern both in Madrid and London. Under Spanish pressure, 
Bougainville withdrew his settlement and in return was granted a voyage to the South 
Pacific, setting off in 1766 (Dunmore 1977 p. 44). 
Bougainville laid the French claim to the East Tuamotu islands in 1767, and then Tahiti 
in 1768, parts of what is now French Polynesia, establishing the future pattern of 
making a written declaration of possession for France and, in Tahiti, burying it in a 
bottle. He was accompanied by a number of scientists. His crew included many 
colourful characters, including the Prince of Orange and Nassau, and a woman 
disguised as a male valet (Ibid. p. 46; see Bougainville 1772 p. 13 and 301; and Cazaux 
1995). 
Bougainville initiated the sensuous, free island image of Tahiti and the South Pacific 
which endures to this day in French minds. In his own words, a young Tahiti woman 
from the canoes surrounding Bougainville's vessels climbed aboard "and negligently 
allowed her loincloth to fall to the ground...Sailors and soldiers hurried to get to the 
hatchway, and never was a capstan heaved with such speed" (cited by Dunmore who 
noted that "On that day the legend of Tahiti was bom", 1977 pp. 48-49). 
Again, symbolic of future patterns, the fact was that the British had beaten Bougainville 
to Tahiti, as Samuel Wallis had anchored there less than a year before. His experience 
suggests that the idea of ever-friendly Tahitians is more complex: he had been met 
with resistance and had returned fire with his more powerftjl weapons, providing a 
signal lesson to the Tahitians who, as Dunmore points out, may well have decided 
shrewdly that providing women and food would speed any intruder along their way 
(Ibid. p. 49). 
Taking along a Tahitian, Ahu-toru, Bougainville then travelled due west and sailed 
through what is now Vanuatu, an archipelago already identified in 1606 by the 
Spaniard Quiros, who had labelled them the Great Cyclades. Travelling on, 
Bougainville encountered reefs east of the northern tip of Australia, only narrowly 
missing discovering the Great South Land, the kind of fateful intervention which was 
often to dog the French in future Pacific discovery. He later took possession of the 
island that to this day bears his name, now within Papua New Guinea. Travelling 
through the East Indies and across to He De France (Mauritius) Bougainville returned 
to France in 1769. In the Parisian salons, Ahu-toru was to become a motif for the 
Rousseauist idea of the Noble Savage, his native islands the new Cythera. 
Geostrategists in London and Paris were to see Tahiti as an important logistical staging 
post in the Pacific quest (Ibid. p. 58). 
On the heels of Bougainville, in June 1769, Jean-Fran^ois-Marie de Surville set off into 
the Pacific from India in search of a "Davis Land", an apparent el dorado reputedly 
discovered in 1687 by the British buccaneer William Davis, west of Peru, which the 
British were thought to have rediscovered. (Dunmore has made a convincing case that 
the rumours of British re-discovery stemmed from Samuel Wallis' voyage in 1768 
when he landed at Tahiti, and French corruption of "Wallis" into "Davis", Ibid, p.67.) 
De Surville landed in the Solomon Islands and gave landmarks the French names they 
possess today - Port Praslin and Choiseul Island. With an ailing crew de Surville 
headed for friendlier climes but fate again played a part and he missed what is now 
Vanuatu and New Caledonia. Sailing south he came within a very short distance of the 
coast of New South Wales, but veered to the east, reaching the shores of northwest 
New Zealand, and eventually anchoring in a bay (Doubtless Bay at the northern tip of 
New Zealand). De Surville and James Cook in fact reached northern New Zealand at 
the same time and missed each other by only a few miles, a fate which was to be 
repeated by the English and French two decades later at Botany Bay. Heading east, 
with a debilitated crew, de Surville abandoned his search and landed in Peru (Ibid, pp 
69-73; see also de Surville, translated by Dunmore 1981). 
There followed two voyages by Kerguelen in 1771 and 1773 where he discovered the 
Kerguelen Islands near Antarctica. He planted a bottled note of possession, thinking 
they were the great southern land which he named Southern France. Kerguelen 
remains a French possession, and uninhabited, although scientists work there. His co-
captain Fran9ois de Saint-Allouam landed at Cape Leeuwin in Western Australia in 
1772. 
The next great French expedition to the southern ocean, that by Jean-Francois Galoup 
de la Perouse, was as grand and epochal as that of Bougainville (see La Perouse 1832). 
It too was led by an aristocrat in pursuit of the glory of the fatherland, who was on a 
mission of scientific discovery - but not possession, as La Perouse believed Europeans 
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had no right to claim lands where inhabitants had worked and buried their ancestors 
(Dunmore 1977 p. 93). After Captain James Cook's discoveries in 1770, there had 
been a hiatus in British exploration of the Pacific as it was preoccupied with the 
revolution in its North American colonies. In 1785 Louis XVI commissioned La 
Perouse to undertake a global voyage of scientific discovery, and spared no expense in 
equipping him and his team for the journey. Louis XVI took a close personal interest 
in the voyage. He was passionately interested in the sciences and the most eminent 
French scientists and cartographers of the day were included. La Perouse's terms of 
reference were focused on discovery, both in the south Atlantic and south Indian 
Oceans, the northern Pacific from Alaska and the Russian coast, down to the south-
west Pacific. The expedition had international support, the British, Spanish, Dutch and 
Russian governments all having agreed to help if necessary around the globe. It is 
worth noting that desphe warring back home, the British and French cooperated in 
guaranteeing free passes to each other's scientific voyages (Ibid. p. 117), a paradoxical 
pattern to characterize their future relationship in the region. 
La Perouse in the Boiissole and commander Paul-Antoine Fleuriot de Langle in the 
Astrolabe left Brest in 1785. They sailed south, around Cape Horn and northward to 
Easter Island, confirming that mythical Drake's Land and Davis Land did not exist. La 
Perouse stopped at the Hawaiian Islands and proceeded up to Northern America from 
where he descended down the western North American coast, charting the geography 
along the way. From Monterey in California he travelled due west, through the 
Marianas and the Philippines to Macao and the southern coast of China. He ascended 
up the coast past the Korean peninsula as far as Kamchatka. Here, La Perouse 
fortuitously sent a messenger, Barthelemy de Lesseps, overland to Paris (no small feat 
in itself) with letters and his journals; and received new instructions from the King to 
proceed south to New South Wales to report on British settlement plans there. 
The expedition landed in the Samoan group, where de Langle and other crew were 
killed in a battle with the indigenous people. After stopping in the northern Tongas and 
passing Norfolk Island, La Perouse proceeded to the Australian coast. 
First French-British-Australian contacts in the South Pacific: cooperation 
and rivalry 
On 23 January 1788, Le Perouse landed in Botany Bay, near the English fleet which 
was anchored there. La Perouse's journal noted that an English boat approached his 
ship, captained by Philip King, since Arthur Philip was away preparing for the fleet to 
move up to a more suitable site for settlement at Port Jackson. Despite La Perouse's 
evident mission, to report on their activities, relations with the British were amicable 
and cooperative. They undertook to send French papers and letters back to France. La 
Perouse spent 45 days in Botany Bay, and buih replacement small boats for those lost 
in Samoa. 
In this time, La Perouse's chaplain, ie Pere Receveur, died and was buried ashore at 
Frenchman's Bay now in the Sydney suburb of La Perouse. He was the first French 
person to be buried in Australia. 
Mystery disappearance 
The French fleet under La Perouse left Botany Bay on 10 March, 1788. They were due 
to travel to Tonga and then double back towards New Caledonia, already discovered by 
Cook in 1774 but not fully mapped, before venturing north, through the Torres Strait 
and back to France via He de France (Mauritius). But they were never seen again. 
La Perouse's voyage and disappearance was a cause celebre in France, which was by 
that time in the throes of the fomenting Revolution. A flurry of search expeditions 
were proposed, some of which failed, including one by Aristide-Aubert Dupetit-
Thouars. Such was Louis XVl's attachment to the venture that his last words before 
the guillotine fell in 1793 were reported to have been a question about the whereabouts 
of La Perouse. 
While revolutionary events in France impeded further expeditions, determination to 
find out what happened to La Perouse resulted in a voyage in 1791 by Bruny 
d'Entrecasteaux, also accompanied by eminent scientists (see Horner 1996 p. 5). He 
succeeded in travelling from Cape Town across the southern Indian Ocean and southern 
part of Australia, and then to the Isle of Pines in the New Caledonia archipelago in 
1792, to the Solomon Islands, west past Papua New Guinea to the Dutch East Indies, 
and then back to circumnavigate Australia once more, this time to follow La Perouse's 
planned route from Botany Bay. He passed by Vanikoro in 1793, where La Perouse 
was later known to have been shipwrecked (Homer 1996 p. 166) (and it is possible that 
survivors could have seen his ships go by). He traced his way back to the Solomons 
and again west to Papua New Guinea, perfecting maps along the way. But it was a 
blighted expedition. Leaders d'Entrecasteaux and Kermadec, and second in charge 
d'Auribeau all died before arriving in the East Indies. Their research papers ended up 
in British hands after capture in the Atlantic, to be returned to France only after the 
intervention of Sir Joseph Banks (Ibid. Ch. 16), an outcome to be paralleled years later 
relating to research by Baudin (see below). 
It was France's fate to be gazumped by the British once more as it was an Englishman, 
Peter Dillon, who finally established what had happened to La Perouse. The story is 
once again one of adventure and rivalry (set out in detail, with poetic licence, in 
Guillou 2000). Dillon was a trader who had taken a German, his Fijian wife and an 
Indian, from Fiji to the Solomons island ofTikopia in 1813. Visiting them in 1826, he 
saw that the Indian had a European silver sword-hilt he had obtained from natives in 
neighbouring Vanikoro. Vanikoro elders spoke of two ships having been wrecked off 
Vanikoro in their youth, with at least two survivors. Dillon was unable to land at 
Vanikoro owing to the weather. Returning to India, he sought to establish the 
legitimacy of the claims. The origin of the sword-hilt was confirmed by none other 
than de Lesseps. La Perouse's emissary who had left the expedition in Kamchatka to 
return to Europe. 
Dillon returned to Tikopia and landed at Vanikoro in 1827, and a French obser\ er, 
Eugene Chaigneau, accompanied him. He heard that there had been four surv ivors but 
two had subsequently been killed. Of the remaining two, one had reportedly sur\ ived 
for about three years, and the other had lived with one of the Chiefs. Dillon located 
many artifacts from the wreck, including nails, scissors, porcelain, metal objects, some 
inscribed with a fleiir de lys, symbol of the French monarchy, and even a silver 
chandelier with the coat of arms of La Perouse's botanist. Collignon (Guillou 2000 pp. 
99-100). One native was using a thermometer as a nose-bone. Dillon took the relics to 
Sydney where they formed a sensational exhibition reported in the Sydney Gazette in 
December 1827; and later in Calcutta, London and Paris (Ibid. p. 119). 
Dillon was a colourfiil character. He had acquired a mixed reputation after an 
ahercation with his ship's doctor in Hobart on his return voyage to Vanikoro, which 
had led to his arrest by Governor George Arthur and his officers, alienated British 
authorities and evidently discouraged French explorer Dumont d'Urv ille, who was in 
the area, from too close contact with him. Dillon struggled even to receive his 
promised salary from British authorities on his return to London, but was feted and 
rewarded by the French. 
Other explorers had sought what Dillon had found, the answer to the La Perouse 
puzzle. These included George Bass. Matthew Flinders, Louis de Freycinet. Louis 
Duperrey and Dumont d'Urville. The latter learned of Dillon's discoveries in Hobart in 
1826 and proceeded to Vanikoro in early 1828, finding more artifacts and seeing the 
wreck sites where, Dunmore tells us, "cannons and cannon balls could cleariy be seen 
on the bottom at a depth of ten to fifteen feet" (Dunmore 1997 p. 108). 
The fate of the La Perouse expedition and its aftermath are emblematic of the dangers, 
risks, mystery and adventure that characterized and motivated European exploration at 
the time, and demonstrate as well the unusual mix of rivalry and unity of individual 
French and British explorers in pursuing goals in the region. 
The French exploratory presence in the Pacific diminished in the late 18*^  century and 
eariy 19'*' century with the preoccupations of the Revolution and its aftermath. The 
British remained active, and British-French rivalry intensified. 
Having left France before the Revolutionary Wars had begun, the eponymous Etienne 
Marchand, a French trader, landed at the Marquesas Islands in 1791 and claimed 
possession, hi fact he had been preceded by an American, Joseph Ingraham. only 
months before. The British made similar claims in the north of the archipelago in early 
1792. Marchand's most significant achievement was the fastest circumnavigation of 
the globe (in 20 months) and proving that France could be an efficient commercial 
competitor. 
The scientifically-minded Nicolas Baudin, accompanied by 22 scientists, was 
commissioned in 1798 to circumnavigate Australia to establish whether it was two 
separate islands, by the French Minister for the Marine who believed "a great nation 
must engage in great undertakings" (Minister Fleurieu cited in Dunmore 1997 p. 117; 
see also Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 55; and University of Sydney, Baudin 
Legacy Project website). But Baudin was still in the northwest of Australia when 
Matthew Flinders got to the south before him. He travelled to Tasmania to check on 
British settlement activity and was plotting from there the southern coast of Australia, 
travelling west, when he ran into Flinders doing the same thing from the other 
direction, at what is now known as Encounter Bay - yet another example of fortuitous, 
amicable, but tardy French interaction with the British. The British were watchful: they 
implanted a flag at King Island under the nose of Baudin, who was encamped nearby, 
out of concern that the French might settle Tasmania; and it is arguable that they 
established a settlement at Port Philip (later Melbourne) in 1803 from concern at the 
French presence (see Homer 1987, Dunmore 1997 p. 123). 
Baudin died before returning to France. He had sent back earlier one of his ships with 
much of the expedition's research, which was captured by the British in the English 
Channel and only released through the intervention of Sir Joseph Banks in a remarkable 
repetition of La Perouse's experience. But British unease remained, and indeed was 
heightened by Peron's journal of the voyage, using French names instead of British 
geographical labels (Australia was ''Terre Napoleon"). French patriotism, and 
nostalgia, was poignantly evident in the description of a meal shared with Peron and his 
fellow scientist Freycinet by Tasmanian Aborigines, when the Frenchmen stood up and 
sang the Marseillaise (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 55; Plomley 1983/ As if to 
underline their position as second-comer, free French access to Australia from the west 
ceased with Britain's taking of lie de France in 1810, particularly after Napoleon's 
defeat at Waterloo in 1815. 
In summary, France's exploration of the Pacific in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries was characterized by scientific interest, the patronage of the King and 
government, a strong sense of national mission, a complex cooperative yet rival 
relationship with the British who repeatedly beat them to the punch, and remarkable 
displays of courage and humanity in the face of loss of life, illness and disappointment. 
European politics and domestic preoccupations in France shaped the timing and naUire 
of French exploration. The French made an invaluable contribution to scientific 
knowledge and especially in mapping the new lands at this time. While there were 
private, commercial ventures, notably at the end of the seventeenth century, and a 
century later, by Marchand, the main motivation was national prestige. This sense of 
national honour was only sharpened by the dominance of the British both in Europe and 
in the new Pacific lands into the early nineteenth century. 
Nineteenth Century: consolidating a regional presence: rivalry and 
ambiguity 
France consolidated its presence in the Pacific in the nineteenth century. Its 
motivations were to establish supply points for its navy; to protect its nationals, mainly 
missionaries; and to assert sovereignty over its settlements, including a penal settlement 
in New Caledonia. There were commercial interests but these were secondary. 
France's pursuit of these interests was characterized by an overriding pattern of 
ambiguities, often arising from political circumstances back home. It was one of the 
first to establish settlements and claim sovereignty over them, yet once again it also lost 
out to the British and Americans on numerous occasions. Its overall approach was one 
of determined power and ambition, yet combined with hesitation and short-term vision 
(see Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 62). 
Early in the century, and mainly when the restored monarchy was in place, the 
eighteenth century tradition of scientific discovery continued to drive French 
expeditions.'^ But these were followed by ventures with more political objectives. 
By the late 1840s, France had established consular representatives in Australia to 
safeguard its interests there, which comprised mainly looking after a small immigrant 
French community and providing intelligence for Paris (Aldrich 1990 p. 201). 
Defending the missionary presence 
France's experience in establishing a foothold in the Pacific in the early nineteenth 
century was a mixed one. It was driven principally by its need to protect the interests 
of its nationals who were Catholic missionaries. Common challenges in the various 
French missionary settlements were first, securing good relations with the locals; and 
second, securing a place in the face of competing activity by non-Catholic European 
missionaries who had usually arrived there first and were overwhelmingly British, 
raising related political rivalries. 
European missionaries had been present in the Pacific since the earliest days of 
exploration, with a Spanish missionary presence in both Americas. As early as 1625 
there was a Congregation of the Missions in Paris. A Societe des Missions Etrangeres 
(Foreign Missionary Society) was formed in 1663, but was unresponsive to efforts by 
the Catholic priest Jean Paulmier de Courtonne, a descendant of Essomeric, the native 
of the southern lands brought back to France by de Gonneville in 1503, to send an 
evangelizing mission to the land of his forebears, since no one knew precisely where 
that land was (Dunmore 1997 p. 126). 
The disruptions of the French Revolution to the stams of the French clergy impeded 
efforts to evangelize overseas which meant they were relatively late arrivals, and 
resented by others already there. These tended to be British or American Protestants. 
The London Missionary Society was set up in 1795 and sent representatives to Tahiti, 
Tonga and the Marquesas in 1796. The LMS had an agent in New South Wales and 
missions in New Zealand. American groups arrived in Hawaii and archipelagos to the 
east. 
These included expedit ions by Freycinet (1817-20) , Duperrey (1822-25) . Bougainvi l le ' s son (1824-
26), and La Place (1829-31). 
" Including by Dumont dX' rv i l le (1826-29 and 1837-40), de Vaillant (1836) and Abel Dupet i t -Thouars , 
(1836-40 and 1842-43), whose uncle had failed in his ef for ts to search for La Perouse (Chesneau.x and 
Maclellan 1992 pp. 56-57) 
It was in Hawaii that the French first undertook religious activity, when the chaplain 
aboard Freycinet's ship Uranie baptized the Chief Minister Kalanimoku at his request 
in 1819 (Dunmore 1997 p. 127). As a group of American Congregationalists arrived 
soon after, a local French resident, Jean-Baptiste Rives, urged the Paris Foreign 
Missionary Seminary to send French Catholic missionaries in 1824. The Sacred Heart 
"Picpus" fathers (named after their Paris address) sent six missionaries to Honolulu in 
1827, but they were not welcomed by Queen Kaahumanu, who had been converted by 
the Americans. She expelled two of the priests, and sought to do the same when 
another arrived in 1835. The French captain de Vaillant, in Honolulu during his 
Pacific voyage, was able to secure a rescinding of this expulsion order. When two 
more missionaries arrived in 1837, they were again expelled. Despite efforts by 
visiting French captain Dupetit-Thouars, this time the expulsion stuck. Captain Cyrille 
Laplace visited in 1839 and was able to negotiate freedom of religion for Catholics, 
along with trade rights equal to those of the British and Americans. The Picpus fathers 
returned in strength, one of whom was Father Damien, known for his work with lepers. 
Such was the influence of the French that their consul was appointed Finance Minister 
in Hawaii in 1863 and then Foreign Minister. However, a provisional government took 
power in 1893 and demanded American annexation. 
The Pritchard affair 
The French were to experience similar contention when French Catholic missionaries 
arrived elsewhere, particularly in what is now French Polynesia, where the Protestant 
London Missionary Society (LMS) had preceded them. The experience has come to be 
known as the Pritchard affair, after the LMS representative in Tahiti at the time. Rev. 
George Pritchard. (Pritchard's account of the events has been edited by Paul de 
Deckker, see de Deckker 1983; see also Newbury 1980 and Faivre 1953.) 
Two Picpus priests. Fathers Caret and Laval, arrived in the Gambier archipelago (part 
of future French Polynesia) in 1834, to a cold reception by the LMS, who subsequently 
withdrew from there. Father Laval went on to establish a highly effective ministry. In 
1836 the fathers landed at Tahiti, where the LMS had been established since 1797. The 
priests courted Queen Pomare to the ire of the LMS representative there, Rev. George 
Pritchard, who secured their expulsion by the Queen back to the Gambiers. Pritchard 
was subsequently appointed British Consul, confirming French fears that the British 
were using religious differences to oust them from the Pacific. The American Consul, a 
Belgian called Moerenhout, sympathetic to the French, informed a visiting French 
bishop about the priests' expulsion. Other French nationals (a carpenter and pearl 
fishermen) were also prohibited from landing in Tahiti. 
In response, the French commissioned Dupetit-Thouars when he landed in Tahiti in 
1838 to "assert the status of France as a nation 'which has the means and the will to 
ensure that its citizens everywhere are respected' " (the captain's instructions, cited by 
Dunmore 1997 p 136). Dupetit-Thouars then undertook some complex diplomacy to 
secure a positive result for France. He first offered Pritchard and Moerenhout asylum 
aboard his ship should hostilities break out. He then sought a letter of apology from 
Queen Pomare to King Louis-Philippe for her treatment of French citizens, monetary 
compensation and a gun salute to the French flag. The Queen accepted, blaming 
Pritchard for the problems. In the end, in a wonderful sign of the way things would 
evermore be done in the French Pacific, Pritchard had to come up with the cash 
compensation himself and Dupetit-Thouars himself supplied the gunpowder for the gun 
salute, as the Queen did not have these resources. Moerenhout was appointed French 
Consul, having lost his American appointment after Pritchard had complained to 
Washington. Dupetit-Thouars subsequently negotiated a favoured-nation trade 
agreement for France similar to that by Laplace in Hawaii. And thus French honour 
was preserved. 
But not for long. After Dupetit-Thouars' departure a prohibition order was issued 
against Catholic preaching and Laplace once again came to the rescue, in 1839, 
negotiating a freedom of religion clause. Resentments between the British-led 
Protestants and the French Catholic fathers persisted. Dupetit-Thouars returned to 
Tahiti in 1842 to reinforce French rights, this time requiring the signing of a document 
placing Tahiti under French protection (Dunmore 1997 p. 139). 
The underlying rivalry and bitterness with the British symbolized in the Pritchard affair 
remained a sore with the French for years, as subsequent history, to be addressed in the 
next chapters, will show (and see, for example, the injunction of the French National 
Assembly President to "turn the page once and for all on the Pritchard affair", 
Assemblee Nationak hearings on France and the Pacific States 1996). 
In the Marquesas, years of unsuccessful efforts by non-Catholic missionaries in various 
islands from 1797 ended in 1838 with a successfiil implantation of Picpus missionaries 
at Tahuata, negotiated, again by the resourceful Dupetit-Thouars (Dunmore 1997 p. 
140). In Tonga, the Wesleyans had been active from 1822 and resisted French Marist 
attempts to settle in 1837. In 1842 a Marist priest. Father Chevron, was able to preach 
there but the mission suffered repeated attacks from 1847 until Chevron obtained an 
edict allowing freedom for Catholics to practice their religion in 1861. Despite similar 
difficulties, by mid-century. Catholic missions were established in Fiji (from 1844), 
Samoa (from 1845), New Hebrides (from 1848) and New Caledonia (from 1843). In 
many cases the intervention of officials and visiting French ships was necessary to 
protect the missionary presence. 
The establishment of a French presence in New Caledonia was difficult. A formal 
agreement was signed by the Melanesians, accepting French sovereignty, soon after the 
arrival of the Marist missionaries at Balade in the north, on 1 January 1844. But the 
settlement was abandoned in 1847 until 1851 after attacks by the Melanesians 
(recounted in Delbos 2000 Chapter 1). Later missionaries survived only after France's 
declaration of possession of the archipelago in 1853, and further contact by French 
ships. 
Eariier attempts by the LMS to establish a foothold in New Caledonia in 1840 and 1841 
did not succeed. LMS' Samoan teachers refused to land on Grande Terre, the main 
island, because of the ferocity of the locals; and the Isle of Pines settlement in 1841 was 
troubled. The Society was more successful in establishing a presence in the Loyalty 
Islands from 1841, providing a further complication for the French in later years. 
In New Zealand, in 1832, English missionaries had resisted possible French influence 
with the arrival of Laplace and other French explorers; and a Wesleyan group had 
unsuccessfully sought to oust French priests. Marist Bishop Pompallier arrived in 1838 
to find Protestant missionary societies ensconced, but met little overt opposition mainly 
because of the size and disparate leadership of the islands (Dunmore 1997 p. 142). 
Despite the Bishop's strong influence in the north, where he conducted himself as a de 
facto government (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 58), the signing of the Treaty of 
Waitangi in 1840 ensured British political dominance. The French had been gazumped 
by the British again. 
The Marists were more successful in establishing ascendancy over the British in the 
islands of Wallis (named after the British adventurer Samuel Wallis) and Futuna in 
1837. But nonetheless they too met a brutal reaction from the local inhabitants. Their 
Father Peter Chanel was to become the first Roman Catholic Pacific martyr, and later, 
saint, in 1841, at the hands of the King whose son he had converted. Remorse for this 
act was to see the entire population convert, which strengthened France's political 
influence there. 
French Marists were to have much less success in the Solomons, where they tried to 
settle in various locations from 1845 but had given up by 1855. They did not even 
attempt a presence in Papua New Guinea until 1881, on Thursday Island; and 1885, at 
Yule Island near Port Moresby, although they were in constant dispute with the British 
including through the Governor of Queensland who in 1896 referred the differences to 
London and Rome. 
The pattern of these experiences explains much about perceptions and contributions of 
the French in the Pacific in the first half of the nineteenth century. Overridingly, the 
Catholic religion soon came to be identified with French interests, and Protestantism 
with British or at least, in French eyes, Anglo-Saxon interests. While France succeeded 
in establishing its own presence in some settlements (French Polynesia, New Caledonia 
and Wallis and Futuna), it lost out in other places (Hawaii, New Zealand, for a time in 
French Polynesia, PNG), in most cases to the British. The religious animosities and 
resentments on both sides underlie the emotion often attaching to French perceptions of 
Anglo-Saxons in the Pacific, and vice versa, persisting until this day. The assertion of a 
political interest in order to protect its nationals became a deep-seated rationale for its 
presence, and one which, it will be seen, has also persisted into the twenty- first 
century. 
Colonization 
French acts of possession in the South Pacific were thus not unalloyed assertions of 
empire. France at the time was indeed motivated by national pride, a mission to bring 
what was seen as "civilization" or religion to the rest of the world and to protect its own 
nationals, and by the special status that an imperialist power might claim in the world 
so that it might rank with other rival powers (Dunmore 1997 p. 179). And despite the 
difficulties of establishing and supporting the missionary presence in the face of rivals, 
France was the first to establish possession, thirty years in advance of other empire-
builders (1842 in Tahiti, 1853 New Caledonia, 1858 Clipperton, and 1886 Wallis and 
Futuna; compared for example to Britain in Fiji 1874, Tonga 1885 and Solomons 1890; 
Germany in New Guinea 1885 and Samoa 1899; the US in Hawaii 1898 and Samoa 
1899; in Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 59). France was also seen by other 
colonizing powers as a force to fear and to counter. However, France had also 
encountered failure along the way. Its failures can be attributed variously to greater 
strength of its rivals, and simple poor timing arising from preoccupations back home, 
but also, as will be seen, to indecision and hesitation. There were also fewer population 
pressures in France at this time (as opposed to elsewhere in Europe, see Dunmore 1997 
p. 179), and France was engaged elsewhere (including Algeria), reducing the urgent 
practical need for it to set up settlements in the Pacific. 
Chesneaux and Maclellan argue that in fact French losses were greater than their wins. 
They were beaten to the punch by the British in Tasmania as has been seen; they failed 
in Hawaii owing to the greater strength on the ground of the British and the Americans; 
and they failed to consolidate their foothold in New Zealand which Britain claimed 
first, despite France's considerable missionary, whaling and settler presence and 
frequent ship visits. The French navy intervened on numerous occasions in Fiji, Tonga 
and Samoa to support Marist missionaries, without asserting their presence, and indeed 
a suggestion of a French protectorate in Tonga was never realized. Proposals for 
French protectorates, sought by French advisors and missionaries in the Easter Islands 
in 1885, and in the north of the Cook Islands, in 1888, both failed largely because of 
indecision back in Paris, perhaps informed by hesitancy about the relative lack of remrn 
for such distant engagement (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 61). 
Indecision, competing interests and preoccupations, and half-heartedness in the capital 
also dictated the French approach to the possessions they did establish. Working 
against French expansion in the Pacific were the extreme and constant political 
instability and changes of government in the motherland for most of the century 
(certainly 1815-80); the continual priority of European politics; the importance of 
colonial undertakings in Africa and Indo-China; the reticence of authorities towards 
Catholic missionaries towards the end of the century; and the relative weakness of 
French commercial activity in the region (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p 62). 
Even where France did establish sovereignty, it did so only progressively and often 
after bartering with Germany and Britain: a Germany which successfully established its 
commercial enterprises from Apia to Fiji through to the Carolinas from 1857; and a 
Britain lobbied by its own colonies in Australia and New Zealand to entrench itself 
more deeply in the region. Just as European power relationships dictated the pace of 
French action in the Pacific when it was a Spanish Lake, so the political chessboard in 
Europe affected the pattern of French annexations in the Pacific. 
In what is now French Polynesia, while the Marquesas were annexed in 1842, Tahiti 
remained a protectorate until 1880, Paris not confirming a declaration by Commander 
Dupetit-Thouars in 1842 in the wake of the Pritchard affair, which also had engaged 
American interests. The Gambiers were only annexed in 1881. French sovereignty in 
the Leeward Islands was set aside by agreement with the British in 1847, challenged by 
the Germans in 1879, proclaimed in 1880, and recognized internationally over Bora 
Bora, Huahine and Raiatea only in 1888. Of the Australs, France formally annexed 
Rapa only in 1888, Remataru in 1900 and Ruratu in 1901, to avoid difficulties with 
Britain (for the same reasons France held back on annexing the Cooks and Easter 
Islands, in the end losing out to Britain and Chile respectively) (Dunmore 1997 pp. 
203-4). 
The New Hebrides remained an arena of French-British rivalry well into the twentieth 
century. 
In New Caledonia, France's initial hoisting of the tricolore when first landing 
missionaries in 1843 was speedily negated by the capital, wary of putting the British 
further offside after the strains of the Pritchard affair in Tahiti. Official annexation of 
the main island, Grande Terre, occurred only in 1853, and effective control of the 
Loyalty Islands, where the London Missionary Society was active, by 1865. 
French Polynesia 
The progressive French annexation of what was to become, in 1880 with the 
appropriation of Tahiti, the Elablisseinents frangais d'Oceanic (French Pacific 
Establishments, EFO), was not only the subject of international negotiation referred to 
above, but also of internal resistance. 
From the early years of the nineteenth century France had come to see Tahiti 
strategically, as an important staging post for its navy (based in South America), and a 
shipping stopping-off point for what it hoped would be profitable trade, over and above 
the romanticized image it perpetuated, particularly once the long-planned Panama 
Canal was constructed. French whalers responded to Government subsidies after 1819. 
In 1816 French marine lieutenant Camille de Roquefeuil on a voyage around the 
Pacific bought sandalwood in the Marquesas, noting that "In order to keep up a good 
understanding, it had been necessary to admit some young girls, who had expressed a 
desire to become acquainted with our people" (quoted in Dunmore 1997 p. 155). But 
such a warm welcome was not to last. 
In the Marquesas, initial resistance by chiefs lotete (1842) and Pakoko (1845) extended 
into guerilla activity leading to French military intervention in 1870 and 1880 
(Toullelan 1990, Dening 1980). The population fell from 60,000 in 1840 to 3,500 in 
1902 (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 70). In Tahiti, Queen Pomare IV only 
reluctantly signed the French protectorate agreement in 1842 and led resistance from 
1844, her forces reoccupying Tahiti in 1846. Tahiti's population had also suffered 
from new diseases and bloody conflict, falling from 70,000 in the 1770s to 10,000 in 
1842 (Dunmore 1997 p. 181). Events in Tahiti had been complicated by the timing of 
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decisions back in Europe, with Britain agreeing in 1842 to the French protectorate, 
notwithstanding lobbying against it by their inveterate Consul, Pritchard, leading to 
French Parliamentary ratification of the plan in January 1843. Rebellions occurred in 
the Tuamotu group, on Anaa in 1852 and the Australes at Rapa in 1887. The Leewards 
war was to last ten years from 1888 to 1897 in response to French annexation attempts 
at Huahine, Bora Bora and Raitea. It took three warships and a force of a thousand 
men to bring the hostilities to an end. Underlying much of this resistance was the 
protestant allegiance and identity of the people, some of whom looked to the British to 
take the place of the French. 
By the early twentieth century, France had consolidated its position. From 1885 the 
administration consisted of a Governor, and an elected General Council of 18 members, 
ten from Tahiti and Moorea, two from Marquesas, four from Tuamotus, one from 
Gamblers and one from the Australs and Rapa. Electors were French citizens. 
France's control was complete to the point of local inertia. The population rose in 
Tahiti from 6,400 in 1881 to 11,682 in 1902, albeit with very few (around 1,000) 
immigrants from France (Dunmore 1997 p. 206). The attention of the colonial power 
was only mobilized when major events occurred which, once again, engaged broader 
national interest emanating from European political developments. Examples include a 
German raid against Papeete in 1914, the departure of a Tahitian battalion for World 
War 1, and differences with Mexico over the annexation of Clipperton (for which the 
King of Italy, of all possibilities, was appointed arbiter in 1931, and who confirmed the 
French position) (Chesneaux and Macleilan 1992 p. 71). 
One area of continuing vexation throughout the latter nineteenth century was land 
ownership. Polynesian practice entailed individual usage of land, within a collective 
lineage ownership. Protestant missionaries had enshrined these principles in the 
Poinare Code of 1842, which were directly contrary to the Napoleonic principles of 
individual ownership. In 1863 France established an Agricultural Fund to do a land 
survey, enabling land transfers to planters and agricultural producers (Europeans, 
Chinese, or locals). While Europeans were not numerous (600 in Tahiti and Moorea, 
in a total population of around 6,000), one resident official, Gauthier de la Richerie, 
asserted in 1862 that sooner or later all the lands would be assigned to whites through 
fraudulent practices such as trading land for liquor (Chesneaux and Macleilan 1992 pp. 
72-73). European (overwhelmingly male) marriage into land-owning indigenous 
families further boosted the de facto European land transfer, leading to an influential 
class of '•'demis\ or mixed-blood people (see Panoff 1989). Chesneaux and Macleilan 
noted that, while less direct than the cantonment and reservations of New Caledonia, 
the alienation of land from the indigenous people was no less real, and effective, in 
French Polynesia (Op cit p. 73). With Pomare's signing of the Annexation Treaty in 
1880, the High Court oversaw land transfers until around 1935 when it ceased 
apparently by general indifference perhaps as memories of the bloodshed of the early 
nineteenth century dissipated. 
But French development plans in the EFO stalled. Its projects for large-scale 
productive plantations of cotton, sugar and coffee failed. The most profitable exports 
were copra, vanilla and mother-of-pearl, ironically produced by small-scale locals but 
controlled by the big French trading houses. By the end of the century oranges were 
also being exported to California and Australia. Phosphate was mined on Makatea 
Island from 1907. But dreams of Tahiti as a strategic commercial stopping point were 
foiled, when, once again, French prestige was usurped over the construction of the 
long-awaited Panama Canal. A private French venture in the late nineteenth century to 
build the canal was led by Ferdinand de Lesseps (nephew of La Perouse's erstwhile 
emissary, Barthelemy de Lesseps) but failed. To rub salt into the French wound, a later 
venture by an American company succeeded (Heffer 1995 p. 148-152). The Canal's 
opening, in 1914, meant effective US control of the eastern access to the South Pacific. 
In any case, less traffic was generated through Papeete than the French had expected, 
and shipping was dominated by the British. 
Perhaps because of its strategic location in the centre of the Pacific, the EFO 
maintained links with its Pacific neighbours, Hawaii, the Cook Islands and even 
California. English was spoken as much as French as late as 1888 (when Robert Louis 
Stevenson visited) (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 pp.74-75). 
The EFO were drawn into World War I. 1088 Polynesians fought for France, and 205 
lost their lives. A German ship surreptitiously helping itself to phosphate on Makatea 
was captured by the French warship, the Zelee, at the beginning of the war. In 
September 1914 two German cruisers appeared off Papeete and shelled the town, 
sinking the Zelee, before sailing away. Another German vessel went aground in 
Maupihaa, west of Tahiti in 1917. 
European interest in visiting the EFO, hitherto confined to prominent individuals such 
as Paul Gauguin, Matisse, and Robert Louis Stevenson, grew after the first World War 
and was actively promoted from 1924. A colonial exhibition in Paris in 1931 
heightened awareness of the colonies. The making of films {Tahou in 1928, Mutiny on 
the Bounty in 1934) perpetuated the romantic Polynesian myth, and boosted interest in 
tourism. 
New Caledonia 
The French claim to New Caledonia, like that of French Polynesia, was characterized 
by difficulties with the British, and by internal resistance. In January 1843, Dupetit-
Thouars dispatched Commander Julien Lafferriere to raise the French flag, and 
establish Bishop Guillaume Douarre and his missionaries at Balade, in the northeast of 
Grande Terre, New Caledonia's largest island. Aldrich (1990 p. 24) noted that a 
cession of land was concluded with local chieftains, but that "this did not effectively 
constitute a claim".'"' But strains with the British over the Pritchard affair in Tahiti led 
the powerful new French Minister for the Navy, Guizot, architect of the new entente 
cordiale with the British back home, to recall Dupetit-Thouars and to have the flag at 
A view not shared by all. In March 2009, Kanak leader Roch Wamytan referred to the January 1844 
treaty with the customary chiefs as the basis for French nationality, not the later declaration of possession 
of 1853. Personal communicat ion, 2009. 
Balade lowered. In any case Douarre and his missionaries were forced to desert 
Balade within twelve months owing to hostility from the local people. 
The motivation for the eventual declaration by Rear-Admiral Febvrier-Despointes of 
French possession of New Caledonia, at Balade, on 24 September in 1853, was 
twofold: the establishment of a strategic base and penal settlement in the western 
Pacific; and forestalling British annexation (Aldrich 1990 pp. 24-26, Dunmore 1997 p. 
188), and indeed, a British hydrographic vessel was in waters off Isle of Pines at the 
time. By this time, France and Britain were allies in the Crimean War and there was 
no negative British reaction. Within a few days of the Febvrier-Despointes 
announcement, the chief of the Isle of Pines declared allegiance to France. Effective 
control over the Loyalty Islands only came later, Mare and Lifou in 1864 and Ouvea in 
1865 (Aldrich 1990 p. 26). A settlement was established by Captain Tardy de 
Montravel in 1854, at a harbour called Port-de-France (which became Noumea inl866). 
As in the EFO, from where New Caledonia was administered until 1860, colonization 
was a slow process, and met significant local resistance. Only 100 white settlers were in 
New Caledonia by 1860, mainly French but also British. The first Governor of New 
Caledonia, Admiral Charles Guillain, oversaw the introduction of convicts (from 1864 
when 250 arrived) and left his mark in the penitentiary building on the He Nou (now, 
with reclamation, attached to the main island), the hospital, wharves, and Amedee 
lighthouse which exist today. In the process there were a number of violent uprisings 
by the local people, particularly over surveying of land to create concessions (Dunmore 
1997 pp. 189-90). 
The settlement was a penal colony from 1864 to 1897. It hosted 25,000 convicts in that 
time, as well as 4,526 deported members of the Paris Commune (the communards) after 
their 1871 uprising against the French government in the aftermath of the Franco-
Prussian War, and over 1,000 Algerian Kabyle insurrectionists in 1871. hi 1880 there 
was an amnesty for political prisoners under which most of them left, only around 140 
choosing to stay. 
As convicts served their time and were freed with a grant of land, and as large French 
companies such as Ballande of Bordeaux were given land on the Grande Terre (main 
island), while the indigenous Kanaks were pushed towards the north and centre, 
indigenous discontent increased. Ownership rights were alien to Kanak concepts of 
land as a tribal home. An effective policy of cantonment of the Kanaks, relegating 
them to reserves, was introduced in 1876. By 1878 tensions erupted in a rebellion led 
by Chef AttaT, sparked by the encroachment on indigenous lands by European-owned 
cattle. The rebellion focused on settlements at La Foa, Bourail and Bouloupari on the 
western coast north of Noumea. Two hundred settlers and twelve hundred Kanaks 
(some engaged in intra-tribal battles) were killed, including Attai himself (see 
Leenhardt 1937, Latham 1978, Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 pp. 63-64, Dunmore 
1997 p. 212). 
Immigration from the motherland was promoted, especially by the active Governor 
Feillet (1894-1903). Several large families and numerous small-holders established 
themselves, to be known as "broussards" (bush dwellers). Feillet's long governorship 
was an aberration. He was succeeded by nine Governors or temporary occupants from 
1903 to 1914, in constant rotations dubbed the valse des gonverneiirs (Aldrich 1990 p. 
314). By 1913 Kanaks were relegated to 120,000 hectares, or 7-8% of the surface of 
the main island, with the Europeans in the bush owning or renting three times more 
land with a population five or six times less (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 66). As 
in the EFO, successive attempts were made at large-scale cultivation of rice, maize, 
coffee and sugar, with little success. The Kanaks succeeded with small-scale coffee 
production in the 1930s. Cattle-raising too was successful, and both persist until today. 
In 1874, French engineer Joseph Gamier discovered nickel on Grande Terre. By 1877 
a processing plant was established at Pointe Chaleix in Noumea, and in 1880, the 
Societe le Nickel (SLN), was set up by John Higginson funded by Baron Rothschild. 
The foundry was not successful at the time, in the face of new technical expertise and 
competition from Canada (Lawrey 1982). Ballande, a businessman from Bordeaux, set 
up the Hauts-Foiirneaux de Noumea in 1909. He established a foundry at Doniambo 
just outside Noumea, in 1910, and another at Thio in 1912 (Jeffrey 2006, and 
www.sln.nc. accessed 21 October 2008). Ballande and SLN merged in 1931. 
Besides Higginson and Ballande, other big names included Bemheim (who endowed a 
private library, which is still operating), Marchand, and Barrau (Aldrich 1990, p. 148). 
SLN and the large French importers dominated the economic life of the colony in the 
early twentieth century. Many smaller mines were established creating wealth for a 
few families, including the Pentecosts and Lafleurs (Ibid. p. 118) who remain 
dominant to this day. By the turn of the century New Caledonia was the world's largest 
exporter of nickel and cobalt and second largest producer of chrome. 
Not all of the leading figures were French. Higginson was originally Irish and came 
from Australia, though became French. James Paddon, a British trader from Australia, 
was a founding business trader in the colony from 1854. In the middle of the 
nineteenth century, English was more understood than French amongst the Kanaks, 
largely because of the work of the London Missionary Society. The first census in 
1860 showed that the majority of the 432 Europeans were Anglo-Saxons (Chesneaux 
and Maclellan 1992 p. 68). The Australian influence in the livestock sector has left 
words such as "station", "stockman", "stockwhip" and "store", in current usage by the 
French in the bush even today. 
A consultative General Council {Conseil general) was created in 1885 but was 
comprised solely of whites from the bush or Noumea. From 1887 the indigenat system 
was introduced, and applied until 1946, institutionalizing discrimination between the 
Europeans and Kanaks. Kanaks were forbidden to leave their reserves without 
permission, had to pay a per head tax, and were required to provide labour for road and 
other public works. Leaders called "Chiefs" and "Lesser Chiefs" were appointed by the 
French administration and were tasked with providing workers for the settlers or the 
mine (Ibid, pp.65-66). 
Development differed between the main island, Grande Terre, and the Loyalty Islands 
and Isle of Pines which were predominantly Kanak and Protestant, and where no 
alienation of Kanak land had been allowed. The English-speaking LMS was replaced 
from 1891 by evangelical missions from Paris and the Bible was translated into local 
languages from 1922. An active French Protestant pastor and ethnologist, Maurice 
Leenhardt, took a great interest in the Kanaks, at times in conflict with the French 
administration (Ibid. p. 67). 
As in the EFO, it took major events such as the 1878 uprising and the First World War 
for the metropolitan power to take much notice of New Caledonia. Three battalions of 
indigenous infantry-men fought for France in World War I (1,107 Melanesians and 
1,006 Europeans fought in Europe, including at Gallipoli, of whom 456 were killed). It 
was Melanesian involvement in fighting for France that contributed to a further Kanak 
revoh in 1917 by Grand Chef Noel. Waddell (2008 p. 38) attributed the rebellion to a 
reaction against the colonial drive to recruit "volunteers" for the European war. 
Chesneaux and Maclellan suggested that it was French losses in the war, with the 
knowledge that France could be defeated, that contributed to Noel's revolt (1992 p. 67). 
In the event the rebellion was easily controlled. Those Melanesians who had served in 
WWI were able to become French citizens, although this did not entail the right to vote 
(complete suffrage in New Caledonia was not attained until 1956, see Gohin 2002, 
point 16; and Chapter 2). In 1935 they were being included on all civil registers. 
Between the wars New Caledonia reverted to its colonial torpor (John Lawrey quoted 
novelist Pierre Benoit who visited Noumea in 1928 and described it as "A small town 
so deeply asleep that it seems dead" 1982 p. 7). It was enlivened by the arrival of an 
effective Governor, Georges Guyon, from 1925 to 1929, who developed infrastructure 
and education, doubling those who attended school by 1939 to over 7,000, of whom 
3,117 were Kanaks (Dunmore 1997 p. 223). 
The success of nickel production fluctuated in line with the vagaries of world demand, 
as it does today. The 1929 depression affected nickel prices and disrupted construction 
of a planned railway, which ceased after the first stage was completed from Noumea to 
Paita nearby in the north. But despite the depression, nickel and chrome production 
increased until the eve of Worid War II. In 1939 nickel production reached 370,500 
tonnes (over eight times production in 1925), and chrome 52,388 tonnes. Since Japan 
was a major customer, production was temporarily disrupted in the early 1940s. 
With vacillating fortunes, the import of foreign labour, necessary to work the mines, 
also fluctuated. Indonesian, Japanese and Vietnamese workers were brought in to work 
on the mines eariy in the century. By 1929 they numbered 14,535, more than European 
residents at the time (Ward in Spencer 1988 p. 82). Many left when their contracts 
expired but by 1931 more than 7,000 Asians were in New Caledonia out of a total 
population of 57,300 (Aldrich 1990 p. 286 and ISEE 2008; Table la Chapter 5). 
With the growth in prosperity punctuated by the Depression, a call for autonomy and 
dominion status was made in 1932, interestingly by a European resident, Edmond 
Cave, a member of the General Council, but did not gather momentum (Aldrich 1990 p. 
314). Dunmore (1997 p. 223) noted that this call reflected the growing identification 
with New Caledonia as opposed to France, by those Europeans who were bom there 
(12,600 of a total European population of 17,400 in 1936). The Melanesian population 
by this time was stabilizing rather than declining. At the turn of the century, the entire 
population numbered around 50,000, and was mainly rural, with only 7,000 living in 
Noumea. The numbers of Kanaks dropped from about 45,000 in 1860 to 27,100 in the 
1920s, and rose again to around 30,000 in 1940 (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p.66, 
Barban9on in De Deckker and Faberon 2008 p. 120; Aldrich 1990 p. 286; Lawrey p. 9; 
and Table la in Chapter 5). 
In contrast to the EFO, in the nineteenth century, New Caledonia with its dependence 
on French shipping and market for its nickel, its internal preoccupation with its role as a 
penal settlement, and with its near neighbour the large Anglo-Saxon continent of 
Australia, had few links within its South Pacific islands neighbourhood. These were 
limited to summary links between its Melanesians and those in the nearby New 
Hebrides islands, and contacts between French residents in each place. 
Wallis and Futuna 
Franco-British rivalry and indecision were features of French annexation of Wallis and 
Futuna. French missionaries had arrived in the islands from the 1830s. France did not 
respond to local requests for protectorate status in the 1840s, nor in the 1860s. The 
Queen of Wallis, Amelie, supported the French missionaries, and efforts by British 
evangelists to establish a presence were abandoned. France finally established a 
protectorate in 1886 in Wallis, and in Futuna in 1887, and then only in response to 
apparent efforts by the British to cultivate Amelie by inviting her to Fiji. But France 
only formalized annexation arrangements in 1913. 
The strongly traditional focus of the islands, and their overwhelming response to 
Catholicism, meant that France did not need to exert much colonial effort to administer 
its colony there. Rather a pattern developed of synchrony between the few colonial 
administrators present, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, and monarchs of the three 
traditional kingdoms, which persists today (see Aldrich and Merle 1997, Cadeot 2003, 
Centre for Contemporary Pacific 2003, Faberon and Ziller 2007, de Deckker in Howe 
1994 p. 269). 
New Hebrides 
France's administration of the New Hebrides was shaped by the complex British-
French relationship, yet more indecision, and a liberal amount of innovation. 
Similar to the situation in Wallis and Futuna, France repeatedly declined several 
appeals for a French protectorate over the New Hebrides islands proposed by the Irish 
trader John Higginson from 1875. The French presence consisted primarily of 
missionaries and large-scale planters. Britain and France, in the face of heavy lobbying 
by their interest groups concerned about eventual dominance by the other, agreed in 
1886 to set up a Joint Naval Commission to administer the archipelago from 1888. 
Having no civil law to back them up, the two French and two British officers, who 
comprised the Commission in its early years, were largely ineffectual. Their 
Commission evolved into a Condominium of the New Hebrides in 1906, to administer 
a joint protectorate. 
The Condominium arrangement was a creative solution at the time to accommodate the 
flagging imperial aims of both parties, who were working increasingly together back 
home to meet the growing German imperialist threat (Dunmore 1997 p. 198). The 
system involved ingeniously duplicative arrangements: two sets of administrators each 
responsible for their own citizens; two languages; two forms of Christianity; three sets 
of laws applicable respectively to the indigenous people, French and British settlers; 
two educational systems; two police systems; two sets of currencies and systems of 
weights and measures. Although at times the British and French Commissioners did not 
speak to one another, and differences were addressed by a mixed tribunal whose head 
at one time was a Spanish count who was deaf (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 76), 
it proved remarkably effective over 80 years and was one of the first examples of 
experimental forms of government in the Pacific. 
It must be said that because the Commissions in practice administered their own 
nationalities (the French, their planters, the British, primarily missionaries), the 
numbers involved were minuscule. Chesneaux and Maclellan note that the British 
population was only 55 (compared to the French population of 151) in 1897, 228 (401) 
in 1906, and 298 (566) in 1910 (1992 p. 77), although by 1939 the French population 
was ten times bigger than the British and centred on the island of Santo. Needless to 
say, with the Commissioners responsible for their own nationalities, the administration 
of the Melanesians took a very low second place. 
But ironically given the unique Condominium arrangement, it is in the New Hebrides 
that Anglo-French ambiguities of rivalry and cooperation were most acutely evident. 
France took its influence and protection of nationals responsibilities far more seriously 
than did Britain, using land claims of French nationals to create the grounds for an 
eventual takeover, and employing French nationals wherever possible, even in lowly 
positions. Despite, or perhaps because of, these efforts, British influence became more 
widespread (Henningham 1992 pp. 26-27). Because most planters were French, land 
disputes arising from different indigenous concepts of land ownership added to anti-
French tensions amongst the local people. Although the dual, parallel nature of the 
condominium set-up arose from different concepts of the state, at times of catastrophe 
(for example, the 1913 eruption of the Ambrym volcano) the administrations worked 
well together (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 77). In an interesting example of 
cooperation on the ground, after the 1929 depression, the French state subsidized the 
price of copra to aid its planters, but the British did not, and often local British residents 
channelled their goods through a compliant French neighbour (Ibid. p.78). Until the 
1960s, the condominium arrangement worked reasonably well and land issues between 
the French and the local people had receded (Henningham op. ch. p. 28). 
Conclusion 
France's activities in the Pacific from the very earliest days were motivated by national 
prestige, a quest for scientific knowledge, and religious proselytization. Rivalry with 
other European powers, mainly the British, and the experience of repeatedly being 
usurped by other powers in the region, sharpened France's sense of national assertion. 
Commercial activity came consistently second to nationalist objectives. Domestic 
political challenges and alliances at home in Europe, which were complex, and at times 
explosive, demanded primary policy attention and shaped the pace and energy with 
which France established its footholds in the Pacific. Increasingly, France became 
aware of the strategic importance of its Pacific colonies, particularly the EFO and New 
Caledonia, in serving its national purpose. 
Hallmarks of the French presence included, at times, extraordinary leadership, courage, 
and sense of style in its commanders as much as its early privateers; in general, 
sophistication and deft diplomacy in a context of international rivalries; a commitment 
to personal hardship and sacrifice for national honour; but only sporadic application, in 
the Pacific, of the highly-developed national sense of brotherhood, freedom and 
equality which evolved in the home country from the late 1700s; a determination to 
suppress local opposition, backed by military strength; and, by the beginning of World 
War II, an element of administrative inertia even as innovative solutions, for example 
in New Hebrides, were being implemented. 
Chapter 2 
World War II and its legacy 
"La fin de la guerre est aussi la fin de I'Empire colonial"? 
("The end of the war is also the end of the colonial Empire", Faberon and Ziller 2007 p. 
348, my questionmark) 
The Second World War challenged the political and economic role of the French in the 
Pacific as it did elsewhere. The rapid defeat of the French government in Paris and the 
participation of citizens from the Pacific overseas territories in combat in Europe 
(including the "Guitarist" battalion, 387 Kanaks and 318 Tahitians and New Hebrides 
locals, of whom a third died, Daly, 2002) traumatized the French and local 
communities in the Pacific, underlining the vulnerability of their French administrators. 
Closer to home, the Pacific theatre itself, where other powers were the main 
protagonists, introduced a violence and destruction of a scale unparalleled in the history 
of the local people. At the same time, the massive influx of American forces stationed 
at bases throughout the Pacific, but particularly in the French territories, exposed the 
local people to an ahemative administrative influence, with relatively larger national 
and personal wealth than their French rulers, and new practices of economic and racial 
egalitarianism. It was the war and its aftermath which catalysed local independence 
movements in the region, including in the French territories. For Australia, one by-
product of the Pacific War was greater awareness of the Pacific island region and its 
relevance to Australian security. The wartime experience initiated a habit of regional 
consultation and cooperation. 
New Caledonia 
In New Caledonia the early days of World War II saw fine examples of Anglo-French 
regional teamship in adversity, reflecting similar cooperation for survival in Europe. 
Australia, whose foreign policy until then had been essentially subordinate to that of 
Britain (Evans and Grant 1991 refer to Australian "foreign policy subservience" at the 
time, p. 19), was to take a central role in what was one of its first independent foreign 
policy decisions (argued in Fisher 2010c). This experience markedly changed 
Australia's view of the French and New Caledonia, just as it did its view of the United 
States and Great Britain, as the young federation acted on the geographic realities of its 
national security. 
Australian perceptions of their French neighbours in New Caledonia and New Hebrides 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were generally not warm. The 
declaration of French annexation in 1853 had been coldly received in Australia. The 
Sydney Morning Herald of 2 November 1853 lamented that "by the laxity of the British 
government...the opportunity of colonizing that fine group [had] been lost" {Sydney 
Morning Herald 1853). Australia had consistently pressed London to colonize, with 
the more extreme advocates arguing for British hegemony in the southwest pacific and 
the ouster of the Germans and French from the area (Dunmore 1997 p. 195). Australia 
was particularly opposed to calls (interestingly, by an Irish Australian, the trader 
Higginson) for French annexation of the New Hebrides which many saw as within 
Australia's sphere (Dunmore 1997 p. 199 and Aldrich 1990 p. 224). By the late 
nineteenth century views on New Caledonia were shaped by the feeling, curious for a 
country itself built by convicts, that a loathsome penal settlement operated in the 
neighbourhood just as Australia had ridded itself of this curse, expressed in concerns 
that escaped convicts would make their way onto Australia's fair shores (Aldrich 1990 
p. 225). 
Australian perceptions of a menacing France were reciprocated. There was a French 
perception that Australia wanted to displace the French in New Caledonia to conserve 
its economic interests (Pons 1988 p. 156). Against their own value systems, some 
French people, even officials, had a disdain for Australians typified in the report of one 
French diplomat who in 1936 described Australians as lacking taste, having never 
"seen a fine piece of furniture, a beautiful painting, a truly elegant woman, ...[nor] 
eaten a decent meal. In the things that interest us, the Australian public is uneducated 
and uneducable" (Aldrich 1990 p. 309). (This was reflected in the title of the 
memoires of the wife of one French Consul, the Comtesse de Chabrillan, ''Deuil au 
bout du monde' or "Mourning in the back of beyond". Chabrillan 1877.) But despite 
all the acrimony in the Australian press, as Lawrey indicated, "Australasian colonists... 
never seriously questioned the permanency of French sovereignty over New Caledonia" 
(Lawrey 1982 p. 18). This belief was shaken temporarily when France fell to the Nazis 
in 1940. 
Australia's role in installing the Free French Governor 
When Paris fell in June 1940, the French Governor in New Caledonia, Georges 
Pelicier, was a senior colonial civil servant who, like many of his peers, saw Noumea as 
a brief career stepping-stone and had not engaged in the society he administered. When 
a central government was set up at Vichy, he was in a most difficult position as to 
whose interest he was to serve. Some of the Caldoches (or long-term European 
residents) sought to benefit from the situation to secure more local control. A local 
lawyer, Michel Verges, promulgated a manifesto seeking a sovereign assembly to take 
over the Governor's powers, and was promptly arrested. Pelicier's own Secretary-
General, Andre Bayardelle, seemed to agree with Verges, noting that the colony was 
too much subjected to the Ministry of Colonies "whose initiatives were frequently 
untimely and cancelled out the best efforts of governors to organize the colony" (cited 
in Lawrey 1982 p. 8). At one point, a leftwing local representative called for New 
Caledonia to be placed under joint Australian-American protection (Burchett 1941 p. 
197). 
After a few weeks of judicious dithering, during which Pelicier even announced that 
New Caledonia would continue to fight at the side of Great Britain (Burchett 1941 p. 
196), on 29 July, responding to pressure from Petain, Pelicier gazetted Vichy's 
constitutional laws (although he resisted pressure to cut off relations with Britain and 
New Caledonia's principal supplier. Australia. Lawrey 1982 p. 28 and Munholland 
2005 p. 38). Many Caldoches angrily demonstrated against these laws. In the event, 
while the General Council unanimously adopted a resolution calling for a 
representative assembly, it added its disapproval of the Governor, and its resolve to 
contact General de Gaulle. In his declining days at the helm Pelicier called for the 
Vichy government to send a warship to Noumea, and the Dumont d'Urville arrived 
from Papeete in late August, captained by a confirmed Vichy supporter. Commander 
Toussaint de Quievrecourt. De Quievrecourt immediately reported to Vichy that the 
local agitators were subsidized by Australia, whose real aim was to annex New 
Caledonia (Lawrey 1982 p. 31). On 5 September, the vacillating Pelicier, after 
suffering a bomb attack at his residence and the mounting anger of the masses, quietly 
slunk out of town with his family, in the early hours, in the words of journalist Wilfred 
Burchett, wrapped warmly against the morning cold, "a peaked cap pulled down over 
his eyes" as the group was conveyed by launch to a Pan American Airways clipper 
(Burchett 1941 p. 205). His post was taken over by the Commander of local French 
forces, Maurice Denis. 
Meanwhile, de Gaulle, then an exiled French military officer struggling to put together 
an alternative government in the wake of the German invasion and collapse of French 
resistance, moved into action. In an early indicator of his strategic vision of the role 
and importance of the French overseas possessions which was to characterize France's 
approach through many of the post-WWII years, he made his famous 18 June appel, or 
call for the support of the Empire. As Munholland noted, "Beginning as an improvised 
coalition of those who...chose to continue to fight at the side of Great Britain, the Free 
French under de Gaulle's leadership became a political movement devoted to a defence 
of the French Empire from its perceived enemies and served as a Gaullist instrument 
for the recovery of French grandeur, prestige, and influence after the humiliation of 
1940" (Munholland 1986 p. 547). 
As such, the ralliement, or winning-over, of the overseas territories had great symbolic 
value. It also had real value, in the need, which De Gaulle also saw, to neutralize, 
early, potential Vichy colonial and naval power overseas (Gorman 1997 and Floyd 
2007 p. 10). Martin Thomas, in his military history of the ralliement in the empire, 
argued that "Control of the French empire was vital to the competing French 
leaderships of 1940-44, since the empire was a physical embodiment of what limited 
independence remained to the Vichy regime" (Thomas 1998 p. 5). 
De Gaulle moved early to secure the support of the New Caledonia outpost to shore up 
his fledgling leadership. He asked the British to assist him to replace Pelicier with a 
pro-de Gaulle figure. The person he had in mind was Henri Sautot, a small man with a 
ginger moustache affectionately known as "Pommes-paille"' ("Straw-potatoes"), who 
was French resident commissioner in nearby New Hebrides. There, he had rallied the 
local French population speedily to the Gaullist cause. He had also worked with 
Australia to build a strategically-important flying-boat base at Vila. 
Australian involvement in the installation of de Gaulle's man, Sautot, was vital. At this 
time, its foreign policy institution was in a fledgling state. Since its formation at 
Federation in 1901, the Department of External Affairs had been subsumed into the 
Prime Minister's Department from World War 1 and only re-established as a separate 
entity in 1935 (Cleland 2008 pp. 164-171). Although Prime Minister Menzies had 
signalled in early 1939 that Australia had its own primary responsibilities and needed 
its own diplomatic sources in the Pacific (Menzies 1939), in practice Australia had 
established diplomatic representation in only three places by mid-1940, in London, 
Washington and Ottawa (the latter two only established as full missions from February 
and March 1940 respectively, Foreign Affairs and Trade 2000). 
To this point, at least from the armistice in June 1940, Australia had not been a 
disinterested bystander. On 18 June, the War Cabinet had discussed events in New 
Caledonia, discussions marked by concern that the Japanese presence in New 
Caledonia, associated with its ongoing purchase of nickel, posed a threat to Australian 
security, particularly with the Australian navy having left for the Mediterranean. This 
appears to be the first discussion of events in New Caledonia by the Australian Cabinet 
(War Cabinet Minute 18 June 1940, No 399 DFAT Historical Documents or HD). 
There was a broader concern about Japanese intentions in the Dutch East Indies (now 
Indonesia), Indo-China, and Hong Kong (Cable Bruce to Menzies 19 June 1940 
Document No 408 DFAT HD). The Department of External Affairs identified early 
that, of all the French possessions overseas, including Indo-China, it was most 
concerned about New Caledonia. It counseled caution, and the continuing support for 
the Bordeaux (later Vichy) government, unless an effective resistance could be 
organized (Memo for Minister 26 June 1940 Document No 440 DFAT HD). One of 
the early options Canberra considered, if only briefly, was an Australian takeover of 
New Caledonia (and then the New Hebrides), to forestall Japan, an option considered 
unattractive as it could provide a precedent for Japan to do the same in the Dutch East 
Indies (Cable to UK Secretary for Dominion Affairs 18 June 1940 Document No 400 
DFAT HD). 
Immediately after the armistice, Australia (along with New Zealand) had sent a 
message of sympathy to Governor Pelicier. Pelicier responded by stating "our firm 
resolve to co-operate with the French community throughout the whole world for the 
liberation of France, for which it has decided to continue the struggle by the side of the 
British Empire", and seeking supplies from Australia (Cables Menzies to Pelicier 24 
and 26 June 1940 Documents No 427and 439 DFAT HD). 
Australia drew its concerns about the vulnerabilities of the French Pacific islands to the 
attention of Britain and the United States. London responded by expressing concern at 
Japanese nickel purchases from New Caledonia, and suggesting Australia send a 
representative to Noumea (Cable Bruce to Menzies 25 June 1940 Document No 438 
DFAT HD). Washington was not responsive (Cable Casey to Menzies 28 June 1940 
Document No 464 DFAT HD). On its own initiative, Australia negotiated with the 
director of France's nickel producer, the Societe le Nickel, to purchase nickel matte, in 
July 1940, in order to encourage the colony to cease exporting to its major purchaser, 
Japan, with the primary aim of heading off on-shipment to Germany. This act was 
described by Lawrey as "a matter of enlightened self-interest", since Australia had no 
need of nickel supplies and was acting solely to maintain a market for New Caledonia 
and keep it in the "allied orbit" (Lawrey 1982 pp 25-26). But the action was later to 
backfire when the locals (incorrectly, as it turned out) accused Australia of acting 
unfairly as a middle-man. 
Australia continued to be concerned about the potential for the Japanese to benefit from 
the situation. It had sent an Australian, Oughton, to negotiate the purchase of chrome 
from New Caledonia, similarly to ensure a market for the territory's chrome alternative 
to Japan. Oughton, among others, reported that the Governor was showing exaggerated 
respect for the Japanese Consul, granting a license for the sale of nickel to Japan (Cable 
to Bruce 13 August 1940 Document No 70 DFAT HD, Munholland 2005 p. 41). 
In July, the Australian Government decided to appoint an Official Representative to 
Noumea, posting Bertram C. Ballard in the position. Ballard was a French-speaking 
lawyer who had been based in Vila from 1934. He was tasked to keep the Australian 
Government "fully informed on political and economic conditions in New Caledonia" 
and assess the attitudes of "officials, the General Council, and Caledonians" towards 
both Vichy and General de Gaulle's movemenf (Instructions to Ballard, undated 
Document No 45 DFAT HD). Ballard's office in Noumea became Australia's fourth 
diplomatic mission overseas, preceding its first mission in Paris by five years, the latter 
being established in June 1945. 
Responding to a request from de Gaulle, and because the area fell under the auspices of 
the Australian Naval Station, the British asked Australia to make available the HMAS 
Adelaide to install Sautot. Having just dispatched Ballard, Australia took its time to 
respond. The situation was complex, as one of Ballard's reports showed. He described 
the atmospherics of a dinner party with both the outgoing Pelicier, the incoming Denis 
and the visiting Fiji-based British High Commissioner for the Pacific, as "scarcely-
restrained hysteria" (Lawrey 1982 p. 38). Wilfred Burchett. then a free-lance journalist 
but later to become one of Australia's well-known war correspondents, referred to the 
"glacial frigidity" of this dinner and the "Gilbertian" situation at Government House in 
a book he wrote about New Caledonia in the lead-up to the War (Burchett 1941 p. 204). 
Canberra continued to bide its time. The Australian govermnent did not want the 
French administering power to be overwhelmed by protesting Caldoches with the 
possibility of Australia being asked to fill the breach, and the potential for 
misinterpretation and consequence elsewhere, notably French Indo-China (Cable to 
Ballard 29 August 1940, Document No 83, DFAT HD; see also Daly p. 3). Thus 
Australia was concerned to ensure a working French administration in New Caledonia. 
There were also signs that the British were not fully aware of the complexities of the 
simation on the ground (see Fisher 2010c p. 27). In the event, Canberra took a decision 
to act only after Ballard assessed that a complaisant Vichy Governor was not likely and 
that the people would "welcome and follow" a Governor appointed by de Gaulle (Cable 
from Ballard 8 September 1940 Document No 110 DFAT HD). 
Australia's hesitation to agree to London's request was perhaps one of the first 
indications that the Australian government, evaluating its own, as distinct from British, 
interests, saw advantage in a stable French-administered allied entity on its eastern 
flank (Fisher 2010c). 
An aged Australian naval vessel, HMAS Adelaide, duly escorted a Norwegian ship, the 
Norden, with Sautot aboard, consistent with de Gaulle's characteristic instructions that 
the operation was to be conducted as a French operation with merely contingent 
support from the Adelaide. In the early hours of the morning of 19 September, 1940, 
the vessels approached the southern passage through the reef near Noumea. They were 
awaiting the agreed signal that it was safe to transfer Sautot to Noumea. This involved 
the quaint arrangement that the Gaullist boat to receive him off the main beach, Anse 
Vata, would throw overboard two kerosene tins when 300 metres from the Norden, and 
two more when 200 metres away (Sautot 1949 p. 39; Lawrey 1982 p. 44). Meanwhile, 
despite all attempts at secrecy, Sautot's planned arrival was well known in New 
Caledonia. Sautot himself explained, unsurprisedly, that one of the Gaullist Committee 
had confided the information to his mistress who, although a loyal Gaullist herself, 
could not restrain herself from spreading the information (Sautot 1949 p. 42). Ashore, 
the French broussards, or rural Caldoches, had descended on the capital from their 
stations and towns in the bush, to welcome the new Governor. Denis, after a pitiful 
show of indecision during which he twice dissolved into uncontrolled sobbing, finally 
escaped the crowd through a back window at Government House, uhimately to be 
detained in the village of La Foa (Burchett 1941 pp. 212-213). 
In the event, the two vessels lumbered into Noumea harbour to see the Dumont 
d'Urville moored with guns trained fore and aft. It was later discovered that shore 
batteries had been given orders to open fire on the Adelaide, orders which were not 
carried out (Lawrey 1982 p. 46). At this point the Adelaide's, commander, H.A. 
Showers, cast diplomacy to the winds and transferred Sautot from the Norden onto his 
vessel, and the Norden set sail back out through the harbour. Members of the Gaullist 
Committee approached in their boat, gave the kerosene tin signal, and took delivery of 
Governor Sautot. The Adelaide continued to patrol, wary of the Dumont d'Urville, 
whose captain showed prudent restraint, especially since some of the broussards in the 
capital were fully enjoying their victory in the streets. There were also reports that a 
second Vichy vessel, the Amiral Charner, was on its way from Indo-China to Noumea. 
The following day, de Quievrecourt formally protested the Adelaide's presence and 
threatened a showdown. With both Showers and the Vichy captain referring time-
consumingly to their capitals, tensions persisted for several days. But Showers 
initiated a personal meeting with the French captain and negotiated the departure of 
Vichy-sympathizing officials on a merchant vessel, and the Dumont d'Urville's 
departure, for Saigon. In view of this, the Vichy government ordered the Amiral 
Charner, en route to Noumea, back to Saigon. 
Showers' diplomacy was not complete. Back in Noumea one Gaullist element had 
cornered the senior French civil servant, Secretary-General Bayardelle, and forced him 
onto the Vichy merchant vessel. The complexities were such that Bayardelle, not in the 
end a Vichyite, is recorded as telling Sautot at this time that within a very short time the 
British would be running New Caledonia (Lawrey 1982 p. 52). To head off further 
mob activity undermining his hard-won negotiations with de Quievrecourt, Showers 
secured Sautot's agreement for him, Showers, to address the Gaullist committee 
directly, and explain the terms of his gentleman's agreement with the Vichy captain. 
After \hQ Adelaide departure, the Australian government extended economic aid and 
cooperation pursuant to an agreement between Churchill and de Gaulle in August 1940. 
But this activity was fraught with difficulties and frictions, as locals grumbled about 
Australian delays. At one point. Free French accusations that Australia was abusing its 
position as middle-man in purchasing nickel (the device constructed to assist New 
Caledonia while preventing nickel purchase by the Germans) were being made 
surreptitiously to London at the same time as the Australian War Cabinet was resolving 
to exercise "a generous spirif in assisting New Caledonia in its economic problems 
(Lawrey 1982 p. 68). These kinds of differences, imbued with emotion and potential 
for misunderstanding, were to characterize future dealings between New Caledonia and 
Australia in the latter half of the century. 
Australian cooperation in providing reconnaissance, training and demolition 
expertise 
Australia played another role in New Caledonia at this time. While the Free French 
government had been established in Noumea, a not inconsiderable achievement 
especially in view of de Gaulle's failure to do so elsewhere (Indo-China, Madagascar, 
the Levant, the French Antilles, all of North Africa and Djibouti, see Thomas 1998 p. 
1), the Australian government knew the new neighbouring regime was fragile as 
Australia prepared for Japan's entry into the war. In February 1941 an Australian 
military mission visited New Caledonia. It recommended setting up an advanced 
operational air base there, to "contribute materially to the defence of Australia in the 
event of war with Japan"(Lawrey 1982 p. 55), supplying two six-inch coast defence 
guns for Noumea and arms, and ammunition and equipment for local forces. The War 
Cabinet meeting, which approved these recommendations, exceptionally included a 
French officer, sent by Sautot, whose task appears to have been, in true Gaullist 
tradition, to assure the Australians that the Free French were in effective control in 
order to head off RAAF control of any air base established in New Caledonia (Ibid. p. 
56). It was curious that Australian Prime Minister Menzies met de Gaulle in London to 
secure agreement to these arrangements only in March, some weeks after the mission 
had arrived in Noumea. So it is not surprising that writers at the time (Ibid. p. 64) 
record some continuing suspicion on de Gaulle's part about Australian activities. For 
all his efforts, Sautot was to pay a heavy price for his cooperation with Australia and, 
later, the Americans (see below). 
These activities were a measure of the strength of Australia's concern to shore up New-
Caledonia. The Army Minister, P.C. Spender, even pronounced that, economically. 
New Caledonia should be regarded as "part of Australia"; and, for the purpose of 
granting export licences, should be "treated on the same basis as an Australian State or 
Territory insofar as purchases from Australia are concerned" (see Lawrey 1982 p. 56). 
A flying-boat base was duly established on the He Nou with a small RAAF detachment, 
two guns were installed on Ouen Toro hill in Noumea (where they remain today), and a 
small artillery detachment remained to train local troops in using them (Smith 2001). 
Australia provided shipping and support for the French Pacific Battalion which, with its 
Tahiti contingent, sailed for the Middle East in May 1941. The RAAF surveyed and 
began construction of three landing fields, at Tontouta (which is now the international 
airport), Plaine des Gaiacs in the north, and Koumac on the northern tip of the main 
island, Grande Terre. And from December 1941 to July 1942 an Australian company 
led by D.G. Matheson was sent to New Caledonia to prepare for guerilla activity and if 
necessary deny the enemy useful assets such as nickel mines including if necessary by 
demolition. They were based in Bourail, north of Noumea (Garland 1997 Ch.2). They 
trained local Home Guards including Melanesians, (of whom they spoke very highly in 
their reports) and later, US infantrymen (see Appendix in Lawrey 1982 p. 123-4). 
Matheson was later killed in the Pacific war. 
Australian soldiers thereafter were primarily active elsewhere in the Pacific and in 
Europe, while the Americans and New Zealanders worked out of New Caledonia. 
De Gaulle's reflexive policy approach, imbued with suspicion about British (and for his 
followers in Noumea, Australian) designs on France's colonial empire and informed by 
the prevalence of the Vichy regime in many colonial capitals (see Thomas 1998), was 
to centralize his authority. He had already imposed controls relating to national pride, 
such as that Australian aircraft were to be employed only subject to local French 
approval and the numbers and roles of resident Australian personnel were to be limited, 
leading to a feeling in Australia that his attitude saw "ingratitude becoming a duty" 
(Lawrey 1982 op. cit. pp. 58-59). An instruction soon came to Canberra from London 
that all dealings with Sautot that would have previously been referred to Paris should be 
referred to de Gaulle's headquarters in London, not simply as a safeguard for Sautot but 
to underline to Australia, which London saw as diplomatically inexperienced, not to 
take advantage of the situation to arrogate to itself more political control in Oceania 
(Ibid. p. 62). 
It is interesting that what led London to impute "diplomatic inexperience" to its former 
colony was in fact the latter's asserting its own interests and assessments at the time, 
perhaps more a mark of diplomatic coming of age. Australia's measured and calculated 
diplomatic activity from its early watchfulness over the nickel market with Japan, its 
establishment of its own Representative in Noumea, its role in ensconcing Sautot, and 
its follow-up military shoring up of New Caledonia's defences in its own interests, as 
distinct from that of the mother country Britain, were all the more impressive in that it 
all took place well before the fall of Singapore and Pearl Harbour. 
Effect on Australian-French-New Caledonian links and embryonic Australian 
diplomacy 
The development of Australian-French-New Caledonian relations at the beginning of 
the war set the pace for future relations and perceptions, notably the suspicions and 
counter-suspicions of future years. While some Australians had called for British 
hegemony in the Pacific to protect Australian security interests many years before, it 
was only at this time that Australia for the first time appreciated the strategic 
importance of effective French administration of its near neighbour. New Caledonia, as 
a direct element in its own security (this strategic significance and consequence for 
policy is enunciated by Burchett at the time, p. 218 e/ seq). Australia's constant 
evaluation of its own, as opposed to British, interests, throughout these uncertain days 
was a critical developmental step. The pre-eminence of British interests for Australia 
until then was no doubt weighted against the fact that the United States at this stage had 
not entered the war and still had not recognized the deGaulle government even by the 
time General Patch arrived in Noumea in 1942. The Australian government's 
establishment of one of its first diplomatic missions (only its fourth office anywhere 
overseas) in Noumea in August 1940, five years before it was to establish a mission in 
Paris, reflected the significance of having its own links with New Caledonia, and the 
latter's important role in the development of Australian diplomacy and foreign policy in 
their earliest years. Australia's experience of its dealings with New Caledonia at the 
time, with its complex layers of formal links to central French headquarters (at this time 
in London but later Paris), to Noumea, and on the ground with local Caldoches and 
Kanaks, and its relations with Tahiti on a secondary level, was to leave an indelible 
imprint on Australian policy-making circles (see Fisher 2010c p. 31). It represented 
one of Australia's first involvements in regional multi-lateral cooperation, with Britain, 
France, the United States, and New Zealand, which was to build into the formal 
institution of the South Pacific Commission (later called Secretariat for the Pacific 
Community) based in Noumea. From this point, Australia's relationship with France in 
the Pacific, particulariy New Caledonia, would be run from Canberra, and not from 
London. 
The Sautot episode and the Australian advance defence mission are also important as 
they boosted the image of Australia in the eyes of many of the resident population, 
building on the identification the European residents were beginning to show towards 
their own New Caledonian interests in their own region with their own geographic 
neighbour. 
Finally, the installation of the Free French government in New Caledonia represented 
one of the first successful "rallyings" of French colonies to the Free France cause. 
Whereas Martin Thomas argues that the various responses by France's other colonies to 
de Gaulle's call for support can be explained by a number of exogenous factors, the 
early response by the Pacific collectivities strengthened their status and place in the 
post-war Empire even if Australia's role in it was for the most part conveniently 
forgotten. So dealing with France over its Pacific territories became an eariy habit for 
Australia and its newfound post-war foreign affairs independence. 
US "invasion" 
But for the people of France's Pacific colonies, it was the American presence during 
the war that radically changed their expectations and way of life. Senior French 
officials in the eariy 2000s privately confided that it was the Americans during the War, 
not the French, who brought the French Pacific islands into modernity (Personal 
communication 2002). 
Americans in New Caledonia 
And the American presence in the French Pacific was not small. Noumea was the base 
of US operations in the South Pacific, and served with the New Hebrides air bases at 
Efate and Espiritu Santo as bastions of the US counter-offensive after the battles of the 
Coral Sea and Midway. 22,000 US personnel were based in New Caledonia, with 
2,600 on Wallis, 4,300 at an air base constructed in the New Hebrides and over 4,000 at 
a refuelling base at Bora Bora and a meteorological station at Raiatea in French 
Polynesia (Dunmore 1997 p. 234 and de Deckker 2003a p. 63). The US used the 
uninhabited French possession, Clipperton, as a meteorological and radio base (Aldrich 
1990 p. 30). 
The impact of the Americans in Noumea was huge. At one point in 1942, over 100,000 
American and New Zealand personnel were there. They outnumbered the population 
of New Caledonia at the time (60,000) and boosted the population of the main island, 
Grande Terre, by nearly 100% (Lawrey 1982 p. 98). Around 1 million US soldiers 
were said to have transitted there during the war (see Lawrey 1982 p. 98 and Le Borgne 
2005 p. 18). 
The Americans were arguably more respected than the French administration in the 
early war years, mainly owing to the dubious behaviour of a French High 
Commissioner appointed by de Gaulle. Governor Sautot's easy manner with the 
Americans and Australians had created concerns for French leaders, so far away in the 
formal European environment. De Gaulle appointed High Commissioner d'Argenlieu 
to keep Sautot's feet to the fire and ensure that France's sovereignty would be 
appropriately defended. D'Argenlieu was an entirely different character to Sautot. He 
was a former World War I naval officer who had become a Carmelite monk and headed 
the Paris Carmelite province until his mobilization in 1939. He proved to be zealous to 
the point of obstruction in asserting French rights, focusing on form rather than 
substance and at one point delaying construction of needed airfields by the allies. He 
also devoted his energies to ousting the much-loved Sautot, finally arresting him and 
sending him off to New Zealand, and then London, at a time when New Caledonia was 
under direct Japanese threat (Sautot 1949 p. 176). He promoted suggestions that Sautot 
supporters were Australian agents (Lawrey 1982 pp. 109-110). At the time both the 
Australian High Commissioner in London and the Prime Minister had been concerned 
at d'Argenlieu's appointment, since he "had no knowledge of the Pacific" and his 
colonial experience had been in the West Indies (cable from Bruce to Menzies, DFAT 
HD August 1941), the kind of background which was to create difficulties for French 
officials in the region forty years later. Munholland (2005) attributed to these 
experiences of rigid French policy adherence the seeds of future differences between 
France and the US after the war. Another observer from the time, Jean le Borgne, 
wrote of de Gaulle's misunderstanding of the humiliation of Sautot inflicted by 
d'Argenlieu (Le Borgne 2005 p. 18). Sautot's own account is a harrowing tale of 
devotion to a cause and deeply felt betrayal and misunderstanding (Sautot 1949). 
For their part, French concerns about American long-term designs were not entirely 
without foundation. The strategic importance of New Caledonia was made very clear 
early in the war. Anthony Eden referred to New Caledonia as a place of the highest 
strategic importance. Roosevelt, who was interested in the contribution New Caledonia 
could make as a US commercial aviation lay-over point in the South Pacific from 1935, 
repeatedly asserted in 1943 and 1944 that New Caledonia should not remain French 
after the war, but rather should be a trustee territory of the United Nations (Lawrey 
1982 p. 121; Weeks 1989 p. 189). The US Navy General Board, and a US Senator 
touring the region, noted the strategic importance of New Caledonia for the US and 
recommended cession by the French to the US (Munholland 2005, Weeks 1989 p. 191). 
By the end of the war a group of New Caledonians themselves proposed that the colony 
become American (Mrgudovic 2008 p. 74). However, there never was a coherent US 
strategy for the annexation of New Caledonia, and the US lost interest in New 
Caledonia at the end of the war (Weeks 1989 pp. 185 and 196). 
The local people responded warmly to the Americans' pragmatism and democratic 
values. In contrast to the French, who extracted free labour from the Kanaks under the 
indigenat scheme, the Americans paid local labourers. Notwithstanding segregation in 
the US Army, the behaviour of white and black GIs, as equals and at ease with each 
other, made an impression. The US military command favoured the study of 
indigenous languages, in contrast to the French approach (Chesneaux in Spencer 1988 
p. 61). According to John Lawrey, who was working in the Australian diplomatic 
mission in Noumea at the time, the impact of the numerous hale and hearty, well-
equipped Americans, cheerily sharing their rations of chocolate and chewing gum, was 
overwhelming (Lawrey 1982). The economy of the archipelago was boosted hugely by 
U.S. consumption. The fact that it was the Americans, not the French, who supplied 
the military materiel to defend the archipelago, weakened the authority of the French, 
for whom the inflexible d'Argenlieu, as described, was a poor representative. The 
practice at the end of the war, of dumping vast quantities of equipment in local 
waterways (this occurred in Wallis, New Hebrides at aptly named Million Dollar Point, 
and New Caledonia) rather than export it or leave it for local use or perhaps misuse, 
simply reinforced the wonder at American wealth and profligacy. One US jeep escaped 
this fate and is still used, today, in Noumea, on significant anniversaries of the war, 
when it is driven around by a jubilant group of Caldoches in the guise of World War II 
officers and a blonde Monroe-look-alike nurse in vintage uniform. 
The War and Americans in the EFO, New Hebrides and Wallis and Futuna 
As in Noumea, in the EFO, the confusion following the fall of Paris in 1940 saw 
demands for more autonomy, which persisted throughout the course of the Pacific war. 
In Papeete, the Free French Committee organized a referendum at the time, with the 
results overwhelmingly in favour of Free France over Vichy (Chesneaux and Maclellan 
1992 p. 80). One of their number, a returned local serviceman from Worid War I, 
Pouvanaa a Oopa, led a push for more autonomy and independence (Faberon and Ziller 
2007 p. 314). An attempt was made to arrest him in 1941 but not carried through 
(Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 80). During the war he was a vocal critic of the 
local administration and rationing system (Dunmore 1997 p. 243) and this boosted his 
political profile. 
While the American presence was not as pervasive in the EFO as in New Caledonia, 
the wealth and economic boost they represented changed Bora Bora, where they ran a 
fuel depot. The island was mythologised and represented as Bali Hai in the James 
Michener novel Tales of the South Pacific, later turned into a Hollywood film, leaving a 
lasting legacy as a tourist paradise. The values the Americans represented, of racial 
equality and modernism, complemented the push for autonomy already underway and 
vocalized by Pouvanaa and his followers. 
In the New Hebrides, during the course of the war, 100,000 Americans passed through 
Efate where they had established an airstrip, huts and recreation base. The main impact 
of the American presence was the revival of an existing cargo cult on the island of 
Tanna, the John Frum movement. 
The tiny island of Uvea in the Wallis group hosted two airfields. Such was the 
attachment of the islanders to the influx of well-off US soldiers that a call was made 
(but not taken up) for annexation before the Americans left in 1946. 
Effects of the War and the US presence on France in the Pacific 
The effect of the American presence and management of the war from the French 
colony. New Caledonia, had broader repercussions for the French Pacific colonies than 
social change. One consequence of the Pacific war for France was recognition of the 
strategic role of the French Pacific presence in regaining national prestige. The early 
rallying to de Gaulle by the French territories there left an important legacy, one which 
de Gaulle had doubtless foreseen in his very early efforts to secure their support. The 
war resulted in the dominance of the Americans in the Pacific as a whole, not simply in 
their continental littoral presence but with island territories of their own, mainly north 
of the Equator. This prevailing strength was to make the Pacific Ocean in the broad an 
"American lake" for most of the rest of the century (Heffer 1995 p. 250). For France, 
struggling to re-establish its national prestige within the western alliance, its Pacific 
presence was a strategic instrument as French leaders sought to entrench France's right 
to a seat at the high table of the UN Security Council in the wake of the war (see 
Chapter 3). 
A second result of the US role in France's territories during the war was that it 
catalysed demands there for more political rights from France. But now the demands 
were being made of a France for whose credibility the American experience called into 
question, not only its military capacity to defend its colonies but the very values of 
liberty, fraternity and equality France professed to represent (Mrgudovic 2008 p. 75). 
De Deckker (in New Pacific Review 2003a p. 63) directly attributed to the influence of 
the Americans the introduction of voting rights in the Deferrre law of 1956 (see next 
chapter; also Le Borgne 2005 p. 18). There is little doubt that in New Caledonia, the 
budding demands for more autonomy already noted amongst the European residents in 
the Cane (1932) and Verges (1940) proposals were compounded by a growing Kanak 
demand for change arising from their contact with Americans, and arguably Australians 
and New Zealanders, during the war. In Tahiti Pouvanaa's demands were more 
extreme and curtailed immediately by the French. But notwithstanding the social 
impact of the Americans, and the calls for greater autonomy, it is undeniable that all 
through the war and beyond, the prevailing culture in all the colonies remained French. 
A third determining feature of the Pacific war for the French territories was its 
reinforcement of the primacy of New Caledonia over the other French colonies in 
strategic and regional importance. Its location, relatively developed infrastructure and 
sophistication, and responsiveness to modernity, underpinned successful US-led 
prosecution of the Pacific war. 
Another enduring characteristic of the early establishment of the American New 
Caledonian presence in the Pacific war was the habit of cooperation and consultation 
between the Free French in London and Noumea, the British, the Americans, New 
Zealanders and Australians, fraught as they nonetheless were with misunderstanding, 
prejudice, and the need for delicate diplomacy. This wartime cooperation was to lead 
the way for a new regional multilateral organization, the South Pacific Commission, 
with its seat in Noumea, in the former US Headquarters buildings, after the War. 
Chapter 3 
France manages independence demands and nuclear testing 1945-
1990s 
The immediate post-war period saw growing demands for autonomy in the colonies and 
signs of responsiveness in France. In the wave of post-war change, as its wartime 
allies shaped new international structures with the United Nations at its core, France 
acknowledged the need for more equality and evolution in the administration of its 
colonies. De Gaulle resigned in January 1946 because of differences over 
parliamentary powers in the new constitution, leading to a period of instability in 
French leadership. Steps to encourage more self-government and even independence 
for the colonies, particularly the African colonies, were initiated by the Fourth and Fifth 
Republics in the 1946 and 1958 constitutions, then rolled back by successive statutory 
measures, to serve French national interests, in a pattern which was to characterize 
ftiture treatment of the South Pacific overseas territories. 
At a conference in Brazzaville (the Congo) in 1944, provision was made for more 
decentralized administration of the colonies and representation in bodies redrafting the 
French constitution (Le Borgne 2005 p. 19). The Conference called for local elected 
assemblies and representation of the overseas territories in the Paris Parliament. 
However, the aim was to contain nationalist aspirations and keep the colonies with 
France (Henningham 1992 p. 120). 
Some Melanesians and Polynesians (war veterans, pastors, customary chiefs) were 
accorded the right to vote in 1945. hi 1945 and 1946 the French government decreed 
further rights for their overseas residents, including French citizenship, but not the 
universal right to vote. While the 1946 constitution affirmed that all residents of 
overseas territories were French citizens, it was only in 1951 that all French citizens in 
the colonies obtained the right to vote, and specifically only in 1956, with the Loi 
Defferre, that all native residents of the overseas were entitled to vote (Faberon and 
Ziller 2007 p. 348; Gohin 2002; Deferre Framework Law No 56-619 of 23 June 1956). 
This needs to be understood within the French context. Coutau-Begarie (1986 Ch. 2) 
noted that this was not an inconsiderable achievement, since it was only in 1944 that all 
French metropolitan citizens, notably women, received the right to vote. In 1946, the 
indigenat system in New Caledonia was abolished. 
The 1946 constitution created a French Union and committed France to leading its 
people to administer themselves and to manage their own affairs democratically, 
''ecartant tout systeme de colonisation fonde sur I 'arhitraire" ("eschewing arbitrary 
colonization". Preamble). The EFO and New Caledonia were henceforward able to 
elect their own depute (member of parliament) to the French National Assembly and 
Senate in Paris. 
Another change in the 1946 Constitution created an administrative distinction, with the 
nomenclature of "departments" for the four oldest colonies (Guyana, Reunion, 
Guadeloupe and Martinique) and of "territories" for the other possessions, including 
New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna. 
France was not acting in a domestic vacuum. As post-war international structures 
evolved, the United Nations was founded in 1945 on a Charter specifying the principle 
of equality of rights and self-determination of peoples (Article 1). It called for states 
administering non-self-governing territories to develop self-government and transmit 
technical information to the UN on them (Article 73). However, the underlying intent 
of France's apparent relaxation of its reins over its possessions was evident in 1947, 
when France decided unilaterally that it would not transmit to the UN information on 
New Caledonia and French Polynesia (and others of its colonies), arguing that they had 
a status similar to the French "departments", with the implication that they had 
administrative and political autonomy and were therefore no longer non-self-governing 
(see Mrgudovic in de Deckker and Faberon 2008 p. 178). France claimed that only 
New Hebrides was non-self-governing (Bates 1990 p. 52). The UN endorsed a 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and set 
up a Decolonization Committee (known as the Committee of 24) in 1960 (UNGA 
Resolution 1514 (XV) and Resolution 1541 of 14 December 1960). But France 
maintained its position on its territories, even after New Caledonia was reinscribed as a 
non-self-governing territory after pressure from Pacific Forum countries in 1986 (and 
only acquiesced in its reporting responsibilities for New Caledonia from 2004, see 
section on reinscription below). 
Apart from providing full French voting rights in the overseas territories and 
departments, the 1956 Defferre loi cadre or framework law aimed at more engagement 
by the Overseas France peoples in their own administration (Law No 56-619 of 23 June 
1956, Article 1; see Cordonnier 1995a p. 47). By this time the French state was 
grappling with major challenges, particularly in Indo-China and Algeria, and its own 
government was unstable. By 1954 France had withdrawn from Indo-China. The 
Fourth Republic had seen 21 changes of government in 12 years (Dunmore 1997 p. 
248). The interlinkages of the fate of the overseas colonies and domestic politics in 
France which obtained during the 19"" century were to take on a new piquancy and 
relevance with the demise of the Fourth Republic largely because of controversial 
French handling of the Algerian rebellion (Dunmore 1997 p. 245; Ziller and Faberon 
2007 p. 21). At one stage France hijacked a plane and arrested nationalist leaders 
(Bely 2001 p. 119). Amidst the threat of an army takeover in Algeria, the French 
President called on de Gaulle to form a government. 
With the advent of the Fifth Republic, and the return of de Gaulle to head it, from 1958, 
a new constitution came into being which enshrined the principle of free determination 
of its peoples and the possibility of new institutions for the overseas territories desirous 
of participating in them, with a view to their "democratic evolution" (Preamble). De 
Gaulle turned the French Union into a Community, and referendums were held in 1958 
throughout the empire on whether or not the colonies would accept the new French 
constitution, which de Gaulle made clear was a vote for staying with France 
(Henningham 1992 123). In his rhetoric, de Gaulle specified two things, first, that the 
contemporary world made it necessary to belong to large economic and political 
federations, and second, that a no vote would mean going it alone, with France not 
giving "further moral or material help" (quoted in Henningham 1992 p. 124). These 
were arguments that were to recur in future years. By voting yes, the colonies could 
choose either integration into France, to continue the status quo, or expanded autonomy 
as a self-governing member of the French Community, effectively laying the basis for 
independence (Faberon and Ziller 2007 p. 21). All but one of France's African 
possessions took up the independence option (Bates 1990 p. 12). All three Pacific 
colonies voted to stay with France, New Caledonia with a vote of 98%, and Wallis and 
Futuna 95%. French Polynesia returned a far lower vote, 64 %, owing to the efforts of 
independence leader Pouvanaa who was arrested for his troubles (Danielsson and 
Danielsson 1986 Ch 6, and see French Polynesia section below). But as the years 
ahead were to show, political evolution was subsequently seen as taking place within an 
indivisible French Republic. 
Strategic Factors 
The nuclear testing issue 
With the loss of Algeria by 1962, de Gaulle adopted a different approach to its 
overseas, and Pacific, territories. Part of de Gaulle's new vision for the Fifth Republic 
was to re-establish France as a self-reliant power, with a geographical and geopolitical 
presence throughout the world and the possession of nuclear weapons (Cordonnier 
1995a p. 52; Waddell, 2008, p. 56). Thus retaining its overseas territories became an 
important objective. 
The late 1950s and early 1960s had seen a rapid modernization of the French economy, 
with successful prestigious projects such as the construction of the supersonic 
Concorde aircraft. De Gaulle espoused what has been dubbed "the politics of 
grandeur" whereby France, befitting its status as one of the five Permanent Members 
of the UN Security Council, would restore its position in the wake of the losses of 
World War II, Indo-China and now Algeria, not to mention the defeats of World War I 
and the 1870 Prussian War. Self-sufficiency was a key ingredient to this policy. The 
national priority at the time was to maintain France's status as a puissance mondiale 
moyenne (middle-sized world power) and an integral part of that was the force de 
frappe, or independent French nuclear deterrent (Danielsson and Danielsson 1986 p. 
43; Woolner 1995; Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 96; Dunmore 1997 p. 247). The 
evolution of a European Economic Community with talk of a European defence 
organism strengthened France's resolve to be responsible for its own defence. In 1960, 
France acquired the atomic bomb. In 1966, France withdrew from the NATO High 
Command as a mark of its determination to retain national self-reliance. Nuclear 
testing that had been carried out in Algeria was to take place in the Pacific, at Moruroa 
and Fangataufa in French Polynesia. It would be essential to maintain the Pacific 
possessions in the French fold, lest a change in status in one would encourage 
independence moves in French Polynesia. 
Also in 1966, de Gaulle visited New Caledonia, telling the locals "You are France 
aiistrale (France in the south). You have a French role to play in the world" (in 
Waddell 2008 p. 56), and went on to French Polynesia to witness one of the first 
nuclear tests there. 
France's acquisition of nuclear capability and testing practices were not an isolated act 
by a pretentious European state. While France, through its policy of self-reliance, 
distanced itself from the Anglo-American special relationship and NATO, its nuclear 
program nonetheless formed part of a western schema of similar activity in the broad 
Pacific region, notably by Britain (at Maralinga in Australia) and the United States (at 
Bikini Atoll in the Gilbert group). 
In the early days of the Cold War, the international reaction against nuclear testing was 
slow to gather momentum, but when it took hold criticism of France was very strong, 
particularly in the neighbouring Pacific region. Contrary to French perceptions that the 
region was targeting France specifically, a general distaste for nuclear testing had been 
evident very early in the South Pacific region. As early as 1956, when neither the Cook 
Islands nor Western Samoa were independent, their local assemblies recorded protests 
against the British and US atmospheric tests in the region (Chesneaux and Maclellan 
1992 p. 184). So it was not surprising that South Pacific islanders were to zero in on 
France for its staging of tests, in Pacific perceptions, far away from the metropolitan 
area and within their neighbourhood. 
Expanded maritime territorial boundaries 
The other major international development in the strategic backdrop to France's 
changing approaches to autonomy demands in the post-war period was the 1982 Law of 
the Sea (UNLOS) convention. After years of negotiation, the international community 
agreed to establish 200 mile exclusive economic zones (EEZ), legally increasing 
dramatically the surface of global sovereignty to individual countries. For France, as 
for many other governments still with overseas possessions, this was the most 
important single stroke for extending national sovereignty since the haphazard 
declarations of the eighteenth century. Although UNCLOS sets out the framework for, 
and records, nations' claims, consistent precise figures about each nation's rightful EEZ 
are difficult to establish.'^ But the overall effect for France is clear. 
With ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention, the French EEZ, i.e., its sea 
resources a l o n e , i s now the second largest in the world after that of the US (at the 
" In France's case, see differences in figures cited by Sevaistre 1986 p. 41, who noted France's EEZ 
was third largest after UK and US [sic]at 11,136,330 sq. km. of which 340,290 sq. km. was metropolitan 
France and 10,796,330 sq. km. in the DOM-TOMS, of which New Caledonia represented 2 m. .sq. km; 
Doumenge 2002 p. 101, noting France's total EEZ as 11.7 million sq. km.; Mrgudovic 2008 p. 84 noting 
France's EEZ at almost 10.5 sq, km. of which more than 7.6 m. sq. km. derive from its Pacific presence; 
and Faberon and Ziller 2007 p. 8 citing French Overseas Files indicating that of France's total EEZ of ' 
11,574 560 sq. km., the entire DOM-TOM EEZ represented 11,234,270 sq. km. with metropolitan 
France's EEZ only 340,290 sq. km.. 
Comparisons of EEZs are indicative only of a sovereign power 's control over sea resources beyond its 
territorial sea. When comparing total land, territorial seas and EEZ areas, France ranks seventh after 
time, it was the third largest in the world after the US and the USSR, which 
subsequently disintegrated). France's territorial sovereignty including all of its 
departments and territories overseas (DOM TOM), extended over 40% of the total 
global maritime zones, or 8% of the surface of the globe, while France's land area 
covered only .45% of the globe (Wikipedia website accessed 1 July 2009 and 
Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 95). Compared to the EEZ of the French 
metropolitan " hexagon" alone of just 340,290 square kilometers, France's EEZ grew to 
11.57 m. square kilometers, of which 7.3 m. sq. km. arose from its Pacific possessions 
and just under 5 m. sq. km. of that, from French Polynesia alone (Faberon and Ziller 
2007 table based on Overseas France files, p. 8). While some French writers have 
claimed that France derives minimal economic return from its large EEZ (Leymarie 
1985 p. 4) and it is true that much of the potential remains unknown, control over these 
resources boosted France's geopolitical prestige globally (see Mrgudovic 2008 p. 81 et 
seq), and particularly at a time when it was under attack in the region, both for its 
handling of Kanak independence claims in New Caledonia, and for its nuclear testing in 
French Polynesia. 
Other international factors 
It is also important to bear in mind that from the 1980s the Pacific Ocean once again 
began to be described as the new centre of the world, with writers and thinkers 
heralding the twenty-first century as the Pacific century (Aldrich 1988 p. 1; Chesneaux 
and Maclellan 1992 p. 102). In a sense, this was nothing new. There had been an 
earlier movement in France in the 1880s led by the Oceanic Lobby Group in Paris 
(Aldrich 1988 p. 11). But this time, the new wave of attention to the Pacific was global, 
and arose from dynamic economic growth in the rapidly industrializing Asian tigers 
(South East Asia, Hong Kong, South Korea), with China poised in the background, all 
littoral Pacific states. A European country with a direct stake in the region, even if it 
was simply in the southern hemisphere of the Pacific, where its Pacific naval presence 
was based, had a perceived advantageous foothold in an economically significant 
region (Lacour 1987 p. 131). Europe's exclusion from the newly-emerging Asian 
Pacific Economic Cooperafion grouping in the late 1980s to early 1990s, and British 
effective withdrawal from the South Pacific in the same period (although it had defined 
its "east of Suez" policy much earlier), only served to strengthen French tenaciousness 
there. 
Early post-war regional context 
Within the South Pacific region, post-war France was increasingly working in a 
regional environment, joining up with the governments of Netherlands, US and UK, 
Australia and New Zealand to form the South Pacific Commission (known as 
the Russia, the US, Australia, Canada, China and Brazil . It is worth noting that there is a minute 
d i f fe rence between France ' s combined EEZ and territorial seas (11.57 m. sq. km.) and its EEZ, 
territorial seas and land (11.7 m. sq. km.) whereas for example with Russia there is a far larger d i f ference 
(7. 5 m. sq. km. to 24 .6 m.sq. km.), reflecting the larger land mass of the latter Wikipedia EEZ accessed 
1 July 2009). Thus the relative potential increase in resources by virtue of an EEZ is far greater for 
France. 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community from 1998) (SPC) in 1947, with its headquarters 
in Noumea. The genesis of the Commission was one of consultations amongst those 
powers responsible for various Pacific islands on the basis of either colonial ties 
(France, Netherlands, United Kingdom) or UN mandates (US, Australia, New 
Zealand). After 1964, with the accession of the first independent Pacific island state. 
Western Samoa (which became independent in 1962), the organization included 
independent states, and added a technical assistance role (see Foreign Affairs and Trade 
1997; Secretariat for the Pacific Commission 2007). 
France from the beginning saw the SPC as a threat to its authority. Along with 
Netherlands and UK, France resisted proposals from Australia, New Zealand and the 
US for elected delegates, and calls by island leaders from 1965 to have representation 
in Noumea (Bates 1990 p. 42). More critically for its own interests, France actively 
opposed political (as distinct from technical) discussion at SPC meetings. It was 
France's intransigence over discussing political questions, notably the issues of 
regional nuclear testing and New Caledonian independence demands, which led the 
frustrated new island governments to form the South Pacific Forum (renamed Pacific 
Islands Forum, PIF, in 2000) in 1971 (see Fry 1981; Henningham 1992 p. 197). The 
Forum was established specifically as a political forum, and its first political 
preoccupations targeted French policies (see Forum Communique 1971). France was 
to tread a rocky path with the Forum in the 1970s and 1980s, and bilaterally with some 
of its members, which will be explored later in this chapter in connection with New 
Caledonia and French Polynesia respectively. But through it all, France was to retain 
the SPC headquarters in Noumea and its membership of the SPC. It thus benefitted 
from a privileged status throughout the regional difficulties of the 1980s to 1990s, a 
valuable asset when it finally sought to improve its standing in the region in the latter 
1980s, which will be considered in the next chapter. 
Institutional structures at home 
The management of the overseas colonies in metropolitan France changed little at this 
time. A full Ministry for Colonies had been established in 1894. Before then, the 
Office of Colonies that Richelieu had established in 1710 had handled the overseas 
colonies for almost two hundred years, attached to the Marine Secretariat, later 
Ministry. The 1894 Ministry was located at one end of the Louvre, which Belorgey 
(2002 p. 84) noted justly reflected the pooriy reduced empire after the Napoleonic 
losses that century, hi 1910 it relocated to the large hotel at Rue Oudinot where it 
remains today. The Ministry was simply divided into economic and political 
directorates until after Worid War II. During the war the importance of the overseas 
empire, particulariy New Caledonia and French Polynesia, in declaring allegiance to 
the Free French government had been vital, an illustration of the interactivity of the 
overseas presence with French domestic politics. It is worth noting that both the Vichy 
and Free French governments had their Colonial Ministries, each seeing the "Overseas 
France" as important elements of their power (albeit with a realistic understanding of 
their ability to defend them, see Thomas 1998 Chapters 1 and 2). 
Similarly, Belorgey noted the great hopes after the War that the colonial empire would 
contribute to maintaining France's global prestige in the wake of the ignominious war-
time experience (Ibid. p. 85). In 1946 with the departementalisalion of the four "old 
colonies", the departments of Guyana, Reunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe came under 
the purview of the Interior Ministry. With the changes of the 1958 constitution, and the 
return of the conservative de Gaulle government, the departments and the territories 
were reunited in the Ministry of the ''DOM-TOM" (departements et tenitoires d'outre-
mer, or overseas departments and territories) under the Prime Minister, reflecting their 
importance as equal but different parts of France. The two remain united to this day, 
albeit more recently under the simpler nomenclature ofOulre-Mer" (Overseas France) 
(at various times in a Ministry or Permanent Secretariat). 
Autonomy demands in the Pacific collectivities 
It is against this background that demands for increasing autonomy within the French 
Pacific entities. New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and New Hebrides emerged in the 
post-war period. Unfolding events in each entity exerted influence on the others. 
These will be reviewed briefly, and include New Hebrides' progress to independent 
Vanuatu in 1980; France's responses to increasingly violent independence demands in 
New Caledonia culminating in the Matignon and Noumea Accords in 1988 and 1998; 
and its management of its strategic interest in atomic testing along with autonomy and 
independence demands in French Polynesia until it finally ceased testing in 1996. 
Tiny Wallis and Futuna, after it voted in 1959 to stay with France, became a French 
Overseas Territory in legislation enacted in 1961 which governs the entity, essentially 
unchallenged, to this day (Loi No 61-814 of 19 July 1961) (De Deckker 2003a p. 66; 
Faberon and Ziller 2007 p. 335). The islands' principal interconnection with the other 
French entities during this period has been the migration of a substantial part of its 
labour force to New Caledonia (see John Connell in Aldrich 1991 p. 99) which will be 
addressed in discussion of recent developments in New Caledonia in Chapter 5. 
New Hebrides becomes Vanuatu 
Although the numbers of French residents in the New Hebrides were small after the 
War (900 French citizens compared to 320 British citizens, and 1,750 "protected 
French citizens", mainly Indochinese working on the plantations, in 1949, Dunmore 
1997 p. 253), there were strong informal links between European residents of New 
Caledonia and New Hebrides, and France continued to invest extensively in 
infrastructure to support French planters in the condominium. But despite French 
efforts to resist decolonization, because it was sharing power with Britain, because 
Britain was on a path of relinquishing its presence east of Suez and granting 
independence to its Pacific colonies, and also because of France's own clumsy handling 
of demands for independence, the condominium of New Hebrides became the 
independent state of Vanuatu in July 1980. 
While it could be argued that elsewhere in the Pacific, independence was being granted, 
indeed often hastened, because of the wishes of the colonial powers rather than the 
local people, France did not want to lose its presence in the New Hebrides (' 'We're 
staying", Henningham quotes the French Resident in 1969 p. 31), not the least because 
of the example it might provide to its other Pacific entities. Its independence was a 
significant blow to France within the context of its grandeur policy and maintaining its 
puissance mondiale moyenne status. Once again, it seemed French interests in the 
Pacific were usurped by Britain's interests, and local indigenous forces. 
Again, the old French Catholic v. British Protestant faultline came into play. British 
evangelists were more longstanding, and more entrenched, in the archipelago than the 
French Marists. The first calls for independence came from mainly English-speaking 
Protestants, while those favouring autonomy of individual islands were primarily 
French speaking and Catholic Melanesians. The English and French were highly 
suspicious about the other. Once again, as in New Caledonia during the war, the 
French attributed very negative motives to Australia and New Zealand (Coutau-Begarie 
1987 p. 287; Domoy-Vurobaravu 1994; Dunmore 1997 p. 268). Such a position is the 
more revealing against the context of brief consideration at the time of the idea of 
Australia taking over from Britain some kind of tutelage role for Vanuatu, which 
Australia rejected (Personal communication from Malcolm Leader, 2009). 
The key issues catalyzing independence calls were land acquisition by settlers, and 
European legal systems, the latter challenging local custom. Such differences, together 
with a cargo cult mentality in a number of small groupings, fostered by the relatively 
profligate presence of the Americans during the war, provided an impetus to 
phenomena such as Jimmy Stephens' Nagriamel movement which propounded 
independence. The decision by French planters to move into cattle ranching in the 
1960s, increasingly taking up interior land, heightened differences. In 1971 Stephens 
appealed to the UN for independence to be granted within a year. The same year, the 
fonner Anglican minister Walter Lini formed the Vanuatu Party, known variously as 
the New Hebrides National Party and the Vanuaaku Pati. Numerous francophone 
parties were formed to counter the Vanuam Party - the Union de la Population des 
Nouvelles-Hebrides (Union of the New Hebrides Population, UPNH), Mouvement 
Autonomiste des Nouvelles-Hebrides (Autonomist Movement of New Hebrides, 
MANH) and the Union des Communautes des Nouvelles-Hebrides (Union of the 
Communities of New Hebrides, UCNH) all of which represented objectives short of 
immediate independence. For a time, MANH formed an alliance with Nagramiel and 
the UCNH with a cargo cuh, the John Frum movement. The French sought to 
discourage support for independence, using the familiar argument that resource-poor 
countries would collapse (Henningham 1992 p. 35). At the same time, the 
Condominium provided for a Representative Assembly in 1974. The Vanuatu Party 
won elections in 1975 and 1979, after forming and then disbanding a Provisional 
Government in 1977. 
France, influenced by New Caledonian lobbyists with interests vested in trade and other 
links with their French New Hebrides compatriots, had been sympathetic to Jimmy 
Stephens. As the Vanuatu Party's support grew, French officials worked behind the 
scenes with parties opposing the Vanuatu Party before the November, 1979, elections. 
The Vanuatu Party victory was a surprise, especially as the Party won even in French 
dominated Santo and Tanna, albeit narrowly. In response, Stephens' movement grew 
into a secessionist rebellion, proclaiming a Republic of Vemarana on Santo in 1979, 
with a French-educated politician Alexis Youlou declaring the nation Tafea on Tanna 
and other islands. Youlou was killed shortly afterwards. The French were suspected of 
having supported these rebellions (Dunmore 1997 p. 269). French officials vetoed 
sending a joint Anglo-French police force to restore order in the rebellious islands. 
French supporters of Stephens were hopeful of continued French control, conscious of 
the Indian Ocean 1975 precedent in Mayotte, which had remained French while the 
Comoros had become independent (Henningham 1992 p. 40). Once again, outcomes in 
one French possession influenced French actions in others. 
In preparing for 1979 elections leading to fiall self-government, French Secretary of 
State for the Overseas, Paul Dijoud, played a role in securing a quasi-federal 
arrangement to allow for separate identities, and continued French influence, in Santo 
and Tanna (Henningham 1992 pp. 38, 41). Henningham also noted that French policies 
may have suffered by the short-term rotation of its officials in the New Hebrides, in 
contrast to British officials who stayed for long periods and could develop deeper 
knowledge of the forces at play. He referred also to the different influences at work in 
Paris, between the Defence Ministry and Overseas France Department on the one hand, 
who were more pro-settler, and the Foreign Affairs and political leadership on the 
other, who were more pragmatic. While such considerations led to disjunctions 
between policy in Paris and French officials' attitudes and actions on the spot, the 
reality is that the French government had the power to control its officials but chose not 
to do so. Only a week before independence the French Resident told French residents 
on Santo that France would intervene to protect it and give it special status 
(Henningham 1992 p. 42). 
And so it was that the new independent government invited Papua New Guinea to send 
troops to assist it deal with the rebels, which it did, with Australian logistical support, 
within days (Ibid. p. 43). A legacy of bitterness remained, despite customary 
ceremonies of reconciliation. 
With this background it is not surprising that as first Prime Minister, Walter Lini 
pursued anti-French policies. He expelled around 700 French residents including 
planters, missionaries, officials and security people, most of whom went to New 
Caledonia where they became ardent anti-independence supporters (Ibid. p. 43). 
Vanuatu joined the British Commonwealth. It supported independentist groups in New 
Caledonia, promoting their cause in the United Nations, and criticized French nuclear 
testing at Moruroa. It was one of the founding members of the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group in the 1980s, mainly to pursue these objectives. It was only after Lini left the 
political scene in 1991 that relations with France improved. Although French aid 
continued during Lini's tenure (about $A 8 m. in 1981 or one third of the budget, 
Henningham 1992 p. 44), it was controversial and heavy-handed, and centred on 
French cultural and education projects. France did not help its cause by threatening to 
remove its aid when Vanuatu agreed to host the dissident New Caledonian Kanaky 
government in 1987 (Mrgudovic 2008 p. 222-223). Vanuatu expelled the French 
Ambassador in 1987 for financial subsidies he had deposited with opposition parties on 
the eve of November elections (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 197). By 1990 
things had improved to the point where Vanuatu had introduced a virtual diplomatic 
detente with France (Chesnaux and Maclellan 1992, p. 199). Nonetheless, unease 
remains, represented, for example, in Vanuatu's continuing claim, in competition with 
that of France, to Matthew and Hunter Islands, two islands 300 km east of New 
Caledonia and south of Vanuam (see Chapter 5). 
Enduring lessons 
One of the legacies of Vanuatu's colonial experience, and arguably its experience with 
the French, was the very damaging effect on regional security, with implications for 
Australia and western interests broadly. Vanuatu adopted anti-west policies, or at the 
most generous interpretation, became skilled in playing off western interests against 
those of external Cold War players like the Soviet Union and Libya (Mrgudovic 2008 
p. 220). It entertained invitations by Libya for scholarships for its smdents in the 
1980s, establishing diplomatic relations in 1987. It was one of only two island states 
(the other being Kiribati) to sign a fishing contract with the Soviet Union in 1986, and 
one of only a few states (New Zealand, Palau, Solomon Islands) to ban nuclear ship 
visits to its ports. It was one of only two states (Tonga being the other) not to have 
ratified the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone in 1986-87 (see Chesneaux and Maclellan 
1992). It is difficult to disagree with the judgement of PNG's then Ambassador to the 
UN, Renagi Lohia, that France's policies were "a direct threat to peace, security and 
stability in our region and they have serious implications for international peace and 
security" (cited in Bates 1990 p. 109). 
Importantly, the post-colonial experience of Vanuatu showed what may be in store for 
the other French entities should France leave in the same circumstances, i.e., where it 
would prefer not to leave. While France, New Caledonia, and the region have come a 
long way since 1980, the lessons are there. At the time it was the relatively low levels 
and directions of French aid which were destabilizing, the former forcing Vanuatu to 
look for donors in new and unwelcome places, and the latter perceived as political 
interference. Even today, French interlocutors will point to Vanuam as the inevitable 
result should France leave its other Pacific entities (Personal communications 2001-
2004). At the 2008 Colloquium marking the anniversary of the Matignon and Noumea 
Accords, Vanuatu surfaced repeatedly as an example of what New Caledonia could 
become without continuing French support, and journalist Alain Rollat referred to 
warnings Vanuatu's leaders gave to Tjibaou about not pressing too hard for 
independence, cautioning "/e risque est I oubir (lest New Caledonia be forgotten), 
harking back to de Gaulle's threats about withdrawing support from colonies voting to 
leave France (Regnault and Fayaud 2008 p. 57). 
For the French at the time, the Vanuatu experience inevitably hardened their attitude to 
independence demands in New Caledonia and French Polynesia, and their anti "Anglo-
Saxon" prejudices. It stiffened their resolve to continue nuclear testing, and their 
resistance to regional criticism. 
New Caledonia: Violent road to compromise and innovation 
The evolution of self-government and demands for independence in New Caledonia 
can be traced through the fomiation and roles of political parties, and the many (twelve) 
statutory changes, in a stop-start pattern from the early 1950s to the present (see 
Appendix 2 for a summary of statutory changes). The difficulties arising from this 
evolution need to be situated against the interplay of French domestic political demands 
and preoccupations in the hexagon, including France's progressive participation in 
European structures, and the regional context and preoccupations confronting the local 
population. It will be seen that the disposition of administrative responsibilities for the 
territories in Paris, relative to other relevant levers of government, such as the Defence 
and Foreign Affairs Ministries, also came into play. 
Political parties and statutory changes 
Although others (Connell 1987, Domoy 1994, Henningham 1992, amongst others) 
have traversed the field, it is worth briefly reviewing New Caledonia's political 
development from WWII until the 1980s, because this history reveals a pattern of 
French fitfulness and outright reneging over promised extensions of autonomy and self-
government. It is this pattern which contributed substantially to the emotional eruption 
of protest in the 1980s, and which leaves continuing questions about the full 
implementation of agreements struck since then. 
Against the background of the history of the differences between the Protestants and 
Catholics in the Pacific, it is perhaps not surprising that the first political groupings in 
New Caledonia followed these lines. In 1946 two groupings were formed, the Catholic 
Union des Indigenes Caledoniens Amis de la Liberie dans I'Ordre (Union of 
Indigenous Caledonian Friends of Liberty in Order, UICALO) and the Protestant 
Association des Indigenes Caledoniens et Loyaltiens Fran^ais (Association of 
Indigenous Caledonians and French Loyalty Islanders, AICLF), which when forged 
together by Maurice Lenonnand in 1953, became the Union Caledonienne (Caledonian 
Union, UC), the first political party of New Caledonia, under the banner, "two colours, 
one united people". 
The UC was a remarkable combination of the interests of European and indigenous 
New Caledonians. Lenormand became the first Vice-President, or head, of the small (7 
member) Council of Government elected in 1957 in accordance with the Defferre laws 
(the 1957 Decree of 22 July 1957 implemented the 1956 Defferre Law for New 
Caledonia). The 98% support for staying with France in the 1959 referendum showed a 
certain unity of purpose of the peoples of New Caledonia which could perhaps be 
explained by a feeling that their wishes for greater autonomy were in general being met 
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by the French administration at the time. It should be remembered that at this time the 
French state was committed to an evolving democratic system for its colonies. It was 
to rethink this position following local pressures for change from European settlers and 
residents concerned by the majority representation of the UC in the Territorial 
Assembly. 
All was to change with the Jacquinot Law of 1963 (Jacquinot Law, 21 December 
1963) which began a series of statutory changes rolling back the powers of the Council. 
It relegated the Council to a consultative role only, removed Ministers, and increased 
the powers of the French State. It effectively returned to the status quo ante of 1957 
(Bates 1990 p. 12). The 1969 Billotte Law (Billotte Law of 3 January 1969), primarily 
focused on taxation exemptions for the mining industry, in practice was designed to cut 
short the enterprising activities of a sector of the New Caledonian local political elite, 
who wanted to control the development of the mining sector. Local Assembly 
members were being lobbied by a major Canadian-based company, INCO, to allow 
competition against the French effective monopoly, SLN (Coutau-Begarie 1986 Ch. 2, 
and Maclellan 2005d). The Law effectively gave the French State power over any 
transaction relating to nickel, cobalt and chrome (Guillebaudl976, p. 171). It was 
already a major shareholder in SLN (see Chapter 5). The Law also created communes 
under the control of the French State. The local Caldoches as much as the Kanak 
membership of the UC responded with continued calls for more autonomy. 
The nickel boom of 1969-72 justified France's concerns to hold the purse strings. 
Production of nickel virtually tripled from 1967 to 1971, and for a time some of New 
Caledonia's GDP indices outstripped those of metropolitan France (Waddell 2008 p. 
74). The boom meant an influx of experts and services people related to the mining 
industry, from metropolitan France, against a background of already increasing 
numbers of Europeans (i.e. French). Christnacht noted that the number of Europeans 
doubled from 1956 to 1976, with the number of Melanesians increasing by only two-
thirds, and Asians, Polynesians and others by three times (2003 p. 3). Thus 
Melanesians lost their majority position.'^ It is estimated that from 1970 to 1976 alone, 
15,000 Europeans came into the territory, from metropolitan France or others of its 
overseas territories, bringing the European population to almost the same number as 
Melanesians (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 144, noted that Melanesians formed 
41% of the population in 1969 and 34% in 1989), significantly changing the political 
complexion of the territory, and doubtless of the UC itself Henningham noted that 
some decline in the relative numbers of Melanesians had been entrenched as early as 
1960, although they formed 51% of the population in 1956, 46% in 1969 and 42% in 
1976 (1992 p. 63, see also ISEE 2008 p. 35). 
This influx of Europeans was not solely due to the nickel boom. Enunciating an overt 
French policy of encouraging external migration for political reasons, French Prime 
' ' see also Tables la and 2 in Chapter 5; Barban?on in de Deckker and Faberon 2008 p. 124 chart noting 
Melanesian population increased by 35 % or 14.408 from 1963 to 1976, while Europeans grew by 52% 
or 17,402 and others by 124% or 14,904; ISEE TEC 2008 pp. 34 and 35. 
Minister and former DOM-TOM Minister Pierre Messmer wrote to his DOM-TOM 
Secretary of State on 17 July 1972 that indigenous nationalist claims could only be 
avoided if residents coming from metropolitan France, or elsewhere overseas in France, 
became the demographic majority ( " A long terme, la revendication nationaliste 
autochtone ne sera evitee que si les communantes allogenes representent une masse 
demographique majoritaire " in Sanguinetti 1985 p. 26). 
Such policies were contrary to the sense of political evolution in the surrounding region 
at the time. There, decolonization was under way, Western Samoa achieving 
independence in 1962, Nauru in 1968, Tonga and Fiji in 1970, Papua New Guinea in 
1975, and Vanuatu in 1980. 
By 1969, Naidosh Naisseline of the Loyalty Islands, returning with many of his peers 
from studies in France during the 1968 student insurrections, fonned a political 
movement calling for independence and comprising mainly Kanaks, named the 
Foulards Rouges (Red Scarves), hi 1971, another Kanak, Elie Poigoune, formed the 
1878 group, referring to the 1878 Kanak rebellion. This political activity, combined 
with the end of the nickel boom, meant that a number of Europeans left the territory 
from 1973. The UC continued to call for more autonomy, one of its Kanak leaders, 
RochPidjot, submitting proposals in 1971, 1975 and 1977. In 1975 Yann Celene 
Uregei, having left the UC, formed the Union multiraciale (Multiracial Union) and 
went to Paris to seek more autonomy. His claims were rejected, and President Giscard 
d'Estaing declined to meet him. Stung, he transformed his objectives to independence 
demands, joining the Comite de coordination pour I 'independance Kanak (Committee 
for the Coordination of Kanak Independence). Also in 1975, a rising political leader 
and former Marist priest, Jean-Marie Tjibaou, organized the Melanesia 2000 festival, 
an event funded by the French State and the local Assembly, focused on Melanesian 
identity and culture which involved representatives from the wider Pacific region. 
Tjibaou travelled the islands of New Caledonia, consulting clans and unifying support 
behind the Festival celebrating Kanak cultural identity (see Waddell 2008). Separately, 
in 1975 the Kanak parties joined to form the Parti de Liberation Kanak (Kanak 
Liberation Party, Palika). Uregei's party became the Front Uni de Liberation Kanak 
(United Kanak Liberation Front, FULK) in 1977. 
While disaffected Kanaks left the UC fold, so did unhappy rightwing Europeans. 
WTien in 1977 the UC, now led by prominent Kanak leaders Tjibaou, Eloi Machoro and 
Yeiwene Yeiwene, began to push for independence (Christnacht 2003 p. 3), Jacques 
Lafleur formed the Rassemblement pour la Caledonie (Rally for [New] Caledonia, 
RPC), which became in 1978 the Rassemblement pour la Caledonie dans la Republique 
(Rally for [New] Caledonia within the Republic, RPCR). His party won the 1977 
territorial elections, and he displaced Roch Pidjot as elected Depute in the French 
National Assembly early in 1978, a position he retained until 2007. Lafleur's party 
with an anti-independence coalition called the Front National pour une Nouvelle 
Societe Caledonienne (National Front for a New Caledonian Society, FNSC) won the 
1979 elections, although the independentists received 35% of the vote (Faberon and 
Ziller 2007 p. 351). The RPCR was by no means solely European in complexion. 
Senior Melanesian loyalists Jean-Pierre Aifa and Dick Ukeiwe respectively became the 
RPCR government's President and Vice-President. 
French government responses to demands for further autonomy from the moderates, 
and to growing support amongst Kanaks for independence and assertion of their 
cultural identity, were not seen as adequate. While the Stirn statute (Stim Statute of 
28 December 1976) claimed to deliver a path to autonomy, it comprised only small 
steps, including establishing a Vice-President of the Governing Council and individual 
responsibilities for its members, withdrawing the right to vote from the French High 
Commissioner who nonetheless continued to preside over the Council (Dommel 1993 
p. 25). French actions at the time, according to Guillebaud, belied any intention 
towards autonomy . He cited manipulation of elections and surveillance of pro-
autonomists (Guillebaud 1976 p. 121). The Dijoud Plan (1978) was focused on land 
reform, but only with the suspension of any consideration of independence for ten 
years. The Loi Dijoud (Law no 79-407 of 24 May 1979) implemented an eligibility 
threshold of 7.5% of the vote for parties to participate in the territorial assembly, to 
address the proliferation of small parties (Dommel 1993 pp 26-7) but was perceived as 
a tightening of the central government's control. These measures were rejected 
outright in the territory (Henningham 1992 p. 70), the multiple Kanak parties forming 
themselves into the Front Independantiste (Independence Front, Fl) to evade the 
Dijoud Plan's intentions. The Fl included the LKS {Liberation Kanak Socialiste, 
Socialist Kanak Liberation), FULK {Front Uni de la Liberation Kanak, United Kanak 
Liberation Front), the UPM {Union Progressiste Melanesienne, Popular Melanesian 
Union), and the PSC {Parti Socialiste Caledonie, [New] Caledonian Socialist Party). 
Its President was Jean-Marie Tjibaou. 
Les evenements - violence erupts 
Although there had been some violent incidents and tensions earlier (Naisseline and 
some followers were arrested for sedition in the 1970s, and a young Kanak was shot 
dead by a policeman in December 1975, Henningham 1992 p. 67; Waddell 2008 p. 
114), it was in the early 1980s that violence and confrontation increased in what were 
referred to as the evenements ("events" or "disturbances"). While many see these 
disturbances beginning in 1984, tensions mounted effectively from the assassination of 
the Secretary-General of the UC in September of 1981 and only eased after the 
assassinations of Tjibaou and his deputy Yeiwene Yeiwene in 1989. 
By 1979 the polarization of political interests had solidified into two camps, the 
primarily Kanak independentist group and the mainly European group loyal to France 
(loyalist) - but this has never been exclusively so, as there are Kanak and European 
elements in both camps. The pro-independence parties coalesced into the Fl; and the 
pro-France group were centred on Lafleur's RPCR. With name changes and various 
satellites and fractures on either side, this was to remain the basic dynamic until the 
present. 
In 1981 the UC, which in August 1980 had announced it would declare independence 
on 24 September 1982, asked the French government to recognize New Caledonia's 
right to independence, and the South Pacific Forum sent a mission to Paris to argue the 
same cause. Here the role of French domestic politics must once again be recognized: 
a new socialist government headed by President Fran9ois Mitterrand had boosted the 
confidence of the pro-independence camp. Mitterrand responded favourably to the 
UC's demands, writing that ''nous demandons que le droit despeuples a disposer 
d'eivc-memes...soit effectivement reconmi anpeuple Kanak" ("we ask that the right of 
peoples to decide for themselves should be recognized for the Kanak people" Angleviel 
2006 p. 139). 
But on 19 September, 1981, UC Secretary-General Declercq, within months of his 
return from a visit to France advising of the planned 1982 independence date, was 
killed, it is thought by rightwing extremists, though, somewhat incredibly, the culprit 
was never found. By June 1982 RPCR's former partner the FNSC, apparently with 
active French government backing (Henningham 1992 p. 72, Angleviel 2006 p. 140), 
moved over to join the FI in a new Governing Council headed by Jean-Marie Tjibaou 
as Vice-President (the President being the French High Commissioner). Rightwing 
demonstrators disaffected by these arrangements (many Europeans from the FNSC 
shifted allegiance to the RPCR) turned out onto the streets that year, and assaulted FI 
and FNSC members in the assembly building (Henningham 1992 p. 73). 
For its part, while the FI had foresworn a policy of violence (at its 1979 Congress), it 
did resort to mobilization of its supporters and disruption, including by setting up 
roadblocks. Tensions mounted. In early 1983, in separate incidents, a police station 
was bombarded with rocks by Meianesian youths at Touho; and at Koinde, 
Melanesians protesting police action during a demonstration against sawmill pollution, 
shot at police, killing two gendarmes and wounding six others. In May 1983 a Kanak 
was killed by a settler at Koinde-Ouipoin after a quarrel and Palika supporters 
destroyed a post office, houses and cars in retaliation. Numerous land occupations took 
place including an extensive one by Eloi Machoro in March 1984 (Henningham 1992 
pp. 72-4). Meanwhile the FNSC dissolved, its supporters returning to the RPCR. 
In July 1983, representatives of the FI, the RPCR and others participated in a round 
table conference at Nainvilie-les-Roches in France chaired by DOM-TOM Secretary of 
State, Georges Lemoine. This was the first meeting of all three parties (pro-France, 
pro-independence, and the French State) at the instigation of France and established a 
precedent of the French State taking at once the roles of arbiter, player, and enforcer of 
law and order, which persists until the present. It resulted in France's historic 
recognition of the Kanaks' "innate and active right to independence" as well as Kanak 
agreement to the participation of the whole population of New Caledonia in 
determining the future, the seeds of the future Matignon and Noumea Accords (Faberon 
and Ziller 2007 p. 352). Although the RPCR refused to sign the resulting statement and 
the FI was obliged to denounce the outcome owing to the non-acceptance by the 
smaller parties, that the meeting itself took place was a watershed of sorts. 
The French followed up the meeting with the Lemoine Statute (Lemoine Law of 6 
September 1984) providing for elections in 1984, increased internal autonomy and a 
five year transition period for a vote on independence in 1989 (Henningham 1992 p. 
74). The Statute was adopted by the French National Assembly despite the opposition 
of the territorial Assembly. Henningham noted French hopes for an FI/FNSC 
government which would lead, over time, a consensus favouring independence with 
close links with France, or enlarged autonomy (Ibid. p. 75). The Statute had some 
novel elements, such as seats for customary representatives, legislative powers and 
removal of the French High Commissioner from the Ministerial Council. But the 
provisions once more proved too geared to the independentist side for the pro-France 
group, and insufficiently responsive for the independentists. 
The essence of the differences centred on the effects of immigration, with the FI 
wanting a "restricted" electorate confined to those with long-term connections with the 
territory, a concern which was to remain at the heart of future negotiations. They 
calculated that Kanaks formed around 40% of a general electorate, but outnumbered 
Europeans in a "restricted" electorate defined by Kanaks and second generation settlers 
(Henningham 1992 p.75). 
In keeping up the pressure, the FI were also conscious that the election of a 
conservative French government in 1986 legislative elections would further set back 
their cause. On 24 September 1984, the anniversary of the 1853 annexation of New 
Caledonia by France, they called for a boycott of the planned elections, and 
transformed themselves into a more militant liberation front, the FLNKS {Front de 
Liberation Nationale Kanak et Socialiste or National Kanak Socialist Liberation Front), 
which also included the UC, FULK, and UPM. Until 1986 it included the Kanak 
Womens Group, and, until 1989, the USTKE or Union Syndicale des Travailleurs 
Kanaks et Exploiles, the Federation of Unions of Kanak Workers and the Exploited, a 
labour union federation. They declared the name of the future independent country 
would be Kanaky, with a green, red and blue coloured flag overlaid with afleche 
faitiere, or traditional hut-top totem finial. Two other less hardline pro-independence 
parties, also offshoots of the UC, remained outside FLNKS, Naisseline's LKS. and the 
PFK {Parti Federal Kanak, Kanak Federal Party). On the other side, an extremist 
rightwing party, the Front National (NF, National Front), emerged. 
The FLNKS called for a boycott of the 18 November 1984 elections. On that day, Eloi 
Machoro wielded an axe against the ballot box at Canala, and burned the ballot papers 
with others buming town halls and disrupting polling, often violently. This act is 
commonly viewed as the beginning of the evenements. The participation rate in the 
election was about 50%, against the more usual 70 to 80% (Henningham p. 83). For 
weeks afterwards, militant Melanesians maintained road blocking barricades, sparking 
serious clashes, including killings. On 1 December 1984, the FLNKS formed a 
provisional government with Tjibaou at its head. The French State sent a new High 
Commissioner, Edgard Pisani, who secured agreement with Tjibaou, on 5 December, to 
lift the barricades. However later that day, at Hienghene in the north, ten Kanaks were 
killed in an ambush, including two of Tjibaou's brothers. Tjibaou, who had been 
expected to be with the group, had unexpectedly stayed on in Noumea. In a measure 
of his stature and leadership, Tjibaou overcame his personal loss and stuck to the 
dialogue process, and his agreement to lift the barricades. The assassins, local mixed-
race farmers, were later acquitted. 
The hastily proposed Pisani Plan (proposed only three days after Pisani's arrival in the 
territory on 4 January, elements incorporated in the Fabius Pisani Law of 23 August 
1985) posited essentially independence in association with France, consistent with 
Article 88 of the French Constitution, an Article which had never before been applied, 
providing for the Republic to conclude agreements with states "which desire to 
associate themselves with it to develop their civilizations" (Christnacht 2004 p. 43). 
The Plan provided for a vote within months, i.e., by July 1985, by those who were 
residents of three-year standing (Faberon and Ziller 2007 p. 353), with France retaining 
"regalian", or core sovereign, responsibilities. (The French use of the word "'regalien" 
to cover such powers in an essentially colonial situation is interesting given the 
etymological history of the term, referring to royal insignia and prerogatives.) These 
include responsibility for internal and external security in the event of independence. 
The Plan appeared to have drawn on the US' compacts in association with its Pacific 
possessions at the time (Armand Hage in de Deckker 2006, p. 285). Pisani himself 
admitted that he saw the proposals as a shock tactic to oblige Europeans to understand 
the need for change (Henningham 1992 p. 86). The RPCR, while denouncing the Plan, 
agreed to participate in the referendum if there were no change to the franchise, to 
demonstrate majority opinion against independence. Once again, the effects of 
immigration were at issue. 
The Pisani Plan was the nearest New Caledonia had come to a vote for independence 
since 1958. Paradoxically it was offered in the wake of almost intolerable tension and 
violence, and yet it was precisely these tensions which aborted it. In November, Eloi 
Machoro's supporters had attacked some hardline rightwing settlers and killed one of 
them, Yves Tual. Rightwing demonstrations and riots ensued, only ending on 12 
January, when a military police sniper shot dead Machoro and an aide at a farm 
Machoro had been occupying near La Foa on the west coast (Maclellan 2005b p. 415). 
In a fleeting visit in January 1985, President Mitterrand declared that France would 
maintain its role and strategic presence and would reinforce the military base at 
Noumea (Leymarie 1985 p. 1). Sporadic incidents continued in 1985. Pisani left in 
May 1985, to be succeeded, perhaps aptly in view of the state of the territory, by the 
fonner Ambassador in Beirut (Faberon and Ziller 2007 p. 354). 
The next proposal, the Fabius Plan (Law of 23 August 1985), was a patch-up window-
dressing effort, against the background of the imminent expected legislative victory of 
the conservatives in France in 1986 who would not be expected to implement it, to 
address the need for the Kanaks to have a measure of democratic control (Faberon and 
Ziller 2007 pp . 354-5). The Fabius Statute provided for the break-up of New 
Caledonia into regions, in some of which, notably the north and the Loyalty Islands, the 
Kanaks would be in the majority and at least could exercise power there. The majority 
of the pro-France group in Noumea and overall would ensure a continuation of the 
status quo. This "regionalization" was a critical principle which was retained in 
subsequent negotiations. But another feature of the Fabius Law was the return of 
executive power to the High Commissioner, tightening the power of the French State. 
The almost-immediate subsequent regional elections, in September 1985, saw strong 
participation and the return of Tjibaou in the north, and Jacques Lafleur in the south. 
International and regional developments: United Nations reinscription of New 
Caledonia as a non-self-governing territory 
The French disposition to broker some kind of compromise at this time was influenced 
by other developments in the surrounding region and in the United Nations. France had 
now become the focus of international attention and regional opprobrium, not only for 
its policies in New Caledonia but also for its nuclear testing in French Polynesia. 
New Caledonia was the subject of close South Pacific Forum attention, and indeed one 
of the reasons for the Forum's fomiation in 1971. FLNKS leaders had urged the Forum 
to support reinscription of New Caledonia on the UN Committee of 24 on 
Decolonization from the late 1970s and early 1980s. The term "reinscription" was 
used, as, as noted earlier, France had declined to report on its Pacific territories from 
1947, claiming they were not non-self-governing. As the island states successively 
gained their own independence, they began to call in the United Nations for self-
determination in the non-independent states. Fiji began to raise these questions 
regularly in the UN after it gained independence in 1970, and targeted the 
administration of the New Hebrides in 1975 (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 186). 
The Front Independentiste presented a petition to the Forum in 1979, when they had a 
representative at the annual Forum meeting. Although the Forum recorded its regret 
and concern at France's nuclear testing in its first Communique (Forum Communique 
1971), its first formal reference to decolonization occurred in 1981, and in 1982 the 
Forum expressly referred to the need for New Caledonia's decolonization (in New 
Pacific Review 2003 p. 107). Melanesian countries neighbouring New Caledonia 
(PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu) united to form the Melanesian Spearhead Group 
expressly to support Kanak independence in New Caledonia in the mid 1980s 
(including Fiji in an agreement signed in 1988). The MSG acted as a ginger group 
within the Forum. It was Australia who had urged restraint on the New Caledonia 
issue within the Forum, in order to give new French proposals a chance to work. Only 
in 1986, after Chirac's reversal of reforms in his Pons proposals (see Cohabitation 
section below), did Canberra's stance in the Forum change. Also in 1986, the 
Nonaligned Movement meeting in Harare admitted the FLNKS as an official observer. 
The Kanak independence issue had been gathering external momentum at the time. 
FLNKS sent 17 Kanaks to Libya, an international terrorist pariah, for training in 1985, 
sparking concern in Australia and amongst western allies. Separately, in July 1985 
France's bombing of a Greenpeace vessel, the Rainbow Warrior, used to protest against 
French testing, in New Zealand, resulted in regional condemnation (see Regional 
criticism section below). 
With Australia's change of position, in 1986, the Forum unanimously supported 
reinscription. Tjibaou went to New York to work with South Pacific delegations, 
culminating in the UNGA affirming the inalienable right of the people of New 
Caledonia to self-determination in December 1986, and the reinscription of New 
Caledonia as a non-self-governing territory with the UN Decolonization Committee (or 
Committee of 24, C24) (UNGA Resolution 40/41, 2 December 1986). Despite French 
diplomatic efforts, and expenditure, to reduce support for the Resolution by extensive 
lobbying, the UNGA reaffirmed this position in a resolution in 1987 A/Res/42/79 
Question of New Caledonia, 4 December 1987). 
After the Matignon Accords of 1988, which were seen as a sign of good faith by all 
parties, the C24 has retained New Caledonia on its list and passes a resolution each year 
on New Caledonia, without a vote (see UNGA Resolutions Question of New Caledonia 
each year, 1987 to present). The Committee's secretariat prepares annual working 
papers on New Caledonia (see for example A/AC. 109/2008/9 Committee for 
Decolonization Working Paper on New Caledonia). France resolutely declined to fulfil 
UN obligations to submit an annual report, as the administering authority, until well 
after the Noumea Accord was signed (see Chapter 7). The Committee received 
submissions regularly from others, mainly various Kanak groups including most often 
FLNKS figure Roch Wamytan. 
Although the Australian government had played a restraining role within the Forum, 
public feeling in Australia against France at this time ran high, particularly fuelled by 
antipathy to French nuclear testing in the region. Through the years of the evenements, 
Kanak students trained in Australia and had close contacts with Aboriginal, Church, 
student and union groups. Powerfiil unions including of teachers and dockworkers, 
supported their case, with the Teachers Federation contributing funds to a Kanak radio 
station in Noumea, Radio Djiido, which had been created by the Matignon Accords. 
These groups were all key constituencies of the Hawke Labor government at the time. 
Relations with France deteriorated as Hawke introduced a ban on uranium exports in 
1985, then on French ministerial and official visits in 1986 (although he reinstated 
uranium exports). 
in 1987, France expelled John Dauth, Australia's Consul-General in Noumea. While 
the French did not give any public'^ or private background reason for the expulsion, 
they clearly were not happy with Australia's policies, and in particular their defeat on 
the floor of the General Assembly in New York, when the Forum-sponsored resolution 
on the reinscription of New Caledonia as a non-self-governing territory received broad 
support (Personal communication Dauth 2009). Whereas Chirac was said to have 
sought the expulsion of the Australian Ambassador to France, the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry had persuaded him to expel Consul-General Dauth instead. It was the Foreign 
'^It was put about as an ostensible reason that Dauth had given AustraHan government aid to the Kanak 
Cultural Centre at Hienghiene, which the French construed as interference (Personal Comments , O 'Lea ry 
2009) , an idea which still had currency when the author served as Australian Consul General as late as 
2001-2004 . 
Ministry, too, that had secured a month-long departure period for Dauth, over the 
objections of the Overseas France Ministry, who wanted him out immediately. 
Cohabitation 
Unfolding events were to demonstrate once more the dominating influence of French 
national domestic politics on its Pacific entities. French national legislative elections 
took place in March 1986 and as expected returned a rightist government under Jacques 
Chirac as Prime Minister. This was the first period of "co-habitation", when the 
President (then socialist Mitterrand) was of one political complexion, while the 
government, headed by the Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, was of the other. This 
dynamic was to colour the handling of the New Caledonian situation at a critical time 
(see especially Cordonnier 1995b), the more so since it is the President who is 
responsible for defence and foreign affairs, and the Prime Minister for handling internal 
policies. During a period when French policy in the South Pacific was constantly under 
international scrutiny, the effects of co-habitation were not constructive overall and 
arguably delayed a resolution of New Caledonian internal tensions. The namre of the 
policy-making process, which engaged a broad range of agency interests only 
inadequately coordinated on a daily basis by the relatively junior Outre-mer or 
Overseas France ministry, complicated these negative effects and led to policy mistakes 
(see also Cordonnier 1995b p. 80). Moreover, there was a close relationship between 
Chirac and Jacques Lafleur, leader of the RPCR in New Caledonia, the latter supplying 
donations to Chirac's campaign funds and fuelling Chirac's criticism of Mitterrand's 
handling of New Caledonia (Henningham 1992 pp. 99-100). 
And so the new French government once again set about rolling back the provisions of 
the previous stamtes. It created a unified land agency, the ADRAF (Age/ice pour le 
Developpement Rural et d'Amenagement Fonder - Rural Development and Land 
Management Agency) which effectively suspended the purchase of settler properties 
for redistribution and introduced redistribution to all communities, not just Melanesians 
(Henningham 1992 p. 100). Similariy the Kanak Cultural Office was replaced by an 
organism that represented all cultures, and Tjibaou was removed as director. 
As early as July 1986 the Chirac government introduced the Pons I statute (Law of 17 
July 1986) providing for a self-determination vote in 1987 on the basis of only three 
years residence in New Caledonia, the latter which was patently unacceptable to the 
independentists. With a low 59% turnout (compared to historically more normal 
turnouts of 70-80%) following an FLNKS boycott, the July 1987 referendum 
unsurprisingly voted 98.3% in favour of staying with France. France pulled out all the 
stops to secure support, setting up roadblocks to prevent agitators entering Noumea and 
bussing in pro-France rural supporters (Personal communication O'Leary 2009). Chirac 
flew by Concorde jet to New Caledonia to be there for the electoral victory, staying just 
three hours before heading back to Paris. 
Meanwhile, violence continued, heightened by the acquittal, in October, of those who 
had killed Tjibaou's brothers and others at Hienghene. By this time, over six thousand 
French military personnel were in New Caledonia, stationed under a policy of 
""nomadisation" near tribal villages ostensibly to aid in rural development (a policy 
continued to the present), but enabling close monitoring of Melanesian activists. In 
early January 1988, a further statute was enacted, Pons II (Law of 22 January 1988). It 
envisaged revised self-government arrangements, including implied abolition of 
Melanesians' special legal status, and revised regional demarcation more sympathetic 
to pro-France views. But, although the pro-France group duly won in the newly created 
western region and made gains in the other Kanak dominated regions owing to 
boycotts, this Statute was never in the end implemented, as dramatic events at 
Gossanah Cave intervened. 
Gossanah Cave Crisis 
The first Pons territorial elections were to be held 24 April 1988, the same day as the 
first round of the French presidential elections, in which conservative Prime Minister 
Chirac was competing with, and trailing far behind, the incumbent, socialist Mitterrand. 
On 22 April, the FLNKS attacked a police station at Fayaoue on the island of Ouvea in 
the Loyalties group, killing four policemen and taking four others hostage at a cave at 
Gossanah (Waddell 2008 Chapter 1, elaborated on tensions in Ouvea and intra-Kanak 
divisions centred there). On 5 May, just after the first round of the presidential national 
election and three days before the second round, the French military were ordered to 
attack the cave and free the hostages. This was done at the price of 21 dead, 19 Kanaks 
and two French soldiers. The first round of the French presidential elections had left a 
run-off between Chirac and Mitterrand for the second round. The order to attack was 
signed off by Mitterrand on the recommendation of Prime Minister Chirac and the 
Defence Minister (Angleviel 2006 p. 161). The prime motivator for the decision was 
Chirac's wish to be seen as strong on the eve of the second round, with Mitterrand not 
wishing to countermand such an order for the same reasons (see Legorjus 1990, cited in 
Angleviel 2006). The predominance of the Defence Ministry over the Overseas France 
Ministry played a role, as did the apparent complete absence of consideration for 
Foreign Affairs issues over domestic imperatives. 
But the handling of the crisis backfired. Once again domestic and international opinion 
focused on New Caledonia. Metropolitan human rights groups SOS-Racisme and the 
Ligue des droits de I 'Homme (Human Rights League) sought an independent enquiry 
into the way in which the Gossanah Cave events had been handled. 
Matignon/Oudinot Accords 
In the event. President Mitterrand was returned to the Presidency (although in New 
Caledonia, with a very reduced voter turnout of 58.3%, 92.3% voted for Chirac, see 
Angleviel 2006 p. 163) and appointed socialist Michel Rocard as Prime Minister. As 
Rocard himself described it (Colloque 2008 recorded in Regnault and Fayaud 2008 p. 
13), one of his first jobs was to address the New Caledonian problem. This he did by 
sending a dialogue mission to New Caledonia, headed by DOM-TOM Prefect Christian 
Blanc, who had been Secretary General for New Caledonia in 1984-85; and including 
not only senior officials but, somewhat creatively, senior representatives of key 
religious affiliations (Catholic Monsignor Paul Gilberteau; the head of the Protestant 
Federation of France, pastor Jacques Stewart; and prominent Freemason Roger Leray). 
Once again, Jean-Marie Tjibaou agreed to lead a process of dialogue rather than further 
violence. It is important to recognize here the role in the Kanak cultural context of the 
parole, or word. As elsewhere in Melanesia, the idea of extended discussion and 
consensus is important in the Kanak culture. And, as in western culture, the idea of 
keeping one's word is of great importance. On the basis of the mission's consultations, 
negotiations were initiated at the Prime Minister's Matignon office in Paris. They were 
difficult negotiations with concessions extracted from both sides only at the eleventh 
hour, late on 25 June, with follow-up later over three weeks at the Overseas France 
Ministry in the rue Oudinot. 
The resultant Matignon/Oudinot Accords'' with the symbolic handshake between 
Tjibaou and Lafleur on 25 June 1988, set aside the thorny independence issue for 
another ten years, when a vote would be planned for a restricted electorate confined to 
those resident in New Caledonia in 1988 and their descendants. Only this restricted 
electorate would vote in provincial and Congress elections. The parties agreed in the 
meantime to work for the economic, social and cultural development of the territory, 
with a buffer one-year rule by Paris through the High Commissioner. Three provinces 
were created, with particular powers, and from their representatives a Congress was 
formed for the entire territor>'. A key underlying principle was to be "re-equilibrage" 
or rebalancing of economic benefits, hitherto confined mainly to the European-
dominated, wealthy Noumea, throughout the territory. With nickel as the key 
economic resource, part of the deal was that Jacques Lafleur would sell his shares in the 
South Pacific Mining Company (Societe Miniere du Sitd Pacifique SMSP) to the 
Northern Province, with the necessary 1.8 b. cfp ($A 29.8 m. converted March 2009) 
financed by the French State. A formula of application of State financial credits to all 
provinces was devised, and a Kanak training program of 400 cadres, or 400 managers, 
was initiated. 
The State, perceived as having been too allied with the independentists at one stage 
(Pisani) and the pro-France group at another (Pons), was to take the role of impartial 
arbiter, a virtually impossible undertaking especially since executive power was 
returned to the French High Commissioner. Tjibaou, for his part, saw the 
inconsistencies in the role of the state, and warned, in a letter to the French Prime 
Minister at the time, that in the context of restoring sovereignty to the Kanak people 
"...the state cannot hide behind the role of arbiter. It is not judge but actor" (cited in 
Waddell 2008 p. 176). Issues related to this dual role were to persist. 
All of this was subject to a national referendum, both for political reasons, to reassure 
the Kanaks that the French people supported the agreement, but also for technical 
" The Accords included the Matignon Accords (a declaration and two texts) agreed on 25-26 June 1988, 
and the Oudinot Accord addressing related legal provisions to be subject to a referendum in November 
1988 (Christnacht, 2004 pp 57-58 and Textes fondamentaux. New Caledonian government and Congress 
websites). 
reasons, since such a referendum was not subject to Constitutional Council scrutiny, 
and it was not at all certain that the measures for a restricted electorate were consistent 
with the French Constitution and its notions of indivisibility (see Christnacht 2004 p. 
59). In the event, the national referendum endorsed it by 80% albeit with a low 37% 
turnout (Waddell 2008 p. 181, noted that this was the lowest turnout in any French 
national referendum since World War II). In New Caledonia, with a 63% turnout, only 
57% voted yes, with mainly pro-France Noumea voting 63% against (and 54% 
choosing not to vote in Ouvea, where the Gossanah events had occurred). Once again 
domestic French politics came into play, with the RPCR in New Caledonia 
campaigning for the yes vote, but its national ally, Chirac's RPR, campaigning for 
abstention to weaken Mitterrand (Christnacht 2004 p. 59). The pro-France RPCR's 
taking this stance foreshadowed further situations where local imperatives surmounted 
metropolitan based positions ultimately leading to divisions within the pro-France 
coalition of interests in the early 2000s. 
Ominously for the future, and for France's credibility with the pro-independence group, 
the only element not covered by the subsequent "referendum law" was the application 
of the restricted electorate to the Congress and provincial elections, owing to the 
apparent constitutional obstacle (Christnacht 2004 p. 60). Touching as it did on the 
most sensitive issue for the independentists, the effect of immigration on the electorate, 
this issue was unsurprisingly to resurface ten years later. 
The difficulty in securing the Matignon Accords, and the continued volatility in the 
territory, was poignantly underlined a year later. In May 1989, attending a traditional 
ceremony to mark the lifting of the mourning period for those assassinated at Gossanah 
Tjibaou himself and his deputy, Yeweine Yeweine, were assassinated by extremist 
militant, Djubely Wea, who felt Tjibaou had sold out their cause. Wea was 
subsequently shot dead and the person charged was subsequently released 
(uncertainties surrounding the assassination are set out in Wall, 2009). The 
assassinations marked a turning-point in New Caledonia's political development. They 
represented a stark reminder to the French of the intensity of continued hostility to their 
policies within the ranks of the Melanesians, many of whom felt that Tjibaou had sold 
out to pro-France forces. Together with the memory of the violence of the preceding 
years, the assassinations were a sobering reminder of what was at stake and arguably 
fortified all sides to implement the Matignon/Oudinot arrangements. 
The next ten years saw concerted growth and development. As envisaged by the 
French state, the Kanaks became more engaged in government, with their parties 
dominant in the Northern Province and Loyalty Islands Province following elections in 
1989 and 1995; and the pro-France group becoming accustomed to engaging Kanaks 
politically, nominating senior Kanak pro-France supporters to prominent positions, 
such as Dick Ukeiwe to the European Depute position in June 1988 (French overseas 
territories could vote for an overseas territory member of the European Parliament); and 
Simon Loueckhote as President of the Congress and then, in 1992, as the youngest 
Senator for France (Angleviel 2006 pp. 225-6). Roads, schools, clinics and hospitals 
and electricity lines were all established in the interior of Grande Terre and the islands. 
Land reform was accelerated. The ADRAF distributed 82,000 ha of land between 1989 
and 1995, increasing by 36% the land controlled by Melanesians (Angleviel 2006 p. 
222). The 400 cadres program had a more mixed success, training numerous lawyers, 
some engineers and one pilot, but as Christnacht admitted, resulting in inadequate 
numbers of mid-ranking Kanak managers (2004 p. 61). The French State provided the 
bulk of the New Caledonia budget, spending $A 470 m. in New Caledonia in 1986. 
There were some limited cultural and economic contacts with Pacific island countries 
(Christnacht 2004 p. 61). 
But the fragility of the arrangements, in the wake of such tension and bloodshed, was 
apparent to leaders. Both FLNKS and RPCR leaders were managing the dissatisfaction 
of extremists unhappy with the compromises they had made. On 27 April 1991, in the 
knowledge that any referendum was likely to result in a no-vote to independence given 
the demographics (Angleviel 2006 p. 226, estimated 65% of voters would have voted 
against), and that such a result risked re-opening old wounds and a return to violence, 
RPCR President Jacques Lafleur proposed a "consensual solution" in order to head off 
a 1998 referendum couperet (literally "cut-off'or "guillotine-style" referendum). The 
UC took up this idea at its congress in 1993, designating such a solution as "negotiated 
independence". From 1995 onwards, negotiations began with both the RPCR and the 
UC preparing papers and ideas. 
Meanwhile, there were changes at the edges of the two main political groupings. Pro-
France supporters grouped in Lafleur's RPCR, were bookended by the rightwing 
National Front and a more leftwing party Une Nouvelle-Caledome pour Tons (A New 
Caledonia for All, UNCT) formed in 1995 by Didier Leroux. The independentist 
FLNKS, now headed by Paul Neaoutyine of Palika (not headed by the UC, as when 
Tjibaou was leader) was riven by internal conflict. The LKS and the USTKE had left, 
leading to the creation in 1998 of the Federation des Comites de Coordination des 
Independantistes (Federation of the Independentist Coordination Committees, FCCI), 
led by longstanding UC or Palika figures Leopold Joredie, Cono Hamu, Raphael 
Mapou, Fran9ois Burck and Aymard Bouanaoue. Another party joined FLNKS in 
1998, the Rassemblement Democratique Oceanien (Democratic Oceanic Party, RDO), 
formed in 1994 from the leftwing of the Oceanic Union, mainly representing Wallisians 
and Futunans, under Aloisio Sako (Angleviel 2006 p. 227). 
The Noumea Accord 
After a seven year gestation period, and drawing from the blueprint of the 
Matignon/Oudinot Accords, on 5 May 1998 the Noumea Accord {L 'Accord de 
Noumea 1998) was signed by representatives of the French State, the RPCR, and the 
FLNKS. The Accord had been hardwon. Lafleur (Colloque 2008) recalled that the 
parties spent ten hours at a stretch in discussion on the final day, as deadlines 
approached. It was endorsed by a vote by the people of New Caledonia, on 8 
November 1998. 74% of the people voted, and of these, 72% supported the Accord 
(Ziller and Faberon 2008 p. 369), 87% of voters in the North, 95% in the Islands, and 
63% in the South. While the support in the (pro-France dominated) South was in 
marked contrast to its rejection of the Matignon Accords, still over a third voted no, and 
42% of central Noumea voted no. 
In the background to the exchanges of ideas by the two principal parties over seven 
years, negotiations had been taking place on the nickel resource. Because the 
rebalancing of economic benefits was so central to any negotiated solution, distributing 
the benefits from nickel became fundamental to any meeting of minds over political 
issues, to the point where they were described by the independentists as a prealahle 
minier, or mining "prerequisite". Lafleur had duly sold his SMSP in 1990 to Sofmor 
{Societe d'Economie Mixte de Developpement Controlee par la Province Nord - Mixed 
Economy and Development Company of the Northern Province), as agreed at 
Matignon, thus facilitating Kanak access to the mining sector, with SMSP becoming 
the largest exporter of (raw) nickel in New Caledonia (Christnacht 2004 p. 63). Sofinor 
had been able to diversify into investment in other sectors. 
But now the Northern Province wanted to move beyond extraction and export of the 
raw nickel product, to establish a processing plant project with the Canadian company, 
Falconbridge. To do this, it proposed exchanging one of SMSP's mining sites with 
SLN-Eramet in order to have sufficient proximate reserves for the Falconbridge project. 
The French State, which happened to be a major shareholder in Eramet, negotiated this 
arrangement only after strong resistance by Eramet. It was only in February 1998 that 
the Bercy Accord was agreed, which allowed for the exchange of the rich Koniambo 
range to SMSP in return for mining titles formerly purchased from SLN by the northern 
province at Poum, provided that Falconbridge reached certain stages of establishment 
of a nickel-processing plant by 2007 (the tortuous negotiations with SLN amidst strikes 
and coercion by FLNKS backed unions and the French State respectively are set out in 
Chappell 1999 pp. 383 and 384). The French State compensated SLN for the 
difference in value between the Koniambo and the less well-endowed Poum massifs 
(^reserves). The Bercy Accord proved an indispensable element of the political 
negotiation process. However, while it signalled that greater control of, and return 
from, resources were an important part of pro-independence Kanak aspirations, it did 
not mean that the resource issue would replace the continuing objective, that of 
independence. 
The Noumea Accord is a highly innovative groundbreaking agreement by all three 
partners, the French State, the mainly Kanak independentists, and the mainly European 
pro-France group. At its centre was a further deferral of any vote on independence, this 
time by 20 years, to a series of three votes between 2014 and 2018, to give more time 
for economic development and postpone a potentially painful divisive vote. Its key 
distinguishing features included an acknowledgement of the "shock" of colonization 
both to the identity of the Kanak people and those who had come either for religious 
reasons or against their will; a future for all groups within a common destiny; and a 
continued commitment to economic rebalancing. In a new concept of "shared 
sovereignty", the French State would transfer all but the central, or regalien, sovereign 
competencies (defence, foreign affairs, justice, law and order, and the currency), 
progressively to local institutions in a defined schedule. New Caledonia was given a 
special status of or "country". Again, in an entirely new arrangement to the 
French Republic, the Congress was endowed with legislative powers to make "his du 
pays"' (laws of the country), subject only to French Constitutional Council review, and 
managed by a collegial executive elected on a basis of proportional representation by 
the Congress. New Caledonia was empowered to conduct certain relations with 
regional countries. 
Remarkably within the French unitary Republic, the Accord recognized a New 
Caledonian citizenship, built on special definitions of those eligible to vote in the 
planned 2014-2018 referendum(s) and in territorial (as distinct from French national 
legislative and presidential) elections, and linked to special employment rights (Article 
2). This step was to address Kanak concerns about the effects of immigration, and their 
core Kanak demand for a restricted electorate, which it will be recalled, had met the 
constitutional stumbling-block in 1988, raising Kanak suspicions about the intent and 
word of the French State. Then, the ambiguity related to those who could vote in the 
planned final self-determination referendum. Under the Noumea Accord, whereas all 
French citizens were eligible to vote in French national legislative and presidential 
elections, the electorates for local elections and for the ultimate referendum were again 
especially defined. Those who could vote in local (provincial) elections were 
essentially those who had been resident for ten years in 1998 (to reflect those who 
could have voted in 1988 as provided in the Matignon Accords). But for the final 
referendum(s) of 2014-2018, it included also newcomers, specifically those with twenty 
years residence by 2014 (i.e. continued residence from 1994, as opposed to residence 
from 1988 as for the local elections). 
While the Accord is a considerable achievement, it is, nonetheless, ultimately an 
exercise by two of the three parties to secure the acquiescence of the third in further 
postponing the final resolution of fundamental differences. As further analysis will 
show, its subsequent implementation has revealed ambiguities in its drafting, precisely 
in the areas of fundamental difference, such as provisions restricting the electorate for 
the local elections. 
On 21 March 1999, the Organic Law was gazetted, implementing the provisions of the 
Noumea Accord, marking a new stage in the statutory evolution of New Caledonia. 
French Polynesia: Strategic pawn 
In New Caledonia, political evolution in the post-war periods centred on pro-
independence and pro-France groups, the latter arising from a large European 
population (34 % in 1996, with around 20% of the population long-term European 
residents, Baudchon and Rallu in Cadeot 2003 p. 248). There, the French State has 
strongly supported the pro-France group, while seeking to play a mediating role from 
the 1980s. New Caledonia also has some basis for endogenous economic growth in its 
nickel sector. 
French Polynesia has differed from New Caledonia in that in the formative post-war 
years, its population has been historically more homogeneous with far fewer long-term 
European, mainly metropolitan French, nationals, and more intermarriage between 
Europeans and locals. Also, it has few resources other than tourism, and became 
chronically dependent on French handouts through its hosting of France's nuclear 
testing program. 
Metropolitan French nationals numbered about 9% of the population in 1988 
(Baudchon and Rallu in Cadeot 2003 p. 248) and they were relatively new arrivals, 
numbering around 30,000 in the 1980s as opposed to barely 1,000 in the early 1960s, 
before nuclear testing began in the territory (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 126). 
During this period as now, the large majority of the people were of Polynesian descent 
(82.7 per cent in 1983 Henningham p. 143), including large proportions of mixed race 
or demis peoples (17% in 1977 Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 126, 14.2% in 1983 
Henningham p. 143), reflecting a far greater degree of marriage between the Europeans 
and the indigenous peoples than in New Caledonia. Although there was a longstanding 
Chinese community, many of whom came in the mid nineteenth century as agricultural 
workers and then became urban business people (4.5% of the population in the 1983 
census Henningham p. 143), there was little immigration from outside France, unlike in 
New Caledonia. This homogeneity of Polynesian ancestry underlay more broadly-based 
support for greater autonomy and even independence. It has been the reason why there 
has been markedly less intercommunal conflict in French Polynesia than in New 
Caledonia. Experienced observers such as Henningham have observed that, without 
the "ballast" of a large European/metropolitan French majority settler population as 
exists in New Caledonia, pro-independence pressures could grow rapidly (p. 160). 
Therefore the hand of France has been all the firmer. 
In French Polynesia, in the 1960s and early 1970s, the main political divisions were 
between pro-France groups, autonomists, and independentists, with the latter two 
groups in the ascendant. But from 1980 all of the principal local parties have sought 
greater autonomy, the clearest division amongst them being between the pro-
independence versus the autonomy-within-France groupings, the latter loosely 
described as autonomist. Because of the broad base of the shared autonomy goal, even 
more than in New Caledonia, politics in French Polynesia have consistently been 
characterized by changes of loyalty, divisions and benchcrossing. 
As in New Caledonia, the French State has been a behind-the-scenes player supporting 
the pro-France groups. But in French Polynesia it has acted more overtly with the pro-
France autonomist parties. This consistently more open role can be explained by the 
central place of French Polynesia, until 1995, in maintaining France's position as a 
puissance mondiale moyenne (middle-sized world power) by providing the site for 
France's testing of nuclear bombs. Since then other motivations have come into play, 
which will be explored in later chapters. French Polynesian politics, like New 
Caledonia's, have also been marked by a succession of statutory change (summarized 
at Appendix 2). 
Perhaps unsurprising given the violent resistance to France in the nineteenth century in 
the EFO, local demands for autonomy and independence increased after the Second 
World War. Over 300 French Polynesians served with the Free French forces, 76 of 
whom died. On their return they were more critical of their society and many found 
their jobs occupied by metropolitan civil servants (Henningham 1992, p. 121). The old 
war horse Pouvanaa (see Chapter 2) wasted no time after the war, in 1947, in forming 
the Comite Pouvanaa (Pouvanaa Committee) to assert local Maohi (indigenous 
Polynesian) economic and cultural claims (Danielsson and Danielsson 1986 pp. 22-26). 
Despite his arrest, and acquittal, that year for plotting against the French State, he 
continued to gather support. Enormously popular, he founded Rassemhlement 
democratique des populations tahitiennes (Democratic Assembly of the Tahitian 
Peoples, RDPT), and was elected Depute or member of the French Parliament in 1949 
with 62 % of the vote, retaining the seat until 1957 (Regnault 2003). 
The 1957 decree (Decree of 22 July 1957) implementing the 1956 Defferre Law (Law 
of 23 juin 1956) introduced new autonomy. The same year, a new name strengthened 
the connection with France, the EFO becoming Polynesie frangaise (French Polynesia). 
Pouvanaa was elected to the most senior local position, Vice-President of the new 
Governing Council. His urging of autonomy increasingly became demands for 
independence, exploiting the dual meaning of the Tahitian word, ti 'amara 'a, (which 
means both autonomy and independence), a device to be used by later leaders. He had 
alienated many powerfijl families and businesses, and the French, with his vocal 
demands, which included pushes for a tax on business to fund independence. And he 
led the "no" vote in the 1958 September constitutional referendum for staying with 
France, with remarkable success, leading to only 64% approval for staying with France 
there, as opposed to the upper 90% in the other Pacific entities. At the time French 
officials worked actively to promote a yes vote, in the knowledge of the planned shift 
of the nuclear testing program from Algeria to French Polynesia (Henningham 1992 p. 
125). 
On the heels of this vote, in December 1958 France issued new ordinances 
{Ordonnance No 58-1337 of 23 December 1958), winding back autonomy and 
reducing local freedoms (Faberon and Ziller 2007 p. 315). Immediately after the 
referendum, in October 1958, Pouvanaa was arrested, after arson incidents in Papeete 
were linked with him and his supporters, and weapons were found at his home. This 
time the French were thorough and he was exiled from Polynesia until 1968, and his 
party banned in 1963. But he remained popular despite his exile, and was elected as 
French Senateur (Senator, member of France's upper house) from 1971 until his death 
in 1977. 
Nuclear testing begins 
In 1962, the nuclear testing program was transferred from the Western Sahara to the 
French Polynesian islands of Moruroa and Fangataufa, with a support base on Hao in 
the Gambier archipelago, and headquarters in Papeete. To safeguard French interests in 
the light of demands for autonomy and independence, possession of the testing sites 
was ceded to the French State in 1964 by the Permanent Commission of the Territorial 
Government (Henningham 1992 p. 164), and later, in 1980, these areas were decreed 
national security zones. Atmospheric tests began in 1966. After regional and 
international outcries, and only after a successful case was brought against France by 
Australia, New Zealand and Fiji in the International Court of Justice, atmospheric tests 
were replaced by underground testing from 1975, continuing to 1996 (with a 
suspension from 1992 to 1995). For the period of nuclear testing, maintaining French 
Polynesia within the French fold was indispensable to its national and international 
stature, and thus of vital strategic significance. In this period there was a massive 
inflow of ftinds, technology, jobs and infrastructure, including construction of the 
international airport at Faaa on Tahiti and airstrips and the Centre d'experimentation du 
Pacifique, (Pacific Experimentation Centre, CEP) on the island of Hao. 
Economic and social change 
Such an influx brought about rapid social and economic change, and a prosperity which 
was as disruptive as it was artificial. Until 1960, the only airstrip was that constructed 
on Bora Bora during the War. Papeete did not have an airport before then, although 
flying boats landed there. As the traditional copra and vanilla markets slumped, and 
phosphate reserves on the island of Makatea dried up in 1966, the islands became ever 
more dependent on French inflows. During the 1960s the budget of the army and the 
CEP increased fifty times (from 1961 to 1966) and the numbers of civil and military 
functionaries from 400 to 15,000 (1961 to 1968). GNP increased 75 times from 1962 to 
1982, and the minimum wage 15 times. Consumption increased but much of what was 
consumed was imported holus bolus from metropolitan France including energy (99%) 
and food (85%) (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 pp. 124-5). 
Dependence on France increased dramatically. Before nuclear testing, French 
Polynesia did not rely heavily on metropolitan funding, with returns on exports 
averaging around 90 per cent of the cost of imports in the 1950s. But metropolitan 
transfers as a percentage of GDP averaged 16.1 percent 1960-63 and reached 39% in 
the 1970s (Henningham 1992 p. 128). The public sector became the biggest employer 
with salaries artificially inflated and paying no income tax. Metropolitan-based 
officials were posted with very large supplements to their salaries. Taxation was 
indirect and included import tax. All of these factors unnaturally elevated the cost of 
living. The windfalls were fitful, with the CEP employing 10,000 in the 1960s but only 
3,000 in the 1980s, and CEP contributing 37% to GNP in 1970, but only 19% in 1980. 
Migration to Papeete increased substantially and rapidly. In 1951 48.6% of the 
population lived on Tahiti, reaching 70% by the 1980s (Henningham 1992 pp. 129-
130). By 1995, the population of Tahiti and Moorea had tripled (49,800 in 1952 to 
161,000 in 1995, Dunmore 1997 p. 265). From being mainly a subsistence economy up 
until 1960, French Polynesia rapidly increased its food imports to the point where 80 
per cent of its food needs were imported by the 1980s (Henningham 1992 p. 131). The 
self-employed peasant class rapidly became a worker class. 
Pro-France versus pro-autonomy 
With Pouvannaa out of the way, political divisions tended to coalesce between those 
wanting continued dependence on France, and those seeking increased autonomy. 
Overall, politics continued to be highly personal. Pouvannaa's supporters created 
political parties around their personal support bases. Francis Sanford and Daniel 
Millaud and their mainly mixed-descent Demis supporters created the Te E 'a Api (New 
Way), and John Teariki and Jean Juventin and their more traditional Protestant 
Polynesian Maohis, the Te Here Ai 'a (Love of Fatherland). The two parties became 
allies. Later, Emile Vemaudon split from Te E 'a Api to form his Te Aia Api {New 
Fatherland). These autonomist parties joined to form the majority in the Territorial 
Assembly in the 1970s. Sanford was elected Depute in the French National Assembly 
from 1968 and 1973. Chesneaux and Maclellan note succinctly that despite their 
generally autonomist disposition, these political groupings, sometimes allies, 
sometimes rivals, represented personal interests without a coherent political plan; and 
splits, defections, unexpected unions and changes of position were their political 
currency (1992 p. 131). France played a role in this, by mainly ignoring their political 
demands, as many French officials believed that autonomist demands were a means of 
squeezing more funding from France (Aldrich 1993; Regnault 2005a; Henningham 
1992 p. 135). This tradition, of playing the independence card to extract economic 
gain, persists until today. 
For these local pro-autonomy political groups, the French nuclear testing issue became 
largely a pawn in the game of political power. Generally, the autonomist parties were 
critical of French nuclear testing. In 1974 Sanford and Teariki supported anti-test 
Fran9ois Mitterrand in the presidential campaign, but in 1981 thought nothing of 
switching support to Giscard d'Estaing who supported nuclear testing, in return for 
various development promises (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 131). (In the event, 
Mitterrand won.) 
Increasingly dependent on France, in the 1960s the territory handed over to the French 
government responsibilities for posts and telegraphs, secondary and technical education 
and some public health programs. The French government expanded municipal 
government which both boosted the aid and development of the outer islands but also 
sheeted the credit to France rather than the Territory (Henningham 1992 pp. 135-6). By 
the 1980s, France was spending over $A 1 b. annually in the territory, Uvice as much as 
it was spending in New Caledonia. 
Re-emergence of independence demands 
Their demands ignored, the autonomist groups occupied the Assembly building in June 
1976 for almost a year. The French simply waited for them to leave (Henningham 
1992 p. 136). With France failing to respond to autonomy demands, it was not 
surprising that pro-independence sentiment re-emerged. Jacqui Drollet formed the la 
Mana Te Nunaa (Power to the People) party in 1975, actively propounding 
independence from 1978, while acknowledging it would take a ten or fifteen year 
planning period. The same year, Oscar Temaru formed a more militant pro-
independence party, the Front de Liberation de la Polymsie (Polynesian Liberation 
Front, FLP), which became the Tavini Huiraatira {Serviteur du Peuple or People's 
Servant) in 1982. It argued for immediate transition to independence, and immediate 
cessation of the nuclear tests. A range of smaller independentist groupings were formed 
in the 1970s and 1980s. 
It was not until the late 1970s that France responded to the sharper calls for autonomy. 
A 1977 statute (Law No 77-772 of 12 July 1977), described as an autonomy 
management statute, was passed recognizing financial and administrative autonomy in 
the territory, restoring the governing Council presided by the High Commissioner, and 
reinstating the Vice-President elected by the Territorial Assembly. The Vice-President 
and the Governing Council had collegial control over specified portfolios, and while 
the High Commissioner had executive power, in practice he refrained from attending 
every Council meeting (Henningham 1992 p. 140). Francis Sanford was elected Vice-
President and served from 1977 to 1982. But the changes were slight and fell short of 
the 1957 Defferre Law provisions. 
In time Sanford began to demand transfer of executive power from the French High 
Commissioner to the Vice-President. At this point Gaston Flosse, who had led 
conservative, pro-France opinion, decided to change his position to favour autonomy. 
Autonomy within France v. independence 
From 1958 Flosse had been active in the Gaullist Union Tahitienne-Union pour la 
Nouvelle Republique (Tahitian Union, Union for the New Republic, UT-UNR), leading 
its 1971 iteration the Union Tahitienne - Union pour la Defense de la Republique 
(Tahitian Union, Union for the Defence of the Republic, UT-UDR) and leading the 
successor party, the Tahoeraa Huira 'atira or People's Assembly, which he set up in 
May 1977. A gifted politician with an eye to the main chance both for himself as much 
as French Polynesia, and stalwart of the French Republic, Flosse began as a relatively 
poor Demi (mixed descent) from Mangareva in the Gambiers. His skill in both 
Tahitian and French enabled him to relate easily to both worlds (Henningham 1992 pp. 
140-141). 
Until 1980 the conservative Gaullists staunchly favoured the nuclear testing program 
and its economic benefits, and opposed greater autonomy as inevitably leading to 
independence. Flosse's supporters claimed that his switch in 1980 to supporting 
greater autonomy was motivated by awareness that this was possible while maintaining 
close links with France. His switch reflected a judgement that supporting greater 
autonomy would, indeed, head off independence. His support for autonomy was a 
watershed for the territory, as it meant that a large majority of the electorate now 
favoured this position. Henningham noted this reflected a Tahitian identity based on 
the Polynesian ancestry of most of the population, with only a small minority favouring 
independence (Henningham 1992 p. 141). Flosse's switch paid off. Tahoeraa with the 
new platform won the 1982 elections, and he became Vice-President. He was to stay at 
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the head of the executive in various forms until 2004, except between 1987 and 1991. 
From 1986 to 1988 he was appointed by Chirac as the first State Secretary for the South 
Pacific. He was elected a Depute in the European Parliament in 1984, and in the 
French Assembly in 1986; and as Senateur from 1998. 
The harnessing of the pro-autonomy sentiment from the broad Polynesian base saw a 
resurgence of interest in Polynesian and Tahitian cultural identity, reflected in the 
establishment of museums {Musee de Tahiti et des lies, the Polynesian Centre for 
Human Sciences) and use of Tahitian language in schools from 1980 onwards. The 
new Internal Autonomy Statute of 1984 (Law No 84-820 of 6 September 1984) 
reflected these changes, allowing the use of Tahitian along with French as an official 
language, and the flying of the Tahitian flag alongside the French tricolore. The 
Statute also considerably expanded self-government. While the French State retained 
responsibility for broad "sovereign" matters such as foreign relations, defence, 
immigration, currency, public order, and economic areas, there were some shared 
responsibilities and the territory was able to conduct some regional affairs. The Statute 
established a local President of the territory, a position won by Gaston Flosse which he 
held to 1987, when his party lost in the 1988 elections, but regained in 1991. The 
cultural symbols in the Statute were tangible rewards for local support for the Statute, 
in contrast to the New Caledonian nationalist opposition to a similar Statute there. The 
symbolic autonomy changes also reflected the greater strategic significance of French 
Polynesia to France as a testing site at the time. It was around this time that Flosse 
began to speak of a "free association"' status for French Polynesia along the lines of the 
Cook Islands' relationship with New Zealand (Henninghaml992 p. 160).^" 
In 1986 Flosse's Tahoeraa won the Assembly elections outright, the first time a single 
party had done so since Pouvanaa's win in 1957. His party benefited from the 
electoral system's heavier weighting to the less populous outer islands, whose voters 
are more conservative and pro-France. Henningham (1992 p. 152) suggested this 
system may well have been designed by the French government to its benefit, a 
precursor to systemic manipulation in the early 2000s. 
At this time international and especially regional pressure was reaching boiling point, at 
France's handling of the deteriorating situation in New Caledonia, and especially its 
bombing of a ship, the Rainbow Warrior, protesting against nuclear tests, in New 
Zealand (see Rainbow Warrior affair section below). In the context of a regional 
diplomatic offensive Chirac, as Prime Minister of France in March 1986, appointed 
Flosse Secretary of State for South Pacific affairs. This meant that Flosse would be 
increasingly absent from Papeete. Already, Flosse's style and political decisions had 
alienated many of his supporters. He was authoritarian, and granted favours and 
Under the Cook Islands arrangement , the Cook Islands has an independent international identity, full 
local self-government , and the right to proceed to full independence should it wish to do so, with N e w 
Zealand undertaking aid and defence commitments . Cook Islanders retain N e w Zealand cit izenship and 
full immigrat ion rights into N e w Zealand but control immigrat ion by mainland N e w Zealanders . Cook 
Islands do not have a seat in the UN. See Henningham 1992, p. 161. 
contracts to cronies while failing to address social problems and tensions in a timely 
way (Henningham 1992 p. 153). The incompatibility of his national ministerial 
responsibilities with those of his Presidency of the territory led him to relinquish the 
latter in January 1987, designating a mate, Jacky Teuira, to the position. His absences 
from the Territory and alienation of key industry players meant that a dockers' dispute 
erupted into a major riot in October 1987, damaging and looting several businesses in 
Papeete. 
Autonomy and independence alliance 
In the end defections from Flosse's party led to his loss of government and support for 
Alexandre Leontieff, a pro-France leader, heading a loose coalition of parties. This 
group was primarily united by their dislike of Flosse and included Tahoeraa dissidents 
{Te Tiarama), the Here Ai 'a centre-left party and la Mana moderate leftwing, pro-
independence party. This was not the last time such a disparate group would be 
gathered for electoral convenience, reflecting, as Al Wardi described it, "political 
nomadism" where ideological distinctions took second place to securing resources for 
constituents by shifting alliances (Al Wardi 2009 p. 198). The coalition held together 
until the end of 1990. In achieving this Leontieff had to tread a careful path promoting 
autonomist demands within France. As Depute in the French Parliament, he cautioned 
that French misunderstanding of the special characteristics of the territory had re-
awoken demands for independence. He and his government advocated an advanced 
form of internal autonomy within the French Republic, with all the advantages of 
independence without the disadvantages {La Depeche de Tahiti, 10 June 1989). 
A side issue at this time, resulting again from the tendency of French Polynesian 
leaders to eye developments in New Caledonia, was concern about French Polynesia's 
status and immigration inflows from Europe, raised by France's economic integration 
into the EU in 1992. Most parties boycotted or did not actively become engaged in 
European elections in July 1989 because of these concerns (Henningham 1992 p. 163). 
France was dismissive, referring to controls held by the French state since 1932 over 
entry and residence, supplemented by the 1984 Statute which provided for consultation 
with the territory on immigration and the control of expatriate residents. 
The most important issue for autonomists remained French Polynesia's dependence on 
French funding arising from the nuclear testing site. Whereas formal opposition to 
nuclear testing was confined mainly to the Tavini and the la Mana which in 1986 
together only attracted around 15% of the vote, general concern about testing was more 
widespread, but always tempered with concern that funding by France not be 
jeopardized. The Leontieff-led government took the approach of encouraging long-term 
planning by France to prepare for when testing was wound down. The French State 
continued to pursue its strategic interests without regard for local sensitivities within 
French Polynesia or more widely in the region, with President Mitterrand at one point, 
in late 1987, visiting the test sites via Hao and returning to France without even 
touching down in Papeete. 
To answer some of these concerns, France legislated amendments to the 1984 Statute in 
July 1990 (Law No 90-612 of 12 July 1990). These granted to the Territory some 
further limited controls over foreign investment, the budget, exploration and 
exploitation of seabed, marine and subterranean resources, and provided for a 
consultative committee over immigration. Local Conseils d'Archipels (Island Councils) 
were set up in the key island groups, Flosse's power base, in a bid to respond to outer 
island concerns about Tahiti's political predominance (Dunmore 1997 p. 264). 
Dissatisfaction continued, with unions organizing disruptive protests against rising fuel 
prices in July 1991, resulting in violence (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 139). 
Nuclear testing and beyond 
Finally, in the face of world and regional criticism for its nuclear testing in the Pacific 
(see following section), French President Mitterrand imposed a moratorium in 1992. 
The decision immediately led to an economic slump. Mitterrand began consultations 
with French Polynesian leaders on the fiiture without the economic boost of the nuclear 
testing apparatus. These talks led to the Pact for Progress, agreed in January 1993 and 
implemented by the 1994 Economic and Social Development law for French Polynesia, 
with a development contract signed in May 1994, extended by another signed in 
October 2000 (Faberon and Ziller 2007 p. 316). Essentially the French underwrote 
extensive ongoing financial support well beyond any cessation of the tests as 
compensation. 
Much of the goodwill accrued in this process was eroded by Chirac's decision, when he 
was elected President, to resume nuclear testing in 1995. Protests resurged, leading to 
riots and burning of the international airport and numerous shops and offices. The 
territory's one remaining economic asset, tourism, suffered as a result. When he 
revised his decision, in 1996, ended the testing program and closed the CEP, Chirac 
promised just under 1 b. former French francs (around $A 300 m.) assistance over the 
succeeding ten years. Ironically, France's major investment, through the CEP, in 
infrastructure, port installations, roads, hydro-electric and solar power schemes, and in 
providing jobs, had built the territory's standard of living and expectations to a high, 
possibly unrealistically high, level. It would be costly to maintain. 
France offered continued extensive financial support, in return for staying with France, 
along with continued self-government, albeit within constraints set by France and, it 
should be noted, with substantially fewer real powers than it accorded New Caledonia 
in 1998. French Polynesia's limited economic resources meant that the stakes were 
lower for France than in New Caledonia. Even Oscar Temaru acknowledged that 
independence would lower the standard of living in French Polynesia (on 13 April 2006 
he told the Nouvelles de Tahiti that independence would only be possible "when our 
country's economic development allows it to ensure sovereignty"). 
Regional concern 
No doubt, with the bulk of testing requirements behind it, France was ready to wind 
down its testing program in any case by the early 1990s. The 1994 Defence White 
Paper shifted emphasis from nuclear to conventional capability, and the focus of 
military research from nuclear to space technologies (Piquet 2000 p. 22). While it 
remained committed to its continuing status as a nuclear power and the force de frappe 
(nuclear deterrent), France had already established its nuclear credentials. The Berlin 
Wall had fallen and the Cold War was in its final stages. But there is no doubt that 
international and regional criticism played a major role in forcing France to do without 
continued testing and to close the CEP. In this, France had necessarily to weigh its 
strategic influence in terms of its nuclear imperative on the one hand, and its 
international reputation on the other. Events showed once again that domestic political 
preoccupations in Paris, linked closely with France's international image, would 
determine outcomes, and that lack of coordination of agencies involved would lead to 
errors. 
Rainbow Warrior affair 
On 10 July 1985, two French secret agents bombed the Greenpeace vessel, the Rainbow 
Warrior, killing a photographer, Fernando Pereira. Greenpeace had been about to 
launch another of the vessel's forays into the region, notably to French Polynesia, to 
protest against nuclear testing there. New Zealand sentenced and jailed two of the 
agents responsible, Alain Mafart and Dominique Prieur, in November 1985. But 
France then impeded wool and offal imports from New Zealand, New Caledonia 
stopped importing New Zealand lamb, and France threatened European Economic 
Community reductions in the EEC quota of butter imports from New Zealand 
(Henningham 1992 p. 226). 
UN Secretary General Xavier Peres de Cuellar was called upon to negotiate a 
settlement, involving an apology and $US 7 m. compensation from France, as well as 
an instruction to France not to obstruct New Zealand imports, in return for New 
Zealand releasing the two agents into French custody for detention for three years on 
Hao atoll. But France did not respect this agreement, freeing the agents and returning 
them to metropolitan France within two years (Henningham 1992 p. 226). New 
Zealand then sought further international arbitration. An international tribunal ruled in 
1990 that France had indeed breached its obligations and required a further payment of 
$US 2 m. into a French-New Zealand fund. 
There were several consequences to this behaviour, which came, it will be recalled, on 
the heels of the most violent episodes in New Caledonia's evenements (disturbances). 
There were domestic repercussions. Until 1985, the nuclear testing and deterrent issue 
had broad-based French domestic support. But the Rainbow Warrior affair was to 
begin to change public opinion within France (Dunmore 1997 p. 260, Chesneaux and 
Maclellan 1992 p. 116). France's disregard for its UN-brokered commitment and the 
legal case protracted over five years raised further questions in the minds of leaders of 
its own Pacific territories about its commitments to them, particularly in New 
Caledonia where France was negotiating the Matignon/Oudinot Accords based 
primarily on promises. The affair also underlined the role of the French Defence 
Ministry in dictating policy on the Pacific, over and above that of the Foreign Ministry 
(see also Mrgudovic 2008 p. 185). This did not result in good outcomes since, as 
Dunmore indicated, Defence planners were resentfial of the activities of the anti-nuclear 
movement (1997 p. 259), had their own operational interests in prolonging the nuclear 
testing presence, and were not nuanced in foreign policy. 
The external effects were disastrous for France and its prestige. The clumsy nature of 
the attack, with France's role and agents so publicly revealed suggested more the action 
of a banana republic indulging in state terrorism than a major world leader. The fact 
that the UN was required to mediate, and that the mediation dragged on over five years 
mainly owing to France reneging on its commitment, sullied France's reputation and 
counteracted the efforts France was making in other areas to improve its image in the 
latter 1980s. 
The Rainbow Warrior affair enabled Pacific leaders to galvanise their efforts and to 
receive a sympathetic hearing on the international stage. As Chesneaux and Maclellan 
(1992 p. 117) indicated, the French action showed blithe contempt for successive 
Forum resolutions condemning French testing. The French argument against others 
interfering in their affairs had been cut dead by its own interference in a New Zealand 
port (Bates 1990 p. 137). The affair represented a golden opportunity for the islanders 
to demonise France (Du Prel 1996 p. 9), especially to portray it as an outsider creating 
instability (Maclellan and Chesneaux 1998 p. 190). 
On a broader scale, the Rainbow Warrior incident hardened New Zealand's support for 
banning nuclear ship visits (Hertningham, 1992 p. 224), which was arguably against 
broad western interests in the Pacific at the time, widening as this New Zealand policy 
did, differences within ANZUS. Thus, just as French handling of New Hebrides and 
New Caledonian issues had inadvertently opened the region to adverse strategic 
consequences, so did this aspect of its dealing with the French Polynesia testing issue 
undermine fundamental western strategic interests. 
Regional criticism 
To understand the depth of feeling and intensity involved in regional opposition to 
French nuclear testing in the South Pacific, and France's seeming disregard of this 
opposition for many years, requires an acknowledgement of significant spatial, 
economic and cultural differences between France and the newly independent island 
countries, and between France on the one hand, and Australia and New Zealand on the 
other. 
The spatial context of the issue for the Pacific countries is fundamental to their stance. 
In the first place, while to a well-entrenched European power, the South Pacific 
countries seemed thousands of kilometers removed from the Hiroshima experience of a 
100 
nuclear explosion, those countries belong to the same hemisphere as Japan. For them 
the lessons from the Hiroshima explosion, the cost in human lives and suffering vividly 
portrayed in newsreels, were stunning in their immediacy and scope. The Hiroshima 
bomb had taken place in their neighbourhood. Memories were recent and vivid, and 
shaped attitudes to nuclear testing in the region itself 
Secondly, whereas France claimed the testing sites were on its sovereign territory, 
whatever the legality of this claim, for Pacific island countries they were taking place 
in their immediate neighbourhood, in what they repeatedly referred to as their 
"backyard" (see for example comments by Cook Islands Prime Minister Davis, in 
Henningham 1992 p. 218). The backyard is a concept of being at home and therefore 
the space for highly private family activity, to be respected by neighbours (France grew 
to appreciate this distinction - see comments made by David Camroux in Assemblee 
Nationale de France, 1996 report p. 53). They felt affronted by violation of this space, 
so proximate to their homes. France might well claim that the Hao area was thousands 
of kilometers from neighbouring islands, but for island countries, the distances were 
perceived as relatively small. Moreover, they shared long-term historical, cultural and 
ethnic ties and a community of interests. For them, even if the claimed risks in testing 
were only moderate (which they did not believe), those risks should be taken on French 
metropolitan territory. 
The concept of being a good neighbour was also different. France's approach to testing 
revealed much about its attitude to the region. Because of the lofty strategic 
significance of the testing program, France never ceased to conduct itself as a nuclear 
power even when ending its program. Even today France would be unlikely to describe 
island Pacific countries as its neighbours (see the section on France as "in" versus " o f 
the Pacific, Chapter 8). And so it has left a legacy which would take significant 
diplomatic and other resources to overcome. 
There were other differences in perception. None of the Pacific countries, including 
Australia and New Zealand, had any experience of the positive uses of nuclear power in 
energy production, whereas in France over 50 % of its energy needs were being met by 
nuclear power stations by the early 1980s (Henningham 1992 p. 165). So in the Pacific 
there was no firsthand evidence of a successful use of nuclear energy, and to compound 
matters, a vivid impression of its most destructive impact. Furthermore, indigenous 
traditions are strongly disposed towards preserving and respecting natural forces. In 
contrast to secular France, Pacific island societies are religious, and operate within a 
more difflise environment where the lines between religion and politics are blurred. 
Thus France tended to dismiss strong opposition region-wide by the Pacific Council of 
Churches, and Paris-based policymakers were too prepared to situate the Council's 
opposition in the context of the Anglo-Saxon Protestant v. French Catholic paradigm of 
the nineteenth century, although the Council included both Protestants and Catholics, 
(Dunmore 1997 p. 259, Henningham 1992 p. 176). Rather, given their traditions and 
religious background, nuclear testing was perceived by many islanders as morally 
wrong. 
And, for Pacific islanders, the nuclear issue was closely interrelated with the question 
of independence for both French Polynesia and New Caledonia. 
South Pacific Forum action 
Just as the Forum's strategy to urge self-determination in New Caledonia was a 
strongly held principle within a broader concept of support for decolonization, so its 
strategy to combat French nuclear testing took place within the broader context of its 
opposition to nuclear activity in the region. 
Forum opposition to nuclear testing was broad-ranging and pre-dated French testing. 
In 1956, both the Cook Islands and Western Samoan local assemblies, even before 
independence, protested against British and American atmospheric tests. Western 
Samoa's Legislative Assembly described the French plan to test in the Pacific as a 
serious threat to health and security in the South Pacific a full year before the tests 
began (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 184). New Zealand also protested against 
American testing at the time (Mrgudovic 2008 p. 113). 
Australia and New Zealand took France to the International Court of Justice in 1973, 
claiming the tests had negative radioactive fallout on the regional population. The ICJ 
found in favour of this proposition, at which point France withdrew from the process, 
effectively nullifying it. But France did announce that it would switch to underground 
testing, which it did in 1975 (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 188, Mrgudovic 2008 
p. 118). 
The islanders established, early, a link between the independence and the nuclear 
testing issues, enunciated by Fijian Prime Minister and founding Forum member, Ratu 
Sir Kamisese Mara in 1973, when he said that by persuading the UN Committee of 24 
on Decolonization to speed up the "liberation" of the French territories, France would 
no longer have the right to undertake its tests there (quoted in Chesneaux and Maclellan 
1992 p. 186). French strategic thinker Isabelle Cordonnier understood the motivation 
when she referred in 1996 to the South Pacific as a geopolitical region, and to its 
opposition to nuclear tests, not as Anglo-Saxon opposition to France, but rather 
opposition to something which was seen as one of the last incarnations of colonialism 
{Assemblee Nationale 1996 p. 54). The formation of a group for a Nuclear Free and 
Independent Pacific (NFIP) from 1975 reflected this thinking. 
Such an approach was not shared by the governments of Australia and New Zealand, 
who in the early 1980s exercised a moderating influence within the Forum on islander 
proposals targeting France and the US, over and above their restraining role on Forum 
resolutions on New Caledonia.^' This is not to say that the colonialist-nuclear link was 
not made by interest groups and unions in each country. In Australia these non-
government groups conducted visceral campaigns against France including boycotts of 
- A role not unnoticed in France itself, see comments by French Minister for Foreign Affairs 1985 to the 
French Parliament noting Australia's moderation in its assessment of the situation in New Caledonia, and 
the moderating influence of Australia on the measured stance in the South Pacific Forum, 29 July 1985, 
Dehats de I 'Assemblee Nationale 2 December 1985 {Assemblee Nationale 1985 p. 55549-50. 
French restaurants, interruption to French postal and maritime services, and protests 
and even bombing of French diplomatic and other premises. Many of these groups, 
particularly the unions, were constituents of the Australian Labor Party. 
In 1983, the new Hawke Labor government banned uranium shipments to France, a ban 
which endured until 1986. As noted in the previous section on New Caledonia, feelings 
also continued to run high against France's treatment of New Caledonia at this time, 
especially with France's reversal of autonomy provisions in the Pons Statutes raising 
questions about France's bona fides. In 1986 France banned ministerial visits to 
Australia, and expelled Australia's Consul General from New Caledonia in 1987. 
Islander anti-nuclear concerns were wide-ranging. Not only did they oppose nuclear 
testing, many of the island countries wanted to control the disposal and movement of 
nuclear waste through the region, and to limit missile testing, and visits by nuclear 
ships. To harness these strong feelings in the region within the context of the interests 
of the western alliance, Australia's Labor government proposed a South Pacific Nuclear 
Free Zone treaty in 1984. Australia exerted considerable diplomatic effort to refine the 
proposals, both with an eye to the needs of the major western ally, the United States, 
but also to protect broad western alliance, and therefore French, interests. The final 
treaty, known as the Raratonga Treaty after the capital where it was signed in 1985, 
prohibited Forum members from acquiring and stationing nuclear arms, nuclear testing, 
and depositing nuclear waste in territorial waters. Its annex exhorted the big nuclear 
powers not to conduct nuclear tests in the Zone, not to use nuclear arms against Forum 
members and to apply the treaty in their territories. Individual members could make 
their own decisions on visits by nuclear vessels. But the definition of the Zone, which 
included the French territories but not the US ones in Micronesia, gave rise to French 
grievances that they alone were being targeted. 
Regional opposition to French testing, and the Raratonga Treaty nonetheless influenced 
France. France's cessation of atmospheric testing in 1975 when it turned to 
underground tests, occurred largely in response to the 1974 ICJ court decision brought 
by Australia and New Zealand against France. After the signature by regional 
countries of the Raratonga Treaty declaring the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone in 
1985, France, in 1989, reduced the number of its annual tests to 8 or 9 and gave 
advance notice of them. The relevance of the Raratonga Treaty was demonstrated by 
France's signing it within months of its final test (in March 1996, after ceasing tests in 
January). 
Nuclear testing issues linger 
There was considerable debate, which continues until today, about the environmental 
and heahh risks of nuclear testing. As time, and opposition, progressed, France became 
more skilled at mounting information and diplomatic offensives. France invited a 
succession of regional teams to visit French Polynesia and conduct tests. These 
included one headed by Haroun Tazieff in 1982; New Zealand scientist Atkinson, in 
1984; their own world renowned oceanographer Jacques Cousteau in 1987; and a Dr 
Feuillade in 1990. None of these missions produced conclusive reports which in any 
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case suffered because France did not allow free access to the sites (Chesneaux and 
Maclellan 1992 p. 120 footnote elaborates on these). French officials also tended to 
quote selectively from these reports (Henningham 1992 p. 171). A US Greenpeace 
team conducted its own tests on the reef without French support in 1990, claiming to 
find radioactive substances before the group was arrested and bundled off to Papeete by 
the French navy (Op cit). 
Lobby groups keep alive the question of negative impacts of the tests, ranging from 
damage to reefs and leaching of radioactivity into the sea, to direct health effects 
resulting in cancer or increased incidence of the disease ciguatera, a poisoning of coral 
fish arising from disruption of the reefs (see for example Maclellan 2006 on leukemia 
rates in the testing area). In April 2009 the Labour Tribunal heard the first case by a 
group of eight plaintiffs seeking compensation for effects of the tests on their health 
(see Moruroa e Tatou 2009). And in December 2009, the French government signed 
off on legislation providing for compensation for those assessed as having been 
affected by the tests, and set up a 10 m. Euro compensation fund {Flash d'Oceanic, 23 
December 2009). The matter remains controversial, and lobby groups staged a protest 
at the new legislation in December 2009, saying it did not go far enough. 
Another remnant of the nuclear testing era is the infrastructure. Whereas much has 
been dismantled, empty buildings and airstrips remain, largely unused (Maclellan 
2005e p. 370). Whether and how this infrastructure is used in future will reveal much 
about the safety of the atolls. A related outstanding issue is the question of the return of 
Moruroa and Fangatufa, ceded to France in 1964 (see section Nuclear testing begins 
above), to French Polynesia. 
Conclusion 
France's presence in the Pacific in the post-war years to the mid 1990s was 
characterized by its strong need to re-establish its national prestige, after the losses of 
the War and subsequently of Algeria and Indo-China. Elements of this process 
included the force de frappe (nuclear deterrent) which it tested in the region; but also, 
as the century progressed, recognition of the value of an extended EEZ that its 
territories represented; and maintaining a foothold in a region widely proclaimed as the 
central player in the forthcoming century. It held fervently to the stated need to protect 
the interests of its nationals, which were most pronounced in New Caledonia. The 
ambiguities of its position were evident in the United Nations, where France claimed 
equal rights with the other four permanent members, but at the time rejected reporting 
and other UN obligations towards its Pacific territories. In the SPC France similarly 
showed the primacy of its national interests at all times, and a reluctance to 
accommodate growing islander confidence, independence and participation. WTien this 
attitude led, counterproductively to its interests, to the formation of the political South 
Pacific Forum, France initially treated the Forum with contempt, ignoring its early calls 
for change in it nuclear testing and decolonization actions. 
France's experience in New HebridesA'anuatu was seminal, not for the French state 
itself which perpetuated some of its mistakes elsewhere, but for regional attitudes to 
France. In this archipelago, France had been locked in an uneasy embrace with its 
traditional rival, Britain, for more than a hundred years. France's traditional concerns, 
to support its nationals and its missionaries, had led it to a surprising and generally 
successful innovation, in the Condominium arrangement. But France also showed 
duplicitous behaviour, in its meddling in a federation arrangement and its willingness to 
work with rebels such as Jimmy Stephens to foment rebellion and even secession, in its 
own interests. Its action was also foolhardy, in that if France had succeeded in securing 
the secession of the island of Santo, it would have created a precedent for the possible 
division of New Caledonia and even French Polynesia. In its presence in Vanuatu, 
France demonstrated that it would leverage aid and economic assistance in return for 
political support. Much of the inconsistency of its policy towards the new state arose 
from the lack of familiarity with the local situation in its administrators and 
representatives rotated for short periods without much control or interest from Paris, 
where institutional arrangements favoured stronger ministries such as Defence, over the 
Overseas France and Foreign Affairs agencies. The way in which Vanuatu's 
independence was handled by France directly led to anti-French sentiment, including to 
the formation of an anti-France Melanesian Spearhead Group with a strong Vanuatu 
base in support of New Caledonia. It also led the small Pacific states to efforts to look 
elsewhere, including Libya, or at least to be seen to be doing so, for support, which was 
contrary to the security interests of the Western alliance and Australia. These 
consequences constimted a critical message for France, and the region, as it managed 
its other collectivities. 
The left-over issue of Matthew and Hunter Islands demonstrated both France's 
continuing wish to retain territory (and desirable EEZ) in the region and that it 
remained prepared to back up its claims with diplomacy underpiruied by force. 
The latter half of the twentieth century was a turbulent time for New Caledonia. The 
French State showed innovation, flexibility and creativity in its proposals to meet local 
demands while retaining sovereignty. But it also showed clumsiness, inconsistency and 
irresolution. The principal dynamic operating in New Caledonia has been between 
groups favouring staying with France and those favouring independence. From the end 
of World War II until the mid 1990s, France alternated between extending and reducing 
autonomy in twelve statutes over five decades. While this stop-start process finally 
resulted in an ingenious series of agreed, democratically-based Accords drawing 
elements from many past proposals, it has also left questions about the veracity of the 
State's word and intentions not only within the territory, but more broadly in the region. 
The potential impact of doubts about France's commitment was seen when Kanak pro-
independence groups sought to seek support in dealings with Libya, risking regional 
security at the time. 
By 1998 the French State, the pro-France groups, and the independentists, had worked 
out temporary arrangements to restore stability to their archipelago, based on promised 
rebalancing of economic development and political power between them, but heavily 
dependent on the French State. Thus a complex, ambiguous, and partisan pattern 
emerged whereby the French State was both an actor and an arbiter in poHtical and 
economic life, allied, by its predilection for New Caledonia to stay within the Republic, 
to the pro-France parties. A key compromise had been the idea of a restricted 
electorate for local elections and the final referendums on the future. Another was the 
planned sharing, between the main communities, of economic benefits arising from 
New Caledonia's main source of wealth, nickel. Handling these two issues was to 
continue to be critical to stability, and fundamental indicators of the perceived 
commitment of the French state to the pro-independence group. The restricted 
electorate touched on sensitive immigration issues. The nickel resource had historically 
fostered disparities and was vulnerable to the vagaries of world markets. A further 
variable arose from the consistent lesson in New Caledonian history that, whatever the 
good intent of the French State, the latter's primary preoccupation with its own 
metropolitan political, electoral and constitutional priorities and timetables, have 
complicated its administration of New Caledonia, even to the extent of provoking 
violence. 
As elsewhere in its Pacific territories, the French State linked economic support with 
fealty to France, and backed its presence by force, dealing firmly with protests, most 
notably during the evenements and in its Gossanah cave raid. The effects of 
metropolitan institutional constraints have been felt, as the Overseas France Ministry or 
Foreign Affairs Ministries have been overridden by the Defence Ministry. As the post-
war period progressed, France did learn a lesson and increasingly sent senior officials 
to the territory who had some relevant experience (for example High Commissioner 
Alain Christnacht) but as ever they were rotated out within very short periods, 
continuing the early pattern of the "'valse des goitverneurs". 
And in French Polynesia, where, as the site of its nuclear testing, the strategic stakes 
were the highest for France during this period, many of the same features were evident, 
with one or two important differences. The key difference was that, with a more 
homogeneous population, demands for greater autonomy were always more broadly 
based. As in New Caledonia, French roll-backs of initial provisions for independence 
were met with a resurgence in pro-independence political groups in the 1970s. But in 
French Polynesia, the political dynamic shifted from pro-France v. independentist as in 
New Caledonia, to autonomist within France v. independentist in the 1980s in the 
absence of a substantial long-term French metropolitan settler population, and with the 
general dependence on the French nuclear testing program there. Prominent pro-France 
leader Gaston Flosse even advocated an mdependence-in-association formula as early 
as 1985. 
Here too, with the added interest of its nuclear testing program, France has been 
prepared to flex its military might to retain support, cracking down on protests and riots 
and in 1985 fatally intervening even on a foreign vessel in a foreign port, to protect its 
interests. With the extensive economic effect of its nuclear testing program based in 
French Polynesia, it is here that the nexus between economic support and political 
dependence is most stark. With France promising ongoing funding for continued 
fealty, local political groups threatened to change sides unless further financial support 
was forthcoming. So political allegiance between local parties, being less ideological 
and more clientelistic than in New Caledonia, was more fluid, with the French State a 
more direct player, overtly backing the interests of the pro-France autonomy group. 
In the post-war period, France has responded fitfully to demands for autonomy in 
French Polynesia as in New Caledonia, through numerous statutory changes. And in 
French Polynesia, too, even more clearly than in New Caledonia, because of the nuclear 
testing program, the interests of one part of the metropolitan bureaucracy, the military 
in the Defence Ministry, regularly overrode the other ministries with an interest in the 
overseas territories. As an added overlay, in French Polynesia the close personal 
relationship between autonomist leader, Gaston Flosse, and the French President, 
Chirac, meant that administrative processes were circumvented and personal interests 
dictated policy, and even statutory change, a feature which was to intensify in the early 
2000s. 
Regional and international pressure played a role in shaping France's approach in both 
New Caledonia and French Polynesia in the post-war period, but stopped short of 
influencing France to grant independence to either. Forum efforts, engaging the United 
Nations, contributed to French efforts to be more flexible with New Caledonia in its 
Matignon/Noumea Accords. Regional opposition, and particularly the Fomm-led 
Raratonga Treaty also led to better management, and then cessation, by France of its 
testing program in French Polynesia. 
But an important legacy of regional opposition to French policies was the change of 
heart by France towards the region itself, its efforts to engage with the region, and to 
implement statutory change within its Pacific collectivities with an eye to the broader 
regional context, which will be the subject of the next chapter. 
Chapter 4 
Regional Diplomatic Offensive 1980s to 1990s 
While France introduced a suite of policies to improve its image and engagement in the 
broader region from the mid-1980s, these superficial changes initially met with mixed 
success. It was only after genuine French attention to independence demands in New 
Caledonia, and the nuclear testing issue, that regional attitudes began to change. 
After the war, well into the 1970s, French policy was to keep its territories relatively 
isolated from the region (Bates 1990 p. 92). Chapter 3 described how France resisted 
efforts to draw new island states into the SPC, and the consequent formation of the 
Forum which excluded France and its territories. France had given some indication of 
a wish to be more involved in the Pacific region in the 1970s. The Secretary of State 
for DOM-TOMs, Olivier Stim, claimed in 1975 that there was no wish for France to 
isolate itself in its territories, and affirmed its desire for its territories to establish 
relations with their neighbours (cited in op. cit. p. 94), and he himself travelled to some 
of the Forum island states. One of the first meetings of France's senior officials and 
representatives in the South Pacific region took place in 1978 to plan a strategy for 
greater regional cooperation, with little apparent result on the ground. Bates notes that 
a subsequent call, in 1980, for a new approach to explain its presence only occurred 
because some island states were stepping up the campaign for the decolonization of 
New Caledonia. The idea languished in the early 1980s, although French Polynesia 
had lodged a request for observer status to the Forum by 1985. 
It was only with the shock of the Rainbow Warrior affair to France's international and 
regional reputation in mid-1985, the reinscription of New Caledonia in the UN 
Decolonization Committee and the conclusion of the Treaty of Raratonga, that 
President Mitterrand and later Chirac (Prime Minister from March 1986) took action to 
repair the damage, always with a Gaullist eye to preserving France's national prestige. 
But the exercise from the outset was one of damage limitation rather than genuine 
policy change. Chirac proceeded with the Pons statutes in New Caledonia throughout 
this period; and even later, when France declared a moratorium on nuclear testing in 
1992, it resumed its nuclear testing program from 1995 to 1996. Bates wrote at the 
time that the exercise was ill-founded in that it was designed to correct misperceptions 
that France believed Australia and New Zealand were responsible for perpetrating, and 
therefore was competitive and presentation-focused rather than collaborating with these 
countries to clarify any differences (Bates 1990 p. 97). 
The first step in this image-improving process was a pledge by Mitterrand to increase 
diplomatic involvement and spending in the region. He set up a South Pacific Council 
in Paris and proposed a French university in the region and numerous scientific and 
cultural projects with island states, but only after having visited Moruroa m late 1985 
"to reaffirm France's commitment to its testing programme" (Henningham 1992 p. 
209). The Council was composed of key cabinet ministers, the French High 
Commissioners and French senior diplomats from the South Pacific, attached to the 
office of the President. 
Flosse as Secretary of State for the South Pacific 
Chirac, who became Prime Minister in March 1986, proceeded with regional 
cooperation projects to stave off criticism from increasingly disaffected island states. 
He appointed his personal friend, Gaston Flosse, then President of French Polynesia, as 
Secretary of State for the South Pacific from early 1986, which post he retained until 
Chirac lost govermnent in 1988. Flosse began a process of armual meetings on the 
South Pacific engaging senior regional French officials. He visited Island states and 
invited their leaders to visit Paris, French Polynesia and even Moruroa. 
French regional multilateral activity increased. France increased its disbursements to 
the SPC. Links between its numerous research and scientific organizations and Forum 
countries, and regional organizations, improved. For the first time, French scientific 
and research activities were pitched to development of regional island states (Bates 
1990 p. 100). With the negative aspects of nuclear testing in island leaders' minds, the 
French turned their attention to bolstering their environmental credentials, setting up an 
environment monitoring observatory to collect and disseminate data in coordination 
with similar laboratories in the region; and participated in conventions on the protection 
of natural resources in the South Pacific and on banning driftnet fishing in the region. 
France offered help in surveillance of EEZs and set up emergency rescue and first aid 
supplies in its territories, for regional use (SPC Conference communique October 1990, 
Henningham 1992 p. 214). It set up a computer centre for the SP Geosciences 
Commission, later SOPAC, in Suva. France joined the Pacific Islands Development 
Program based in Honolulu. France also established a Consulate General in Honolulu 
in 1987, accredited to the Micronesian entities. 
Flosse oversaw new bilateral aid to regional states, consisting of emergency and 
humanitarian aid in the wake of environmental disasters such as cyclones, and project 
aid and loans, including from his small ($US 4 m. per annum) South Pacific 
Cooperation Fund. Flosse's support to the Solomon Islands, in May 1986, providing 
speedy and effective assistance in the wake of a devastating cyclone, set things off to a 
good start and was replicated in aid to the Cook Islands, Fiji and Vanuatu after similar 
natural disasters. Overall, France increased its bilateral aid expenditure to an average of 
$A 12 m. a year from 1987 to 1990, a modest amount given it was spending over one 
hundred times that in its own Pacific territories (Henningham 1992 p. 209). 
In all of this, the French military took a high profile, the senior representative 
accompanying Flosse on visits, often in naval vessels. Naval courtesy calls to Fiji and 
Polynesian countries increased, sometimes delivering aid equipment. This was seen by 
many as designed to legitimize the presence of the French military in the region (Bates 
1990 p. 99). 
France encouraged French business and investment in the non-French Pacific. 
Alliances frangaises were formed in Fiji and Tonga. At this time, reflecting shades of 
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the old idea of France's mission civilisatrice, or civilizing mission, there was prevalent 
reference to the concept of rayonnement, or dissemination of French culture, in the 
South Pacific region, including by President Giscard d'Estaing. This included the idea 
of the French territories there being seen as a means to spread French influence, just as 
the colonies had done in Africa (see for example Leymarie 1985 p. 2, Aldrich and 
Connell 1989 p. 5, Ch. 8 and p. 101; Cordonnier 1995a p. 113; Henningham 1992 p. 
194). This trend took place within the context of a revival of the idea of formalizing 
the influence of French culture globally, and specifically of the French territories, as a 
source of spreading French influence. Mitterrand created a High Council for 
Francophonie in 1981 and Chirac created a State Secretary for Francophonie in 1986 
(see Aldrich and Connell 1989 Ch. 8). 
Flosse's leadership of the strategy proved a mixed blessing for many reasons. On the 
one hand, his Polynesian ancestry, ability to speak Tahitian facilitating communication 
with other Polynesian speakers, his flamboyant creativity, frenetic preparedness to 
travel widely, and obvious desire to help were all assets, hnportantly, he was a strong 
regional personality working from Papeete, and not a metropolitan Paris-based 
functionary. 
But his brief was problematic. It was based on checkbook diplomacy and corrective 
presentation rather than collaborationist. He was tasked to play a role in general policy 
and economic development in the French territories and improve relations in the South 
Pacific working with the DOM-TOM Ministry and Foreign Affairs Ministries, but he 
was excluded from policies towards New Caledonia (Bates 1990 p. 97). 
Apart from the confused messages inherent in Flosse's friendly overtures, while nuclear 
testing continued and policy tightened towards New Caledonia, he made some clumsy 
faux pas, reflecting a lack of understanding of island politics and a tendency to self-
aggrandissement, which countered many of France's positive intentions. Financial 
payments were offered to the opposition in Vanuatu's elections in 1987, leading to the 
expulsion of the French Ambassador there. In the Solomon Islands, even the generous 
and speedy French emergency response to the 1986 cyclone was undercut by Flosse's 
provision of aid to Prime Minister Kenilorea's home village which played into the 
hands of the opposition and resulted in Kenilorea having to resign (Bates 1990 p. 105). 
He also oversubscribed in the Cook Islands, where Prime Minister Davis, who had been 
well-disposed towards French Polynesia despite opposing French testing there, also lost 
his job over handling of aid from France (Ibid.). Flosse's personal manner stood out 
from the generally modest island ways. For example, he arrived at the 1987 Apia 
Forum meeting with his own luxury armour-plated limousine, where all other Forum 
leaders including the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers made do with the 
VIP cars provided by the Samoan government (Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 197). 
His regional impact was divisive, even to the point of threatening regional security. 
Already, France's New Caledonia policy had led elements in New Caledonia and 
Vanuatu to consolidate ties with Libya, and Libya was glad to comply given its own 
problems with France over Chad (Henningham 1992 p. 222). This development 
undermined the overriding western security strategy, led by regional powers Australia 
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and New Zealand, and supported by France, of denial of the region to hostile powers. 
But Flosse's heavy hand added its own ingredient of insensitivity and 
counterproductivity. At one point, in 1986, he threatened that if France withdrew from 
New Caledonia, there would be civil war between the Kanaks and Caldoches and the 
resulting power vacuum would be filled by the USSR and Libya, ki June, 1987, he 
sought to galvanise Australia, New Zealand, the US, France and Great Britain to define 
a policy for the South Pacific (Bates 1990 p. 109), seemingly unaware of the 
provocative nature of this suggestion to the independent island states, with its overtones 
of colonialism. 
These lines of argument led to direct responses, especially by Melanesian leaders. In 
1987, both Vanuatu's Prime Minister Lini and PNG Ambassador to the UN at the time, 
Renagi Lohia, referred to France's policies as "a direct threat to peace, security and 
stability...in our region and they have serious implications for international peace and 
security" {Islands Business April 1987 p. 19), and the Solomons Prime Minister noted 
that "the powers that perpetuate terrorism in the region do not include Libya" {Post 
Courier 2\ May 1987 p. 2). 
And, just as French policies in New Caledonia had proven divisive regionally by 
directly resulting in the formation of first, the Forum, and then, the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group, so now Flosse compounded the problem, by counter-proposing a 
Polynesian Community. Although Flosse credited Cook Islands Prime Minister Sir 
Tom Davis with the idea, it seems generally accepted that it was Flosse's (by 
Chesneaux and Maclellan, 1992, p. 197; Bates 1990 p. 112). He organized meetings 
with Polynesian leaders to discuss it and raised it when he received regional leaders as 
his guests in Papeete (Bates 1990 p. 112). His actions were part of a deliberate policy 
of divide and rule, and were badly received. 
France's relationship with Fiji was also regionally divisive. France sought to increase 
its influence, capitalizing on the nuanced regional responses to the 1987 coups by 
military leader Colonel Rabuka. Australia and New Zealand, and the Commonwealth, 
instituted sanctions against Fiji, although some island leaders were more forgiving. 
Although France publicly neither condemned nor condoned the coup, it conducted a 
joint naval exercise with Fiji shortly afterwards, and welcomed Prime Minister Sir Ratu 
Mara to Paris, providing much-needed international recognition in doing so 
(Henningham 1992 p. 216; Bates 1990 p. 101). France stepped up bilateral aid 
commitments to around $A 16m., which compared favourably to Australian annual aid 
of around $A 14 m. at the time. This aid included a helicopter and civil emergency 
equipment which some saw as potentially usable by the rebellious Army. France 
already had military links with Fiji arising from shared participation in the UN Interim 
Force in Lebanon. EC aid continued uninterrupted, no doubt influenced by French 
views. Meanwhile Flosse drew pointed comparisons between regional views criticizing 
Rabuka's desire to reduce the influence of the Indian community while insisting the 
future of New Caledonia should be decided by the Kanaks; and questioning the 
Forum's view of New Caledonia as an international issue while maintaining Fiji was an 
internal matter (Bates 1990 p. 102). 
I l l 
The reaction of regional leaders was, understandably, mixed. The Forum in its annual 
Communiques continued to voice its strong opposition to France's nuclear testing 
including its resumption in 1995; and to watch closely developments in New 
Caledonia. Some leaders, such as in Western Samoa and Cook Islands, favourably 
noted French efforts to dialogue and provide constructive aid, but continued to oppose 
France's nuclear testing and New Caledonia policies (Henningham 1992 p. 215, Bates 
1990 p. 107, Chesneaux and Maclellan 1992 p. 199). Tonga's public position 
vacillated. Not surprisingly, Melanesian leaders were more resistant, with PNG and 
Vanuatu not dissuaded from their efforts in the UN attacking French nuclear and New 
Caledonia policies (Bates 1990 pp. 102-103). As noted in Chapter 3, Vanuatu expelled 
the French Ambassador and France reduced its aid there. Bates in 1990 made the harsh 
conclusion that the Flosse initiatives "failed to reduce the hostility of the Melanesian 
countries towards France and ...there is no conclusive evidence that they had a 
moderating effect on the attitude of the Polynesian states" (p. 113). 
A policy shift from 1988 
But over time, with the nomination of socialist Michel Rocard in place of rightwing 
Chirac as Prime Minister amidst the Gossanah Cave affair in May 1988, France 
bolstered its efforts with more concrete policy change. Rocard led France's changed 
approach to New Caledonia with the Matignon Accords, and, significantly, removed 
Flosse from his position in 1988. He revived France's South Pacific Council which had 
been inoperative under Chirac, and established a regional roving ambassador for the 
South Pacific, a position which endures until today. Naval visits to island states 
increased. Rocard himself visited the Pacific in 1989, including Australia, New 
Caledonia, Fiji, French Polynesia, but finished pointedly with Moruroa. During his 
visit he urged the French territories to integrate more in the cultural and economic life 
of the region (Chesneaux and Maclennan 1992 p. 200). And in 1992 his successor 
Pierre Beregovoy announced a suspension of nuclear testing in French Polynesia 
(which Chirac resumed in 1995 as noted). 
The island governments at this time were certainly happy to accept more engagement 
from France in development cooperation. In 1992, Henningham, while noting 
continued opposition by island countries over New Caledonia and nuclear testing, 
pointed to France's diplomatic offensive having "secured broader acceptance . . .of the 
view that France has a legitimate role, and contributions to make to the region's 
economic welfare", particularly by Fiji, and countries of Polynesia and Micronesia, 
although acknowledged some improvement even with Melanesian countries by 1990 
(pp. 218-19). But these countries continued to oppose nuclear testing, and remained 
vigilant over New Caledonia. It took concrete policy change in both areas to improve 
regional acceptance. Even after cessation of nuclear testing in 1996, regional leaders 
did not see either the Matignon or the Noumea Accords as sufficient in themselves to 
remove New Caledonia from the United Nations Committee of Decolonization (C24) 
list. Thus, as noted in Chapter 3, every year, to this day, a New Caledonia resolution is 
passed without vote in the C24, sponsored by Fiji and PNG (see also Regional reactions 
section of Chapter 7). 
In Australia and New Zealand, grassroots sentiment was strongly anti-nuclear testing 
(especially in New Zealand) and pro-independence for New Caledonia. The two 
governments officially recorded these policy stances, but worked to moderate regional 
pushes for tough action against France. As described in Chapter 3, they had slowed 
down island leaders' moves for reinscription of New Caledonia with the UN 
Committee of 24, only changing their stance when Chirac tightened policy with the 
Pons statutes. Differences with Chirac's approach had led to a deterioration in 
relations, especially between Australia and France, culminating in the expulsion of 
Australia's Consul General in Noumea, John Dauth in 1987. No doubt relations were 
coloured by the complexion of governments in the respective countries, improving for 
example when both French and Australian governments were of the socialist left, as 
when Rocard became Prime Minister in France in 1988 while Hawke led Australia. 
Throughout the difficult 1980s both the Australian and New Zealand governments had 
conducted private dialogue in Paris, to encourage change. Accordingly, both welcomed 
the Rocard reforms on New Caledonia, and strongly supported the Matignon 
Agreements. The Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, visited New Caledonia 
shortly after signature of the Agreements, where for the first time in many years the 
Australian Consul General at the time hosted a reception attended by both RPCR and 
FLNKS members (Personal communication O'Leary September 2009). 
Notwithstanding lingering strains in New Zealand over the Rainbow Warrior affair. 
New Zealand's Foreign Minister vished Noumea in 1989, offered technical assistance 
to support the success of the Matignon Accords, and spoke of France's important role 
and enduring legacy in the South Pacific (in Henningham 1992 p. 228). Both 
governments took a more measured approach to decolonization than many other island 
governments, welcoming, for example, the Micronesian non-independent states into the 
Forum and regional structures in the 1980s (Henningham 1992 p. 222). This was to 
have the effect of paving the way for an accommodating view to the French entities in 
the 1990s. 
By the end of the 1990s, France had begun to implement genuine policy change, 
ceasing its nuclear tests in the region by 1996, by which time it was well into 
implementing the Matignon/Oudinot Accords in New Caledonia, and adjusting its 
statutory provisions for French Polynesia to accommodate demands for change. These 
processes were not straightforward and involved extensive financial and administrative 
investment. France began advocating greater participation in the region by both 
collectivities in the 1990s and early 2000s. But, with a record of broken promises in 
the preceding decades, some of the difficulties France encountered in implementing 
changes in its entities, which will be explored in the next two chapters, left continued 
questions about its future role and acceptance in the region. 
Part II - France in the Pacific - 1990s to present 
Chapter 5 
New Caledonia: Implementation of the Noumea Accord and political 
evolution from 1998 
Chapter 3 concluded that the ftindamental poHtical pillars, on which the compromise of 
the Noumea Accord was based, included defining restricted electorates in certain local 
elections and the final referendum(s) to meet Kanak concerns at the weakening effect 
on their vote by immigration inflows from elsewhere in France; and the fairer 
distribution of the benefits accruing from the nickel resource between the Kanak north 
and islands, and the mainly European south. Developments surrounding these two 
critical elements unfolded at the same time as the fledgling New Caledonian 
government began to test its wings, operating as a collegial Executive, with resultant 
strains. 
Restricted electorate and related issues, including immigration 
Differences over defining the electorate in the Organic Law 
Leaders of the different parties, both pro-France and pro-independence, and 
representatives of France signed the Noumea Accord on 5 May 1998. On 19 March 
1999 the French National Assembly gazetted its Organic Law setting out the provisions 
by which the Noumea Accord would be implemented. Its wording (see below) led to 
strong disagreement about the definition of the electorates for local elections known as 
the restricted electorate, a concept fundamental to the new notion of New Caledonian 
citizenship, specified in the Accord's Article 2 (as noted in Chapter 3). The wording 
was at best a gaffe or at worst a cynical effort to favour the pro-France political groups, 
given the centrality of the restricted electorate/citizenship issue to the negotiations. 
It should be acknowledged that the very idea of defining different electorates for 
different elections, based on years of residency, was an innovative and flexible 
response to Kanak concerns, on the part of French authorities, within a constitutional 
system which claimed above all to be unitary and indivisible, in the sense of delivering 
one vote to one person (see Diemert in Tesoka and Ziller 2008 p. 234). Previously, the 
Matignon Accords had introduced the notion of a 10-year residence requirement for a 
vote in the independence referendum planned for 1998; however, the implementing law 
had been itself the subject of a referendum, to circumvent scrutiny by the Constitutional 
Court. The Noumea Accord in contrast introduced a new notion of New Caledonian 
citizenship linked with the 10-year residence requirement for local elections, and was 
subject to constitutional amendment, a device again to prevent consideration by the 
Constitutional Court (see Faberon and Ziller 2007 p. 390). It was a unique and 
difficult concept for the French legal draftsmen. 
For the ultimate referendum(s) on the future of New Caledonia, Article 2.2.1 of the 
Accord, and Organic Law Article 218 (full text at Appendix I), defined the electorate as 
including those with twenty years residence to the referendum date no later than 31 
December 2014 (i.e. those resident before December 1994); those eligible to vote in 
1998; those having customary civil status or if bom in New Caledonia, having New 
Caledonia as the centre of their material and moral interests or having one parent bom 
there with such material and moral interests; voting age persons bom before 1 January 
1989 who lived in New Caledonia from 1988 to 1998; and those bom after 1 January 
1989 having one parent who could vote in 1998. There was little difference between 
the meaning of what was enshrined in Article 2.2.1 of the Accord, and subsequently 
spelled out in Article 218 of the Organic Law, although there was one obvious 
difference, the Accord referring to twenty years residence to 2013, and the Organic 
Law referring instead to twenty years residence to 31 December 2014. But no 
differences arose (to the time of writing, early 2011, at least) from the wording of these 
provisions. 
For local elections, i.e., provincial assemblies and Congress, it had been agreed that the 
electorate would be a narrower group, including those eligible to vote in 1998 as well 
as essentially those who had been resident for ten years. But questions arose from the 
wording of the provisions applying to some voters as they appeared in the Organic 
Law, i.e., whether those on a particular annex list needed ten years residence to the date 
of any particular Congress or provincial election being held during the Noumea Accord 
period (envisaged in 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014), or simply ten years residence to 1998. 
It was the wording of Article 2.2.1 of the Accord that gave rise to the ambiguity that led 
to a particular interpretation being enshrined in Article 188 of the Organic Law (see 
Appendix I). Article 2.2.1 of the Accord defined the electorate for the local provincial 
and Congress elections as including (a) those able to vote in 1998, (b) those on an 
annex list of those not normally able to vote in New Caledonia but who had ten years 
residence the date of the election", i.e., without specifying which election was 
referred to ; and (c) those reaching voting age after 1998 who either had ten years 
residence to 1998, or a parent either eligible to vote in 1998 or a parent on the annex 
list as having ten years residence "a/ the date of the election " (again unspecified). 
Thus, this provision referred at one point (under (c)) to voters with ten years residence 
to 1998, and in (b) and elsewhere in (c) to voters on an annex list, with ten years 
residence at the date of the election. The inference, for pro-independence supporters, 
was that ''at the date of the election " referred to the 1998 vote referred to in (a). 
But when it appeared in March, the implementing legislation, the Organic Law, Article 
188, referred to (a) those able to vote in 1998, (b) those on an annex list and resident in 
New Caledonia for ten years " at the date of the election to the Congress and to the 
province assemblies"'' and (c) those attaining majority age after 1998 either with ten 
years residence in 1998, or having had one of their parents fulfilling the conditions to 
be a voter in the 8 November 1998 referendum, or having one of their parents 
registered on the annex and with ten years residence in New Caledonia at the date of 
the election"' (i.e. unspecified election but with the implication that it would be the 
specific election to the Congress and province assemblies referred to at (b). 
The wording of Article 188 of the Organic Law referring to Congress and provincial 
elections, and the confusion of meanings in the Noumea Accord Article variously to ten 
year residence to 1998, and to annex list voters with ten years residence to an 
unspecified election, provided for ambiguities and ill feeling which were to plague 
subsequent years. 
The differences reflected fundamentally different ideological approaches. For the pro-
independence groups, preserving the unique voting rights of the electorate as it stood in 
1998 meant respecting the special place of the indigenous, Kanak, and for some, 
Caldoche, resident, amidst a fear of being outnumbered by continued influxes of 
newcomers. It was part of the agreed, "rebalancing" process under the Accord, and the 
basis for the concept of New Caledonian citizenship and the objective of common 
destiny (see the position of the pro-independence party Union Caledonienne, Nouvelles 
Caledoniennes 7 February 2005; comments by Roch Wamytan, Nouvelles 
Caledoniennes 8 May 2003). The pro-independence groups argued for the "frozen" 
igele o r f i g e ) interpretation, i.e., ten years residence requirement to 1998, since this 
would freeze the electorate at the time of the Noumea agreement, and not include future 
immigrants from elsewhere in France who would distort the balance between pro-
independence and pro-France support, in favour of the pro-France lobby. For this 
interpretation, the "annex list" of those ineligible to vote remained that in operation in 
1998. 
The pro-France groups took as their starting point the defence of the fundamental right 
of each person to vote without exclusion (see for example the viewpoint of the 
Association of the Defence of the Right to Vote, Nouvelles Caledoniennes 17 March 
2005; and the position of the pro-France Rassemhlement, Nouvelles Caledoniennes, 15 
February 2005). They argued for the "sliding" {glissant) interpretation, i.e., ten years 
immediately preceding any provincial election, which for the 1999 elections would 
mean people on the annex list resident for ten years to 1998, but for subsequent 
elections held in 2004, 2009 and 2014, would include people who had ten years 
residency immediately before each of those elections - i.e., on subsequent annex lists 
that did not even exist at the time of the Noumea Accord itself This would include 
French newcomers who could be relied upon to inflate the pro-France vote. 
In the event, the French Constitutional Council ruled in favour of the "sliding" 
interpretation, favouring the broader interpretation of the "annex list", which favoured 
the pro-France groups (see Christnacht 2004 p. 65). 
To remove any ambiguity and settle mounting concerns amongst the pro-independence 
group, the Jospin government initiated a change to the Constitution to re-establish its 
own interpretation of the frozen restricted electorate. This involved a huge procedural 
effort, to make a creative compromise conceived in a particular local circumstance 
consistent with the ftindamental one-person one-vote principle of the French 
constitution. Presumably to hasten this unusual provision through the necessarily 
cumbersome processes (which involved convening the Versailles Congress, or joint 
session of both the National Assembly and the Senate), it was hooked for 
administrative purposes to another, unrelated, amendment on the independence of the 
French national Superior Magistrature. A statutory provision expanding the concept of 
citizenship and legislative powers for French Polynesia was also attached to this 
amendment (see Chapter 6). However, both amendments failed in 2000 when the 
Magistrature amendment was abandoned as being judged to have insufficient support. 
This device, whereby important New Caledonian and French Polynesian legislation 
was attached and made hostage quite randomly to a piece of unrelated national 
legislation, is a stark example of how the overseas collectivities' statutory needs are 
subordinated, often quite unnecessarily, to metropolitan political process. The issue 
rellected the fundamental paradox of reconciling indigenous rights with Republican 
constitutionalism. In New Caledonia, given the controversy about the restricted 
electorate issue, concerned local players could be forgiven for believing that the device 
was construed precisely to slow down the implementation of these pieces of legislation, 
and to suspect the commitment of the French State. In any case, that was the effect (see 
for example conclusions of the pro-independence group Palika's annual congress in 
2004 questioning the French State's ambiguous positioning and its capacity to 
guarantee balanced Noumea Accord institutions, and calling for the immediate re-
establishment of the fixed restricted electorate, Nouvelles Caledonienms 17 November 
2004). 
Discontent amongst the pro-independence group, particularly the Kanaks, not 
surprisingly continued to simmer, so much so that when Chirac visited Noumea in 2003 
he promised to resolve the problem before the end of his mandate in 2007. In 2003 the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group focused Pacific Islands Forum attention on the "lack of 
implementation of certain provisions of the Noumea Accord, in particular the electoral 
process and issues relating to New Caledonia's referendum process" (MSG Attachment 
to 2003 Auckland Forum Communique), urging the Forum Ministerial Committee to 
focus on the issues in a planned visit in 2004 (see also Chapter 7). In October 2005, 
FLNKS leader Roch Wamytan included concerns about the restricted electorate in a 
speech he made to the UN Fourth Committee on Decolonization (see UN Document 
A/C.4/60/SR.5, October, 2005, p. 11), proving in the process that the UN procedures 
remain relevant to the New Caledonia situation. 
Meanwhile, more recently-arrived European residents of New Caledonia, with the 
backing of pro-French parties, had taken their case, claiming they had been deprived of 
a vote in local elections, to the French State Council, which in 1998 rejected their 
claims, as did the Appeals Court {Cour de cassation) in response to similar claims in 
June 2000, and again the Administrative Appeals Court in October 2003. Separately, 
aggrieved citizens took their cases to international courts. The European Human Rights 
Court decision on 11 January 2005, while indicating that the ten year residence 
requirement seemed disproportionate to the goal pursued, recognised the validity of the 
statutory requirement taking into account "local necessities" which justified it. And the 
UN Human Rights Committee indicated on 15 July 2002 that the dispositions of the 
New Caledonia statute relating to voting rights were not contrary to the International 
Civil and Political Rights Convention (see Faberon and Ziller 2007 p. 393-4). 
It was only in February 2007, almost nine years after the Accord was agreed, that the 
French legislative amendment was implemented, confirming the frozen electorate 
interpretation, and clarifying what had become for the independentists a continuing 
sore. To compound the ambiguous drafting in the first place, the procedural handling 
meant that France appeared to have redressed Kanak and independentist grievances 
only after three of its own Courts and two international institutions had supported them. 
The word of the French State was thereby once again proven suspect. 
Immigration: removal of ethnic categories from the census 
In a related development, Chirac further raised Kanak and pro-independence concerns. 
When he visited Noumea in July 2003, on the eve of a scheduled local census, he met a 
group of young New Caledonians and answered "impromptu" questions. One young 
white New Caledonian referred to the forthcoming census and complained that she 
could not tick any of the "ethnic membership" boxes on the form, not being Kanak, 
Wallisian, or Asian but "just" being a French citizen. Professing outrage, Chirac 
described these questions in the census as irresponsible and illegal, saying "There is 
only one reply to such a question, you are all French and there are French people of all 
ethnic origins" (RFO TV News 24 July 2003; Maclellan 2005b p. 404). He 
commanded that the New Caledonian census would thenceforward not seek 
information about ethnic origins (Chappell 2009 p. 363). The census had to be deferred 
for a year while forms and procedures were reviewed. 
This decision was troubling for Kanaks for two reasons. First, knowledge of their 
numbers and locations in the archipelago was an important instrument of rebalancing 
economic development, which was a fundamental element of the Noumea Accord. 
Second, ethnic figures revealed the extent of immigration from metropolitan France and 
other French overseas territories, and French encouragement of such immigration had 
historically been one of the Kanak and pro-independence group's prime concerns and 
underpinned concerns about voting rights and calls for the restricted electorate. 
Doumenge, for example, had noted that France had till then specifically retained the 
ethnic classification for New Caledonia given the evolutionary process arising from the 
Matignon and Noumea Accords (in Faberon and Gautier 1998); and that the ethnic 
statistic was relevant to the prediction that there would be a Kanak majority over time 
(Doumenge 2000 p. 65). In response, some Kanak groups {Union Syndicate des 
Tmvailleurs Kanaks et des Exploites, Federation of Unions of Kanak Workers and the 
Exploited, USTKE; UC; CaJedonie monpay, Caledonia my country) boycotted the 
2004 census. The FLNKS agreed to participate only with the promise of a parallel 
"cultural" survey of villages as a gesture to these concerns, even though such a survey 
was not comparable to a full census. 
Concerns about the implementation of the restricted electorate, and ongoing 
immigration, were shared by some Caldoches (see Muckle 2009 p. 191). Shared local 
concerns over immigration-related issues contributed to a gradual coalescence of 
interests between some elements of the pro-independence and pro-France groups 
leading to a political realignment incorporating both (elaborated on in the Political 
transition and realignment section). 
More broadly, in the South Pacific context, the French State's doing away with ethnic 
indicators was anomalous. Other regional countries, including Australia, New Zealand, 
and Fiji, routinely counted ethnic numbers if only to assist in the economic 
development of disadvantaged groups. The decision thus had important social and 
political ramifications, the more so because it was taken deliberately by the Chirac 
government. 
In practice, the boycott rendered the 2004 census virtually useless on many counts, and 
even official published statistics continued to draw upon 1996 figures as the most 
recent reliable figures right up to early 2011 (the two main sources are New 
Caledonia's Institut de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, Institute for Statistics 
and Economic Studies ISEE; and France's national Institut national de la statistique et 
des etudes economiques National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies INSEE; 
see for example ISEE 2008 and Table 2). 
It was notable that there was no regional reaction to this change, reflecting the 
weakened impact of the Melanesian Spearhead Group, and the tentative preliminary 
engagement in regional organizations by the new, pro-France-led New Caledonian 
Government (see Chapter 6). However, in its annual working paper on New Caledonia 
preparatory to the annual UNGA resolution on New Caledonia, the UN Decolonization 
Committee noted the removal of the ethnic category in the census and local indigenous 
opposition to it (UNGA Fourth Committee 2008 p. 2). 
It was only in late 2008, perhaps conscious of the reference in the UN Working Paper, 
that France reversed the decision and announced that the ethnic categorization question 
would once again be included in the 2009 census. However, in the event the New 
Caledonian Government questioned the manner of conducting the 2009 census and the 
result, claiming the outcome understated the population increase, an important indicator 
on which funding from France is based (Lepot 2010). The New Caledonian 
government claimed that some households were not covered, and queried the coverage 
of the census, noting the numbers and efficacy of census agents had been affected by a 
flu outbreak at the time, and an unusually high turnover of agents. It queried the results 
for some suburbs and the census' migration figures. ISEE announced it would do a 
further study on immigration inflows, mid-2010 (Lepot 2010). Apart from the overall 
population figure and the three provincial figures, the publication of most figures from 
the 2009 census was held up until April 2011, with the annotation initially that this was 
awaiting "authentication by decree" (ISEE website 2009 census accessed 13 May 2010) 
and subsequently that the figures were "not available" (ISEE website 2009 census 
figures accessed 3 December 2010 and 12 January 2011). By April 2011 the ethnic 
composition figures were included in ISEE's website, however they too were qualified, 
by the inclusion of extra categories which affected direct comparison with previous 
census figures (see below). 
Immigration inflows: continuing increases from metropolitan and Overseas 
France 
Despite the disruption to ethnic category numbers from 1996, the signs are that 
immigration from metropolitan France and other French overseas territories has 
increased since the 1998 Noumea Accord was agreed (see analysis below), and this has 
not gone unnoticed. New Caledonia's Vice-President, the FLNKS' Dewe Gorodey, in 
her opening speech to a 2008 Colloquium marking the 20 year anniversary of the 
Matignon Accords, referred early to the concerns of the drafters of the Matignon and 
Noumea Accords to legitimize the sharing by immigrants of a common destiny with the 
Kanak people, and concluded her speech by noting the fragility of the pact, which 
depended on trust (Regnault and Fayaud 2008 p. 25). FLNKS Leader Roch Wamytan 
in his presentation to the same Colloquium referred to the continued influx of 
metropolitan immigrants from 2000 to 2004 (Regnault and Fayaud 2008 p. 47). Palika 
leader Paul Neaoutyine at the December 2008 Noumea Accord Signatories Committee 
meeting flagged immigration as a continuing concern (Releve de conclusions 2008, p. 
7). 
Table la shows the official breakdowns of Kanak^^ and European population 
percentages in various censuses since 1887, graphed, from 1911, to 1996, in Table 2. 
Table la also includes figures reported by ISEE in April 2011 on the basis of the 2009 
census, but which included extra ethnic categories and thus render a comparison 
impossible with earlier years (see below). For analytic purposes. Table lb includes the 
percentage breakdown of the communities in 1996 and the qualified, but not directly 
comparable, figures reported from the 2009 census in April 2011. 
The increases in the "Others" categories between 1911 and 1931 followed by the post-
war dramatic fall from 1946 to 1956 can be attributed to the early development of the 
nickel industry when workers were imported, many temporarily, from Indonesia and 
Vietnam. The number of "Others" has increased dramatically and steadily with the 
nickel boom and since and has included Wallisians from Wallis and Futuna, Tahitians, 
Indonesians, Vietnamese and other Asians, Ni-Vanuatu, and others. 
^^  W e use the term "Kanak" in this population section to refer to N e w Caledon ia ' s indigenous Kanak 
population. Official ISEE- INSEE statistics of ten refer to "Melanesiens"' (Melanesians) when referrino 
specifically to N e w Caledonia ' s Kanaks, but do not include other Melanesians such as ni-Vanuatu w h o 
are reported separately as "'ni-Vanuatu'" or are included in their "Others" category. 
Table l a 
Year Kanaks 
Number 
% Europeans 
Number 
% Others* 
Number 
% Total 
1887 42,500 68.0 18,800 30 1,200 2.0 62,000 
1901 29,100 53.5 22,750 41.8 2,550 4.7 54,500 
1911 28,800 56.9 17,300 34.2 4,500 8.9 50,600 
1931 28,600 50.0 15,200 26.6 13,400 23.4 57,300 
1946 31,000 49.4 18,100 28.9 13,600 17.0 62,795 
1956 34,969 51.1 25,260 36.7 8,351 12.2 68,580 
1969 46,200 46.0 41,268 41.0 13,111 13.0 100,679 
1976 55,598 41.7 50,757 38.1 26,878 20.2 133,333 
1983 61,870 42.6 50,757 37.1 29,524 20.3 142,251 
1996 86,788 44.1 67,151 34.1 42,897 21.8 196,936 
2004** n/a** n/a** n/a** n/a** n/a** n/a** 230,789 
[2009*** 99,078*** ^Q J**** 71,721*** 2g 2*** 74,781*** 50.5***] 245,580 
*Other : includes Wallisians f rom Wall is and Futuna, Tahitians, Indonesians, Vietnamese, Ni-Vanuatu 
and Others, except for 2009 *** 
**There was no ethnic category in the 2004 census 
*** "Others" in 2009 included new categories '"me/is'' or mixed race, "Caledonians" , and more "non-
declared", and for this reason are not comparable with 1996 or earlier years, see Table l b 
Source: Christnacht 2004 p. 29 ; Institut de la statistique et des ftudes economiques and Institut national 
de la statistique et des etudes economiques ISEE-INSEE Recensements de la population. Population 
Census , 2008 and 2009 
Table lb 
New Caledonia: Ethnic composition of population, 1996 and 2009 
Community 1996 % [2009*] % [2009] % main 
groups 
reallocated** 
Kanak 44.1 40.3 44.3** 
European 34.1 29.2 33.9** 
Wallisian (Wallis and 
Futuna) 
9.0 8.7 10.4** 
Tahitian 2.6 2.0 
Indonesian 2.5 1.6 
Vietnamese 1.4 1.0 
ni-Vanuatu 1.1 .9 
Others 5.0 16.3 
Of whom* 
Other Asian 
Mixed race, multiple 
Caledonian 
Other 
Non-declared 
(•S) 
(8.3) 
(5.0) 
(LO) 
(1.2) 
*Figures based on new census formulation with new categories under "Others", shown 
**Figures calculated by ISEE reallocating some of the mixed race figures attached to the three main 
ethnic communities 
Source: Pascal Rivoilan et David Broustet, Synthase - Recemement de la Population 2009 ISEE website 
accessed 12 May 2011 
Table 2 
New Caledonia: Census and Population Composition 1911-2004 
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Note : "Melanesien" refers to Kanaks, see footnote 22. 
The ISEE noted that the large increase in the "Others" category in the 2009 census 
(Table 1 b) occurred in part because that census offered more options under "Others" 
for the citizen to nominate, than in earlier censuses, including new categories of "we/zV 
or "mixed race", "Caledonian", and "non-declared" (Rivoilan and Boustet 2010). Why 
the 2009 census would do this when the ethnic category issue was so controversial was 
not explained. The ISEE not only set out the full breakdown (second column of Table 
lb), which showed a marked decline in the Kanak and European populations and 
increase in the other categories, but went on to reallocate some of the "mixed race" 
figures to the sensitive Kanak and European categories, resulting in a pattern similar to 
that in 1996, albeit with a slight increase in the Kanak community over 1996, and a 
slight decrease in the European category (columns 2 and 3 of Table lb). How it was 
decided whether a person of mixed race was allocated to the European or Kanak group 
was not explained. The resuUant uncertainties around these two key and sensitive 
indicators mean that they cannot reliably be used for comparative purposes. Still, they 
point to a continuation of the underlying general trends evident from Tables 1 a and 
Table 2. 
One trend maintains a steady and large increase in recent immigration from other parts 
of overseas France, mainly from French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna, which 
inevitably reduces the proportion of the population that is indigenous. Overall, as Table 
2 graphically shows, the numbers of Europeans and "others" combined have increased 
steadily, rendering the Kanaks more of a minority over time (see Increasing European 
immigration section below). 
According to Gerard Baudchon, then head of the ISEE, of the 34.1 % of the population 
in the "European"' category in 1996, more than half (or about 20% of the population) 
were people of European ancestry who were bom in the territory. Around a third (he 
estimated about 12% of the population) had come from metropolitan France (Baudchon 
with Rallu in Cadeot 2003 p. 248). As a point of comparison, he noted that only around 
9% of French Polynesia's population were bom in metropolitan France (88% being 
Polynesian), and 4% of Wallis and Futuna's population (87%) being Polynesian). 
Declining Kanak proportion of a more diverse popularion 
While Kanak numbers dropped dramatically with the influx of European settlers late in 
the nineteenth until the early twentieth century, troughing in 1931, Tables 1 a and 2 
show they increased thereafter, particularly after World War II and after 1969. These 
changes are attributable to the early effect of disease and violence by the incoming 
settlers, and the retum of confidence and prosperity after the world wars. The 
proportion of Kanaks in the total population was on a steadily decreasing trend from 
68% in 1887, down to about ha l fby 1956, and reaching a low of 41.7% in 1976. The 
relative decline in the 1970s underpiimed Kanak independence claims and concems 
about becoming a minority in their own country. 
Since then, the Kanak proportion increased to about 44% in 1996, the last clear 
comparable census, with the 2009 census indicating either a similar figure (44.3% in 
column 3 Table lb) or a decline to 40.3% (column 2 Table lb). This 2009 figure of 
40.3% for the Kanak population, before "reallocation" increased it to 44.3% as show n 
in Table lb, shows a significant decline. Indeed it is lower than the 1976 all-time low 
of 41.7% and would be a serious concern to pro-independence Kanaks. 
In both 1996 and the known 2009 resuhs (i.e., both before and after "reallocation" of 
the mixed race group). New Caledonia's largest population groups remain the Kanaks 
who represented 44.1%) in 1996 and 40.3% (or 44.3% "reallocated") in 2009; then the 
Europeans 34.1% in 1996, 29.2% (or 33.9% "reallocated") in 2009; followed by the 
Wallisians from Wallis and Futuna 9% in 1996 and 8.7% (or 10% "reallocated") in 
2009 (ISEE-INSEE TEC 2008 and 2009 published 2011). Kanaks also may be 
increasingly seen as one of a number of growing Pacific Islander communities relative 
to others. In 1996, Pacific Islanders represented 57% of the population, compared to 
43% non-Islanders, mainly European and Asian. While exact comparison cannot be 
made with 2009 because of the "Others" category issue, taking figures before 
reallocation of the "mixed race" category (column 2 of Table lb), the total of 
Kanak,Wallisian, Tahitian and ni-Vanuatu alone is 55.9% and it could be assumed that 
most of the 8.3%o of "mixed race respondents would be of Islander origin. "Post-
reallocation" figures (column 3 of Table lb) show Pacific Islanders as at least 57.6% of 
the population (Kanak, Wallisian, Tahitian and ni-Vanuatu). Thus it seems that the 
Pacific Islander component is increasing while the non-Islander component (mainly 
Europeans and Asians) is declining. 
Kanaks have traditionally lived primarily in the Northern and Islands Provinces whose 
populations are declining, as evident in Table 7. There has been increasing internal 
migration from those provinces to the Southern Province (see analysis by Faberon and 
Ziller 2007 pp. 357-358). Table 7 shows that in 2009, 74.5% of the population were in 
the Southern Province, 18.4% in Northern Province (compared to 21% in 1996), and a 
low 7.1% in the Loyalty Islands Province (compared to 10.6%). In 2009, Kanaks 
formed 96.6% of the population of the Loyalty Islands Province, 73.8% of Northern 
Province (Europeans 12.7% and other communities 5.7%), and 26.7% of Southern 
Province (Europeans 35.9%, Wallisians 11.4% and other communities 9.7%) (Rivoilan 
and Boustet 2011). Around 50% of the Kanak community (whose numbers were 
qualified in the 2009 census, as indicated above) lived in Southern Province, whereas 
90% of all other communities lived there (Rivoilan and Boustet 2011). 
Table 3 
New Caledonia: Fertility Index by province 1981-2007 
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Translation from top: 
Fertility Index Change by Province 
Number of children per woman: LoyaUy Islands, North, New Caledonia, South, Threshold of 
generational replacement 
Source: ISEE-TEC, Editions Abregees, 2010, /ndice de fecondite par province 
In the past, Kanak fertility rates have been high relative to other residents, but they are 
declining. In 1997, the tenritory-wide average was 2.67 children per woman, while the 
rate was 3.3 in Loyalty Islands, and 2.9 in Northern Province, both provinces where 
Kanaks predominate (Baudchon and Rallu in Cadeot 2003 p. 248); compared to 2.5 in 
Southern Province. Table 3 graphs the overall declining trend from 1981 to 2007. 
Internal migration by Kanaks from the Kanak provinces to Southern Province (see 
Table 7) limits the capacity to make assumptions about Kanak fertility rates on the 
basis of Province. However, in 2007, the territory-wide average dropped to 2.2, and all 
Provinces showed a drop from 1997, with the Loyalty Islands at 2.4, Northern Province 
1.9, and Southern Province 2.2. Table 3 shows that fertility rates for the predominantly 
Kanak provinces is declining more steeply than rates in the predominantly European 
Southern Province. 
Continuing immigration (see next sections) on a declining, minority Kanak base mean 
that Kanaks are unlikely to become the majority in New Caledonia for the foreseeable 
future. More importantly, as Tables la and 2 show, Kanaks were in the minority in 
1994, which is the year of 20-year residence eligibility for the electorate voting in the 
final referendum(s) 2014 to 2018 (see first section, this Chapter). 
As noted earlier, the influxes of outsiders in the past have consisted predominantly of 
Europeans from metropolitan and Overseas France; with some non-Kanak Islanders 
mainly from Wallis and Futuna, Vanuatu, and Tahiti; and Asians, principally from 
Indonesia, Vietnam and Japan who came as workers on the mines in the early twentieth 
century. All three inflows have occurred as a result of deliberate French policy for 
varying reasons at different times. The next sections concentrate on the two most 
sensitive inflows, those of Europeans (read French) and of Wallisians. 
Increasing European immigration 
France has encouraged the long-term presence of its metropolitan nationals. The 
numbers of Europeans grew through the nineteenth century in response to the French 
State's establishment of convict and agricultural settlements (see Chapter 1). Tables la 
and 2 show that the numbers of Europeans increased at the turn of the century, declined 
until the mid 1930s, and rose particularly after 1956, and again after 1969 and 1989. 
The decline early in the twentieth cenmry coincided with the period of colonial torpor 
described in Chapter 2. The increases after 1956 can be attributed to Gaullist policies 
encouraging settlement of the territories, and an influx of French expatriates from 
Algeria (known as pieds-noirs). From 1969 the numbers reflect the influx of experts 
and administrators associated with the nickel boom, and those encouraged by Prime 
Minister Messmer's famously vaunted aim to head off independence claims of Kanaks 
by outnumbering them (see Chapter 3). The European population stabilized from 1976 
to 1989 as the evenements took hold. After the signature of the Matignon Accords in 
1988, Table 2 shows that the European population steadily increased, as did the Kanak 
("Melanesian") population. This reflects inflows of expertise accompanying the 
development of the nickel projects and the relative stability secured by the Matignon 
and Noumea Accords. While figures after 1996 are less reliable, there is evidence that 
influxes from other parts of France occurred, partly because of development of the 
nickel resource, and partly as a result of French salary and retirement incentives (see 
below). 
Public official statistics after 1996 are broken down unevenly, for example see Table 5, 
the columns of which were published in the ISEE-INSEE Census 2004 and 2009, 
comparing periods of varying length, i.e., 6, 7, 8 and 5 years). ISEE-INSEE"s Situation 
Demographique 2008 and 2009 offer annual population and migration figures and 
estimates, enabling a rough comparison of per annum migration at Table 6. 
Although the figures set out in Table 1 a show the European proportion of the 
population declining steadily from 41% in 1969 to 34.1% in 1996 (and 29.2% or at 
most 33.9% in 2009, see Tables la and lb), they do not tell quite the full story. Many 
people of European origin often tended to say in the censuses they were New 
Caledonians of European origin (i.e. rather than bom in metropolitan France) (see 
Faberon and Ziller 2007 pp. 357-358 and Baudchon and Rallu in Cadeot 2003 p. 248), 
meaning they were not included in the European category and may have been included 
into categories such as "others" or "undeclared". In the 1996 census, a breakdown of 
the non-Kanak, non-European population (the broader "others" category of 21.8% in 
Table la) showed that figure included Wallisians (by then 9% of the total population), 
Tahitians (2.6%), Indonesians (2.5%), Vietnamese and other Asians (1.9%), Ni-
Vanuatu (1.9%) and 4.6% of the population as either "others " (6, 829 or 3.5%) or 
"undeclared"(2,209 or 1.1%) (ISEE statistics cited in Faberon and Ziller 2007 p. 359). 
Thus as many as a further 4.6% of the population represented in this "others" or 
"undeclared" group may have been European, which could bring the European 
proportion to as much as 38.7% in 1996. 
In 2009, when the "Others" group included many more categories, there were as many 
as 16.5% who defined themselves as "mixed race" (8.3%), "Caledonian" (5%), 
"undeclared"(l .2%), or "other"(l .0%) (ISEE Census 2009). INSEE included some 
(4.7%) of the 8.3%) "mixed race" group in its "reallocated European" figure of 33.9% 
(column 3 Table lb), but the criterion they used is unknown, so there may have been 
more who were European; and up to 7.2% more (i.e., certainly many of the 
"Caledonian" category, plus some from "undeclared" and "other") could conceivably 
be added to that figure. 
Thus, the manner of presentation of ethnic breakdown figures, especially in 2009, can 
understate the European category. 
Migration inflows 1989-1996 
Table 5 fills out the picture from Table 2 for the period from 1983 to 2009. Based on 
official ISEE-fNSEE statistics which vary in periods applied, and including figures 
from the boycotted 2004 census, it shows natural growth in the population of 2.6% 
from 1989 to 1996, with migration inflows at .7%, or over 9000 people in that period 
(compared to 2.1% per annum from 1983-89). 
The 1989-1996 figure is similar to the extensive immigration of the nickel boom at the 
end of the 1960s and early 1970s (11,000 immigrants came to New Caledonia between 
1969 and 1976, see Doumenge et al 2000 p. 65). The official statistician, ISEE-INSEE, 
noted that after the nickel boom around 1970, new arrivals had slowed by 1989, 
attributing the increase from 1989 to 1996 to the signature of the Matignon Accords in 
1988 (ISEE-fNSEE 2004 Census). Table 5 shows that per annum net migration 
significantly increased to 1996 (from 163 in 1983-1989, to 1298 1989-96), and Table 6 
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too shows relatively large increases in per annum inflows from 1990 to 1994 (an 
average of 1267 per year for that 5 year period). Most of these immigrants were 
French, as Table 4 shows that the number of people in New Caledonia bom in France 
or its overseas departments increased from 17.2% in 1983 to 17.5% in 1996. 
These figures are important as all of those arriving before 1994 will be eligible to vote 
in the 2014-2018 referendum(s), and, mostly being French, would be likely to vote pro-
France in such a referendum. 
Migration inflows 1996-2009 
After 1996, figures are affected by the 2004 boycott, the non-inclusion of an ethnic 
category in the 2004 census, the qualification of the ethnic category figures from the 
2009 census, and they continue to be reported and analysed by the French authorities 
over differing time periods. Moreover, figures on migration inflows for 2009 were 
only released in April 2011 and were unclear, applying two different methodologies 
(see Royer2011). 
Still, Tables 4, 5 and 6 report overall population, natural and migration inflow 
increases, and country of birth figures and are less affected by the problems with the 
2009 ethnic categories (albeit all are affected by the 2004 boycott, and Table 5 by the 
presentation of different time periods and methodologies). They show an overall trend 
of continued steady migration mainly from France and the overseas French entities. 
Table 6 shows that the large per annum inflows from 1990 to 1994 (an average of 1267 
per year for that 5 year period), were followed by lower inflows from 1995 to 1999 (an 
average of 504 per year for that 5 year period), followed by similar inflows to those of 
the early 90s from 2000 to 2009 (average of 1162 a year for the 9 year period). Jean-
Fran9ois Royer applied various methodologies to the 2009 census results and reported 
that from 2004 to 2009, per annum net migration inflow was 900 people (mean of 5 
years), compared with 500 from 1996 to 2004 (mean of 8 years) and 1200 from 1989 
to 1996 (mean of 7 years) (Royer 2011 p. 3). Despite qualifications. Table 5 shows a 
trend of increase in migration inflows of 1.7% per annum from 1996 to 2009 although 
at a lesser rate than the 2.6% rate from 1989 to 1996 over seven years, with an 
apparently greater increase from 1996 to 2004 (1.9% per annum over eight years) than 
thereafter (1.2% 2004 to 2009 or five years, estimate). Royer postulated that the 
fluctuation and, according to some (for example, the New Caledonian government who 
had questioned the results), surprising relative lack of growth in the population to 2009, 
had occurred because of young New Caledonians travelling to France and other places 
including Australia, for higher studies, rather than reduced migration flows per se 
(Royer 2011, pp. 3 and 4). 
And after 1996, even more of the newcomers came from France, either the hexagon or 
its overseas enthies. ISEE reported that from 2004 to 2009, 18,500 people bom outside 
New Caledonia settled there, 75.5% from metropolitan France, 17.3% from other 
countries, 4.9% from Wallis and Futuna and 2.3% from French Polynesia (Rivoilon and 
Broustet 2011 p. 2)(Note: differences between these numbers and the figures in Tables 
5 and 6 can be explained by different methodologies, including calculation of the net 
apparent migration inflow, which covers arrivals and departures, not simply arrivals). 
In 2009, results reported in Table 4 show that, of 245,580 inhabitants, 75.6% were bom 
in New Caledonia, 19.2% in metropolitan or Overseas France, and 5.2% in foreign 
countries. The Table shows that the number of people in New Caledonia bom in 
France or its overseas departments increased from 17.5% in 1996 to 19.2% in 2009, 
exceeding the increase in the difficult 1980s period when French immigration was 
considered a problem. In 1996, the flawed 2004 census, and 2009, the percentage of 
French/Overseas French-bom was 17.5%, 18.1% and 19.2% respectively, each more 
than the 17.2% in 1983. 
Table 4 
New Caledonia: Place of birth 1983-2004 (in %) 
1983 1989 1996 [2004*] 2009 
New Caledonia 76.8 78 76.7 76.8 75.6 
France/other Overseas depts 11.6 10.8 12.4 13.9 15.0 
French Pacific entities: 
Wallis and Futuna 3.5 3.6 3.4 2.9 2.9 
French Polynesia 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.3 1.3 
Total France/Overseas France 17.2 16.2 17.5 18.1 19.2 
Foreigners 6.0 5.8 5.8 5.1 5.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
*census subject to a boycott call by some pro-independence parties 
Source: ISEE-INSEE Recensement de la Population de la Noiivelle-Caledonie aii Jlaoiii 
2004;Recensement 2009 Tableau 1 
Cadeot's analysis of the 1996 census showed that 23.3% of residents of New Caledonia 
(see Table 4), and 35% of those of the greater Noumea area, were bom outside the 
collectivity. Of those bom outside New Caledonia, 75% were French, of whom 50% 
were bom in the metropole, the others from elsewhere, mainly the former French 
possessions in North Africa, Indochina, and New Hebrides (Cadeot 2003 p. 57). 
Annual estimates for natural population increase show a declining trend from 2000 to 
2007, averaging 3086 a year, standing at 2886 in 2007 (ISEE-INSEE 2008). However 
their figures for migration inflows slightly increased, averaging 1020 per year in that 
time, and standing at 1134 in 2007, increasing to 1760 in 2008 (see Table 6). Given 
earlier trends (Table 4) it can be assumed that most of the migration inflow was from 
metropolitan France or from other French overseas entities. 
Even accepting the probable underestimate of the population increase of 1.9% per 
annum from 1996 to 2004, owing to the boycott by some locals, to a total increase of 
33,953 over the five year period (Table 5), official statistics noted that this growth was 
far greater than in metropolitan France (.5%), and French Polynesia (1.8%) (ISEE-
TSEE Recensement 2004). 
Table 5 
New Caledonia: Demographic summary 1983-2009 
1983-1989 1989-1996 1996-2004* 2004*-2009+ 
(6 Years) (7 Years) (8 years) (5 years) 
Population (start of period) 145,368 164,173 196,835 230,789 
Population (end of period) 164,173 196,836 230,789 245,580 
Variation(start to end) 18,805 32,663 33,953 14,791 
Net natural increase 17,826 23,552 27,817 14,134 
Apparent net migration 979 9,111 6,766 657* 
Natural increase (%) pa 2.0 1.9 1.5 N/A+ 
Net migration (%)** pa 0.1 0.7 0.4 N/A+ 
Total per annum change 2.1 2.6 1.9 1.2 £"5?*+ 
1.7++ 
163 1,298 
1200 
845 [2000-07 1020 pa#] 
500 900 
Per annum apparent net 
migration*** 
According to Royer## analysis 2011 
*census subject to a boycott call by some pro-independence parties 
**difference between numbers of those entering and leaving, regardless of place of birth 
***apparent net migration divided by number of years in the relevant period 
+some figures not available, ISEE 2009 figures provisional 
++figure presented by ISEE 2010 for 1996-2009 Graphique complemenlaire 1 
#ISEE Situation Demographique 2008 provided as basis of comparison in absence 2009 figures 
Source: ISEE-INSEE Recensement de la Population de la Nouvelle-Caledonie au 3Iaout 2004, ISEE 
Recensement 2009 (provisional figures), ISEE Recensement 2009, April 2011; ##Jean-Fran9ois Royer, 
Les Fluxes migratoires externes de la Nouvelle-Caledonie 1989-2009, ISEE 2011. 
Table 6 
figures 1981 to 2007 
Year Population* Migration Year Population* Migration Year Population* Migration 
1981 141 136 331 1991 173 163 874 2001 215 260 932 
1982 144 221 41 1992 177 560 1004 2002 2 1 9 387 1132 
1983 147 178 25 1993 182 038 1532 2003 223 592 1305 
1984 150 187 27 1994 186 953 1850 2004 227 878 1518 
1985 153 072 28 1995 192 010 389 2005 232 258 1361 
1986 155 828 21 1996 195 621 504 2006 236 528 751 
1987 158 866 7 1997 199 506 350 2007 240 390 1134 
1988 162 082 5 1998 203 330 528 2008 244 4 1 0 1760 
1989 165 160 521 1999 207 228 751 2009 245 580 
1990 168 635 1078 2000 211 200 571 2010 
*estimates, at 1 January 
Source: from Table PI - Evolution generale de la situation demographique en Nouvelle-Caledonie, 
ISEE Situation Demographique 2008 ; Recensement 2009 
Table 7 
New Caledonia: Population by province 1976-2009 (% of total) 
1976 1983 1989 1996 2004 2 0 0 9 + 
Loyal ty Islands 10.9 10.7 10.9 10.6 9.6 7.1 
Nor thern Province 24.0 21.5 21.0 21.0 19.2 18.4 
Southern Province 65.1 67.8 68.1 68.4 71.2 74.5 
Of wh ich N o u m e a 55.8 58.5 59.4 60.4 63.4 66.7 
N e w Caledonia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: ISEE-INSEE Recensement de la Population de la Nouvelle-Caledonie au 31 Aoiit 2004 ; ISEE 
Recensement 2009 Tableau 2 
Overall, these figures suggest a significant recent increase in numbers of migrants into 
New Caledonia from other parts of France. Added to the apparent understatement in 
statistics of the size of the "European" (born in France) group, it is clear that the 
proportion of Kanaks relative to other communities is declining, in a generally more 
diverse population. 
The development of three major nickel projects (see section on Nickel and rebalancing 
development in this Chapter) in the early 2000s has inevitably meant an increase in the 
number of French experts and companies to service them (Gerard Baudchon and Jean-
Louis Rallu in Cadeot 2003 p. 250), just as the 1970s nickel boom saw similar inflows. 
This influx can be expected to continue and grow as the nickel projects develop. 
Retirement incentives 
Apart from the inflow of personnel relating to the production of nickel, a second factor 
underlying a large influx of immigrants from metropolitan and Overseas France has 
been the active encouragement by the French state of retirement by French officials to 
its overseas collectivities, including New Caledonia (and French Polynesia) (Chauchat 
2006 p. 140). 
From 1950, there have been special payments, or surrenmnerations (extra 
remuneration) for French civil servants working in the overseas territories. As an 
example, when Chauchat wrote in 2006, the extra payments brought the normal salaries 
of working civil servants in New Caledonia to as high as 194% (in the more remote 
communes, a mere 173% in Noumea Ibid. p. 143). In French Polynesia, the payments 
were even higher, going up to 204 % in some islands. Little by little these special 
payments attached to retirement, and not only of Overseas France civil servants, but to 
any civil servant retiring to the French overseas entities, which was thereby expressly 
encouraged by the French state. In 2006, when Chauchat wrote about the subject (and 
as of September 2008), retirees, not just former civil servants who had worked in the 
French Pacific territories, but any civil servant retiring from metropolitan France or 
other overseas territories, were paid 175% of their normal retiring pensions if they 
retired to any of the French Pacific territories, with more if they had dependent 
children, and special extra entitlements for former military personnel (Ibid. p. 147). 
Chauchat ascribes these payments to an active State policy encouraging movement of 
people to the Overseas entities (Ibid. p. 140), and clearly such incentive payments are 
designed to encourage a strong presence of inhabitants from the hexagon, as opposed to 
local indigenous peoples. 
From 2003 to 2006 there were three parliamentary efforts to curtail these payments, to 
address the soaring costs (which Chauchat 2006 p. 149, put at EUR 2.2 b. all-up in 
2001, although Overseas France Minister Yves Jego indicated that the sum was EUR 
295 m. in 2007, perhaps measured differently, see Flash d'Oceanie, 4 July 2008) given 
the relative attractiveness of the overseas entities to retirees removing the need for 
special incentive payments, but mainly to redress the situation where many 
beneficiaries had had no previous connection with the French overseas entities to which 
they were retiring. All three attempts met with opposition by the Overseas France 
Minister at the time who said such changes would need wide consultation, would 
profoundly impact the small economies, and could result in law and order problems (for 
example, Minister Girardin comments to Senate review in 2005, Chauchat 2006 p. 
176). 
However, in April 2008 new President Nicolas Sarkozy said that the implementation of 
this system would be progressively curtailed, underlining that this was because it 
applied to people who had never worked in the particular overseas entity to which they 
were retiring (RFOFr website, April 2008, Retraites : Menaces sur les fonctionnaires 
d'Oiitre-mer, accessed 15 September 2008). In July 2008 the French Secretary of 
State for Overseas France, Yves Jego, announced that the scheme was coming to an end 
{Flash d'Oceanie, 4 July 2008). At that time, 83% of civil servant retirees in New 
Caledonia (and 59% of those benefitting in French Polynesia) had never served 
anywhere but metropolitan France. The French National Assembly passed legislation 
by the end of 2008 which provided for very gradual phase-out of the provisions, by 
2027. 
The various (not necessarily consistent) figures quoted by French authorities showed 
that such immigration had been increasing dramatically, particularly in recent years. A 
French budget report showed a 70% increase in costs of the scheme in Overseas France 
overall, in 2005 over the payments in 2000 (F/ash d'Oceanie 4 July 2008). Jego told 
Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes on 28 July 2008 that there had been a tripling of the 
numbers in New Caledonia from 1658 in 1989 to 5198 in 2005. ISEE figures (TEC 
Tableaux de I'Economie caledonienne, Caledonian Economic Tables 2008, Les 
fonctionnaires retraites en Nouvelle-Catedonie, Retired Civil Servants in New 
Caledonia) showed there were 3,927 retired French State officials receiving pensions in 
New Caledonia in 1990, and 3,954 in 2001, after which there were big increases, 
almost doubling, to 5,451 in 2007, receiving pensions worth a total of 20.3 m. cfp ($A 
334 m. converted 16 March 2009). The daily newspaper Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes 
estimated there were about 6000 in 2008 on the basis of local statistics (Nouvelles 
Caledoniennes 28 July 2008 accessed 9 Sept 2008). Of New Caledonia's population 
estimated to be just over 230,000 in 2008, 6,000 French mainland or overseas retiree 
migrants is a significant figure, especially when the entire population grew at 1.9% , 
around 4,000 people, per annum in the five years to 2004 (Table 4, and see Faberon and 
Zillerp. 358). 
Those retirees estimated to number around 4000 by 1994 (on the basis of ISEE TEC 
2008 figures above) will be able to vote in the final referendum(s), having twenty years 
residence to 2014. These retirees, being newcomers from other parts of France, would 
be likely to vote pro-France. With the retirement incentives not fiilly cutting out until 
2027, all of the 6000 or so retirees currently in New Caledonia would have a personal 
interest in the outcome of the Noumea Accord and their rights in a post-Accord New 
Caledonia. 
Inflows from Wallis and Futuna and ethnic violence 
The historic relatively large and continuing influx of people from Wallis and Futuna is 
a sensitive issue in New Caledonia. The absence of the ethnic breakdown from the 
2004 census is particularly relevant here. The qualifications of the 2009 census 
reporting on ethnic categories highlight the sensitivities, since the published figures 
show "reallocations" from the new "mixed race" category only for three communities: 
Kanak, European and Wallisian. Despite the apparent drop in numbers of people bom 
in Wallis and Futuna in the flawed 2004 and 2009 censuses at Table 4 (from 3.4% of 
the population in 1996 to 2.9% in 2004 and 2009), and the apparent drop in proportion 
of Wallisians from 9.0% in 1996 to 8.7% in 2009, which shifts to an increase to 10% in 
2009 after "reallocation" (Table la), other indicators are that their numbers are in fact 
increasing. A 2008 census of Wallis and Futuna showed that there were 13,445 
Wallisians in Wallis and Futuna, representing a 10% decline in population from 2003 
(Hadj 2009), and the main destination of the emigrants is New Caledonia. There are 
more Wallisians in New Caledonia than in Wallis and Futuna. The 1996 census 
reported 17,763 Wallisians in New Caledonia then, while Flash d'Oceanie of 27August 
2008 reported an estimated 20,000 Wallisians in New Caledonia at that time. 
The inflows are set to continue. There is no source of income for Wallis and Futuna 
other than direct inflows from the French State and remittances from workers in New 
Caledonia (and to a lesser extent French Polynesia), and it is French policy to facilitate 
these remittances. Part of the Noumea Accord involved special commitments by New 
Caledonia towards Wallis and Futuna, specified in Article 225 of the 1999 Organic 
Law. An agreement was signed between the French State, New Caledonia and Wallis 
and Futuna in December 2003 specifically providing working rights for Wallisians in 
New Caledonia, with the State undertaking to cover social services costs for Wallisians 
there for a period of ten years. This unusual provision appears to have originated in the 
strong support Wallisians in New Caledonia have traditionally given to the pro-France 
political groups. 
Violent Disturbances 
Wallisian immigration has been inflammatory. The only major outbreak of violence in 
New Caledonia since the evenements of the 1980s has centred on ethnic differences 
with the Wallisians. 
In 2001, ethnic violence erupted at the outlying mission township of Saint-Louis near 
Noumea where local Melanesian Kanak communities uneasily lived side by side 
newcomers from Wallis and Futuna, who are Polynesians. Kanak tribes had been 
established in the area since the late nineteenth century. Wallisian workers began to be 
settled there from the 1960s (see Maclellan 2005a pp. 8-9). Ethnic differences were 
exacerbated by the fact that Wallisians, along with most newcomers from other French 
metropolitan and overseas collectivities, tended to support the pro-France group 
(Henningham 1992 p. 185). Their leader, Robert Moyatea, supported the pro-France 
Rassemblement-UMP group. The local Kanak clan chief is Roch Wamytan, a 
prominent FLNKS leader. There were allegations that the pro-France RPCR leader 
Jacques Lafleur had encouraged settlement of Wallisians in the Saint-Louis area to 
shore up electoral support in the Noumea outer area against the FLNKS. 
Tensions mounted from 2001, and included a longstanding road blockade and violence 
engaging the local gendarmerie. At the height of the disturbances two Kanaks and a 
Futunan were killed, and a police officer and a French priest were shot. In July 2003, 
250 French gendarmes intervened against Wallisian troublemakers. This attack 
occurred the same month that President Chirac visited New Caledonia. It was followed 
by the removal of the Wallisian community from their homes, to be resettled in housing 
elsewhere in Noumea, in what many saw as an ethnic cleansing operation. 
The unstable situation at Saint-Louis is a recent example of the fundamental volatility 
of New Caledonia, and shows how the French presence, even as a guarantor of law and 
order, continues to be based on military muscle. It also highlights the complexity of the 
political scene, where strong French action was taken to support the grievances of the 
Kanak, pro-independence peoples there. 
Tension persists between the Kanaks and Wallisians, including occasional violent 
personal attacks. 
Other immigration issues 
To respond to Kanak concerns about immigration, the managers of the major nickel 
projects under construction have devised elaborate ways to limit the impact of imported 
labour. Inco used a prefabricated design for construction largely outside New 
Caledonia for the building element of the massive Goro project in the south. From 
2006 to 2009, Inco imported around five thousand workers from the Philippines for the 
construction phase of the project. The workers were flown in on charter aircraft, stayed 
for temporary rotations, usually six months, at campsites where they were kept without 
being allowed to circulate beyond the site. Xstrata are planning to do the same thing to 
meet labour demands when construction begins on the smeher in the north at 
Koniambo. The arrangement resulted in industrial protests in late 2006 (see Flash 
d'Oceanie 10 August 2007), arguably laying the basis for continuing strikes and the 
ultimate formation of the union-based Labour Party (see Political transition and 
realignment section below). 
It remains to be seen how well a similar arrangement will work in the north, where the 
mining sites are located in the midst of Kanak settlements, and where the local Kanak 
people are keen to be employed. There are potential human rights issues relating to 
these workers. 
Control over immigration 
Another, related question is that of control over immigration. Currently, it is the 
French government which has control over entry into New Caledonia, with the local 
govermnent having a say over the related matter of approvals for employment of 
foreigners. 
The Noumea Accord does not refer specifically to immigration, but does provide, under 
"Shared Powers", at Article 3.2.2 that the New Caledonian Executive will be 
"associated with the implementation of rules relating to entry and stays of foreigners" 
(the implication being that it is the French State which has the principal power). And 
under "New responsibilities immediately transferred to New Caledonia" at Article 
3.1.1 the Accord specifically indicates that local inhabitants' employment rights will be 
respected, and that regulation will be strengthened over people not settled in New 
Caledonia. But in the Organic Law of 1999, the French government's control over 
entry and stay of foreigners is stated explicitly (Article 21). Article 34 provides for the 
High Commissioner to "consult" the local Government on entry and stay and on visas 
for stays of more than three months, with the local government being "informed" of 
decisions taken. 
In practice the French State approves entry, and the local New Caledonian Executive 
Government (ministerial council) approves work permits. The Executive considers 
every application by a foreigner to work in New Caledonia, on a case by case basis. 
The system is unwieldy, and foreign experts are in limbo while the processes chum 
through their applications, and many have no choice but to enter on tourist visas to do 
contracted work. 
The New Caledonian government has no power, however, to limit the entry or 
employment of French nationals from elsewhere in France or Overseas France, 
notwithstanding the protective provisions of Article 3.1.1 of the Accord. 
It is significant that immigration is not mentioned amongst the five "regalien" or core, 
sovereign, powers to be the subject of the final referendums. 
European Union immigration 
Another potentially troublesome area for New Caledonia arises from the consequences 
of European citizenship of its inhabitants. All French nationals are EU citizens, 
including all Melanesians, Caldoches, immigrants from other French entities such as 
French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna, and all French officials and their families on 
temporary posting in the collectivity. There is also a very small number, difficult to 
quantify from official statistics, but apparently growing (see Faberon and Ziller 2007 p. 
267, also discussion in Chapter 7 of the effects on the French collectivities), of non-
French EU citizens (who would be included in the "foreigner" category of Table 4, 
which in total was 5.8% in the last comprehensive census, 1996, and 5.2% in 2009). 
Chapter 7 outlines in some detail the impact of EU membership on the French Pacific 
entities. France has negotiated special non-reciprocal rights for its citizens in New 
Caledonia relative to the EU. Thus New Caledonians can vote in EU elections, travel 
to and work in EU countries, and export goods to the EU at preferential rates, while 
there are restrictions on similar EU rights in the French collectivities. 
Still, there is unease in New Caledonia (as in French Polynesia) about these provisions 
and their potential effects, particularly if EU immigration, especially from parts of 
Europe other than France, were to grow and add to the complexities of French inflows. 
This unease is reflected in very low voter turnouts in elections for representatives to the 
EU Parliament (21.82% in June 2009, despite the EU having altered arrangements and 
provided for one Depute or Member of the European Parliament, specifically for the 
French Pacific collectivities, see background in Chapter 7). 
In electoral arrangements negotiated by France, the EU has accepted that EU voters are 
not able to vote in New Caledonia's provincial and congressional elections, recognizing 
the special reasons for which the restricted electorate was devised in New Caledonia. 
However, EU law provides that any EU citizen may vote in municipal elections in any 
EU member country, including the EU overseas collectivities of member states, after a 
six month residency period and registration with the local commune. The Noumea 
Accord does not specify a restricted electorate for municipal elections. Locals fear the 
effect of votes in municipal elections from newly arrived European residents, who 
would have little understanding of the history of the restricted electorate and the 
sensitivities underlying it (Maclellan 2005b p. 413). The broad number of EU residents 
includes French nationals otherwise ineligible to vote locally, such as French and 
European newcomers, and newcomers from other French collectivities, arriving since 
1998; and French officials posted temporarily in New Caledonia and their families; 
who could be expected to support pro-France political groups. The dimensions of the 
potential impact of the European vote is evident in New Caledonia, where the eligible 
voting population was 154,228 in the June 2009 EU election compared to 135,000 who 
were eligible to vote in the May 2009 provincial elections. In 2009 the winning Pacific 
candidate was Maurice Ponga, a longstanding Kanak UMP (pro-France) representative 
who had retired from the Congress. 
Immigration: summary 
Managing the effect on Noumea Accord commitments of immigration inflows from 
metropolitan and Overseas France, and potentially the EU, is a continuing concern for 
the Kanaks, the Caldoches, and the French State. The way in which the French State 
handled the definition of the restricted electorate, Chirac's decision to remove ethnicity 
from the census, belatedly but only incompletely rectified, and the inclusion of non-
comparable ethnic categories in the 2009 census, renewed local concerns about 
France's commitment to its word, particularly given continued increases in numbers of 
newcomers from the rest of France. Local concern consolidated into new political 
alignments (to be discussed below). 
Sarkozy's early attention to curtailing retirement provisions encouraging French 
migration into the Pacific entities was a positive development for Kanaks and other 
long-term residents, although the phase-out will not take full effect until 2027, well 
beyond the Noumea Accord deadlines. 
Population inflows from the other French entities, particularly Wallisians, created 
different and more serious concerns. The only significant recurrence of violence since 
the evenements occurred in 2001-3 over ethnic and political issues arising from the 
presence of Wallisians in a Kanak tribal area. The import of thousands of temporary 
immigrants from the Philippines to work on the major nickel projects presents potential 
problems, including human rights issues. And EU citizenship created obligations 
which complicate implementation of the Noumea Accord. 
The French State's handling of these issues will be a critical determinant of trust and 
stability for the fiature. 
Nickel and rebalancing development 
The second core issue critical for the success of the Noumea Accord, is the more 
balanced distribution of economic returns to the collectivity between indigenous and 
non-indigenous interests. This principle had been established by Michel Rocard in the 
Oudinot Accord hammered out after signature of the Matignon Accord, i.e., to restore 
economic, social and cultural balance dubbed the " bet on intelligence" by Rocard (see 
Angleviel 2003). By far the most valuable resource at this stage is nickel, and this has 
been the principal focus of the rebalancing effort. 
New Caledonia has over a quarter (and possibly up to 40%) of world nickel reserves, 
and is the third largest nickel producer in the world and the largest producer of ferro-
nickel (Horowitz 2004 p. 299, Maclellan 2005c). Folklore amongst old mining hands 
has it that, in an ancient geological upheaval, what is now New Caledonia broke away 
from the vast Gondawanaland (the major part of which now forms Australia), turned 
upside down and exposed massive reserves of red iron along the whole of Grande 
Terre. Burchett in 1941 wrote of the expanses of the red ore so dense that lakes formed 
because water simply sat on top of soil so iron-rich it prevented absorption (Burchett p. 
161). New Caledonia's extensive nickel reserves are the more valuable at a time when 
world demand for nickel is generally increasing, and as China and India industrialise 
and consume more stainless steel, of which nickel forms the principal component, in 
household and other products, although the 2008-9 global financial crisis has impacted 
on these trends. 
The French state is the largest contributor to New Caledonia's budget, contributing 
121.5 b. cfp or $A 2 b. in 2007, about a sixth of its GDP of an estimated 768.1 b. cfp 
($A 13 b. converted 7 July 2009) that year (ISEE TEC 2008 p. 96; ISEE website 
ww vv.itsee.nc accessed 28 October 2008). But nickel is by far the largest single source 
of income: nickel mineral and matte exports were worth an estimated 177 b cfp ($A 3 
b.) in 2007, when prices were high, contributing around a quarter of New Caledonia's 
economic growth between 1998 and 2006 (ISEE TEC 2008 p. 9\,BUan economique 
2009 p. 5). However, the vast bulk of these profits accrue to French interests (see 
section below on Greater returns of profits, for breakdown of SLN ownership). Raw 
nickel is currently exported to Australia (worth around $A 85 m. in financial year 2007-
8, DFAT website www.dfat.aov.au accessed 7 July 2009). 
While the principal funding and investment effort in New Caledonia is directed towards 
expanding the nickel sector, to date the single nickel producing unit remains SLN's 150 
year old Doniambo plant in the south; and the only completed new processing plant, the 
enormous Goro nickel complex, is also in the south, albeit not yet producing (to time of 
writing, mid 2011) after substantial financial setbacks (see below). Albeit much 
planning and groundwork having been achieved in the north, completion is still a long 
way off, in part a consequence of the global financial crisis. 
Ambiguity in the responsibility for mineral resources 
Under the Noumea Accord, the New Caledonian government was given responsibility 
over the exploration, exploitation, management and conservation of natural resources 
in the Exclusive Economic Zone (Article 3.1.1), a significant concession. But there are 
ambiguities. The transfer or responsibility for hydrocarbons, potash, nickel, chrome 
and cobalt is under the heading of "Shared Powers" in the Accord (Article 3.2.5), with 
the New Caledonian government taking over the drafting of mining regulations, and the 
Provinces the power to enforce them. The State participates in a Mining Council. 
But in the 1999 Organic Law implementing the Accord, the State is described (Article 
21, point 7), as being responsible for regulation in matters mentioned in Article 19, 
point 1, of Decree No. 54-1110 of 13 November 1954 reforming the regime of mineral 
substances in the overseas territories, and installations which use them. That Decree 
covers substances useful in research and activities relating to strategic substances 
linked to national defence (including related to atomic energy, see Faberon and Ziller, 
2007 p. 380). In Article 22 of the Organic Law, New Caledonia is given (at point 10) 
responsibility for the regulation and exercise of rights of exploration, exploitation, 
management and conservation of natural, biological and non-biological resources in the 
exclusive economic zone ; and (point 11) for regulation relating to hydrocarbons, 
nickel, chrome and cobalt (my italics) (Organic Law 1999 points 10° Reglementation et 
exercice des droits d'exploration, d'exploitation, de gestion et de consei-vation des 
ressources naturelles, biologiques et non-biologiques de la zone economique exclusive, 
and 11° Reglementation relative aux hydrocarhures, au nickel, au chrome et au cobalt). 
The lack of specification of the exploration and other rights on the latter resources lying 
other than in the exclusive economic zone is an effective qualifier. 
The ambiguity is related to earlier qualifiers of the mineral responsibility in the 
Matignon Accords and its Referendum Law of 1988. According to a Senate Report at 
the time, any strategic primary resource linked to national defence and mentioned in the 
referendum law of 9 November 1988 endorsing the Matignon Accord remained the 
responsibility of the French State. Article 8 point 7 of that Law referred to "any 
strategic primary substances as defined for the entire territory of the Republic" (see 
Referendum Law 88-1028 of 9 November 1988; and French Senate Document No. 180 
p. 68, report by M. Jean-Jacques Heist on the draft Organic Law). 
The ambiguity at the least gives rise to confusion. Angleviel noted that there is an 
overriding stipulation, defined by the French Council of State, relating to strategic ore 
(uranium) and oil, which could enable the predominance of national interests over local 
or international ones (New Pacific Review 2003 p. 157). Senior New Caledonian 
leader Jacques Lafleur maintained (Personal communication March 2009) that the 
French State continued to hold power over the sub-soil of the EEZs regardless of the 
provisions of the Accord. Australian companies interested in exploration offshore have 
had difficulty clarifying which State or New Caledonian authority was responsible for 
what. The ambiguity over responsibility for such an important resource has the effect 
of limiting external interest in investment, which may well be the intent, and raises the 
question of whether France intends to retain control over the development of minerals-
related industry. 
Greater returns of profits from SLN France to New Caledonia 
Still, France has ensured that more of the returns from nickel production return to New 
Caledonia than in the past, although French interests retain the largest shares. 
Until the time of writing (early 2011), the only productive nickel processing unit has 
been the 150-year old Doniambo plant just out of Noumea, in the mainly European 
Southern Province. The plant is run by Societe Le Nickel (Nickel Company, SLN). 
The French State acquired 50% share and exclusive ownership in 1947 (see Horowitz 
2004 p. 292). It has retained a large ownership since. The 1969 Billotte Laws shored 
up French control over mining during the 1960s/1970s nickel boom, and indeed were 
designed to head off Canadian interests in the industry at the time (see Chapter 3). In 
1983, the French State owned 70% of SLN by way of its public company, ERAP (the 
remaining 30% equally divided between Elf Aquitaine and Imetal, two other French 
companies). 
These days, while the French state's share in SLN has reduced, the largest share of 
SLN's revenues continues to return to France (see Horowitz 2004 p. 300 and 
Henningham 1992 p. 78). This predominance is an issue for the pro-independence 
groups. The FLNKS sought a 51% share for New Caledonia in SLN (Neaoutyine 2006 
p. 164). Today, French company Eramet remains the largest shareholder in SLN 
(56%), and Nishin Steel Japan owns another 10%. However, in a deal struck in 1999 as 
background to the Noumea Accord, New Caledonia now has a 34% share in SLN 
through the New Caledonian company STCPI {Societe Territoriale Caledonienne de 
Participations Industrielles, [New] Caledonian Territorial Company for Industrial 
Participation). When STCPI was created in 1999, it acquired 30% of SLN and 5.1% of 
SLN's parent company Eramet. This was substantially less than the 51% sought by the 
FLNKS. Under an option arrangement in July 2007, STCPI's share of SLN was 
revised upward to 34% of SLN along with a downward revision of its share of Eramet 
to 4.1% (see www.euroinvestor.co.uk accessed 20 October 2008; and www.sln.nc 
accessed 21 October 2008). 
Apart from New Caledonia's (STCPI) 4.1% share of SLN's parent company Eramet. 
the other major shareholders in Eramet are French. They include the French Duval 
family (37%); Areva (26%), a strategic nuclear-power related company 93% owned by 
the French State; a private French investor Romain Zaleski (13%); a US company 
Northern Trust (3%); and remaining shares unknown (see 
www.transnationale.org/companies/eramet.php and www.eramet.com'). There is an 
agreement between the Duvals and Areva that they will vote and act together (see 
www.pressreIeasepoint.com/eramet-sorameceir-and-areva-renew-their-
shareholders039-agreement). 
STCPI continues to seek to increase its holdings in both SLN and Eramet. 
With these changes in shareholdings in favour of New Caledonia, through STCPI, New 
Caledonia has benefitted substantially. Through the nickel boom years 2007 and 2008, 
SLN paid over 20 b. cfp (EUR 167 m. or $A 300 m. converted 7 July 2009) in taxes 
and 2.3 b. cfp (EUR 19.2 m. or $A 33 m.) in dividends to the New Caledonian 
government. SLN claims it spent another 25 b. cfp or EUR 209 m. ($A 366 m.) in local 
purchases, and 663 m. cfp or EUR 5.55 m. ($A 9.7 m.) in training and working 
conditions in New Caledonia. In addition SLN spent 35 b. cfp or EUR 293 m. ($A 513 
m.) on expanding Doniambo's capacity to 75,000 tonnes (see Doniambo expansion 
section below) (www.sln.nc accessed 17 March 2009). 
Extended production of nickel in the south and new production in the north 
At the same time plans were set in place to develop mining outside of the European-
dominated south. Chapter 3 described how as a background prerequisite to the 
signature of the Noumea Accord, the mainly Kanak Northern Province was endowed 
with the Koniambo mountain range, and with a share in the establishment by a 
multinational company (initially Falconbridge, subsequently taken over by Anglo-
Swiss company XStrata) of a processing plant at Koniambo. The development of a 
third processing unit at Goro in the mainly European Southern Province by Canadian 
company Inco was a fiarther arm of this agreement to balanced development, along with 
expansion of production to 75,000 tonnes a year of the Doniambo plant in the South. 
The success of this rebalancing strategy will be integral to the continued peaceful 
presence of the French in New Caledonia, and more broadly, in the South Pacific. 
Horowitz (2004) in a perceptive review of nickel politics noted that the balanced 
development of projects in the north and the south will reflect the expectations under 
the Noumea Accord itself, i.e., the expectations of the Kanaks that economic 
independence will lead to the possibility of political independence, and the expectations 
of the pro-France groups in the south (and the French State itself) that rebalanced 
economic development will, by its very prosperity, head off independence demands. 
She wrote that "The Koniambo Project is thus viewed either as representing the 
possibility of greater political and economic autonomy for Kanak as a precursor to 
independence or, in contrast, as yet another in a series of actions that have used 
economic gains to deter pro-independence aspirations" (Horowitz 2004 p. 309). 
Challenges affecting rebalancing success of the mining projects 
At the outset it must be recognized that development of even one major nickel plant in 
an island economy is a massive undertaking, involving billions of dollars, complex 
technological and metallurgical challenges, labour concerns, social and environmental 
factors. Such projects challenge any government. For France, the development of the 
three nickel projects in New Caledonia represents the largest French mining interest 
ever on its soil. Indeed the Goro project alone is the largest French mining venture 
within sovereign French territory (see Newman 2001). Undertaking this multi-project 
venture thousands of miles from the capital in an island environment adds further 
dimensions of complexity. And the fact that it is doing so at the same time as it is 
developing the statutory framework for its entity of New Caledonia, within its Noumea 
Accord commitments, adds another complication. Even for the French State the 
projects are enormous (as the Mayor of Noumea, Jean Leques, charmingly put it, even 
the most beautiftil woman can only give what she has, Personal communication March 
2009). 
Added to that is the fact that the relatively inexperienced New Caledonian Government, 
and provincial administrations, under their new-found powers from the 1998 Noumea 
Accord, are tackling these large projects in their first years of existence, developing 
legislative frameworks along the way. 
A second consideration is that, accepting that producing the annual existing 50-60,000 
tonnes of nickel from the Doniambo plant adjacent to the relatively sophisticated 
infrastructure of Noumea has never been simple or straightforward over the 150 years it 
has existed, it is even more complicated to envisage establishing a further plant in the 
South, still relatively near to Noumea. Factors include the far greater volume of ore to 
be processed, the new technology involved (acid leaching), the extensive new 
infrastructure in terms of port facilities and power generation required, and the 
extremely fragile nature of the environment at Goro and Prony Bay. 
But development of a similar plant in the northern tip of the main island of Grande 
Terre, where Koniambo is located, multiplies the demands by several degrees. While 
there has been a Northern Province government which has run the province effectively 
since it was created by the Matignon Accords in 1988, particularly under the current 
Province President, the respected and capable Paul Neaoutyine, local government there 
is a relatively new phenomenon. Because most economic development has taken place 
around Noumea, there is far less infrastructure and support in the north even in the 
small provincial capital Kone, 200 km north of Noumea, let alone at nearby Koniambo. 
Logistic requirements are enormous. The initial investment in establishing housing, 
shops, schools and transport within the area to service the new plant is considerable. 
Added to all these elements are the normal vagaries of the international market and 
multinational business activity. The biggest single threat to the success of the 
rebalancing plan in the nickel sector is, as in the past, the volatility of the market. The 
global financial crisis of 2008-9 has had devastating effects on the rebalancing effort. 
For example, the all-time high price for a tonne of nickel in early 2007 was SUS 
54,000. With the effects of the global financial crisis, the price had dropped to below 
$US 10,500 by early 2009. In October 2008, two major bankers backing the critical 
northern Koniambo project (the failed Lehman Brothers, and the Hong Kong Shanghai 
Bank) withdrew from the project {Flash d'Oceani, 20 October 2008). 
The French State's support for the nickel projects, financial, administrative, and 
especially in law and order and the framework of judicial and legislative backing, on a 
daily basis, led by its successive High Commmissioners there, is its most important 
indicator of good faith and commitment to its word under the Matignon and Noumea 
Accords. At the same time, this commitment by the French State is a strong indicator 
of its will to keep New Caledonia French. There is no doubt that the running of the 
major nickel projects favour French interests, businesses and personalities. 
Southern Province - Doniambo expansion 
Investment: $US 380 m. 
Projected production: 75,000 tonnes p.a. (from 62,000 tonnes in 2007) (TBA) 
Projected employment: 2,200 (from current 2,000) 
In 2001, SLN initiated a program to expand its capacity at the existing Doniambo plant 
from around 60,000 tonnes of nickel per annum, to 75,000 tonnes per annum after 
establishing an enrichment plant at Tiebaghie in late 2008. With the dramatically 
lowered nickel prices consequent to the global financial crisis, these plans have been 
revised. 
Doniambo's production reached 62,000 tonnes in 2007 as nickel prices rose, but with 
the effects of the global crisis, production dropped to only 51,000 tonnes in 2008. 
Profits dropped from 70 b. cfp ($A I.l b. converted March 2009) in 2007, to 8 b. cfp 
($A 130 m.) in 2008. (See section on Greater returns of profits for details of SLN's 
ownership.) 
By late February 2009, when the company was losing 100 m. cfp a day ($A 1.6 m. 
converted March 2009), SLN Managing Director Pierre Alia announced a series of 
measures, including reduced working hours, to meet revised production needs without 
retrenching staff (Nouvelles Caledonienms 21 February 2009). As the largest 
employer in New Caledonia, these measures met stiff union opposition, including by 
the prominent militant mainly Kanak union the USTKE, which had just formed a 
political party exacerbating divisions on the pro-independence side of politics in the 
lead up to the May 2009 provincial elections (see Political transition and realignment 
section below). Despite advanced work on expanding production capacity at 
Doniambo, effective increases will depend on world markets. 
Southern Province - Goro 
Investment: SUS 4.3 b. 
Projected production: 60,000 tonnes p.a. (possibly late 2011 or 2013) nickel 
5,000 tonnes p.a. (possibly late 2011 or 2013) chrome 
Projected employment: 2,000 (construction) 
(plus 4-5,000 temporary imported workers) 
800 (production) 
2,000 (indirect at production) 
The massive Goro project has been a hardwon effort on the part of Inco (which became 
Vale Inco in 2006 when the Canadian company was taken over by Brazil's Companhia 
Vale do Rio Doa, or CVRD, later Vale). Inco had had interests in New Caledonia since 
1902. In 1969, it undertook exploration in the Goro area, a large stretch of bright red 
land, so rich with ore that when it rains water just sits on top of the mineral-dense soil. 
The Billotte Laws described in Chapter 3 were expressly designed to prevent local 
authorities from dealing with Inco and to keep control in French hands. Inco's work in 
New Caledonia has been long and patient. 
In 1999 Inco constructed a pilot project to test the new hydrometallurgical process, 
itself an impressive refinery. Construction of the huge Goro plant itself, 100 times 
bigger than the pilot project, began in 2002. As the first cab off the rank of all the 
planned new projects, the commencement of construction threw up a range of 
difficulties which needed to be tackled by the relatively inexperienced New Caledonian 
government under its new powers. Getting it right was fundamental, not only to the 
success of the Goro project itself, but for the other planned New Caledonian projects in 
the south (Prony) and north (Koniambo). 
Problems emerged as soon as the bulldozers reached the ground, problems which were 
to increase massively the cost of investment. Despite dramatically increasing nickel 
prices at the time, driven by increasing demand in China, barely a year after they began, 
Inco had to suspend operations, from late 2002 until 2005, to re-cast the project, in the 
wake of a range of cost-increasing local concerns and demands. The revised project 
boosted the investment cost from $US 1.4 b. to $US 2 b. (Chauchat 2006 p. 126) but 
this was to rise to $US 3.2 b. by 2008, and $US 4.3 b. by 2011 (Reuters report 26 April 
2011). Concerns focused on local employment and workers rights, environmental 
issues, and cultural issues arising both from the neighbouring Kanak communities and 
the Caldoches. 
A shared concern was that the Kanaks and Caldoches would be by-passed in the 
project. The Kanaks were concerned that their status as indigenous residents and 
relationship to the land at Goro would not be respected. They wanted assurances that 
their communities would receive some of the financial benefits and employment 
opportunities. They were concerned about environmental issues, and particularly 
opposed a plan to dump manganese wastes into the ocean. They organized themselves 
into a committee called Rheebu Nlnni ("eye of the land") under the leadership of 
Raphael Mapou, and staged protests, strikes and road blockades. This grouping 
represented a further fragmentation of the FLNKS parties (see Political transition and 
realigruTient section below). Separately the Customary Senate established a Resource 
Management Council (see Waddell 2008 p. 206). In 2003, sponsored by Inco, Mapou 
and others travelled to Canada where they met Inuit leaders from whom they took 
further cues on ways to secure assurances and make claims for compensation. 
For their part, established Caldoche small business and contractors were concerned 
about being sidelined by large foreign firms and personnel including from Canada and 
neighbouring Australia, in providing goods and services to the mining project. Not 
surprisingly the scale of the project was unfamiliar and overwhelming for many of 
them. Cultural issues, of a different nature than for the Kanaks, also emerged. After 
decades of protection and isolation from the region, the Caldoches were unused to the 
manner and ways of foreign company representatives who came to set up local offices. 
Small matters such as the kind of electric plugs used (the regional Australian standard 
or the French European one which had prevailed till then) set off accusations of foreign 
takeover. 
What followed was an example of practical cooperation and teamship in a tense and 
fractious environment. The French State, through the office of the then High 
Commissioner, Daniel Constantin, played a key advisory role. Constantin's input was 
highly underrated at the time, mainly because of his lowkey approach and discretion. 
In consultation with senior French and Province officials, Goro's management led by 
Inco's Brisbane headquarters and its local CEO at the time, Pierre Alia, undertook a 
thorough review and developed mechanisms to deal with local concerns. A brief 
consultation of Goro's website reveals the result: a pilot committee of the Southern 
Province, a Local Community hivolvement Program to ensure opportunities to local 
contractors, a Community Participation Program for the employment and training of 
local communities, including Kanak communities, a Business Participation Alliance, a 
Community Relations Office and a Worksite Accord with project workers. The 
company also took groups of Kanak leaders to Toronto to meet senior company 
representatives and see how Inco operated in its Canadian projects. 
Share participation by the three Provinces of New Caledonia was also devised. Vale 
Inco has a 69% interest in the project. The three provinces of New Caledonia together 
hold a 10% equity interest. This was increased from an initial 5 per cent following 
FLNKS opposition to the Southem Province grant outright, in 2002, of an exploration 
permit to Inco relating to the neighouring Prony site (see next section below). The New 
Caledonian share is paid to the Societe de Participation Miniere du Sud Caledonien 
(SPMSC South [New] Caledonian Mining Participation Company, of which 50% is 
owned by the Southem Province and 25% each by the other two Provinces (see 
Faberon and Ziller 2007, p. 361; and http://ww w.inco.com/global/goro"). Through a 
jointly owned company called Sumic, Nickel Netherlands, Japan's Sumitomo Metal 
Mining Co. Ltd. and Mitsui Co. Ltd. own the remaining 21% interest in the project. 
Apart from its business and community consultation, hico complied with the 
environment code set up by France's INERIS {Institut National de I'Environnement 
Industriel et des Risques, National Institute for Industrial Environment and Risk). For 
its part, the French State enabled the inclusion of the Southem Coral Reef on the 
UNESCO Common Heritage list, while negotiating arrangements allowing for the Goro 
project activities in Prony Bay. 
Inco also established extensive training facilities; and to deal with concerns about 
imported labour, and devised a method of pre-fabrication for the construction phase, 
whereby 400 modules making up the plant were to be constructed in the Philippines. 
The company imported around 5,000 workers from the Philippines during the 
construction phase (2006 to 2008), chartering planes from the Philippines, immediately 
bussing the workers to campsites where they were confined for the duration of their 
contracts (generally up to six months), and returning them the same way. Given the 
extreme sensitivity of the local population to immigration issues, French immigration 
and security personnel were engaged to ensure quiet movement in and out of the small 
island entity with minimal social disruption or media attention. 
The plant will process low-grade ore using hydrometallurgical technology. It is 
estimated there are 50 years of reserves. At capacity, the site will produce 60,000 
metric tonnes of nickel per annum, 4,300 to 5,000 metric tonnes of cobalt. It will 
generate around 800 local jobs directly, 2000 indirectly and during the construction 
phase. 
Construction was due for completion in 2008, with production in phases to begin from 
2009. However, the global financial crisis, declining nickel prices, and technical 
problems delayed production, which had not commenced by the time of writing (early 
2011). One report referred to a production date as late as 2013 {VoiJa encylopedie 
website "Vale Inco Nouvelle-Caledonie" accessed 13 June 2011). 
Southern Province - Prony 
Investment: $ U S I . 5 b . 
Projected production: 60,000 tonnes p.a. (2011-23?) nickel 
6,000 tonnes p.a. (2011-23?) chrome 
Projected employment: n/a 
In 2002, the then President of Southern Province, Jacques Lafleur, granted an 
exploration permit to Inco for the Prony mining resource, contiguous to Goro. The 
grant potentially allowed Inco to double its production capacity at Goro, at a time when 
Inco was seriously re-examining the viability of the Goro project in the face of severe 
cost overruns and local opposition. The decision was highly controversial at the time. 
Lafleur's own supporters in the Provincial Assembly resented his lack of consultation, 
and the Kanaks believed that Inco was granted the licence free of charge (Neaoutyine 
2006 p. 169). It was not well-received in New Caledonia and arguably contributed to 
the defeat of Lafieur's party by a more broad coalition of pro-France and pro-
independence supporters in 2004 provincial elections, in which Lafleur lost the 
Presidency of the Southern Province (see Political realigmnent and transition section 
below). 
The grant was challenged in the Administrative Tribunal, and taken to the Paris Appeal 
Courts. In June 2008 a judgement was pronounced against the allocation of the licence 
to Inco. The new Southern Province President, Philippe Gomes, called for tenders. 
Vale Inco, SMSP and SLN all tendered and the rights were granted to the French 
company SLN. This bolstered the longstanding French State and private French 
interests already vested in New Caledonia. It is worth noting that in the meantime, 
Inco's former CEO Pierre Alia, who had overseen the construction of the Goro project, 
had taken up the position as Director-General of SLN. In this way, French-dominated 
interests once again held sway over the beleaguered Inco. It is ironic that the original 
concerns that one company, Inco, should not dominate both Goro and Prony projects 
did not prevent the one major French company SLN being accorded Prony rights, 
notwithstanding its dominance of the nickel industry through the only working unit, 
Doniambo. 
Few believe that the Prony development will proceed speedily. SLN Managing 
Director Pierre Alia believed in 2009 that h would be fifteen years (i.e. 2023) before 
production would begin. In proceeding with the project, SLN will necessarily conduct 
negotiations with Vale Inco who manage the neighbouring Goro project over joint 
infrastructure issues including energy requirements and other inputs, efficiencies which 
were at the heart of the earlier decision to grant the Prony licence to the operators of the 
Goro project in the first place. The granting of the licence to SLN gave power to the 
dominant French company with its own interests at Doniambo, to dictate the pace of 
production. 
Northern Province - Koniambo 
Investment: $US3.8b . 
Projected production: 54,000 tonnes p.a. (mid 2012 to 2014) 
Projected employment: 2,000 (construction) 
750 (production) 
2,000 (indirect at production) 
The Koniambo nickel project in the mainly Kanak Northern Province is a critical 
element of rebalancing efforts. The Koniambo deposit is a rich resource. It is 
estimated that it holds reserves sufficient for 100 years of production (Neaoutyine 2006 
p. 170). Under the terms of the Bercy Agreement (see Chapter 3), which granted the 
Koniambo massif to the Northern Province company Societe Miniere du Sud Paciflque 
(SMSP), the Canadian multinational Falconbridge was obliged to complete a feasibility 
study, the decision to construct a refinery, and investment program by 1 January 2006 
to forestall the return of the Koniambo Massif to its original owners, Eramet and SLN. 
In 1996 the Northern Province company and Falconbridge submitted a plan for 
construction of the plant to the French government which was approved. As the 
deadline approached Falconbridge was subjected to a takeover bid by Inco, which 
would have meant an effective monopoly of the two major planned nickel projects by 
the one multinational. Behind the scenes, French officials sought alternative investors 
to stave off domination of all of the major new New Caledonian projects by Inco. 
There was also interest by Chinese companies, which worried senior French officials. 
In the event, Falconbridge was taken over by the Anglo-Swiss company Xstrata (which 
already had a 20% stake in the company) in 2005. Xstrata holds 49% interest in the 
Koniambo Nickel SAS company, with SMSP holding 51%. The project involves 
refining ore through established pyrometallurgical processes, and producing 54,000 
tonnes of nickel a year, equal to the annual production at Doniambo. The deadlines for 
the project feasibility study were duly met, and construction of infrastructure providing 
access to the site, roads, a port and townships, began in early 2007. Earthworks for the 
refinery site were concluded by early 2009. 
With the withdrawal of two major backers of SMSP's share in the wake of the global 
financial crisis (Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and Lehman Brothers), 
two New Caledonian based French companies, Caisse d'Epargne and the Bank of New 
Caledonia extended credit lines but for amounts far short of what was needed by SMSP 
($US 212 m. over 20 years, with SMSP Chairman Andre Dang noting further amounts 
would be needed, Oceania Flash 6 January 2009). This arrangement was a less 
satisfactory solution for the Northern Province than external backers, as it restored a 
certain degree of French control. 
Inevitably, the global financial crisis has meant delays in the construction phase of the 
refinery itself The project involves investment of $US 3.8 b., with tax exemptions by 
the French State worth $US 150 m.. The project will also require an electric power 
station and dam to provide electricity and cooling for the refinery. It should create 
2000 jobs in the construction phase, 750 jobs when up and running and a further 2000 
indirect jobs in the area (Horowitz 2004 p. 307). It will also require the importation of 
foreign labour, which may be more difficult in the Kanak heartland than it was for Goro 
in the south (see Other immigration issues section). At the Seventh Meeting of the 
Noumea Accord Committee of Signatories in December 2008, caution was registered 
about the need to "carefully prepare" for the necessary use of foreign workers {Releve 
de conclusions 2008). 
Horowitz concluded in 2004 that the development of the Koniambo project suggested 
that the French State and the pro-France forces had succeeded "in their attempts to 
convince independence-minded Kanak - through financial assistance that increases 
political dependency - to focus their efforts on economic development while 
postponing the push for independence to a point in the indeterminately distant future". 
She believed that pro-independence Kanaks "have used political pressure to negotiate a 
very favourable deal for their mining company" (p. 309). 
In the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis, the pro-independence parties 
generally understood that the pace of the project was bound to be affected and were not 
unduly concerned about that (Personal communication 2009). However, should the 
crisis, and delays, persist closer to the 2014-2018 Noumea Accord deadlines, their 
position could change, particularly if other projects in the south managed to increase 
their production, especially if their own northern project should stall, again skewing 
production and benefits towards the south at the expense of the Kanak north. 
To put the exogenous difficulties in context, Xstrata was expected to proceed with 
construction at a time when three nickel mines closed in Western Australia (BHP's 
Ravensthorpe, Norilsk's Cawse mine, and Xstrata's own Sinclair mine) owing to the 
effects of the global financial crisis. 
Northern Province - Gwangyang 
The Northern Province investment arm, SMSP, has entered into a 30-year agreement 
with the Korean company Posco. Two joint subsidiaries have been created, the Nickel 
Mining Company (NMC) and the Societe du Nickel de la Nouvelle-Caledonie, New 
Caledonian Nickel Company (SNNC). SMSP owns 51% of the venture, and Posco 
49%. Using raw ore imported from three companies based in the Northern Province 
(1.8 b. tonnes over the next 30 years), the smelter in Gwangyang, Korea will produce 
4,000 tonnes of matte in 2008 building to 30,000 tonnes (from exports of 1.8 b. tones of 
raw ore from New Caledonia) by 2010. The first shipment left New Caledonia in June 
2008. The Northern Province hopes to use the revenue from the venture to offset costs 
of the Koniambo project. 
Northern Province - Poum 
Consistent with the Bercy Agreement (see Chapter 3), with Xstrata's proceeding with 
the Koniambo project as scheduled, SLN duly took over the Poum massif in January 
2006 but to date there is no indication as to how this resource will be used (www.sln.nc 
accessed 21 October 2008). 
In summary, whereas very solid progress has been made towards increasing New 
Caledonian shareholdings in existing projects, and in establishing a Northern Province 
nickel plant, progress has fallen short of Kanak and FLNKS expectations. FLNKS and 
other New Caledonian groups would like to see a bigger share for New Caledonia in 
SLN and Eramet, the French companies controlling existing nickel production. 
Progress on the big projects (Doniambo expansion and Goro) in the south has been 
speedier and potentially more lucrative than the northern Koniambo project. This has 
not gone without the notice of the Kanaks. FLNKS spokesman Victor Tutugoro 
warned in 2002 that it would be disastrous if the Southern Province were to have two 
projects and the Northern Province none (in Horowitz 2004 p. 308). 
The sleight-of-hand of southern pro-France leaders in allocating a third project to the 
south through the Prony permit, and the subsequent legal redress then open tender 
which resuhed in increased control by the existing dominant French company SLN, 
was also a blow to the confidence of the FLNKS in the context of rebalancing 
development. The stepping-in of two French companies to replace substantial foreign 
investors in the Northern Province Koniambo project similarly strengthened French 
control. Local concerns over job protection and the environment aggravated divisions 
within the pro-independence and the pro-France political groupings, to be reflected in 
political developments to be outlined below. The huge drop in the international price of 
nickel with the international financial crisis in late 2008 to less than a quarter of what it 
was in 2007, inevitably affected the pace of the projects. While there is time for a 
recovery in world prices, questions about the viability of the projects and the real effect 
on economic rebalancing efforts are likely to remain in the critical 2014-2018 decision-
making period. 
Hydrocarbons 
Another major potential source of revenue for New Caledonia, rarely spoken about 
publicly, is evidence of the presence of hydrocarbons offshore within its EEZ. 
The presence of oil and gas in the west of the main island, Grande Terre, had been 
known from early in the twentieth century, although it was not believed to be of 
commercial quality (Vialley et al 2003). From 1994, Australia and France (the French 
Institute, IFP, InstHiit fran<;ais de petrole in collaboration with the Mining Service of 
New Caledonia) participated jointly in the FAUST (French Australian Seismic 
Transect) within the framework of Zoneco (the program of resource assessment of New 
Caledonia's EEZ) to assess the likelihood of hydrocarbon resources within the 
contiguous EEZ. 
The 2001 FAUST Zoneco survey found likely petroleum potential, both oil and gas and 
gas hydrate, in the northern part of the New Caledonian Basin and at the Fairway Ridge 
Basin (see Vialley, Lafoy, Auzende et al 2003), although later research (Nouze et al 
2009) disproved the gas hydrate possibilities. French and Australian scientists have 
conducted numerous prospectivity assessment surveys and studies in French and 
Australian waters respectively either side of the EEZ/Australian continental shelf line 
in the last ten years, in areas shown at Map 3 (Location of Hydrocarbons off New 
Caledonia). These areas are being studied closely on the basis of indicators of the 
presence of hydrocarbons (mainly sedimentary thickness, for early background see 
Symonds and Willcox 1989 and Bemardel et al 1999). 
While the potential resource reserve in New Caledonian waters may be comparatively 
large, there is some question about viability of exploitation with existing technology. 
The increasing price of petroleum, and its expected scarcity in decades to come, 
suggest that at some point New Caledonia's offshore resources are likely to become 
exploitable. Some oil companies (Total and Hardman Resources) have shown interest 
in exploration rights. 
The hydrocarbon potential represents a strategic asset for France into the future, and 
thus would bring into play the clauses placing a caveat over New Caledonia's 
responsibilities for its resources, cited earlier in this Chapter (see section on Ambiguity 
in the responsibility for mineral resources). Clarifying who has control over the 
hydrocarbon potential offshore is likely to come into play in the lead up to the 2014-
2018 Noumea Accord deadlines. 
Progress in implementation of the Accord 
Against the background of the complex tasks of managing the immigration/electorate 
issue and rebalancing the benefits of the mineral resource, other aspects of Noumea 
Accord implementation have proceeded, with mixed results. 
Institutions and symbols 
Generally, the structures introduced by the Accord have been established and work 
well. These include the Provincial governments and Congress, along with a parallel 
Paris-organised Committee of Signatories to discuss and monitor the implementation of 
the Accord schedules. 
New institutions, such as a Customary Senate, have been put in place and are engaged 
in the legislative process on a consultation basis. A committee was formed in 2007 to 
consider New Caledonian symbols, and by 2008 the government had endorsed a New 
Caledonian anthem and a motto, although issues such as a name and flag remained 
under discussion. Debate on the flag has exposed divisions (see The flag issue section 
below). 
Despite the provision in the Accord for New Caledonia's special status as a "country", 
the term is actively avoided by the French State and pro-France groups. Instead, 
references are made to "la Noiivelle-Caledonie ", "la Caledonie ", the "collectivite " or 
even the outmoded and incorrect "territoire"; pro-independence leaders do use the term 
''pays'' (see, for example, Sarkozy 2007b; Frogier in Nouvelles Caledoniennes 8 March 
2010; Neaoutyine 2009). 
The land issue has receded, with a conference on land held in Noumea in 2001, and 
AD RAF {Agence de Developpement Rural et d'Amenagement Fonder or Rural 
development and Land management Agency) carrying out its acquisition and 
distribution with generally very little contention, hi 2008, in the context of 
development of the northern mine at Koniambo, agreement with customary leaders was 
secured for a housing estate to be built on customary land. FLNKS leaders however 
continue to monitor the land issue and claim few resources have been given to AD RAF 
in recent years to allow it to continue its work. The current schedule of transfers show 
the handover of ADRAF as being one of the last, projected to take place by January 
2014 Flash d'0ceanie,2\ September 2010). 
The three provincial governments are responsible for the administration of their 
regions, effectively with the Kanaks governing the Northern and Island Provinces, and 
the pro-France groups governing the Southern Province. The Matignon/Noumea 
Accords were based on this federal provincial system, designed to provide a means 
whereby the Kanaks could govern themselves within a united New Caledonia. 
However, one New Caledonian commentator has noted that in the implementation, too 
little power has been exercised by the provinces relative to the collectivity-wide 
Congress (Colloque 2008, Bretegnier in Regnauh and Fayaud 2008 pp. 49 and 91), an 
eventuality which would dilute the power of the pro-independence groups (since, while 
they are in charge of two of the three provinces, it is the pro-France groups that 
dominate in the collectivity-wide (collegial) government). But it could be argued that 
the jury is still out on that issue. Certainly the Provinces wield some key powers 
relating to development of resources including mineral resources, despite ambiguities 
in the Noumea Accord and Organic Law (see section on Ambiguity in the 
responsibility for natural resources). 
Education, employment and training 
The ''400 cadres'" (400 managers) training program (later called ''Cadres avenir'-
fijture managers program) was set up in 1988 to redress the chronic underrepresentation 
of Kanaks in the professions (then fewer than 6%, see Nouvelles Caledoniennes 10 
August 2009; see Haut Commissariat, 1999; and Guiart, 1999, p. 131). At the time, a 
senior Kanak leader cautioned that the training program, over ten years, would lead to 
the emergence of a Kanak bourgeoisie, and was part of a strategy of integration, to 
silence nationalist demands (Waddell 2008 p. 205). This may well have been the 
intention. 
The French High Commission issued a 10-year review of progress in 1999. It noted 
that 444 people had concluded some kind of training, 70% of them Melanesian 
(generally meaning Kanak) (this proportion it claimed was consistent with rebalancing 
objectives), with a 70% success rate defined as having an employment placement (Haut 
Commissariat 1999, p. 8). By June 2010, the Committee of Signatories noted the High 
Commissioner's report that by 31 December 2009, there were 1058 trainees, of whom 
69% were Melanesian; of 700 of these who had returned to the collectivity, 490 were 
Kanaks who had been employed {Releve de conclusions 2010 p. 5). This means that 
over 30% of the intake were non-Melanesian. The inclusion of non-Melanesians itself 
is a shift from the original aims of the program, focused on providing opportunity for 
Kanaks. It is not clear where the returning trainees have been placed for employment. 
These former trainees were not particularly evident in the upper echelons of 
government or industry. A newspaper report in mid-2009 suggested that the program 
until then had trained 41 engineers, 4 pilots, 3 doctors and 2 architects {Nouvelles 
Caledoniennes 10 August 2009), quite a low return for the investment in the program. 
It is true that Kanaks are heavily engaged in government in the Northern and Islands 
Provinces. But in 2009 the administration of these provinces still included large 
numbers of French and Caldoche officials, teachers and advisers (one Kanak leader 
illustrated this by referring to the Northern Province official directory, where just three 
of the ten directors of departments were Kanak, all of the others European, Personal 
communication, March 2009). 
Progress on efforts to enshrine protection of local employment in local law, a critical 
element in the concept of New Caledonian citizenship under the Accord, has been slow. 
A draft law prepared by the Avenir Ensemble-led government, relating to preferential 
employment in the local civil service, was rejected by the French Council of State, and 
a subsequent draft before the Congress, aiming at protecting access to local jobs by 
local residents of 10 years' residence was hampered by an abstention by the FLNKS in 
December 2009 (Muckle, 2009 pp \9Q-\9\-, Nouvelles Caledoniennes 14 January 
2010). A text was agreed and voted on by July 2010, with some reservations on the 
criteria applying to locals protected by the law {Nouvelles Caledoniennes 28 July 
2010). The Committee of Signatories in December 2010 simply foreshadowed further 
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consideration of this issue by the Congress in the future {Releve de conclusions 2010 p. 
5). 
The French State has respected its commitments to "accompany" the collectivity by 
providing the requisite funding transfers as various responsibilities have been devolved. 
However, there remain issues over the phased handover of some powers to the New 
Caledonian government by the French State, particularly the responsibility for 
education. The Noumea Accord provided for transfer of primary school responsibility 
in the first term of the newly created New Caledonian Government (i.e. 1999 to 2004), 
which was duly completed; and secondary schooling in the second and third terms 
(2004-2009 and 2009-2014 respectively). Little had been done by the end of the 
second mandate (2009), or indeed by the time of writing (mid 2011), to transfer 
secondary education to New Caledonia, amidst concerns by some pro-France forces 
about changing the French national system with the risk that standards would not be 
maintained. While this opposition came mainly from the Caldoches, French transients 
(posted in the collectivity) and mainly European Noumea urban population, some 
FLNKS elements shared some of the concerns. It was only well behind schedule, in 
November 2009, that the New Caledonian Congress passed legislation providing for the 
handover of the secondary education ftinction by January 2012; and the pro-
independence side accepted continued authority by France over teacher qualification, 
issuing diplomas and approving the final school curriculum (see Maclellan 2009c). 
And by September 2010, when New Caledonian President Gomes and French High 
Commissioner Dassonville signed a framework agreement covering the transfer of 
some responsibilities, on the critical education issue, the schedule had again slipped, 
providing for the transfer of secondary education from 1 January 2011 to 1 January 
2013 {Oceania Flash 21 September 2010). 
The education issue is particularly delicate, as the French education system was a major 
issue in the evenements period, with FLNKS supporters establishing Kanak People's 
Schools in the rural areas in the early 1980s. There has been some progress in 
responding to Kanak concerns. The primary school curriculum has been altered to 
cover local history, and mAcademie des langues kanak. Academy of Kanak 
Languages, was established in 2007. But, whereas the local French system is one with 
universal access, in practice it remains two-tier in New Caledonia. Kanak children 
attend local primary schools in the provinces but only by travelling long distances or by 
boarding at very young ages, or both. Schooling is also conducted in French, a 
handicap for the indigenous people, particularly when it is considered that there are 28 
indigenous languages (Tryon in Faberon and Hage 2010 p. 399; also Mokkadem et al 
1999). When important exams occur at the end of middle school, the ' 'brever , many 
Kanaks are flinneled into more technical areas while academic streams tend to be 
dominated by non-Kanaks. Most of the 30% of students who drop out of the school 
system are Kanaks (Maclellan 2009c). Kanaks represented only 23% of candidates for 
the baccalaureat exam in 2009, compared to 69% Europeans {De I'ecole coloniale a 
I'ecole d'emancipation, Nouvelles Caledoniennes 22 March 2010). The 2009 Census 
showed that in 2009, 54.1 per cent of Europeans had the baccalaureat, compared to 
only 12.5 per cent of Kanaks and 14.2 per cent of Wallisians. 20,233 Europeans had 
obtained a tertiary degree, but only 2,214 Kanaks and 470 Wallisians. 
Slippage in other transitional arrangements 
In other areas, the New Caledonian Congress agreed, in November 2009, that it would 
take over control of maritime affairs in its territorial waters on January 1, 2011 and 
control of domestic air transport and airport police in January 2013, although the 
international airport at Tontouta would remain under French control {Flash d'Oceanie 
1 December 2009; Maclellan 2009c). 
For the duration of his term, from late 2007 to October 2010, the French High 
Commissioner, Yves Dassonville, sought to play an energizing role, tightening up the 
processes for successful completion of transfers of powers, even in sensitive areas 
(Personal communication February 2009). However, implementation of the main 
process, convening the Noumea Accord follow-up mechanism, the Committee of 
Signatories, was fitful. After the Seventh Meeting in December 2008, the Committee 
did not meet until June 2010, Paris twice deferring scheduled meetings (from 2009 to 
early 20\Q Nouvelles Caledoniennes 29 March 2010), citing pressing domestic 
preoccupations, but perhaps also responding to emerging differences within each of the 
pro-France and pro-independence groupings. The Conclusions of the Meetings reveal a 
hesitation and slippage in implementation, particularly on the key issues. 
The Seventh Meeting of the Committee, in December 2008, agreed that transfers in the 
key areas provided for in the Noumea Accord (secondary public education, and 
responsibility for the Agence de Developpement de la Culture Kanak (ADCK or Kanak 
Cultural Development Agency) and the Agence de Developpement Rural et 
d'Amenagement Fonder (ADRAF or Rural Development and Land Management 
Agency) should proceed. While it underlined that no transfer should be partial, it did 
agree that transfers could be "progressive", i.e., that the pace of transfer could be 
negotiated. The French State agreed to provide accompanying funding. The meeting 
decided that certain other powers, specifically civil security, and civil and commercial 
law, should be treated with flexibility. In mid 2009, the transfer of these powers was 
deferred from 2009 to 2011 (see Releve de conclusions 2008; and Flash d'Oceanie 10 
December 2008). 
When the June 2010 Meeting was finally scheduled, as preparation, the New 
Caledonian Congress sought in May 2010 to endorse a convention on the transfer of 
responsibilities to be signed by President Gomes when the Committee of Signatories 
met. However, UC members absented themselves from the vote and instead sought a 
review of progress under the Accord {Nouvelles Caledoniennes 20 and 24 May 2010). 
The Eighth Meeting essentially established a number of sub-committees to handle 
ongoing issues: a Pilot Committee on the Transfers of Responsibilities, to assess 
progress so far; a Strategic hidustry Committee to continue the work of a mining 
assessment team; and a Committee to prepare for the post-2014 vote provided for in the 
Accord (Releve de conclusions 2010). 
New Caledonian President Gomes signed a framework agreement with French High 
Commissioner Dassonville on 24 September 2010, but it covered the transfer of some 
responsibilities already transferred (public service training, public telecommunications 
and post office functions), and, as noted above, slowed the transfer of secondary 
education to 1 January 2013. The New Caledonian government announced at the same 
time that working groups were looking at transfers in further areas, including civil and 
commercial law, civil status, civil security, all three levels of education, lands and 
cultural institutions. Transfer of the ADCK was envisaged to take place by January 
2012, of the AD RAF by January 2014, and of domestic maritime and domestic air 
transport police and security, respectively, by January 2011 and 2013 {Oceanie Flash 
21 September 2010). 
The Ninth Committee of Signatories was scheduled to meet in June or July 2011. 
External affairs responsibility 
The Noumea Accord provides for New Caledonia to take over some aspects of external 
trade, air and maritime services (Article 3.1.1), the French State specifically retaining 
responsibility for foreign affairs, but with New Caledonia able to have its own 
representation in South Pacific countries, and certain South Pacific, EU and UN 
organizations, and to negotiate agreements with these countries in areas of its 
responsibility under the Accord (Article 3.2.1). The Accord specifically says that 
training will be provided to prepare New Caledonians for their new responsibilities in 
international relations (Article 3.2.1). 
In practice, however, as in the other two Pacific entities, there has been little 
substantive investment in preparing New Caledonian local officials for such 
responsibilities. Although a Unit for International Cooperation exists under the office 
of the President, it is poorly staffed and resourced. Bernard Deladriere, an experienced 
advisor to the New Caledonian Government under Frogier, handled foreign affairs 
virtually single-handedly until the 2004 elections, after which the Theinereau 
government engaged a New Zealander to head its external affairs unit. However from 
2008 to 2009, the Martin government attached no priority to the external affairs unit, 
which was moved to a different building from that occupied by the Government, 
without appointing a director for it. There has been little or no training in English, or in 
international relations and diplomacy. The Gomes government has announced that it 
will attach local personnel to French embassies in the Pacific (see Flash d'Oceanie 10 
March 2010). Without a solid and well trained Secretariat, and strong English-
language skills, it is difficult for senior New Caledonian government members to 
participate meaningfully in the many specialized regional meetings they ideally should 
attend each year. 
France's claim over Matthew and Hunter Islands 
Nothwithstanding the transitional nature of the Noumea Accord, France has continued 
to assert its claim over the islands of Matthew and Hunter, a claim which has been 
contested by elements of the FLNKS. 
Originally discovered by British sea vessels in the late 18"' century, both France and 
Britain had claimed the islands relatively recently (France in 1929 and Britain in 1965). 
France retained its claims after Vanuatu's independence in 1980, when Vanuatu 
asserted its own claim. To make a point, France established a weather station on one of 
the islands in 1981. As recently as 2004, an incident demonstrated the commitment of 
each to their claim. France had detained a Taiwanese fishing-boat for illegally fishing 
in Matthew and Hunter waters in November 2004, but allowed the vessel to leave when 
the fishermen Hashed a fishing authorization by Vanuatu authorities. Subsequently both 
France and Vanuatu agreed to negotiate an agreement on the sharing of resources in the 
area and France proposed further cooperation with Vanuatu in policing the maritime 
zone. In May 2005, Vanuatu threatened to take the matter up with the United Nations 
{Flash d'Oceanic 25 May 2005), but did not subsequently do so. 
In May, 2007, as part of Law of the Sea procedures enabling members to extend their 
continental shelves, France lodged a submission on behalf of New Caledonia, relating 
I'ntei- alia to the area encompassing the Matthews and Hunter group. In July 2007 
Vanuatu's Prime Minister wrote to the President of France objecting to UN 
consideration of the submission, and subsequently registered its objection with the UN. 
In a letter from the office of the French Prime Minister to the Secretary-General of the 
Law of the sea, France wrote that it "takes notice of this objection" (Gorce 2007). 
In recent years France has sent annual "missions de souverainete'" (sovereignty 
missions) to the island groups, often with scientists aboard (see for example Les 
Nouvelles Caledoniennes 3 February 2009). 
Vanuatu has called upon Melanesian solidarity in advancing its claim. In July 2009, on 
the eve of France's hosting its Oceanic Summit with regional leaders, the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group, which has its secretariat in Vanuatu, and includes Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji and the FLNKS from New Caledonia, signed 
the Keamu Declaration, stating that the Matthew and Hunter group traditionally 
belonged to Vanuatu. The FLNKS signatory, Victor Tutugoro, had secured the 
agreement of New Caledonia's Customary Senate to the agreement {Flash d' Oceanic 
28 and 29 July 2009). 
Action on post-Noumea Accord sovereign or '•'•regalien'''' powers 
The Noumea Accord provides that votes will be held after 2014 on the transfer of 
responsibility for the final sovereign powers: foreign affairs, defence, justice, law and 
order, and currency (Article 3.3). But France has acted in two of these areas, defence 
and the currency, in ways which would bear on the future, post-Accord characteristics 
of New Caledonia. 
Defence commitments 
In 2008 France constructed a large military complex in Noumea, for the first time 
bringing together the headquarters of all of its Pacific military forces under one roof 
The same year the French installed a listening post facility near Tontouta, the 
international airport in New Caledonia {Les Noiivelles Caledonieimes 6 September 
2009). And in its Defence White Paper that year, the Sarkozy government announced 
that New Caledonia would form the base for France's Pacific military presence (see 
Chapter 8). Also in 2008, France announced a Mutual Logistical Support Arrangement 
with Australia, under which New Caledonia would give ongoing logistical support to 
Australia (see Chapter 7). 
Since the defence function is one of the five regalien or sovereign responsibilities 
specifically mentioned in the Noumea Accord as being subject to a vote after 2014, the 
timing of France's consolidation of its defence presence raises questions about its 
commitments to the Accord. Indeed, this French action is reminiscent of the 
declaration made by Mitterrand about reinforcing Noumea as a military base in the 
troubled mid 1980s, designed to underline French military power to potential 
troublemakers (see Chapter 3). 
The inconsistency with Noumea Accord principles has not gone unnoficed. Kanak 
leader Roch Wamytan opposed the defence measures {Islands Business November 
2009), saying that such steps were inconsistent for "a country on the path to 
emancipation". Acknowledging that defence was a French sovereign power, Wamytan 
noted that the French state was making decisions lasting five to twenty years in the 
future without involving the pro-independence signatories of the Noumea Accord. 
Question of the Euro 
One fiirther inconsistency in the implementation of the Noumea Accord has been on 
another of the five sovereign powers to be addressed after 2014, the currency. New 
Caledonia's current currency is rooted in the colonial past. The three French Pacific 
territories have used the cfp from 1945, when it referred to "colonies fran^aises du 
Pacijiqiie" or French Pacific colonies, but was known as "Change frangais du 
Pacifique'" from 1947 (Tesoka and Ziller 2008, p. 395), aUhough it has been defined 
variously as "cows'' or "comptoir fran^aispacifique "(all loosely meaning "French 
Pacific Currency"). France negotiated a special exception in the EU Maastricht Treaty 
when it adopted the Euro and stipulated "France will retain the right to issue currency 
in its overseas territories... and will be the only authority to determine parity of the cfp" 
(Special Protocol Number 13, Maastricht Treaty, see Tesoka and Ziller 2008 p.404). 
From 1 January 1999, the cfp was linked with the Euro at a specified rate (EUR 1:120 
cfp). Until then, it had been linked with the US dollar for a number of years (including 
through the US:French franc rate, see Webster's online dictionary. Definition of Cfp). 
With France's switch from its own franc to the Euro in 2002, the French State's 
position on the cfp has been that it can be replaced by the Euro if all three French 
Pacific collectivities agreed to do so. Despite initial opposition, French Polynesia has 
agreed to the change, and the question is not an issue in Wallis and Futuna. But for the 
pro-independence parties in New Caledonia, the question is a sensitive one. They see 
the cfp as a symbol of the past. For FLNKS leaders, resorting to the currency of the 
metropole, let alone that of Europe, would be a backward step in the move to 
independence. Some even believe that if a change were to be made, it would be 
preferable to move to the Australian dollar given the economic realities of the region, a 
position which is totally unacceptable to the French State (Personal communication to 
author 2004; see also Maclellan 2005b p. 413 on local concerns that a move to the Euro 
would be inconsistent with linkages to the Pacific region). 
Most importantly, pro-independence leaders see discussion of this issue as premature. 
They point out that the currency is one of the five 'Veg<3//ew"(sovereign) issues spelt 
out in the Noumea Accord ) which are to be looked at within any new political 
organization resulting from the 2014-2018 consuhations following a referendum (see 
Neaoutyine 2006, p. 78 and Personal communication Tutugoro 2009). They wonder 
why France has raised this issue and see it as divisive. 
The issue remains under ongoing discussion in the Noumea Accord Signatories 
Committee. The seventh meeting of the Committee of Signatories in December 2008 
could only secure agreement for working groups to "study" a possible move to replace 
the cfp with the Euro {Releve de conclusions 2008). 
Social and cultural factors 
It is difficult to assess the social effect of the implementation of the Noumea Accord to 
date. As in other regional island countries, urban drift is a fact of life (see Table 7). 
But a two-tier society is particularly evident in the city. Chirac's decision to excise the 
ethnic category from the 2004 census, questioning by the New Caledonian government 
of official 2009 census results, and the inclusion of non-comparable ethnic categories in 
2009, all make it difficult to quantify the ethnic characteristics of Noumea. The 1996 
census showed that of Greater Noumea's population of 118, 823, Melanesians (Kanaks) 
totalled 25, 613 (21%), Europeans 54, 323 (45.7%), and others 38,887 (32%, including 
Wallisians, Tahitians, Indonesians, Vietnamese, ni-Vanuatu and others) (ISEE TEC 
2008 p. 35). So Kanaks were far outnumbered by Europeans and other islanders and 
ethnic groups. 
The 2009 census showed that the population of Noumea itself (i.e. not Greater Noumea 
as cited above) had increased from 76,293 in 1996 to 97,579 in 2009; and the 
population of the Southern Province as a whole from 134,546 to 183,007 in the same 
period. The populations of the two Kanak-dominated provinces showed an annual 
decline of 1.38% and small increase of .66% respectively whereas the white dominated 
Southern province grew by 2.4% per annum in that period, suggesting that much of the 
inflow to the South consisted of Kanaks from the Northern and Islands Provinces. 
Noumea has remained clearly a European city. The council housing blocks on the 
outskirts of Noumea, while pleasant and of a high quality, were fijlly occupied by 
Kanaks, and the miserable squats in certain outlying areas solely Kanak, and growing. 
A 2009 survey showed that the middle classes were deserting Noumea (15% decline 
from 1996 to 2002), which was showing a widening gap between the very well-off 
(who are generally European) and the squatters (mainly Kanaks) (SCAN 2009 cited in 
Les classes moyennes desertent Noumea, Nouvelles Caledoniennes 22 March 2010). 
The new, small, efficient public buses that serviced the capital were almost exclusively 
used by Kanaks and occasionally foreign tourists, rarely if ever by Caldoche or French 
residents 
In central Noumea in 2009, Kanaks were notable by their absence in meaningful 
employment in government, shops or business. They occupied low level service jobs, 
such as in garbage collection and domestic cleaning. The only other visible Kanaks 
were the aimless groups, mainly of young Kanaks, sitting and strolling around the Place 
des Cocotiers at any given time. 
According to a senior Kanak leader Dewe Gorodey, many young people took refuge in 
music and drugs (mainly light hashish), and by returning to their villages periodically, 
rather than participating in modem life. Such practices are of real concern when set in 
the context of Tjibaou's concerns about the reasons for. and effect of, alcohol 
consumption by Kanaks, which were important underpinnings for his leadership of the 
independence movement (Waddell 2008). 
The creation of the impressive Tjibaou Cultural Centre on the Tina peninsula on the 
outskirts of Noumea, and of the Agence de developpement de la culture kanak, also 
reflect the society's dichotomies. These institutions certainly represent the financial 
commitment of the French State to encourage the evolution of Kanak culture. But it is 
an irony that the Tjibaou Centre's main buildings were designed by a European 
architect, Renzo Piano. Although inspired by the concept of a case, or Melanesian 
house, in the process of construction and evolution, the construction is essentially a 
European one. Kanak-sponsored performances in this elegant strucmre have been 
dwarfed by large-scale rock concerts which Kanak groups organize regularly in fields 
and stadiums elsewhere, featuring international and local indigenous artists. Young 
Kanaks flock to these rock concerts in large numbers. 
Mwa Ka and cultural symbolism 
The continuing role of Kanak cultural symbolism, and the ambiguous views of the 
French and local Caldoches towards it, were evident in the effort by the Conseil 
National des Droits du Peuple Autochtone (CNDPA, National Council for hidigenous 
Peoples Rights) to give a totemic monument, the Mwd Kd (literally, "big house") to the 
city of Noumea (see Maclellan 2005a for a full discussion of this). The monument, 12 
metres high and carved by representatives of the eight traditional Kanak areas, was 
designed to represent the unity of the people of New Caledonia. The organizers had 
planned to erect it, on 24 September 2003, the day when France's taking possession of 
New Caledonia is traditionally marked, and specifically for the ISO**" anniversary. 
The organisers had hoped to erect the monument in the central Place des Cocotiers, in 
between the statues of two Governors, Olry (described by one organizer as a symbol of 
military repression) and Feillet (referred to as representing economic development for 
profit alone). 
Not surprisingly, the event was fraught with tensions and differences. Senior FLNKS 
leaders were at pains to emphasize that the initiative had not been an FLNKS one, but 
one from a small group of Kanaks (Personal communication, 2009). On the pro-France 
side, the Mayor of Noumea, Jean Leques, declined to situate the monument in the 
central Place des Cocotiers as requested, with veteran Southern Province President 
Jacques Lafleur stepping into the breach and inviting its temporary location in a square 
not far from the New Caledonian Government and Southem Province offices. For 
different reasons, this offer displeased some Kanak activists and pro-France supporters 
alike. Differences over this issue highlighted, and reflected, divisions which were 
emerging at the time within both the pro-independence and pro-France groupings to be 
discussed in the Political transition and realignment section below. 
It was only on 24 September, 2005, when a new Avenir Ensemble government agreed 
to the monument's permanent placement, that a handover ceremony took place, at a site 
near the Museum of New Caledonia. Some senior pro-France New Caledonian leaders 
did not attend the ceremony erecting the totem. 
Family Reconciliation: Tjibaou meets Wea 
More encouragingly, the easing of tensions and stable climate engendered by the 
Noumea Accord did allow for a rapprochement of sorts between the Kanak clans 
affected by the 1989 assassination of Tjibaou at Gossanah. 
In 2004 Marie-Claude Tjibaou led a ritual reconciliation ceremony between the Tjibaou 
family at Hienghene and the Wea family of Ouvea. However, this gesture, designed to 
signify not only forgiveness by the wronged family, but a unity of common cultural 
purpose, was itself fraught with tension. One of Tjibaou's sons did not participate, and 
customary leaders in Hienghene were reserved about the ceremony. Strong emotions 
continue to surround not only the assassination, but the path represented by Tjibaou, 
leaving question marks for the future, particularly should a new young Kanak pro-
independence leader emerge (for a sympathetic elaboration of the dynamics in Ouvea 
as opposed to elsewhere in the Kanak communities, see Waddell, 2008). 
Political transition and realignment 
The Noumea Accord is based on an inclusive, collegial government, albeit one which 
votes on issues, necessarily strengthening the power of a majority. The Accord, 
continuing measures established in the Matignon Accords, provided for three 
provinces, each of which elect representatives to provincial assemblies, some of which 
serve in New Caledonia's Congress (see Table 8). Southem Province elects 40 
members (of whom 32 are in the Congress), Northern Province 22 (15) and Loyalty 
Islands Province 14 (7). Elections operate on a party list system, and only parties 
securing more than 5% of the vote can earn representation. The Congress in turn elects 
a collegial "Government", or Executive made up of Members (similar to Ministers) 
who hold assigned portfolios. This Government may include from 5 to 11 Members, 
elected on the basis of a formula reflecting the proportion of party strength in the 
Congress. The Congress has legislative powers in specified areas within its 
competence. 
Table 8 
New Caledonia: Political institutions 
Provincial Elections -^Congressional seats New Caledonian Government 
(restricted electorate) 
Southern Province 
40 of which 32 ) 
Northern Province ) 22 seats of which of which 15 ) from 5 to 11 
Southern Province ) 
14 of which 7 ) 
Source; ISEE TEC 2008 p. 3.2 
The Noumea Accord envisaged elections to the provincial assemblies and Congress 
every 5 years, i.e., four sets of elections (1999, 2004, 2009, 2014), after which the issue 
of proceeding to a series of up to three referendums would be addressed. 
As the following sections will show, despite, or perhaps because of, the violent 
differences which led to the Matignon and Noumea Accord provisions, the collegial 
province-based system has shown itself to be generally resilient in its first decade, 
surviving political division. Not unnaturally in this transition period taking over the 
levers of government in a new collegial format, both major groupings have undergone 
significant change and fragmentation. The first three elections to the Congress in the 
post-Noumea Accord period have reflected a number of these political changes (see 
Table 9 on Political Representation 1999 and 2009), and are a good measure of the 
success of the Noumea Accord system. 
Pro-France fragmentation 
The most significant political change in New Caledonia from 1999 to 2009 has been a 
realignment within the pro-France groups. This change represented in part generational 
change. The old pro-France guard, led by the authoritarian and energetic, albeit ageing, 
Jacques Lafleur in the RPCR renamed the Rassemblement-UMP (R-UMP) after its 
conservative counterpart in France, the UMP (Popular Movement Union), was 
challenged by a younger group, the Avenir Ensemble (AE, Fumre together) led by 
Harold Martin, Marie-Noelle Themereau, Philip Gomes, and Didier Leroux. This new 
party was formed just months before the 2004 elections, but managed to win 16 of the 
54 Congress seats in that election. 
Apart from concern over the centralized style of Lafleur and related personality 
differences (for example, Lafleur and Didier Leroux participated in a heated televised 
debate leading up to the election), the fonnation of the AE was driven by a feeling that 
Lafleur's Rassemblement-UMP was running the Congress and Executive more as a 
majority government than as a collegial group as explicitly intended in the Accord. 
These concerns were not without foundation. At the outset, in the first years of the first 
term, the Executive had been scrupulous to observe the externalities of a collegial 
government. The (RPCR) President was never seen at public functions without the 
(FLNKS) Vice-President at his side, with amusing cartoons showing the ubiquitous 
image of the tall Frogier with the diminutive bespectacled Dewe Gorodey in her 
flowered oceanic dress. The image was a powerful symbol of the new arrangements. 
But the RPCR's inclusiveness and patience with the FLNKS cooled over time within 
that first five-year term. Increasingly, the exigencies of government demanded that the 
Executive vote on key government decisions, inevitably leading to a pattern of 
dominance by the majority over the FLNKS minority. By 2003 Gorodey no longer 
appeared with Frogier, and physically distanced herself from the RPCR/R-UMP. She 
declined to move into the new Congress headquarters, across the road from the grander 
Southern Province waterside offices, on the basis that the Congress would be literally 
overlooked constantly by Jacques Lafleur (President of Southern VroVmce){Nouvelles 
Caledoniennes 4 December 2002). (Reviving the 1980s tendency to blame Australia 
for problems with the Kanaks, one local satirical political monthly, the Chie/i Bleu, 
reported an RPCR view that Gorodey preferred the company of the Australians, a 
reference to the location of the Australian Consulate-general in the same building as the 
former government offices, where Gorodey had chosen to remain, Chien Bleu January 
2003.) 
Meanwhile, there were many developments, apart from concerns at how collegiality 
was working, which established and reinforced a commonality of interests among some 
pro-independence and pro-France supporters. These common concerns resuhed from 
the French State's handling of definition of the restricted electorate, the removal of the 
ethnic category from the census, and over employment protection and enviromnent 
concerns highlighted by the rapidly developing nickel projects at the time. As 
discussed below, the FLNKS itself was experiencing further fragmentation and 
disaffection, partly fed by the old divide-and-rule habits of the RPCR/R-UMP. For 
example, the RPCR had been instrumental in husbanding the support of immigrant 
Wallisians, and stirred the pot at Saint-Louis between Wallisians and FLNKS leader 
Roch Wamytan, who was chief of the local Kanak tribe there. These moves backfired 
when some disaffected Kanaks gravitated towards the new AE. The AE thus came to 
unify many Caldoches and Kanaks around these common concerns. In a way it 
reflected a new pro-New Caledonian ideal which eclipsed for a time other fealties, and 
led it to win as many seats in the 2004 Congress as the RPCR/R-UMP did (Table 9). 
This development led to a shake up in the R-UMP itself, with Frogier replacing Lafleur 
as President, followed by the resignation of Lafleur who formed a further party, the 
Rassemblemenlpour la Caledonie (RPC) in 2006 along with Senator Simon 
Loueckhote. But by 2008 Loueckhote himself had formed yet another pro-France 
party, the Mouvemen! de la Diversite (Diversity Movement, MDD). 
The split in the pro-France camp, especially around these New Caledonian-centred 
issues, concerned the French State. The government of newly-elected UMP candidate 
Nicolas Sarkozy called for the AE and R-UMP to unite, which while resulting in a 
short-term reshuffle, instead led to fiarther splits in the pro-France ranks into a number 
of small parties, hi July 2007, AE leader Martin agreed on a cooperation pact with 
Pierre Frogier of the R-UMP, which was opposed by other AE founders Philippe 
Gomes and Didier Leroux. President Themereau and Leroux resigned from the 
Executive. Frogier became Congress President and Martin, President of the Executive. 
By the end of 2008, just months before the 2009 provincial/Congress elections, the AE 
had split into numerous parties including those led by Philippe Gomes (Caledonia 
Together, Caledonie Ensemble), Themereau (Union for a future together, Union pour 
un avenir ensemble) and Didier Leroux (Future Together Ensemble). The ultra 
right wing Front National split when its former leader Guy George formed the 
Mouvement Caledonien fran^ais (French Caledonian Movement, MCF). Moreover, a 
number of small groups emerged covering a range of interests, from environmental to 
protection of local employment, some neither pro-France nor pro-independence, but all 
hoping to be courted by either side for representation in electoral lists. 
In the end, the pro-France side paid a high price for disunity. In May 2009 provincial 
elections it returned with a reduced majority, winning 31 of the 54 seats, five fewer 
than in 2004. The overarching role of the RPCR had been replaced by three major 
groups, the R-UMP headed by Frogier (13 seats), the Caledonia Together headed by 
Gomes (10 seats) and the Future Together by Martin (6 seats), together with Jacques 
Lafleur's new party the RPC (2 seats). The most nationalist group, the National 
Front/MCF), won no seats at all. And no pro-France group won any representation in 
the Loyalty Islands, which was a first. 
Pro-independence disunity 
The FLNKS too were divided. Leaders could not agree even on who should be 
President from 2001 onwards, although in the consensus-centred Kanak culture this 
was less a problem than it might have been in the other mainly non-Kanak political 
parties. Whereas the FLNKS ran on a relatively united ticket in 1999, by 2004 the UC 
and a new UC Renouveau could not agree to run on the FLNKS ticket, dividing the 
vote and considerably damaging their chances in the Southern Province. In 2004 the 
FLNKS did not win one seat in Southern Province. This was a new and worrying trend 
for collegiality, the more so when there remained in both the Northern and Island 
Province some form of representation, however small, of the pro-France parties (see 
Table 9). The real concern was that with no representation in the Southern Province, 
where the vast Goro project was proceeding relatively swiftly compared to the 
Koniambo project in the North, the Kanak polity would feel further marginalized and 
isolated from power and money centres. 
The FLNKS had appeared to have learned the political lesson of its losses in the 
Southern Province. Together with the LKS, it had been able to secure four cabinet 
ministries in the new Executive elected in 2007 following the R-UMP/AE 
acccommodation, as opposed to the three positions it had held before then. Its efforts 
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to agree on a united ticket in the south, in order to win baclc representation there, were 
frustrated, however, by the formation of a new, more vocal and potentially disruptive, 
pro-independence force. 
In November 2007, the Union Syndicate des TravaiUenrs Kanaks et des Exploiles 
(Federation of Unions of Kanak Workers and the Exploited, USTKE) formed a new 
political party, the Labour Party (Parti travailliste). The USTKE, although not the 
largest or most powerful Kanak union, was a highly visible one, and had been behind 
numerous strikes, protests and blockades for decades, including in the years following 
the signature of the Noumea Accord, stirring up general strikes and airport blockades 
over local employment protection issues. As a union, it had also been manipulated in 
the past by pro-France groupings in order to undermine Kanak unity. 
The Labour Party's platform included to protect employment rights of the Kanaks and 
ensure implementation of the Noumea Accord. It held its first Congress in November 
2008, and revised its objective to seeking full sovereignty and independence in 2014. It 
noted the non- implementation of the Noumea Accord particularly in the areas of local 
employment protection and economic rebalancing. In March 2009 it staged a blockade 
at the international airport on employment rights (opposing SLN measures to reduce 
working hours in the wake of plummeting nickel prices) to which the French State 
responded with police force and teargas (see Fisher 2009a). In the lead up to the May 
2009 provincial elections, the Labour Party supported the idea of proceeding 
immediately to a referendum on independence in 2014 (see Referendum issue section 
below). 
Although the formal membership of the Labour Party is small (just over 500 attended 
its 2008 Congress), its potential to mobilize has been proven, not only to rally 
supporters to demonstrate as in the early 2009 airport blockade, but also in the 
USTKE's sponsoring large music festivals which have attracted tens of thousands of 
young New Caledonians (see for example Maclellan 2005a p. 11). 
So the new Labour Party presented a problem for the unity of the pro-independence 
group. It ran its own lists in all three Provinces, drawing away votes from the 
mainstream FLNKS groups. 
Table 9 
New Caledonia: Post-Noumea Accord election results 
1999 2004 2009 (May) 2009 (Dec)* 
Turnout 74% 76.42% 72% 
New Caledonian Congress 
RPCR (pro-France) 24 
RFC (Lafleur) 2 2 
Rassemblement-UMP (Frogier) 16 13 13 
Front National 4 4 
Alliance (pro-France) 3 
Avenir Ensemble (pro-France) 16 6 6 
Caledonie ensemble(Gomes) 10 10 
Total Pro-France 31 36 31 31 
UNI-FLNKS (independentist) 8 
FLNKS 12 3 3 
UNI (Palika) 6 8 6 
Union Caledonienne 7 8 8 
Federation de Coordination 
des Independantistes (FCCI) 4 1 
UC Renouveau I 
LKS 1 1 1 1 
Parti Travailliste 3 4 
Union nationale pour le renouveau 1 
Total pi 'o-independence 23 18 23 23 
Total 54 54 54 54 
Executive 
AE 4 
RPCR/Rass UMP 8 4 3 
M'mt pour la Diversite 1 
Caledonie Ensemble 3 
Total pro-France 8 8 7 
UNI-FLNKS 3 2 
UC 1 2 
Palika 1 
FLNKS 1 
Total pro-independence 3 3 4 
Total Executive 11 11 11 
Southern Province 
AE (pro-France) 19 8 
Caledonie Ensemble 11 
RPCR (pro-France) 25 16 
RPC 2 
Rassemblement-UMP 15 
Alliance Pour la Caledonie 4 
(pro-France) 
Front National (pro-France) 5 1 
Total pro-France 34 40 36 
FLNKS 6 4 
Total pro-independence 6 0 4 
Total 40 (of which 32 in Congress) 
Northern Province 
UNI-FLNKS (ind) 11 9 
FLNKS-UC 8 
Parti Travailliste 3 
FLNKS 6 
UNI 8 
UC (independentist) 7 
FCCI 4 
Total pro-independence 18 18 20 
RPCR 4 3 
AE 1 
Rassemblement-UMP 1 
Une Province pour tous 1 
Total pro-France 4 4 2 
Total 22 (of which 15 are in Congress) 
Islands Province Dec 20 
FLNKS 6 
FLNKS/UC 6 
Palika 2 
UC 4 6 
UNI 2 
UNI/FLNKS 4 
LKS 2 2 2 2 
Parti Travailliste 2 4 
UC Renouveau 2 
FCCI 2 2 
Union nationale pour le renouveau 2 
Total pro-independence 12 12 14 14 
RPCR 2 2 
Total pro-France 2 2 0 0 
Total 14 (of which 7 are in Congress) 
• D e c e m b e r 2009 figures reflect a re-run of the Islands elections in December 2009 
Still, in May 2009 provincial elections, the mainstream pro-independence groups were 
able to increase their support in both the Loyalty Islands and the Southern Province, 
enabling them to restore representation they had lost in the latter province in 2004 
(although it is arguable that FLNKS could have won more than the 4 out of 40 Southern 
Province seats if the Labour Party had not run its own list). They increased their total 
representation from 18 to 20 seats in the 54-member Congress, with the UC and 
UNI(?7«/o« Nationalepour I'lndependance - National Union for Independence) 8 seats 
each, FLNKS 3, LKS 1, see Table 9). But the brand new Labour Party won 3 seats, 
bringing total pro-independence representation to 23 seats. 
The Labour Party also had managed to secure representation in both the Northern and 
Loyalty Islands provinces. However it was not satisfied with its win of 2 seats in 
Loyalty Islands, and called for a re-run of the election there owing to electoral 
anomalies (principally the disproportionately high number of proxy votes for those 
islanders residing on the main island). The French Council of State voided the 
province's election and in a re-run in November 2009, the Labour Party doubled its 
representation, to four. This meant a ftirther increase in its representation in the 
Congress, from 3 to 4 seats. 
Meanwhile divisions within the FLNKS mainstream groups persist (for example in the 
election of the Vice-President, the former incumbent and expected winner, Palika's 
Dewe Gorodey was displaced by UC's Pierre Ngaihoni.^^ How the mainstream 
FLNKS groups manage their own divisions, and more extreme Labour Party demands, 
will be a challenge as the 2009 Congress prepares for the transition to a post-Noumea 
Accord New Caledonia. 
Evolving views on what comes after the Noumea Accord 
Referendum issue during the 2009 campaign 
The campaign for the 2009 provincial elections saw the emergence of preliminary 
positions on both sides relating to the holding of one to three final referendums as 
provided for under the Noumea Accord. 
The Accord provides that from the beginning of the fourth term (2014) with the 
approval of three fifths of Congress, a date will be set for a referendum on the transfer 
of the ""regalien", or five sovereign, responsibilities to New Caledonia (i.e. justice, law 
and order, defence, currency and foreign affairs); on its access to "an international 
status of fiill responsibility"; and on the organization of citizenship and nationality 
(Article 5). The electoral body for such a referendum is broader than that for 
provincial elections, including all voters in those elections but also those establishing 
20 years' residence to December 2014 (i.e. those establishing residence before 31 
The post 2009 elected N e w Caledonian "Government" or Cabinet consisted of seven m e m b e r s from 
pro-French parties (for Rassemblement -UMP: Bernard Deladriere, Jean-Claude Briault , Sonia Backes , 
for Caledonie Ensemble: Philippe Germain, Philippe Dunoyer and for L M D party, Le Mouvemen t pour 
la Diversite, which had entered into an alliance with Rassemblemen t -UMP: Simon Loueckhote) and four 
f rom the pro- independence side (UC: Pierre Ngaihoni , Yann Devillers, Palika: D e w e Gorodey, F L N K S : 
Jean-Louis d 'Anglebermes) . 
December 1994) (see Appendix 1). If voters vote against the proposals in the first 
referendum, and if one third of the Congress decides so, a second will be held, and if 
the vote is again negative, a third on the same basis. If the response is still negative, 
then "political partners" will meet to examine the position. If Congress has not fixed a 
date for a vote before the end of the penultimate year of the mandate (2017), the French 
State will do so in the final year (2018). This provision, together with the successive 
three vote option, led one senior French adviser, Alain Christnacht to suggest, in early 
2011, that technically a vote could slip to 2023 (Christnacht 2011). Whatever the case, 
the "political organization", set in place by the 1998 Noumea Accord, will remain, at its 
latest stage, without any regression to the status quo ante. 
Well before the May 2009 May provincial elections, the pro-France side had already 
planted the seed of an alternative to the provisions of the Noumea Accord. They 
claimed that proceeding to the referendum(s) envisaged in the Accord would result in 
the predictable outcome of a vote to stay with France, since, in all elections so far since 
the Noumea Accord, the pro-France side has won the most seats. They warned that 
proceeding to a vote would therefore needlessly arouse sensitivities and probably 
violence (see for example "Z 'Interview: Jacques Lafleur melera sa voix a la 
campagne'", Les NouveUes Caledoniennes 27 February 2009). The caution is probably 
justified. The demographics discussed earlier in this Chapter show increasing 
predominance of newcomer immigrants from France and other French entities, who 
tend to support staying with France; and a decline in the percentage of Kanaks, who 
form the bulk of those supporting independence. It was such concerns which had led to 
the proposal by Jacques Lafleur to renegotiate and extend the Matignon Accords in 
1998. At that time, he envisaged an extension of an independence vote by 30 years, 
although compromised on the 15 years provided for in the Noumea Accord (i.e. from 
1999 to 2014) (according to Pierre Frogier, Lafleur made the concession in the 
pressured final hours of the negotiations. Personal communication, March 2009). 
On 4 January 2008, echoing Lafleur's earlier moves in 1998, AE's Harold Martin in his 
inaugural speech as President of the Congress, referred to the Noumea Accord 
provision for the post-2014 Congress to approve with a three fifths vote, the holding of 
an electoral consultation, or referendum, on New Caledonia taking over full state 
powers, which would be three times repeated in the event of a negative vote, after 
which all political parties would meet to discuss the situation. He noted that the result 
of any such vote would be predictable (i.e. not in favour of the independence camp) and 
proposed devising now "a new accord for New Caledonians", without waiting for the 
referendums (see Flash d'Oceanie, 8 January 2008). His suggestion at the time was 
met with silence from the pro-independence FLNKS side, whom he had evidently not 
consulted. 
Separately, from early 2009, Jacques Lafleur persistently floated the idea of a 50-year 
further delay in moves to any vote for independence in a ''pacte cinquantenaire" (50-
year agreement) (for example, NouveUes Caledoniennes 26 February 2009, 27 April 
2009, 5 March, 2009, 25 September 2009, 27 October 2009, 13 January 2010). 
During the 2009 provincial election campaign, there were mixed views amongst the 
parties on the idea of delaying a vote. Interestingly, the most strident views came from 
elements of each opposing camp, both favouring the idea of proceeding as early as 
possible to a ''referendum coiiperef (cut-off referendum), but for different reasons. 
Pierre Frogier, R-UMP leader, spoke volubly and publicly about the need to proceed 
immediately in 2014 to a referendum, i.e., not to wait until later in the agreed period to 
2018 to vote. He described holding an early referendum openly, and provocatively, as 
to ''declencher" or ''purger'" (to "activate" or "purge") discussions of a new future 
sooner, rather than to delay inevitable decisions any longer, probably with the aim of 
thereby forestalling independence indefinitely. 
Ironically, the only other proponent of an earlier rather than later referendum was the 
new Labour Party at the extreme end of the pro-independence spectrum ("Le Parti 
travailliste pour I 'independance en 2014" Nouvelles Caledoniennes 18 November 
2008). Its support was potentially troublesome given the tendency of its backbone, the 
USTKE, to initiate strikes and even violence to progress its causes. 
Other parties were more cautious. On the pro-France side, the views of Harold 
Martin's AE were already known, i.e., favouring talks to circumvent the need for the 
referendums (see above). Phiiipe Gomes, leading the Caledonie Ensemble, supported 
this view {Nouvelles Caledoniennes 20 April 2009). In a rare public comment from the 
mainstream FLNKS, Paul Neaoutyine disagreed with Frogier's idea of a "purging 
referendum", saying it was based on a disrespectful view of independence. 
Independence, he said, was a right to be respected, not something to be feared. He 
favoured a consensual approach, one which was yet to be explored ("w« resultat qui 
doit se rechercher"), but one where all the options were on the table, i.e., independence 
as well as that of staying with France {Nouvelles Caledoniennes 20 April 2009). 
For its part, the French state maintained a public distance on the question during the 
election campaign, with President Sarkozy having said, addressing the December 2008 
Noumea Accord Signatories meeting, that it would be for New Caledonians to decide 
on a referendum "whatever pro-independence or otherwise (sic) beliefs, there is a 
rendezvous and you will decide, but without violence" {Nouvelles Caledoniennes 10 
December 2008). Preserving the role of an impartial State, representatives of the French 
State were privately unequivocal in claiming its commitment to proceed to referendums 
strictly consistent with statutory requirements under the Accord and the 1999 Organic 
Law (Personal communications February 2009 and May 2008). 
In the event, in the 2009 election, both parties that publicly had supported an early 
referendum did very well, the R-UMP winning the most seats of any single party, and 
the Labour Party winning 4 seats after its establishment only eighteen months earlier. 
L 'apres-Accord: independence and sovereignty 
Pro-France groups 
The fact that the most conservative pro-France party had shared a strong position in 
favour of an early referendum with the most extreme, pro-independence party, seemed 
to galvanise the mainstream pro-France parties around a position advocating caution 
about holding an early referendum, which may well have been the intent behind 
Frogier's position. Indeed, the R-UMP stance seemed to have been simple posturing: 
by October 2009, Frogier was no longer speaking of "purging" independence by the 
earliest possible "yes or no" vote, but rather of a vote proposing a choice between 
independence and an option of substantial autonomy {Nouvelles Caledoniennes 26 
October 2009). He proposed an option of a form of free association where New 
Caledonia would remain French and allow France to continue to be in charge of the 
more expensive powers (which he defined as the five regalien powers), while New 
Caledonia took on the remaining powers {Flash d 'Oceanie 27 October 2009). In his 
proposal, Frogier was reflecting the recently evolved positions of other pro-France 
parties, in an effort to respond favourably to Sarkozy's desire for the pro-France parties 
to work together. 
On the pro-France side, Harold Martin and his AE, who had long supported discussions 
to circumvent a referendum, endorsed Frogier's October proposals. Martin saw any 
definitive "solution de sortie'", or post-Noumea Accord scenario, as having to be shared 
with the pro-independence groupings and the French State. It was thus "necessary to 
negotiate these sovereign responsibilities". He linked the idea with President Sarkozy's 
support, expressed in 2007, for the most innovative solutions for New Caledonia, in 
order to guarantee the personality and powers of New Caledonia within France 
(Sarkozy 2007a, Martin in Nouvelles Caledoniennes 29 October 2009). Separately, 
Martin proposed engaging former High Commissioner and Noumea Accord negotiator 
Alain Christnacht in preparing for "/ 'apres-Accord'' {Nouvelles Caledoniennes 12 
September 2009). 
Philippe Gomes' Caledonie Ensemble adopted a more nuanced position. Before the 
2009 provincial elections, he had warned about the risks of an early 2014 referendum, 
raising the spectre of a resurgence of political tensions concealing ethnic cleavages 
{Nouvelles Caledoniennes 20 April 2009). He had also supported a referendum 
affirming a Caledonian identity providing for enlarged responsibilities and possibly 
even "shared sovereignty" with the French State, for example joint exercise of 
"regalien' or sovereign responsibilities in the region, an idea which Frogier appeared 
to subsequently take up. By February 2010, after Frogier had spelled out his 
association-style proposal. Gomes noted his continuing opposition to a "useless" 
referendum, and said he favoured early discussions with pro-independence groups to 
outline what was to come after the Noumea Accord. But he underlined that it would be 
for the representatives elected in 2014 to finalise arrangements. No doubt mindful of 
the damaging effect of the 1988 Presidential election campaign on New Caledonia's 
history (see Chapter 3), he also cautioned lest the discussions be influenced by the 
French presidential election campaign in 2012 {Nouvelles Caledoniennes 22 February 
2010). 
Pro-independence groups 
The thinking of the pro-independence groups was also evolving. 
Paul Neaoutyine of Palika had elaborated on his ideas of independence in a 
comprehensive interview published in 2006 (Neaoutyine 2006). At that time, he had 
referred to ""decolonisation en douceur''\''sof\ decolonization") whereby a New 
Caledonia which had been accompanied by France in its emancipation, rather than left 
on its own, would be able to establish links with France as with any other country 
(Neaoutyine 2006 p. 68). Victor Tutugoro, official spokesman for FLNKS, spoke in 
similar terms in 2008, agreeing with his interviewer that independence was a dead 
concept in a globalized world. He argued that independence and sovereignty meant the 
capacity to choose one's own interdependencies, to choose with whom one wanted to 
work and exchange {Nouvelles Caledoniennes interview, 17 June 2008). In a personal 
interview with the author, Tutugoro was more precise, saying the FLNKS wanted the 
right for New Caledonia to decide who it concluded treaties with, and that France was 
one of a number of possibilities (Personal communication April 2009). 
In their emphasis on the post-Accord New Caledonia having the capacity to decide with 
whom it would deal, both Neaoutyine and Tutugoro were building on the foundation 
established by Tjibaou when he said that "Sovereignty is the right to choose partners; 
independence is the power to manage all the needs that colonization, the present 
system, has created Sovereignty gives us the right and the power to negotiate 
interdependencies. For a small country like ours, independence is choosing our 
interdependencies skilfully" (Tjibaou 2005 p. 152). 
In his 2006 interview, Neaoutyine also emphasized that, while independence was a 
right, the ways and means to it could be negotiated (Neaoutyine 2006 p. 71). On the 
currency (Euro) issue and defence relationship with France issues as for the three other 
regalien areas (justice, law and order and foreign relations), "we can be included in a 
more global disposition and keep our independence". "We have already entered into 
independence", and with the planned transfer of responsibilities in the near future, "we 
can never go back". "What we decide over the last five [regalien] responsibilities, will 
only concern areas which we will share with others. At that stage we will be practically 
already independent. C'A ce stade nous serons pratiquement deja independants ") I 
think most citizens understand thaf (my italics, Neaoutyine 2006 p. 82). By the end of 
the Noumea Accord, he said, the country would find itself in a situation of being 
''virtually independent". "In other words, we are on the way to acceding to 
sovereignty. The Noumea Accord is a concrete process, at the end of which the 
responsibilities will be transferred from the governing colonial power to a country on 
the way to emancipation..." (Ibid.). 
In May 2009, on the eve of the provincial elections, Neaoutyine told the Nouvelles 
Caledoniennes that independence was written into the Accord, and that after 2014, 
when the transfer of the last responsibilities would be effected, "our country Kanaky-
New Caledonia would be independent" (6 May 2009). A few days later, he elaborated 
that the final referendum would focus on the future of the five remaining regalien 
sovereign responsibilities, which he noted independent states in the world exercised in 
quite varied formulas, even in "shared ways" such as was the case for France in its 
currency and defence. "1 consider then that our country will be in the situation of 
quasi-independence; and it is possible to resolve this question and the future of the five 
sovereign responsibilities by discussion" {Nouvelles Caledoniennes, 8 May 2009). 
By September 2009, Neaoutyine was supporting Gomes' ideas of "shared sovereignty" 
as contributing to accelerating the implementation of the Noumea Accord. He 
underlined Palika's support for the continued transfer of responsibilities, adoption of 
identity signs (for example, a flag), and equitable social and economic refonns. He 
indicated once again that the objective of decolonization as proposed by the Noumea 
Accord was reached by transferring responsibilities and preparing for the final 
referendum, and defining a clear political framework for Caledonia's exercise of 
regional and international responsibilities. 
At the same time, in a reference to the activities of the Labour Party, Neaoutyine 
denounced any strategy of destabilization, saying the new social contract would be 
through social dialogue, not through street movements resulting in imprisonment of the 
young in the name of an industrial union which they did not understand. Despite 
statistics showing widening social gaps, Neaoutyine said the new institutions of New 
Caledonia, including the provinces, had resulted in many improvements in the 
distribution of public monies. He said he had no sense of an impoverishment of the 
people in the bush or tribes, although there was a problem of access to employment 
(Nouvelles Caledoniennes 24 September 2009). 
Participating in a visit to Australia in March 2010, as part of the collegial government, 
Neaoutyine said that as the pro-independence group was a minority, majority 
government would exclude them (Personal communication Neaoutyine 2010). As 
such, a collegial, proportional representation system was important to give the 
independantistes access to power via the provinces. This seemed to suggest that 
proportional voting for a collegial government should be retained post-2014. He 
underlined that the pro-independence group were ''acteurs'", i.e., they had an active 
role, in the "emancipation" process. 
Also early in 2010, as some already agreed legislation on the protection of employment 
was returned to the Congress after Council of State approval, only to meet further 
discussion, Neaoutyine flagged a "destabilization" that was occurring. He warned that 
"If the non-sovereign responsibilities are not transferred, constitutionally, the 
referendum [foreseen by the Noumea Accord] can not be organized" and tha t" If this is 
the aim of the manoeuvre [i.e. questioning agreed legislation], to delay things, to find 
ourselves again in a new situation, this must be clearly said" {Nouvelles Caledoniennes 
29 April 2010). 
Palika's Charles Washetine shared Gomes caution about what was strictly required 
under the Noumea Accord in 2014. He spoke of respecting the calendar and modalities 
of the Accord, which stipulated only that provincial elections must be held in 2014, i.e., 
with greater flexibility on the timing of a referendum (Nouvelles Caledoniennes 30 
November 2009). In other comments he said that the FLNKS were prepared to "play 
the game" of the Noumea Accord to its full completion (Personal communication 24 
February 2009). Palika's Dewe Gorodey added, in October 2009, that her priority was 
not independence at any cost, but rather, successftil decolonization, with access by the 
Melanesian world to every place it was legitimately able to claim. The essence was not 
a referendum, with winners and losers on different sides. What counted was an 
outcome of the Accord, through which those who had nothing today "feel they are 
winners" {Nouvelles Caledoniennes 7 October 2009). 
For their part, the broad FLNKS coalition was more cautious, and suspicious about the 
motives and actions of the French State. In September 2009, the FLNKS met to review 
political developments. In comments reported by the Nouvelles Caledonietmes, the 
FLNKS ascribed nefarious motives to the French State, specifically in its dealings with 
social conflict (i.e. heavy handed approach to USTKE action), the evolution of the 
Organic Law (i.e. amendment to allow for slower implementation of some transfers of 
responsibilities), and on the international stage (a possible reference to efforts to have 
New Caledonia displace the FLNKS in the Melanesian Spearhead Group). By all this, 
the FLNKS saw the French State as aggressively preparing the way for a new 
negotiated solution in place of a referendum on full sovereignty. The FLNKS 
described the recent agreement between the R-UMP, Caledonie Ensemble, and AE as 
"a deviation from democracy dictated by the French State". "What the State is not able 
to say in view of its international engagements, it tries to impose by a strategy aiming 
to suggest that the Noumea Accord has broken down...But the FLNKS will not be 
duped in this, and would remain vigilant" {Nouvelles Caledoniennes 4 September 
2009). Nonetheless the FLNKS leaders singled out Philippe Gomes, namely his 
policies aimed at tackling inequality in wealth distribution, for positive comment. 
The FLNKS remained mute on Frogier's October 2009 "in association" proposal, 
despite holding a further scheduled meeting shortly after his announcement {Nouvelles 
Caledoniennes 30 October 2009). In a private comment, the FLNKS spokesman Victor 
Tutogoro noted that the final referendum would pose a choice between remaining under 
guardianship {'"tutelle") with considerable autonomy, or acceding to "full sovereignty" 
(which would not seem so very different from the "association" v. "independence" 
choice Frogier was proposing). But he specifically rejected leaders "slicing up" the 
Noumea Accord by deciding not to apply certain aspects of the Accord which had been 
ratified by the people (Personal communication 30 October 2009). 
Elements of the FLNKS added their own comment in subsequent months, marking 
further areas of concern. Jacques Lalie {Union national pour le renouveau - National 
Union for Renewal, UNR) declared that his party shared the FLNKS position, noting 
that in view of what the "colonized people" had already given up, "it was difficult to 
say that we had still more to offer". However, it was necessary to work on a 
democratic outcome, and proceed to an initial referendum, one or two years after 2014 
{Nouvelles Caledoniennes 2 December 2009). The UC's Charles Pidjot said his party 
aimed at the transfer of all responsibilities, except the sovereign responsibilities, before 
2014, followed by a referendum (Nouvelles Caledoniennes 6 November 2009). 
French State 
When the Secretary of State for Overseas France, Marie-Luce Penchard visited New 
Caledonia in November 2009, she reportedly supported Frogier's "free association" 
idea provided it was endorsed by a consensus in New Caledonia {Nouvelles 
Caledoniennes 6 November 2009). 
In his New Year speech to the Overseas France in January 2010, President Sarkozy said 
discussion was required amongst Caledonians so that the vote foreshadowed in the 
Accord "would translate into a result approved by a very large majority" (Sarkozy 
2010a). Since he had ruled out independence for the Overseas France as a whole, 
earlier in his speech, he clearly hoped for the people of New Caledonia to agree on an 
alternative option (see Chapters 8 and 9). 
The flag issue 
Discussion and decision around the issue of a flag or flags for New Caledonia have 
sharpened divisions and tested the provisions applying to the workings of the Congress. 
The R-UMP's Pierre Frogier proposed, in February 2010, that the Kanak and French 
flags be flown together as a gesture of recognition in the context of talks about future 
institutions {Nouvelles Caledoniennes 9 February 2010). Philippe Gomes of the pro-
France Caledonie Ensemble, and Neaoutyine of the pro-independence Palika, alike 
rejected the idea as contrary to the Noumea Accord, which, Neaoutyine pointed out, 
called for "one" identity sign {Nouvelles Caledoniennes 15 and 29 April 2010). Article 
1.5 of the Noumea Accord provides for common discussion of identity signs, including 
of "a flag" in the singular, whereas Article 5 of the Organic Law provides for New 
Caledonia to "mark its personality alongside the national Emblem and signs of the 
Republic" under certain conditions, including the agreement by 3/5 of the Congress. 
The Committee of Signatories agreed on 24 June 2010 that both flags be flown together 
in view of 2011 Pacific Games to be held in New Caledonia the following year {Releve 
de conclusions 2010). The same day. President Sarkozy endorsed flying both flags 
above the French High Commission building in Noumea, provided the New Caledonian 
Congress endorsed the idea by passing a pertinent resolution. He recognized that the 
recommendation had not been easy for the parties, and that it was one preliminary step 
in a longer process that would result in the choice of one flag that would be accepted by 
all (Sarkozy 2010b). On 13 July the Congress voted by a strong majority (42 of the 54 
members) in favour of flying the two flags {Voeu No 1, 13 July 2010). The resolution 
occurred days before the French Prime Minister, Francois Fillon, arrived in Noumea to 
witness the flying of both flags over the French High Commission building. 
Despite Congress' resolution on the issue, some municipalities declined to fly both 
flags. The Union Caledonienne took exception to this, and resigned from the 
Government on 17 February 2011, precipitating a new vote for a new Government by 
the Congress. Article 121 of the Organic Law provided that, if one member of the 
collegial Government resigned, all resigned, and a new Government should be elected 
by the Congress within fifteen days. On 3 March, following the election of a new 
Government, Gomes authorized one of his Caledonie Ensemble members to resign, 
once again triggering another election on 17 March, following which a Caledonie 
Ensemble member again resigned, with another election on 1 April. In all three 
elections Harold Martin was elected President with his K-UViVIAvenir Ensemble 
grouping winning the most seats. Gomes claimed that the initial UC action had been 
taken in concert with Frogier's R-UMP in order to oust him, and pushed for province-
wide elections so the people could have a voice over the flag issue. He also appealed to 
the French Council of State against the High Commissioner's decision to allow the 
election of a new government on 3 March once his party representative had resigned 
{Le Figaro 8 April 2011). This appeal was not upheld by the Council of State. 
The Union Caledonienne called for a public demonstration by its supporters on the 
issue on 3 April, and the Caledonie Ensemble likewise called out its supporters for the 
same day, leading the High Commissioner to ban such demonstrations on that day. 
Meanwhile, Overseas France Minister Marie-Luce Penchard visited the collectivity on 
17 April and negotiated an agreement to suspend further resignations and elections, and 
to endorse the continuation of the Martin government in caretaker mode, until Article 
121 of the Organic Law could be amended, in the interests of stability and the 
continued working of the government {Flash d'Oceanie 18 April 2011). This occurred, 
with the amendment providing for an eighteen month period after a resignation before a 
subsequent resignation could occur {Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes 28 May 2011). 
These developments were important as they showed the underlying emotion 
surrounding the issue of the flag, and the risks associated with precipitating action 
outside of the Congress (i.e. through the Committee of Signatories) without adequate 
consultation and under pressure from external and French domestic events such as the 
visit by the French Prime Minister, the French President and the hosting of the Pacific 
Games (the latter two events planned for August 2011). The developments also 
showed that even when the majority of the Congress voted for a particular action, if 
underlying concerns were unresolved, progress would not occur, an important lesson 
for addressing key questions for the future. 
Metropolitan and other Institutional Factors 
Despite the French State's financial and political commitment to implement the letter 
and the spirit of the Noumea Accord (see for example speech by Secretary of State Jego 
to Colloquium, Regnault and Fayaud 2008 p. 23), there has been a tendency for the 
French State, as the Noumea Accord signature recedes in time, increasingly to treat 
New Caledonia (and the more so French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna) as just 
another administrative unit. Institutional changes suggest diminished attention to 
Overseas France and the Pacific entities, particularly over the first years of President 
Sarkozy's leadership. 
Ministerial level 
From 1999 to 2010, there were eight Ministers or Secretaries of State for Overseas 
France (see Table 10), all of them relatively junior in the ministerial pecking order, and 
with progressively less experience or background in the Pacific. Early appointees had 
some close engagement with the region and issues (Secretaries of State Queyranne and 
Paul by virtue of their direct engagement in the Noumea Accord and Matignon 
processes respectively). Brigitte Girardin, a former senior bureaucrat, had at least 
worked closely with Australia on issues relating to Antarctica. But after Girardin, 
appointees had little or no familiarity with the Pacific. 
Table 10 
List of French Ministers/Secretaries of State for Overseas France 1999-present 
(all working under the Minister for the Interior) 
M. Jean-Jack QUEYRANNE 
Secretary of State for Overseas France 
4 June 1997 
M. Christian PAUL 
Secretary of State for Overseas France 
29 August 2000 
Mme Brigitte GIRARDIN 
Minister for Overseas France 
7 May 2002 
M. Francois BAROIN 
Minister for Overseas France 
2 June 2005 
M. Herve MARITON 
Minister for Overseas France 
27 March 2007 
M. Christian ESTROSI 
Secretary of State for Overseas France 
19 June 2007 
M. Yves JEGO 
Secretary of State for Overseas France 
18 March 2008 
Mme Marie-Luce PENCHARD 
Secretary of State for Overseas France from June 2009 
Minister for Overseas France from November 2009 
Source- Ministry of Overseas France website wwvv.outre-mcr.gouv.fr accessed 18 February 2010 
There was also a pattern of appointing political figures to what became very short stints 
(notably the terms of Mariton and Estrosi, less than a year each), with incumbents using 
the position for their own domestic political ambitions (for example, Estrosi after his 
short term taking up the position of Mayor of Nice). 
The pattern has not gone unnoticed. One of the clearest messages from the New 
Caledonian participants at the 2008 commemorative Colloquium on the Accords was 
the loss of knowledge and understanding of their concerns, in Paris (see for example 
comments by Wallis Kotra noting the worry that younger generations of officials 
belonged to a culture at odds with the Overseas France and with New Caledonia in 
particular, in Regnault and Fayaud 2008 p. 55). 
From the time of de Gaulle, all French Presidents, Pompidou, d'Estaing, Mitterrand, 
and Chirac, shared the Gaullist view that the Overseas France was France, and 
contributed to the grandeur of France (Aldrich and Connell 1989 Chapter 1; Leymarie 
1985 p. 2; Domoy-Vurobaravu 1994 p. 50-51). With the election of President Nicholas 
Sarkozy in May 2007, his views on France s possessions overseas were little known. 
Sarkozy departed from the usual cast of French Presidents, coming from a younger 
immigrant generation and with a foreign wife. He did see Overseas France as 
important in his presidential candidature, sending his advisers on information gathering 
missions there during his campaign. In New Caledonia's case he also set out his views 
in writing, portrayed himself as overly sympathetic to the pro-France view, and was 
obliged to correct this impression in later contacts (see Chapter 8). While his priorities 
clearly lay with Europe and economic reform, this in itself was not something new for 
French Presidents. 
However, early in his Presidency, Sarkozy did not give a high priority to the overseas 
possessions. What little clues he gave about his policy seemed to stem from his own 
background as a tough Interior Minister who cracked down firmly on crime and local 
disturbances. He initially relegated the Overseas France portfolio, which had been held 
under Chirac by a full Minister (albeit working to the Interior Minister), to a Secretary 
of State. His Ministers for the Interior, to whom the Secretary for Overseas France 
worked, have consistently been individuals with strong metropolitan political ambition 
but no familiarity with the Overseas, or French Pacific (Michele Alliot-Marie to 2009, 
succeeded by Brice Hortefeux in mid-2009 and Claude Gueant in February 2011). 
In his first two years, Sarkozy continued the trend, set under Chirac's latter years, of 
appointing to the Overseas France portfolio, political allies and individuals without 
much familiarity with Overseas France, let alone the French Pacific. Christian Estrosi, 
a close supporter, was his first appointment. At first the administration glossed over 
Estrosi's disastrous handling of his inaugural visit to New Caledonia, in October 2007. 
The visit occurred after a long period of industrial unrest, strikes and blockades. No 
doubt taking his cue from Sarkozy's firm domestic security policy, Estrosi directed the 
High Commissioner to control a protesting crowd assembled outside the Commissariat. 
The experienced High Commissioner, Michel Mathieu, who had served a full term in 
French Polynesia before arriving in Noumea two years before, resigned over the 
incident. Estrosi used tiie incident to underline the Sarkozy government's intolerance 
of industrial disruption and social unrest {Flash d'Oceanic, 15 October 2007). The 
FLNKS reacted badly, accusing Estrosi of precipitating a political crisis (Radio New 
Zealand International, 15 October 2007). In Tahiti, Estrosi also announced reforms to 
deal with ongoing political instability in French Polynesia. Although close to Sarkozy, 
Estrosi had no prior background in the Pacific. He was essentially a domestic political 
animal with his eye on the Mayorship of Nice, a position he subsequently assumed, 
resigning from the Overseas France portfolio to do so in March 2008. Sarkozy 
replaced him with Yves Jego, one of his own advisers but who also had no background 
on the French Overseas entities, or the South Pacific. 
And Jego likewise created difficulties. As Overseas France Permanent Secretary from 
2007 to 2009, he supported the trend of ad hoc attention to Overseas France, and of 
treating the latter as more or less just another domestic part of France. He even 
publicly posited a reorganization whereby the Overseas France Secretariat could be 
abolished, with matters relating to the overseas entities being handled within each 
relevant ministry {France 24 interview 19 February 2009). Handling matters this way 
would mean that the special challenges and characteristics of the overseas entities, and 
certainly the particular regional settings in which they operated, could be lost in 
bureaucratic processes. This presented particular risks for New Caledonia in the 
Pacific, as the last phase of the Noumea Accord processes began. 
The new administration's relative disregard for the particularities of Overseas France 
changed in early 2009, after violent strikes and protests about the high costs of living in 
Guadeloupe, speedily spread to Martinique, Guyana and Reunion. After a failed visit 
to Guadeloupe by Jego to deal with the protests (when he speedily retreated to Paris 
despite having promised to stay in that territory until the matter was resolved, see, for 
example, Le Figaro 10 February 2009), Sarkozy was forced to address the issues 
himself By June 2009 he had called a general review of the State of the Overseas 
France; created an Interministerial Council for Overseas France; and replaced Jego with 
Marie-Luce Penchard, a Guadeloupe bureaucrat, the first Overseas France local 
resident to be appointed to lead the Overseas France portfolio. In November 2009 he 
announced a number of measures principally to address economic concerns in Overseas 
France arising from the review. He also upgraded Penchard to full Minister status, 
albeit continuing the long tradition of serving under the more senior Minister of the 
Interior. He continued with his overall firm approach to security issues. 
So Sarkozy has learned about managing Overseas France essentially by trial and error. 
But whether his refomied approach to Overseas France in general translates to better 
handling of the Pacific entities, particulariy New Caledonia, remains to be seen 
(Chapters 8 and 9 analyse Sarkozy's approach to New Caledonia). Penchard may come 
from Guadeloupe, but, like her immediate predecessors, she has no experience of the 
French Pacific. So Sarkozy's presidency seems to point to a continuation of the 
relative institutional relegation of the management of the Overseas France of recent 
years, which, as the experience of Estrosi and Jego shows, has already had some 
negative consequences in terms of stability of both the French Pacific and the 
Caribbean. 
Officials level 
Generally, many of the most senior officials posted to the Pacific entities, i.e., as High 
Commissioners, have tended to have had some previous experience of the region. 
Since the conclusion of the Noumea Accord, French High Commissioners in Noumea 
Thierry Lataste, Daniel Constantin, Michel Mathieu, and Yves Dassonville all had 
previous experience in the region and South Pacific issues. They also had in common 
long years of experience as prefects, the internal mainland counterpart of the High 
Commissioner designation in overseas collectivities. But. as Mathieu's fate has shown, 
their experience can be overlooked by zealous political appointees to the 
Secretary/Minister of Overseas France position. 
In February 2011, President Sarkozy interrupted the trend by appointing as High 
Commissioner in Noumea Albert Dupuy, a senior and experienced prefect but without 
any experience in the South Pacific. And many of the other French officials posted to 
support the High Commissioners routinely do not have previous experience of the 
Pacific. They are officials of the Interior or other domestic Ministries such as 
Education, posted for two-year terms. They may have extensive experience in 
administering densely-populated, complex and sometimes ethnically-charged situations 
within metropolitan France. They may sometimes have experience in other overseas 
territories (in armouncing his Caribbean-focused reforms on 6 November 2009, 
Sarkozy provided for the nomination and consideration of at least one Overseas France 
resident applicant when posts in the overseas France were being filled, on a trial basis, 
Sarkozy 2009). But they often have little knowledge of the South Pacific region, and 
as Interior Ministry officials they are not versed in foreign policy. Their primary 
interest is domestic. Thus they use the same mechanisms to address local concerns as 
they might in mainland France handling urban racial violence, i.e., a heavy handed 
police force armed with batons, tear gas and shields. 
One worrying continuing trend in terms of the effectiveness of the Overseas France 
Secretariat in operating with a clear understanding of the regional context is the 
ongoing tendency for it to operate in Paris largely in isolation from other ministries, 
even the Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministries. Coordination is ad hoc, with 
different French ministries becoming involved only as issues relating to them arise 
(Personal communicafion, senior Overseas France Secretariat official, Paris May 2008). 
Sarkozy's newly formed Intenninisterial Council for Overseas France may redress this 
situation, at least as far as the broad interests of the Overseas France (as distinct from 
Pacific France) are concerned. The Council was formed in 2009 primarily to conduct a 
review of Overseas France policy after problems in the Caribbean. When he announced 
reforms relating to Overseas France after the problems in Guadeloupe and Martinique, 
on 6 November 2009, after the first Interministerial Council meeting, Sarkozy said that 
he wanted all ministries to feel they had a role in relation to Overseas France, not just 
the Overseas France portfolio (Sarkozy 2009). 
But the ongoing role of the Council is not clear. Moreover, while at the same time he 
upgraded the relevant senior politician to Minister as opposed to Secretary of State for 
Overseas France, the incumbent was still to work to the more senior Interior Minister, 
protracting the problem of coordination and ultimately power of decision-making. As in 
the past (see Chapter 3), the relatively junior place of the Overseas France Permanent 
Secretary in the hierarchy of ministries means the critical inter-ministerial consultation 
and coordination task cannot be carried out effectively by the Overseas France 
Secretary or Minister. This provides a particular weakness in respect of such senior 
Ministries as Foreign Affairs and Defence whose inputs are particularly important in 
successful implementation of policies in the South Pacific. History has shown the 
strong role naval personnel have played in France's evolving presence. 
French analyst Gerard Belorgey noted in 2002 that not only did the relatively low level 
in the ministerial pecking order hamper the Overseas France Minister or Secretary in 
the coordination and arbitration of other ministries' activities in the overseas entities, he 
emphasized that dealing with Overseas France often involved issues which by their 
very nature were not conducive to easy ministerial partnerships. He noted that the 
coordination ftinction involved highly political activity, not only because it meant 
ensuring toeing a certain line of conduct, but because Overseas France inherently 
involved power stakes (Belorgey 2002 p. 92). As evident in earlier chapters, these 
coordination difficulties relating to Overseas France have been an ongoing issue since 
early colonial times. 
In practice, when there are differences of view, the arbitrating function falls to the 
political advisors for Overseas France in the offices of the President and the Prime 
Minister, officials who are versed in domestic politics and rarely, if ever, have even 
visited the South Pacific or the French Overseas entities. Whereas in the Pacific region 
itself, there are annual meetings of senior French functionaries, including the resident 
Ambassadors, High Commissioners and senior military representatives (see below), in 
Paris such regular structured consultation on an ongoing basis does not occur. There is 
no overarching political eye, or steering inter-agency Overseas France committee that 
meets regularly. In practical day-to-day matters, each functional ministry operates on 
their usual (domestic) policy basis, guided mainly by an objective that the political 
masters not be bothered by problems from the overseas entities. When a serious 
problem does arise, the political advisors step in (Personal communications Paris 
2008). 
Within the Secretariat the interests of the Pacific entities with their individual statutes 
are not helped by the fact that the Secretariat also manages the French overseas 
departements, entities with an entirely different status and set of needs, being 
juridically integral parts of France itself Sarkozy's Interministerial Council for 
Overseas France similarly handles the affairs of the entire Overseas France, which 
dilutes attention to the peculiarities of the French Pacific (indeed most of the 137 
reforms relating to the Overseas France announced in November 2009 applied 
primarily to the French Caribbean entities Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Guyana). 
For its part, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has three ambassadors, one for the Pacific, 
one for the Indian Ocean, and one for the Caribbean overseas entities. They are 
nominally assigned to the Prime Minister's office, not the Overseas France Secretariat, 
mainly because they are more senior to most of the personnel in the Secretariat, an 
arrangement which is unlikely to endear itself to Secretariat personnel and thus is likely 
to impede close cooperation. However, the ambassadors are physically located within 
the Overseas France Permanent Secretariat at Rue Oudinot. 
The main job of the Ambassador for the South Pacific is the representation of France to 
the SPC and guiding the expenditure of the Special Fund for the South Pacific 
(Personal communications by then-incumbent, 2002), the latter role itself having been 
diluted in recent years with the establishment in 2003 of a steering committee for the 
fund which includes representatives from the entities themselves who take turns in 
Chairing meetings (Mrgudovic 2008 p. 299). The Ambassador has a role in France's 
relationship with the Pacific Islands Forum but tends to focus on technical rather than 
political issues. As diplomatic professionals, they carry out their tasks discreetly and 
without fanfare, and for relatively short appointments (around three years). The 
occupant also needs to take care not to step on the toes of the bilateral resident 
Ambassadors. Moreover, the position is based in Paris, not in the region. The 
Ambassador has an assistant, a relatively junior level diplomat from the Foreign Affairs 
ministry, based in Noumea. This person's main role is to provide ongoing liaison with 
the SPC and to advise the High Commissioner on foreign policy issues. The value of 
these arrangements in providing a well-informed decision-making apparatus in Paris 
and in the Pacific entities themselves depends mainly on the personalities involved, and 
on the willingness of the neighbouring bilateral French ambassadors to copy their 
reporting and analysis to Noumea and Papeete. 
There are annual officials meetings in the region including France's regional 
ambassadors (from Australia New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and Fiji), the 
Ambassador for the South Pacific, its resident High Commissioners from Noumea and 
Papeete and Delegate from Wallis and Futuna, and senior Paris-based officials. In 
2008, at France's invitation, Australia's Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
responsible for the South Pacific, Duncan Kerr, attended one of these meetings. 
Although these meetings tend to focus on technical issues, there is potential for them to 
address broader strategic questions. The extent to which their discussions influence 
decisionmaking in Paris is limited, without a similarly regular Paris-based interagency 
mechanism. 
New Caledonia, and the other two French Pacific entities, all have a presence of sorts in 
Paris. However the main function of the three offices for the Pacific collectivities has 
been to provide support for visiting residents of the entities, directing them to social 
services and other functional support. The offices are not staffed with trained 
diplomats or functionaries and do not carry out a role of advocacy for the entities with 
the French State. French Polynesia has had a Delegation in Paris since 1971, long 
occupying, with the Tahitian Tourist Office, fashionable premises in the Boulevard 
Saint Germain. Until very recently New Caledonia's presence was modest, having 
been established in 1989. In 2008 the Maison de Caledonie moved to more impressive 
premises near the Place de I'Opera. Wallis and Futuna in contrast has a very small 
office within the Overseas France Secretariat at Rue Oudinot. 
None of this is conducive to regular informed policy review, definition of an 
overarching strategy, or even coherent policy implementation in relating to the South 
Pacific entities, particularly New Caledonia at this sensitive time. Furthermore the 
administrative structures and the relative infrequency of strategic policy statements do 
not ensure accurate public or media understanding in metropolitan France, of the issues 
in the overseas collectivities, which is already at a very low level (Belorgey 2002 p. 
88). The risk here is that, should the situation change suddenly, as occurs often in the 
Pacific, and as is increasingly likely with approaching New Caledonian deadlines, the 
media and public opinion can react in an uninformed way, and become an aggravating 
factor. 
Conclusion 
A fundamental question for the fiature of New Caledonia remains the credibility of the 
word of the French State, ultimately defined by its full implementation of the spirit and 
letter of the Matignon/Noumea Accords. In the conclusion of his "intellectual 
biography" of Tjibaou, Eric Waddell underlined Tjibaou's understanding of the 
importance of the '"parole", or word for the Kanak people. "He knew full well that the 
parole is at the origin of and determines the geste - the act. It is binding, with one 
having no sense or meaning without the other. France's unfulfilled words and shallow 
memory have been a constant source of frustration and bitterness for the Kanak people" 
(Waddell 2008 p. 208). At the 2008 Colloquium marking the 20"' anniversary of the 
Matignon Accords, the idea of France keeping its word was a recurring theme, with 
then Overseas France Secretary Jego underlining the importance of France delivering 
on its "'parole donnee" (having given its word) (see Regnault and Fayaud 2008, p. 23 
and 167). 
The French State and the pro-independence and pro-France sides have all put 
considerable energy, effort and resources into sustaining a stable political situation for 
the first ten years of the Noumea Accord. The political system established under the 
Accord has generally proven resilient in its first decade. 
However, cracks have emerged which need ongoing attention. 
In the first instance, the "word" of the Accord has meant different things to different 
sides, as evident in the disagreement over the fundamental definition of the restricted 
electorate. Similariy, the Accord itself represents different things to each side, as 
Horowitz has argued. For the pro-independence groups, the Noumea Accord means a 
step forward in the acquisition of more autonomy on a path ultimately leading to 
independence. For the French state, it provides more time during which France may, 
through generous financing and judicious control of the handover of elements of more 
autonomy, and by keeping its promises, secure the support of the pro-independence 
groups to relinquishing their goal of independence. Indeed, nowhere in the Noumea 
Accord are the words "independence" or "self-determination" used. Instead, there are 
references to "emancipation" and "a common destiny" (see Berman 2001, for an 
elaboration of what these omissions may mean for the fiiture). But the question of 
whether this rules out full independence per se cannot yet be answered. The public 
comment by "mainstream" (FLNKS) pro-independence leaders has so far been 
ambiguous, as they wait for the interim terms of the Noumea Accord to be fulfilled; and 
the influence of the more definitively independence-oriented Labour Party is yet to be 
fully tested. 
France's dilatory approach to fulfilling the restricted electorate promise, its 
longstanding encouragement of immigration, its dilatory and ambiguous handling of 
the critical ethnic category in the census, and the relatively slow transfer of important 
responsibilities such as education, have all strained Kanak credulity. Even as Noumea 
Accord deadlines approach, with defence and the currency among one of the five 
powers yet to be decided, France has built up its defence infrastructure near Noumea, 
and urged replacement of the cfp by the Euro. Despite rhetoric about implementing 
Noumea Accord provisions for New Caledonia to engage directly in regional relations, 
little preparation of a working regional relations capacity is evident. 
Similarly, despite significant financial support by France, the economic rebalancing and 
redistribution of the benefits of exploiting nickel have to date been demonstrably and 
quantifiably more successful in the European-dominated South than in the mainly 
Kanak North. World economic conditions have had an effect, slowing the pace of 
investment and production schedules, and leading to withdrawal of external investors to 
be replaced by French interests, in the Kanak North. To the time of writing, despite all 
the planning and expenditure, the only working processing of nickel remains in the 
ageing French-dominated SLN unit at Doniambo in the South. There remain as yet 
untested statutory ambiguities about responsibility for minerals pertaining to the 
exploitation of the nickel resource, and the potential for hydrocarbons. 
Kanaks remain generally isolated and alienated in society and politics in the wealthy, 
more populous and predominantly European south. They have so far shown patience 
with this situation. As the 2007 nickel boom recedes, and if ongoing global constraints 
on nickel exploitation continue as Noumea Accord deadlines draw near, their patience 
will be tested. 
Financial shares granted to New Caledonia in the major nickel companies SLN and 
Eramet, as well as Inco's Goro project, which have been used to buy off support for 
independence, have been the subject of bargaining, and seen to be inadequate especially 
by the pro-independence group. There has been considerable local concern about job 
protection and environment issues. The overall result is shared anxiety, by Kanaks and 
some Caldoche alike, about the French State's intent and impartiality, which has 
underpinned the fracturing and realignment of parties within the pro-France group. 
For its part, the pro-independence group has sought to participate constructively within 
the Noumea Accord structures, but is deahng with divisions of its own, including the 
emergence of a radical new political force in the Labour Party. One writer has 
described French efforts to redress the economic divide as seriously divisive of the 
Kanaks, precisely by focusing on economic development as distinct from political 
emancipation (Waddell, 2008 p. 206; see also his reference to writer Ferenczi's 
description of Rocard, the architect of Matignon Accord, as a "virtuous Machiavelli", 
footnote II p. 214). Outside of the agreed political institutions, Kanak activism finds 
expression through ethnic disharmony, primarily but not solely at Saint-Louis, with a 
potential for further violence remaining so long as Wallisian ethnic issues are not fully 
resolved; assertion of environmental protection principles, through the Rheebu Nmr, 
and of indigenous rights, for example through the CNDPA efforts to establish the Mwd 
Kd, with mixed responses from the Caldoche and the French. Kanak leaders have used 
and will continue to use international forums on occasion to raise some of their 
concerns. 
In the context of the importance of keeping the ''parole", feelers by the pro-France 
groups about commencing negotiations on the future, circumventing the proposed 
Noumea Accord referendums, have been met with a mixed reaction from the 
mainstream independence group. In May 2009 elections, it was the group at either end 
of the political spectrum (Frogier's pro-France R-UMP and the pro-independence 
Labour Party), that supported an early referendum under the Accord, i.e., 2014, which 
fared well (R-UMP winning the most pro-France seats. Labour Party making inroads in 
the new Congress). But since then, conscious that holding a referendum, which is most 
likely to result in a vote against independence, risks a return to violence by the pro-
independence groups, even R-UMP's Frogier has advocated a more moderate 
consuhative approach to manage the referendum process. 
Handling of the dual-flag proposition raised by the pro-France R-UMP, apparently 
influenced by external events such as visits by French dignitaries, has highlighted deep-
seated divisions which go beyond agreements reached within institutions such as the 
Committee of Signatories and even the Congress. The strength of divisions has tested 
the viability of these institutions. These developments raise cautions about the future 
handling of sensitive core Noumea Accord issues. 
Pro-independence groups are cautious and insistent on the full implementation of the 
Noumea Accord, including full transfer of responsibilities as promised, and a 
referendum posing the choice between remaining with France with a high degree of 
autonomy, and independence. So future negotiations are likely to centre on the subject 
of a referendum (see Chapter 9). But the demographics, and electoral patterns so far, 
suggest that the majority of eligible voters will not support the independence option. 
Thus, there is potential for violence and disruption. 
Overlaying all of these issues, senior French officials in Paris are increasingly less 
directly experienced and without first-hand knowledge, of either the transitional issues 
or of the region, and work only in stop-start contact with other related ministries 
including Defence and Foreign Affairs. 
Finally, implementation of the Accord so far has shown the continued relevance of the 
UN, the PIF, the MSG, and even the EU, in enabling a Kanak dissenting voice to be 
heard. The UN Decolonization Committee, and UN human rights and indigenous 
rights organizations such as the UN Rights of Indigenous Peoples Forum remain 
forums for venting Kanak concerns. The UN Decolonization Committee has heard 
Kanak concerns, particularly on the restricted electorate, protection of employment, the 
ethnic census category, and Matthew and Hunter issues. The MSG has been the vehicle 
for Melanesian agreement on Vanuatu's claim to Matthew and Hunter. And the PIF 
and EU Human Rights Court have been engaged on electoral process issues. 
All of these factors operating together, in a transition period as new government 
systems are settling into place, mean there are fundamental vulnerabilities and 
instabilities which could yet surface in a way prejudicial to smooth negotiations for a 
durable, stable future in New Caledonia beyond 2018. 
Chapter 6 
French Polynesia: Autonomy or Independence? 
Since nuclear testing ceased in 1996, as in New Caledonia, French Polynesian politics 
have also been characterized by fragmentation of principal parties, loyalist and pro-
independence alike, and surprising alliances, but, unlike New Caledonia after 1999, all 
against a background of continued constant statutory change without broad 
consultation. Local corruption and overt French intervention have been characteristic 
of French Polynesian politics in the last decade. 
Elections in 1996 saw the return of Flosse's Tahoeraa but also an increase in support 
for Temaru's pro-independence Tavini. Flosse closely followed developments in New 
Caledonia, especially its Organic Law of 1999 giving it special status (where it was 
assigned sui generis status and referred to as a "'pays", or country). He sought similar 
provisions for French Polynesia. While he did not claim a self-determination 
referendum or restricted electorate, as applied to New Caledonia, he did seek legislative 
powers and special citizenship provisions linked with protecting local labor and 
property rights. Despite the difficulties of cohabitation, conservative President Chirac 
and socialist Prime Minister Jospin endorsed Flosse's proposals, as did a constitutional 
review. However the final step, adoption by a joint sitting of the French Assembly and 
Senate in a Versailles Congress, was frustrated by linking the measure with a separate 
and unrelated amendment on the independence of France's Superior Magistrature, 
which was judged in the end unlikely to attract support and was thus withdrawn, the 
same provision that held up the restrained electorate amendment for New Caledonia 
(see Chapter 5). Once again, other domestic metropolitan priorities dictated policy 
change in the South Pacific entities. 
After Flosse's Tahoeraa won 2001 local elections, and Chirac was re-elected as 
President in 2002, a renewed constitutional review process judged, in March 2003, that 
the proposals could not go as far as Flosse had sought. French Polynesia would have to 
remain as an overseas "collectivity" (not "country" like New Caledonia, as proposed), 
albeit a collectivity with considerable autonomy. It would also not take on legislative 
powers of its own, as the New Caledonian goverrunent had done. Without the full 
support of the local assembly, the resulting Organic Law of February 2004 (Law No 
2004-193 of 27 February 2004) was passed by the French National Assembly. While 
not delivering everything Flosse had sought, it was a monument to Flosse and his 
majority, pro-autonomy within France, party. It strengthened the Presidency (Flosse 
was to be titled President of French Polynesia) and included a measure allocating a 
bonus of one third of the seats, in each electorate, for the winning party, presumed to be 
Flosse's Tahoeraa. in local elections. But in subsequent elections in May 2004, the 
provision backfired. Despite winning 8% more votes in the collectivity as a whole, 
Tahoeraa was defeated by just 400 votes in the most populous electorate, the lies du 
Vent (Windward Island), in Papeete and Faaa. Thus the bonus 13 seats went to the 
winning Tavini-led coalition. Of the 57 seat Assembly, Tavini's Union pour la 
Democratie coalition (UPLD, Union for Democracy) won 26 seats, anti-Flosse 
autonomist parties a further 3, and Flosse's Tahoeraa 28. Temaru's alliances, and 
winning over one Tahoeraa member, enabled him to take government with 30 votes. 
Aside from the procedural aspects, the election of and support for Temaru reflected 
increasing dissatisfaction with Flosse's personal style and government of patronage. 
Pro-independence ascendance 
For the first time, the government was led by avowedly pro-independence parties. At 
the time, Temaru was measured and conciliatory, announcing that the goal of 
independence was a long-term one, perhaps over fifteen to twenty years (see Chappell 
2005b, Regnault 2005a p. 43). He spoke about shared sovereignty along the lines of 
the Cook Islands/New Zealand model (Mrgudovic 2008 p. 360, Nichols 2007). Since 
then he has been relatively silent on the concept of independence in the domestic arena 
(but see Regional issues section). In June 2009, in stocktaking discussions with French 
officials as part of a French program of consultations after the violent May 2009 
protests in Guadeloupe, he made a distinction between "sovereignty" and 
"independence", expressing his support for sovereignty for French Polynesia while 
noting that independence would not mean a "full break" {Radio New Zealand 17 June 
2009). 
When he was elected, in May 2004, Temaru also made no reference to his earlier 
reiteration, since 1990, of a demand for the UN Decolonization Committee to reinscribe 
French Polynesia as a non-self-governing territory. But by the end of 2004, with his 
leadership frustrated by efforts by the pro-France group, Temaru did raise 
independence questions in regional forums with a predictable French response (see 
Regional Issues below). 
On Temaru's surprise election, there began an ongoing game of musical chairs, with 
various members and elements of the coalition switching sides in votes of no-
confidence in successive Presidents. Flosse thus regained the Presidency in October 
2004. But, in a move which looked like French collusion with Flosse, the French 
Council of State annulled the 2004 Windward Islands electorate election a month later, 
requiring a re-run. At the same time, in a move reminiscent of France's resistance to 
Vanuatu's independence (see Chapter 3 p. 10) the Overseas France Minister, Girardin, 
threatened to turn off the economic aid tap if Temaru won the election (Chappell 2005b 
p. 199). Again France's efforts backfired: a re-run election delivered a slightly 
increased vote to Temaru, this time he won by 600 rather than 400 votes, leading to the 
reinstatement of Temaru as President in March 2005 (29 seats to 26). Destabilising 
activity by Flosse (backed by his French supporters) continued. By the following year, 
the UPLD majority lost the Presidency of the Assembly in April 2006 but regained it 
the same month, only to lose it again in December 2006. This time, aware of mounting 
feeling against Flosse personally, the Tahoeraa did not put forward Flosse as President, 
but one of his supporters, Gaston Tong Sang. 
The French Government, dismayed by the chronic instability inherent in French 
Polynesia, and no doubt the loss of support for the pro-France faction seemingly as a 
result of its 2004 changes, sought to stabilize things with two pieces of legislation, 
provisions in an Organic Law for Overseas France in February 2007 (Organic Law 
No 2007-223 of 21 February 2007) with the effect, for French Polynesia, of abolishing 
the one-third bonus for the majority in each electorate, and a revision of French 
Polynesia's 2004 Organic Law in December 2007 (Law No 2007-1720 of 7 
December 2007) which Paris again pushed through the National Assembly, despite the 
local Assembly's vote against it (in 44 of 57 votes). To limit the proliferation of new 
parties, the new Law provided for proportional voting in two rounds, with only those 
receiving a minimum of 12.5% of the vote in the first round proceeding to the second. 
To curb the constant change of Presidents and Speakers, the President could henceforth 
only be replaced by a motion which included the simultaneous election of a successor; 
and the Speaker could only be elected once for a full five-year term. Various parties in 
the Assembly, including the Tahoeera and UPLD, were united in their opposition to the 
legislation which they saw as French tampering with local issues {Flash d'Oceanie 11 
October 2008). As succinctly described by Lorenz Gonschor, "This episode proved 
once more that the statute of autonomy does not guarantee real local self-government, 
as France remains able to make arbitrary modifications to its political system against 
the explicit will of the local assembly" (Gonschor 2008 p. 154). 
As in New Caledonia, French efforts to rally the pro-France parties backfired by 
inadvertently promoting a coalescence of interests between the local parties around 
their own French Polynesian interests. Partly, too, developments were influenced by 
Sarkozy's election as President in May 2007, meaning that Fiosse had lost the close 
political support in Paris of his friend Jacques Chirac. But then Flosse's supporters 
became disenchanted with Tong Sang when they were left out of a delegation visiting 
Paris in mid 2007 (see Gonschor 2008 p. 152). Tong Sang's government too proved to 
be shortlived, to be replaced in August 2007 by the unlikely coalition of Fiosse and 
Temaru, with Temaru as President. Flosse's chameleon politics operated once more, 
as they had when he changed from pro-France advocate to pro-autonomy champion in 
the 1980s. By agreeing to share power with his former arch enemy, pro-independence 
Temaru, he was preserving his own position and role, but also working to represent 
local interests. 
Regnault, in 2005, noted the increasing similarities between the Fiosse and Temaru 
camps at the time, their shared view of an evolving autonomy along the New 
Caledonian model, a desire to distance French Polynesia from links with the 
metropolitan power, but with a strong awareness of the need for cooperation for 
development and aid (Regnault 2005a p. 38). As Fiosse lost personal support and 
Temaru gained experience in government, their objectives merged sufficiently to allow 
for an alliance convenient for each. Nonetheless, some of Flosse's supporters deserted 
to Tong Sang at this time (Gonschor p. 152). 
In February 2008 elections, Gaston Tong Sang became President. He had formed a 
new party, O Porimtia to Talon Ai' a (Polynesia is our country), leading an alliance 
called the To Tatou Ai'a (Our Land) with Tahoeraa dissidents including Jean-
Christophe Bouissou's Rautahi (Unity) party; former Ternary ally Emile Vemaudon's 
Ai' a Api (New Homeland party); the former centrist Fetia Api (New Star of Philip 
Schyle); and some small pro-France parties. Tong Sang's alliance won 27 of the 57 
seats, Temaru's UPLD 20, and Flosse's Tahoeraa 10. This suited the French State, 
which had envisaged a coalition of pro-autonomy Tong Sang-Flosse supporters (as 
opposed to pro-independence supporters). Indeed, Secretary of State for Overseas 
France, Estrosi, had visited the collectivity during the months before the election, 
showing support for Tong Sang and reportedly telephoning Flosse and another party 
leader Nicole Bouteau, in between rounds, to urge them to join with Tong Sang 
(Gonschor 2008 p. 155); and again after the second round, when Tong Sang's coalition 
fell short of a majority, phoning Flosse to urge him to support Tong Sang. 
But Flosse found it intolerable for Tong Sang to take the Presidency, notwithstanding 
his strong showing. To the chagrin of the French state, a few days later, on February 
23, Flosse, after having pledged during the election campaign that he would never 
again work with Temaru, struck a last-minute alliance once again with Temaru, 
cobbling together further support from other dissidents, and became President with 
Temaru as Speaker of Parliament. Unlike his treatment of Tong Sang, Estrosi did not 
congratulate Flosse, but rather "took note" of his presidency (Gonschor 2008 p. 157). 
To show their concern, Sarkozy's UMP government in Paris expelled Flosse from the 
metropolitan party (Flash d'Oceanie April 16 2008). 
In his analysis of the results, Gonschor pointed to Temaru's loss of support through the 
departure of his key ally, Vemaudon, to Tong Sang, and disappointment with Temaru's 
performance. At the same time Tong Sang had proved skilful in consolidating a 
relative majority after a short time because of the desire of many for a cooperative 
relationship with France, particularly amongst the growing number of French settlers 
and the Chinese community from which Tong Sang came (Gonschor 2008 p. 157), and 
who in the past had supported Flosse. Flosse's Tahoeraa indeed appeared to have 
retained mainly the support of rural and working class Polynesians, who tended to be 
critical of France, and who tended therefore to have more in common with Temaru, 
thus explaining the odd working relationship between Flosse and Temaru. 
But the situation did not end there. In April 2008 Tong Sang was once again elected 
President with the support of benchcrossers. Overseas France Secretary Jego again 
congratulated Tong Sang, noting that as President he reflected truly the will of the 
people expressed in the February elections; stating, or perhaps warning, that this time 
stability would prevail; and pledging support for large-scale projects in French 
Polynesia. 
Instability and divisions continued to prevail. On 12 February 2009, following Tong 
Sang's resignation as President, the Assembly elected Temaru as President, with 37 
votes of the 57 members, including support by his own Tavini but also that of Flosse's 
Tahoeraa, and of a Tong Sang breakaway group lorea Te Fenua headed by Jean-
Christophe Bouissou. Tong Sang received 20 votes. The change was the tenth since 
2004 elections, and the fourth time Temaru was elected President since 2004, which 
suggested majority support lay with him, whatever the divisions. This time Temaru 
proclaimed he would govern in a form of national unity government, to bring stability 
for the remainder of the term, to 2013. He consolidated his support in succeeding 
months to 40 of the 57 seats, h April 2009 Temaru reshuffled his Cabinet to reflect 
differences with Flosse, retaining two Tahoeraa members who were considered to be 
serving in their personal capacities. But by November 2009 instabilities emerged again, 
as the collectivity's budget appropriation was being debated, with Tong Sang winning a 
parliamentary vote on the Presidency once more. 
In the meantime, Flosse was under personal pressure. He had long had a murky past 
including facing corruption charges, mainly getting off with at most minor charges and 
penalties. Amongst other charges he faced, Flosse had been given a three month 
suspended sentence in June 2006 after having been convicted of abuse of political 
office related to an investment in a hotel by his son (see Radio New Zealand 
International 2\ June 2006). A journalist mysteriously disappeared while 
investigating Flosse's alleged involvement in the Clearstream secret accounts 
allegations by then Prime Minister Villepin against Sarkozy. However in November 
2009 Flosse's immunity from prosecution, deriving from his status as French Senator, 
was removed at the request of judges investigating irregularities in the Office of Posts 
and Telecommunications. He was charged with passive corruption, embezzlement of 
public fiands and complicity in destruction of evidence, involving alleged financial 
kickbacks via an advertising company that was once in charge of the French Pacific 
territory's phonebook and related advertising revenues {Flash d'Oceanie 24 December 
2009). He was imprisoned temporarily, securing a release on bail of just under $US 1 
m. in December, when he again took up his Assembly and French Senate seats. 
Separately, in early December, Flosse was found guilty in a "fictitious jobs" scam 
(involving numerous jobs for friends and allies which were not seen as serving any 
public purpose and which were not advertised) while he was President and required to 
repay over $US 2 m. and a hefty fine {Flash d'Oceanie 24 December 2009). Gonschor 
(2008) enumerates many examples of the political nepotism rife under Flosse's 
leadership. 
In January 2010, in a message to the Overseas France, President Sarkozy foreshadowed 
further reforms of the electoral system and institutional mechanisms in French 
Polynesia, "in order to guarantee more stability to elected majorities and therefore to 
give more capacity to envisage political and public actions in the long-term" (Sarkozy 
2010a). The promise did not put an end to instability: in April 2010 Temaru was 
elected as Speaker of the Assembly, with 30 votes of the 57 members, prompting 
President Tong Sang to appeal to President Sarkozy to dissolve the Assembly given the 
untenable political situation. 
When released in March 2011, the draft electoral reforms appeared to be mainly 
technical, including limiting the number of Cabinet members, specifying a minimum 5-
year term for President of the Assembly, and increasing to 2/3 of the Assembly the 
number of votes required for a no-confidence motion to succeed. However, the reforms 
specifically included an electoral "bonus" of 33% (or 19 seats) to the majority in the 
first-past-the-post system, when it had been a similar bonus that had caused problems in 
2004 {Flash d'Oceanie 18 March 2011). Whether these reforms will be adopted, and 
how they will be implemented and respected, remains to be seen. 
In the context of division and partiality by the French state, Temaru has managed time 
and again to maintain leadership and a certain dignity, with the apparent support of 
most French Polynesians. 
Regional Issues 
In a regional context, Temaru's leadership is significant. He has maintained 
longstanding links with regional leaders, to whom he is well known, unlike Tong Sang, 
and well liked, unlike Flosse. He well understands regional history and is able to play 
the regional and Pacific Islands Forum cards when possible. In September 2007, under 
threat from Tong Sang's new coalition, when Temaru was obliged to work with Flosse, 
he used his regional contacts to dissuade some regional Polynesian island leaders from 
participating in a royal Polynesian gathering sponsored by Tahitian royal family 
descendant Joinville Pomare with the support of Tong Sang. While representatives 
from New Zealand, Cook Islands, Wallis and Futuna and Hawaii attended, Temaru and 
Flosse successfully discouraged representatives from Western Samoa and Tonga from 
attending. (Pomare, like Temaru, is a pro-independence supporter, but sees a greater 
role for traditional leaders than Temaru, and has allied himself with Tong Sang, see 
Gonscher2008 p. 153.) 
Temaru is skilful in using his regional influence, via regional public calls for 
independence and reinscription of French Polynesia with the UN, to consolidate his 
position in the archipelago particularly on those many occasions when the French State 
and others resist his electoral pull. As noted in the last section, whereas Temaru was 
relatively silent on independence issues at home immediately after his first election, 
even softening his idea of the timing and form of independence, after France's 
tinkering with the electoral system and the electoral re-run of 2004, he continued to 
raise the independence issues in the Pacific Islands Forum. When he attended the 
Forum summit following French Polynesia's admission as an Observer in 2004, he said 
he wanted reinscription with the UN Decolonization Committee to be on the Forum 
agenda {Radio New Zealand 5 August 2004). He raised the issue at the 2006 Forum 
summit, where the French were quick to react, a French official saying that French 
Polynesia already had the capacity for self-determination and did not need external 
support for what was essentially an internal matter (Nichols 2007 p. 118). This was 
redolent of the French rationale for non-cooperation with the UN in 1947. 
After French unilateral legislation to change the political system yet again in 2007, at 
the 2007 Tonga Forum summit, Temaru called again for Forum support for 
reinscription, and called for an autonomy solution for French Polynesia, a "Tahiti Nui" 
Accord, along the lines of the Noumea Accord of New Caledonia. He warned about 
French efforts to change statutory provisions relating to elections, and to seek ftirther 
elections in early 2008 {TVNew Zealand, 17 October 2007). No doubt this influenced 
French support for other contenders in the local leadership stakes. 
Back at home Temaru and his followers did not let independence issues rest either. In 
January 2008, his Tavini party sought signatures on a petition favouring UN 
reinscription. And in June 2009, just after he once again acceded to the Presidency 
after Tong Sang's resignation, in the context of discussions with French officials in the 
wake of violent protests in Guadeloupe, Temaru said that the issue of sovereignty (as 
distinct from a complete break with France) needed to be discussed, and proposed 
discussions of an alternative name for French Polynesia, such as Tahiti Nui (the Greater 
Tahiti) or Maohi Nui (The Greater Indigenous people) {Radio New Zealand website 
www.radionz.co.nz 16 and 17 June 2009 accessed 19 June 2009). 
When Noumea hosted the UN Decolonization Committee's 2010 Pacific regional 
seminar, Temaru visited Noumea and staged a protest outside the SPC headquarters 
where the meeting was being held. While claiming that he was not speaking as the 
French Polynesian Speaker, but in the name of the Maohi or indigenous people {Flash 
d'Oceanie 18 May 2010), he said that if they won the next election, they would declare 
the country independent and sovereign. He again called for reinscription of French 
Polynesia with the UN {La Depeche de Tahiti 1\ May 2010). By July 2011, his party 
began to lobby regional governments (Personal communication, Tuheiava 2011). 
French Polynesia signed on to an agreement to work more closely with the other French 
Pacific entities in February 2010. At the time, then Assembly Speaker and pro-France 
leader Philip Schyle, said that he was interested in how aspects of New Caledonia's 
Congress and the institutional arrangements under the Noumea Accord might apply to 
French Polynesia {Nouvelles Caledoniennes 26 February 2010). Encouraging closer 
consultative relations between the three French Pacific entities enables France to 
provide a regional alternative for French Polynesia to Temaru's support within the PIF. 
In time, depending on how the grouping evolves, and on whether or not the French 
entities become fiill members of the PIF, it could represent a pro-France ginger group, 
or sub-group, within the PIF. As such it will be pushed by France. 
Economy 
Unlike New Caledonia. French Polynesia's economy offers no single valuable resource 
to fuel its economy. For most of the second half of the twentieth century its mainstay 
has been income derived from France's nuclear testing, directly, until cessation of the 
tests in 1996; and since then, from massive compensation payouts over periods which 
have successively been extended. This means that the French budgetary contribution is 
far higher than in New Caledonia, around a third (of the total GDP 536.3 b. cfp ($A 6.8 
b. converted 24 February 2010) in 2006). France contributed around 190 b. cfp ($A 2.4 
b.) in 2007, 159 b. cfp ($A 2.0 b.) in 2006, and 148.6 b. ($A 1.8 b.) in 2005 (//«»?-
Commissariat, Direction des Actions de I'Etat, Bureau des affaires economiques el des 
entreprises in ISPF website accessed 24 February 2010). Its expenditure includes EUR 
150 m. (SA 307 m.) a year {Senat 2006) in its ongoing nuclear compensation 
commitment. 
All political players understand this dependence. Thus when Oscar Temaru talks about 
independence, he also speaks of a continuing role for France, for example in a formula 
similar to that applying between the Cook Islands and New Zealand (Mrgudovic 2008 
and Nicholls 2007). No one doubts that any form of independence would require 
continuing aid from France. And France, by constant reference to its largesse (for 
example, Girardin's threat to turn off the economic tap in the event of a pro-
independence victory, Chappel 2005b p. 199), has made it clear that independence 
would mean French Polynesia going it alone. 
Local resources are thin, mainly tourism and pearls. Because of the high cost structure, 
the number of tourists is unlikely to increase and indeed has hovered around 210,000 a 
year since 2004. 218,000 tourists visited in 2007, mainly from the US, metropolitan 
France, Europe, and Japan. Global conditions resulted in a drop to 196,496 in 2008, 
and 160,000 in 2009, with large decreases from all destinations other than metropolitan 
France. This has lead the major hotels to re-think their presence, and by early 2010 the 
Tahiti Hilton was set to close (La Depeche de Tahiti 11 March 2010). Although Flosse 
secured the identification of French Polynesia as a target tourist destination by the PRC, 
so far his efforts have not been rewarded by a large influx of Chinese tourists. 
Services, mainly tourist-related, dominate the economy, employing 54,000 of 69,000 
total salaried workers in 2007. 
Pearl exports are valuable but a modest and declining proportion of total exports (Table 
11). 
Table 11 
French Polynesia: Contribution of pearl exports to total exports 2006-2008 
In millions of cfp (SA converted 24 February 2010) 
2006 2007 2008 
Total exports 22 380 ($A284.4 
m.) 
17 135($A217.7m.) 22 239 
($A282.6m.) 
Pearl exports 11 098 
($A141.0m.) 
10 681($A135.7m.) 8 473 
($A107.6m.) 
Source: IPSF website http://\vww.ispf.of' 'ISPF/Chif r e s / t r e f a s p x accessed 7.4 Fehmarv 701 n 
Although successive governments have nominated fisheries as a development priority, 
for various reasons including migration of fishing stocks, inadequate infrastructure, 
high local costs, and the increasing habit of importing frozen fish from France, fisheries 
have not taken off, sales from local production declining from 683 tonnes in 2004 to 
539 tonnes in 2007, rising to 612 tonnes in 2008 (ISPF 2008 www.ispf.pf accessed 28 
October 2008 and 24 February 2010). 
Metropolitan Handling and Institutional Factors 
As in New Caledonia, the Frencli state has continued to play a behind-the-scenes role to 
push the local leadership in a pro-France direction, seemingly unresponsive to the 
democratically expressed sentiments of the local people. Its failed early support for 
Flosse, including by introducing statutory measures specifically designed to bolster his 
majority, were followed by a distinct public preference for Tong Sang over Temaru, 
reflected in congratulatory messages to Tong Sang referred to earlier in this chapter. 
No supportive public statements were made by French officials when Temaru was 
elected in 2004; mstead a re-election was held in which once again he won without 
comment from the French state. And the French state was again quiet following 
Temaru 's subsequent election in early 2009. 
As for New Caledonia, senior officials in Paris and in Papeete dealing with French 
Polynesia have over time increasingly been individuals with little experience of the 
Pacific region. With the departure of High Commissioner Michel Mathieu for Noumea 
in 2005, an official versed in the Pacific, successive high commissioners have been 
highly trained professionals, but not particularly experienced in regional affairs or even 
with previous experience in French Polynesia itself 
Conclusion 
The recent history of French Polynesia demonstrates the mixed legacy of France's 
presence in the Pacific. Because of the dominance of personality-driven politics, with 
the small-time corruption and nepotism that that implies, the dynamics have tended to 
evolve around the French State's preference for the archipelago to be led by a pro-
France big man rather than an avowed pro-independence indigenous leader. Thus 
France has tended to take a partisan, interventionist position, with constant reminders of 
the archipelago's dependence on French largesse, which has encouraged at times a 
venal coalescence of interests between the local pro-France and autonomist supporters 
who switch allegiance for personal gain, defying French efforts to consolidate the pro-
French grouping. Frequent statutory change has been imposed without fijll 
consultation and assent by the local assembly. The fact that the economy of French 
Polynesia offers no dominant resource such as New Caledonia's nickel, and that its 
principal resources, tourism, pearls, and fisheries offer limited scope for development, 
means that the collectivity would be less likely than New Caledonia to survive as an 
independent entity without substantial French aid. It is arguable that the instability 
arising from local personality driven politics, corruption, and French interference, 
which ensures a weak economy dependent on France, serves French interest in 
remaining in French Polynesia. But as such, these elements of the political scene create 
ongoing uncertainty and instability ripe for exploitation, particularly should a 
sufficiently motivated and powerful leader emerge. 
In French Polynesia as in New Caledonia, the UN and PIF remain relevant venting 
points for dissatisfied pro-independentists, Temaru having raised the issue of 
reinscription of French Polynesia with the UN Committee of Decolonization in the 
Forum, making himself visible at the Committee's regional seminar in Noumea in May 
2010, and lobbying regional governments in July 2011. 
The French state has reacted to Temaru's periodic efforts to draw regional attention to 
French Polynesia's dependent status, by seeking to dislodge him from power over the 
last five years. This raises questions about respect for democratic principles in French 
Polynesia, and also reflects France's determination to retain control over French 
Polynesia. 
Chapter 7 
France's engagement in the region from the 1990s - French 
collectivities, France, the EU and the region 
As memories of the aberrations of the 1980s receded, and as France fine-tuned its 
approaches in New Caledonia and French Polynesia while mounting its regional 
diplomatic offensive in the 1990s, it became a more familiar and accepted regional 
participant into the 2000s, albeit as an outside player. While the French state continued 
to invest heavily both financially and politically in managing aspirations in its Pacific 
entities for more autonomy, it encouraged greater contact by all three with the region, 
within limits. 
France develops its regional links 
Diplomatic Representation 
France continued to deepen and broaden its own links with the region. The Foreign 
Affairs Ministry maintains resident diplomatic representation in the largest Pacific 
countries, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and for historical reasons in 
Vanuatu; and continues to have a Paris-based Ambassador for the South Pacific, 
supported by a diplomat based in Noumea. The Interior Ministry sends high level 
representatives to each of its collectivities, known as "High Commissioners and 
Delegates of the French Republic" in Noumea and Papeete, and known as "Prefect" in 
Wallis and Futuna. In April 2009, announcing a global reorganization of priorities in 
its foreign representation based on a 2008 white paper, Paris indicated that its Embassy 
in Canberra would carry the highest diplomatic responsibility in the region {"mission 
elargie\ i.e., with the broadest range of responsibilities); that Wellington and Port Vila 
would be secondary missions {''missionsphoritaires'\ with a secondary set of 
responsibilities) and Suva and Port Moresby, would be considered as posts with a 
simple diplomatic presence {Flash d Oceanic 30 March 2009). The mission at Suva 
covers, besides Fiji, Tonga, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Nauru. 
Since the 1980s France has conducted annual meetings of its Pacific-based high-level 
officials, including its regional ambassadors and Ambassador to the South Pacific, its 
High Commissioners and Prefect from its three entities, and Paris-based Overseas 
France Ministry or Secretariat officials. In 2008 for the first time it invited Australian 
Parliamentary Secretary for the Pacific, Duncan Kerr, to participate in one of these 
meetings in Noumea. 
Oceanic Summits 
France has been a dialogue partner with the Pacific Islands Forum from 1989, 
participating in post-Forum summit meetings with island leaders each year. These 
contacts at the highest level were boosted when President Chirac launched an initiative 
for regular consultations with regional leaders, called France-Oceanic Summits, the 
first of which was held in Papeete in 2003. France hosted a second Summit in Paris in 
2006, and a third in Noumea in 2009. At these Summits, France has expressed support 
for the Pacific region, reinforced its desire to see its own collectivities participate more 
in the life of the region, and pledged cooperation principally in environment and 
fisheries surveillance, and through its South Pacific Fund (see South Pacific Fund 
section below). Each successive Summit has represented a demonstrable effort to 
address issues of significance to the island states, in the context of objectives defined in 
the Pacific Islands Forum and other organizations, and to integrate EU activity as well. 
However, the third Summit in Noumea, which was the first under Sarkozy's 
presidency, lost a certain momentum when he decided not to attend, relegating French 
representation to his Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, with concomitant lower level 
representation by Pacific leaders (only the presidents of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, 
and the Prime Ministers of Samoa, the Cook Islands, and Niue attended themselves, all 
other delegations were headed by ministers, MFA spokesman, 28 July 2009, website of 
French Embassy Fiji accessed 24 February 2010). 
In its second and third meetings, France sought to engage Australia. Australia was 
absent from the first, owing to a diplomatic hiccup. Then French Polynesian President 
Flosse, long disaffected with Australia, had omitted to invite the Australian 
Government. When Paris-based French officials belatedly extended an invitation just 
weeks before the event, the Australian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were 
unable to attend, and France did not accept the Austrahan proposal to send a Special 
Envoy, maintaining at the time that it was a senior leaders meeting. (Interestingly, at 
the same time Australia had extended an invitation to France to participate in a regional 
counter-terrorism ministerial summit in Indonesia and yet accepted a designated 
ambassadorial level representative when French ministers were unavailable.) 
Nonetheless, the Australian Government has been supportive of France strengthening 
its links with regional leaders in such meetings. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer 
participated in the second Oceanic summit in June 2006 in Paris, and Parliamentary 
Secretary for the Pacific, Duncan Kerr, in June 2009 in Noumea. 
Cooperation within the United Nations 
At the same time as it was initiating its Oceanic Summits, France was quietly reviewing 
its approach to the UN Decolonization Committee, or Committee of 24. 
As noted in Chapter 3, France had removed its Pacific colonies from the UN 
Decolonization list of non-self governing territories in 1947, arguing that its entities 
were self-governing, and declining to transmit reports to the United Nations provided 
for under Article 73(e) of the Charter. 
France did not alter its approach when the UN Decolonization Committee was 
established in 1960. The Decolonization Committee prepares Working Papers on non-
self-governing territories on the basis of reports by the respective Administering 
Authorities. UNGA Resolution 1541 (XV) of that year set out the Principles which 
should guide members as to whether or not an obligation exists to transmit information 
called for under Article 73 e of the Charter. It refers to non-self-governing territories as 
"those in a dynamic state of evolution and progress towards a full measure of self-
government". France bitterly opposed New Caledonia's reinscription on the UN List of 
Non-Self-Goveming Territories, after intense lobbying by the Pacific island countries, 
in 1986. Even after it had concluded the Matignon Accords in 1988, France declined to 
transmit reports on New Caledonia to the United Nations. 
But from January 2004, without any public fanfare, for the first time France began to 
submit (confidential) annual reports on the situation in New Caledonia to the 
Committee, as Administering Authority (Personal communication from C24 Secretariat 
2008). Against the background of the history of France's non-compliance with the 
Committee, this was an extraordinary step, undoubtedly reflecting renewed confidence 
in its position, and a belief that the international community would endorse its 
unfolding plan for New Caledonia. Several of the current 29 members of the C24 
come from the region: Papua New Guinea, Fiji, East Timor and Indonesia are all on 
the Committee. Moreover, in the post-Cold War world, Committee members Indonesia 
(with an eye to its troubles in West Papua and Acheh), Russia and China amongst 
others, all for domestic reasons are disposed to resist active decolonization moves that 
might bolster separatist claims. France calculates that its Noumea Accord framework 
for an outcome in New Caledonia will receive widespread support in the very 
Committee which regional Pacific and Kanak independentist leaders used, by 
reinscription, to further their claims. 
In the same spirit, in October 2009, the New Caledonian government, with France's 
blessing, sent a delegation to make a presentation to the UN Decolonization Committee 
for the first time. The delegation was led by pro-France leader Philipe Gomes and 
included representatives of the collegial government, including FLNKS. Gomes 
referred to his government's participation as providing a more balanced input to the 
Committee, which had till 2004 received petitions and presentations from non-
government sources in New Caledonia, mainly the FLNKS. 
France and the delegation extended an invitation for the Decolonization Committee to 
hold its next Pacific regional seminar, in Noumea in May 2010. The Committee 
agreed, and duly held its seminar in the SPC headquarters in Noumea, 17-18 May. The 
regional impact of France's efforts to court the Committee was undercut by France's 
treatment of Kanak customary leaders and visiting French Polynesian Speaker and 
intermittent President Oscar Temaru, all of whom protested outside the building at their 
non-inclusion. French authorities sent them on their way {Nouvelles Caledoniennes 11 
Md.)! Flash d'Oceanie 17 May 2010), although they were given an opportunity to 
meet Committee representatives at a dinner hosted by Kanak customary leaders. 
But there are signs that France is picking and choosing those elements of the 
decolonization process which it will support. The suggestion by at least one member of 
the Decolonization Committee, that a quid pro quo of holding the Decolonization 
Committee's Regional Seminar in Noumea should be the requirement for a visiting 
(investigatory) UN mission to New Caledonia, was not implemented. France has never 
accepted a visit by such a UN mission to New Caledonia. It has maintained this 
position despite the record of cooperation by other Administering Authorities (for 
example, New Zealand has accepted five visiting UN missions to Tokealau since the 
1970s, UN Paper A/AC. 109/2006/20), and despite strong exhortations by the 
Committee that Administering Authorities do so (see UN Paper A/AC. 109/2009/L.6). 
The ministerial Pacific Islands Forum missions to New Caledonia have sent their 
reports to the UN Committee (PIF Communique 1991, paragraph 34), although there 
has not been a visiting PIF mission since 2004 (see section Pacific Islands Forum 
Watching Brief below). 
There are also moves under way to overhaul the wording of the annual UN General 
Assembly Resolution on the Question of New Caledonia, which has been a thom in the 
side of France from 1986. A general review of the text will provide an opportunity for 
France to modify longstanding critical references to the situation in New Caledonia. 
Implicit in France's taking on its UN responsibilities as Administering Authority, is an 
acknowledgement that New Caledonia is a non-self-governing territory whose future 
would therefore be bound by UN decolonization principles. These principles provide a 
pointer to the possible fiiture status of New Caledonia. The principles are laid out in 
two linked UN General Assembly Resolutions (1541 and 1514). UN General 
Assembly Resolution 1541 of December 1960 provides for three options by which a 
territory "can be said to have reached a ftill measure of self-government: (a) 
Emergence as a sovereign independent State; (b) Free association with an independent 
State; or (c) Integration with an independent State" (United Nations Resolution 1541 
December 1960, Annex). The principles include a commitment to an outcome based 
on "the free and voluntary choice by the peoples concerned" (Principle VII (a)). In the 
case of the integration option, the outcome is to be based on "equal status and rights of 
citizenship between the peoples of the erstwhile territory and the independent territory 
to which it is to become integrated" (Principle VIII), begging questions about the 
special citizenship rights France provided under the Noumea Accord (i.e. the restricted 
electorate for the final referendum on New Caledonia's future status). 
In the recurring UN General Assembly Resolutions on the Question of New Caledonia, 
the UN General Assembly has invited "all the parties involved to continue promoting a 
framework for the peaceful progress of the Territory towards an act of self-
determination in which all options are open and which would safeguard the rights of all 
sectors of the population, according to the spirit and letter of the Noumea Accord" 
(UNGA A/Res/64/102 operative clause 12). 
France's taking on its Administering Authority responsibilities also reasonably means 
that France should comply with injunctions such as that in UNGA Resolution 35/118 
which in its Annex calls for member states to " adopt the necessary measures to 
discourage or prevent the systematic influx of outside immigrants and settlers into 
Territories under colonial domination, which disrupts the demographic composition of 
those Territories and may constitute a major obstacle to the genuine exercise of the 
right to self-determination and independence by the people of those Territories" 
(UNGA 35/118 Plan of Action for the Full Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 11 December 1980). UN 
General Assembly Resolutions on New Caledonia have variously referred to the 
problem of immigration, the most recent noting "the concerns expressed by 
representatives of the indigenous people regarding incessant migratory inflows" 
(A/RES/64/102, 19 January 2010, operative para 4). 
France no doubt calculates that its objective to retain its Pacific entities will be 
enhanced by complying with some of the UN decolonization procedures. But the UN 
mechanisms, with their history of non-compliance by France, remain a vehicle for any 
dissenting pro-independence voices in the French Pacific entities, particularly New 
Caledonia, to make themselves heard, should their aspirations not be met. In particular, 
the relatively new UN instrument protecting indigenous people's rights (such as the 
2007 Declaration on Indigenous Rights, see Chapter 9), provides a further avenue of 
redress for disaffected Kanak peoples in the playing out of the Noumea Accord and its 
aftermath. 
Aid to region 
France contributes aid to the region through its participation in the SPC and the South 
Pacific Regional Environment Program (SPREP), and support for Forum activities. 
France contributes to emergency disaster management and fisheries surveillance 
through a trilateral FRANZ (France Australia New Zealand) arrangement (see below), 
and defence training and exercises engaging regional countries and its Armed Forces in 
New Caledonia and French Polynesia. Its main aid delivery arm, the Agence Franqaise 
de Developpement (French Development Agency, AFD), has only one bilateral aid 
program in the region, in Vanuatu, which it operates from Noumea after closing hs 
office there in 2002. France is a major contributor to the EU European Development 
Fund (EDF) activities in the region and participates in the Asian Development Bank. 
And its Ambassador to the South Pacific administers a small South Pacific Fund. 
Inconsistent Statistics 
Statistics about French contributions through these various mechanisms are opaque and 
inconsistent. Depending on sources, there is clearly some overlap in stated 
expenditures, creating a confused picture (for example, overlaps in reported French 
bilateral aid and EU aid, see below; also some program assistance, as distinct from core 
budget support, to SPC comes from the South Pacific Fund; and some emergency 
assistance under the FRANZ arrangements is included in expenditure by the New 
Caledonian Army (FANC, Forces Armees de la Nouvelle-Caledonie). 
The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs shows variable and not necessarily comparable 
figures. An item on its website dated June 2006 (accessed 27 February 2010), entitled 
"France and the Pacific Region", showed that in 2006, France's total bilateral aid 
budget to the region was around EUR 15 m. a year, and specified a Ilirther 12. 8 m. that 
year through EU channels, a total of EUR 27.8 m. (around $A 40 m. converted 19 May 
2010). An item on the same Ministry website, dated October 2009, showed France's 
bilateral aid disbursement to the Pacific totalled EUR 103 m. ($A 146 m.) in 2008 and 
EUR 98 m. ($A 140 m.) in 2007, and was not clear on whether that included funds 
through the EU. These figures appear to be a large leap from the EUR 27.8 m. in 2006, 
but may include French contributions through the EU (French Foreign Affairs website 
www.diplomatie.«ffluv.fr/fi7'pavs-zones-geo 833/oceanie 14692/index.html accessed 14 
May 2009 and 25 February 2010 and superseded by May 2010; and bilateral aid section 
accessed 25 February and 19 May 2010). 
If these figures do include contributions by way of the EU, then the situation is further 
muddied by the caveats to EU aid (see EU representation and aid to the region section) 
such as the pattern of underspending allocations; and the occasional lumping together 
of EU funding to the independent Pacific countries along with EU overseas 
collectivities (such as the French Pacific ones there) (see for example EU website 
overview on EU and the Pacific, www. europa.com). 
France also sometimes includes in its aid figures, expenditure in its own entities. A 
figure provided by the French Government to the OECD in 2006 and cited by OECD as 
gross French bilateral aid to "Oceanie^" or the Pacific (undefined), amounted to $US 
110 m. ($A 128 m. converted 19 May 2010), but this included some items specified as 
bilateral aid, to its own three collectivities (OECD 2008a Tables B.3 and B.4 pp. 86 and 
87). 
Some other analyses (see for example Mrgudovic 2008 p. 326 footnote 1012; Hughes 
2003 p. 20) also include in aid figures, France's financial support for its own three 
Pacific entities. This is very distorting, since this amount is very large, totalling around 
$A 4.6 b. a year ($A 1.9 b. or 121.5 b. cfp to New Caledonia in 2007 in ISEE TEC 
2008 p. 960; $A 2.7 b. or 159.1 b. cfp to French Polynesia in 2006 from French High 
Commission press release 7 August 2007; and $A 5 m. or 373.7 m. cfp to Wallis and 
Futuna in 2006 from Wallis and Futuna Statistics Office, STSEE, www.spc.int/prism 
accessed 19 May 2009). While there is no doubt that much of this expenditure in the 
French collectivities benefits economic development there, and therefore the region, 
since it is expenditure on sovereign soil of a developed country, it is difficult to 
describe this as development assistance to the region. 
From all of this, while there seem to be some discrepancies, the clearest conclusion to 
be made is that France, on its own account and through contributions to the EU effort, 
spent EUR 27. 8 m. in 2006, EUR 98 m. in 2007 and EUR 103 m. in 2008, on aid to the 
Pacific region over and above its expenditure in its own Pacific collectivities (Note: the 
large increase in 2007and 2008 appears to be accounted for by the inclusion of EU 
contributions, and possibly includes some EU allocations as opposed to expenditure). 
France's 2006 expenditure of EUR 27.8 m. in the Pacific included assistance in 
governance (against drug trafficking and money laundering), sustainable development 
(through SPREP and SPC projects including on coral reefs), health (including a joint 
Australian project on AIDS through the SPC, and a New Zealand project on public 
health monitoring), education (university cooperation and professional and technical 
training), broadcasting (cooperation with RFO and other French broadcasters), 
infrastructure (modernization of secondary airports and renovation of Vanuatu's 
hospital) and natural disaster assistance (including implementation of the FRANZ 
arrangement). France has been a member of the Asian Development Bank from 1970 
with 2.322% of shares (fewer than Australia's 5.773% but much more than New 
Zealand's 1.532%). It is described as a non-regional member. The ADB supported 
projects in the South Pacific through loans and financing to a value of $A 684 m. in 
2007 (ADB 2008 p. 16). 
Table 12 
Indicative figures on France's assistance to the region (in millions of Euros ($A)) 
2006* 2007# 2008# 
Aid to region* 27.8 ($A 40) 98(140) 103(146) 
Of which, bilateral* 15.0 ($ A 21) 
Of which, tlirough EU (just under 20% EDF) 12.8 ($A 19) 
Some indicative programs funded (not complete): 
South Pacific Fund 2.4 ($A3.4) average p.a. 2007-2009 
SPC+ 3.0 (4.2) average p.a. 1999-2009 
Plus French share/EU 1.0 (1.4) average p.a. 2002-2007 
Coral Reefs Initiative 2004-9 2.0 (2.8) average p.a. 2004-9 
Activities through FRANZ++ 1.0 (1.4) 
(emergency aid, logistic support) 
Sources: *French Ministry of Foreign Affairs website w\¥w.dipioniatie. t iouv.fr/fr/pavs-zones-
geo 833/oceanie 14692/index.html accessed 14 May 2009 
#French Ministry of Foreign Affai rs website accessed 26 February 2010; may include allocations 
through EU progratns 
+ S P C Annual Reports and Financial Statements, France and E U Support to SPC 1993 to 2009. 
++Est imate f rom F A N C 
Considering it is a country resident in the region, France's aid to the region is relatively 
modest, given the contributions of other Pacific region donors and given its own 
contributions to other regions. 
Australia's 2009-10 budget for the region totalled $A1.092 b. (Australian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Press Release 12 May 2009). New Zealand spent $ NZ 205.5 m. in the 
Pacific in 2007-8 and allocated $NZ 756 m., or $NZ 278 m. per annum, for the three 
years from 2009-10 (NZ AID website http://w ww.nzaid.govt.nz/proarammes/c-pac-
countries.html accessed 19 May 2009 and 6 July 2010). 
As a point of comparison, the OECD Official Development Assistance or ODA figures 
are useful. ODA only includes specially defined assistance (essentially official 
government aid with the main aim of economic development of developing countries 
and containing a certain percentage of grant aid, see OECD 2008b). The OECD ODA 
statistics used by Australia's Ausaid in its 2009 publication, Tracking Development and 
Governance in the Pacific, showed that France provided $US 16.7 m. ($A 19.4 m. 
converted 19 May 2010) or 1.4% of total ODA contributed to the Pacific Islands Forum 
countries in 2007, with the EU contributing $US 71.2 m. ($A 83 m.) or 6.1% (and 
France contributes around 19% of EU funding to the Pacific). In the same comparison, 
Australia provided $US 649. 3 m. ($A 757 m.) or 55.7% of ODA, and New Zealand 
$US 120.9 m. ($A 141 m.) or 10.4%. France was also outshone by the US (14.7%) 
and Japan (6%)(Ausaid, 2009 p. 42). 
Table 13 
French global bilateral public development assistance disbursements 2007 and 
2008 
In millions of Euro 
2008 % total 2007 % total 
Europe 295 7% 180 4% 
North Africa 436 10% 459 10% 
Sub-Sahara Africa 1 886 43% 2140 47% 
South America 141 3% 263 6% 
Middle East 531 12% 724 16% 
Central and Southern Asia 120 3% 135 3% 
Far East 372 8% 218 5% 
Pacific 103 2% 98 2% 
Non-zone assistance 550 12% 356 8% 
Total bilateral assistance 4 435 100% 4 572 100% 
Posted;: 12.10.09 
Source: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs website vsw w.diploinatie.gouv.fr accessed 19 May and 8 
December 2010 
Compared to its own expenditure in other regions, France's aid to its immediate 
neighbours in the Pacific region seems meager. The French Foreign Ministry site's 
table of global disbursements (Table 13) showed that the 2008 and 2007 figures for the 
Pacific represented just 2% of total French bilateral aid disbursements, well behind 
Africa (which received 53% in 2008), the Middle East (12 %), Asia (only 3%) and 
South America (3%). In 2005, the tiny state of Mauritania alone received EUR 36 m. 
($A 64 m.), more than the entire Pacific region at the time (French bilateral aid, French 
Foreign Ministry website www.diploinatie.^ouv.fr/fr/pavs-zones-
aeo 833/oceanie 14692/index.html accessed 14 May 2009). These figures suggest that 
despite its sovereign presence, France does not see the Pacific as hs own immediate 
region, with special aid contribution responsibilities. 
Moreover, the relative disproportion of France's expenditure in its own entities relative 
to the rest of the region underlines the paucity of its aid to the region. France 
contributed $A 1.9 b. or 121.5 b. cfp to New Caledonia alone in 2007 (not including its 
metropolitan based expenditure such as payment of military personnel see ISEE 2008, 
p. 96), more than the GDPs of each of the Forum island members except PNG, Guam 
and Fiji. Its total contribution to its three territories (280 b. cfp or $A 4.6 b.) is worth 
more than any individual Forum member's GDP except PNG and Guam (SPC statistics 
translated into cfp. Table, ISEE TEC 2008 p. 12). France's $A4.6 b. expenditure in its 
own Pacific collectivities compares with Australia's total global aid program of $A3.8 
b. (2009-10, Ausaid's website www.ausaid.gov.au accessed 5 October 2009). 
South Pacific Fund 
At the same time as France is talking about improved political dialogue and hosting its 
Oceanic Summits, its assistance through its own South Pacific Fund is declining. The 
Fund is the same one originally established by Flosse when he was Minister for the 
South Pacific (see Chapter 4). It has fluctuated in value, from around EUR 3m. a year 
in the 1990s, but has declined in recent years, from EUR 2.7 m. in 2007, to EUR 2.5 m. 
in 2008 and EUR 2 m. in 2009 (see Flash d' Oceanie 13 March 2009, 14 November 
2008, and 2 April 2008). Moreover, the focus in the last few years has shifted from 
Flosse" s idea of supporting local Pacific island projects, to funding projects primarily 
and overtly to assist the French Pacific entities' involvement in the region (see the list 
of priority areas under the program, article "Le Fonds Pacifique", website of the French 
Embassy in Papua New Guinea, http://www.ambafrance-
pg.org/article.php3?id_article=427 accessed 8 March 2010). This means the Fund 
serves France's regional objectives, more than the priorities of the independent Pacific 
island countries themselves. 
France and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) 
From 1947, France has hosted the headquarters of the SPC in Noumea, including 
throughout the regional difficulties of the 1980s. Originally housed in the former US 
military headquarters from the Second World War, the French State facilitated the 
construction of an impressive new headquarters at a valuable nearby beachfront site, 
completed in 1995. It provided 75 million francs ($A 20 m.), the largest single 
component, towards construction costs {Journal Officiel du Serial, response to question 
10070, 15 October 1998). The main conference room, designed by a Fijian architect, 
takes the form of an upturned boat with oceanic details such as a reflective pool 
mirroring the ocean against its internal walls, and finishes of ropework over the glossy 
wooden panels. The organization has operated in both French and English since its 
inception, a significant symbolic achievement for France given the cost and limited 
capacity of most of the members to draw on the French translations. Despite France's 
modest ongoing financial contributions to the SPC, French nationals have held 
prominent positions in the organization. New Caledonia's Jacques lekawe was 
appointed Secretary-General in 1992, but passed away before assuming office. The 
office of Deputy Director General to the SPC has recently been occupied by French 
nationals (the former Cultural Attache to the French Embassy in Sydney, Yves Corbel, 
served as Deputy from 1997 to 2006; and his successor, Richard Mann, is a French 
national). 
Since it is the largest international conference facility in Noumea, the French State and 
New Caledonia have benefitted from their investment. The SPC has been amenable to 
the Conference facility being used for a range of domestic political meetings, including 
a New Caledonian land issues conference in 2001, and a satellite video hook-up 
between the New Caledonian government and the then Overseas France Minister, 
Brigitte Girardin, in 2003. 
Mrgudovic (2008 p. 139) argued that the SPC had been a strong force for the 
integration of France and its entities into the Pacific. If so, this is more because of the 
institutional presence of the SPC in Noumea and the political effect of Pacific island 
experts and officials travelling to Noumea regularly, than because of French 
engagement in the work, and funding, of the SPC. The technical focus of the SPC has 
set it apart from political differences over the years, and is a testimony to the maturity 
of the Pacific island countries, supported by large regional donors, Australia, New 
Zealand, France and to a lesser degree the United States and, in the past, the United 
Kingdom. 
France's contribution to the SPC has averaged just over EUR 3 m. in each of the last 
ten years, although according to one senior official, the amounts expended in any year 
fluctuate owing to the nature of program assistance (SPC 2009). For example, SPC 
figures show that it contributed $US 7.1 m. in 2007, about half of what Australia and 
New Zealand respectively contributed ($US 14.7 m. Australia, $US 14.5 m. New 
Zealand) (SPC 2007). France also contributed through EU contributions which also, by 
their nature (going to programs rather than the core budget), are variable, averaging 
around EUR 5 m. a year from 2005 to 2007, Ibid.). 
France, Australia, New Zealand and regional defence and other links 
While France's 2008 Defence White Paper said very little about the Pacific perse (see 
Ministere de la Defense 2008; Fisher 2008c), it did highlight the importance of regional 
partnerships, specifically mentioning Australia. The Paper sought to focus France's 
domestic priorities on better intelligence and technology while rationalizing and 
reducing overall numbers of personnel and bases, hi this context, the Paper announced 
that Noumea would host the pre-eminent French defence presence in the region, with 
personnel in French Polynesia to be reduced by half between 2011 and 2015 to 1100. 
New Caledonia's defence personnel would be reduced slightly from its current 3000. 
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but its police and civil security personnel would increase. France had already built a 
consolidated headquarters bringing together all arms of the defence presence at a new 
$A 13 m. headquarters in Noumea. 
Cooperative defence relations between France and Australia, often with New Zealand, 
have grown. The tripartite FRANZ arrangement, based on an exchange of letters in 
1992, provides for disaster relief coordination engaging aid and defence elements from 
all three countries. There have been numerous examples of FRANZ cooperation to 
assist regional countries after natural catastrophes (for example, Solomon Islands in 
2007 after a tsunami). Aid officials from each FRANZ country meet regularly for 
planning purposes. In recent years the Arrangement has been extended to cover 
maritime fisheries surveillance, formalized in a joint declaration signed in Canberra in 
March 2006 (DFAT website France country brief, Pacific Engagement, accessed 8 
December 2010). France provides feedback to Pacific island countries from 
overflights by its military aircraft on illegal fishing identified in vast areas contiguous 
with its territory. It is a complementary mechanism to similar activity by Australia and 
New Zealand in other areas of the South Pacific, with regular day to day engagement 
by France with regional countries providing useful, economically valuable regional 
intelligence. 
FRANZ countries, along with the United States, participate in annual quadrilateral 
discussions on maritime security, including fisheries and Pacific traffic issues. France 
has participated from 1998 through its military forces based in French Polynesia and 
New Caledonia (Press Release, US Coast Guard, 19 March 2009; Flash d'Oceanie 21 
April 2009). The COMSUP (Commander of French Armed Forces in the Pacific) 
advised in early 2009 that the French Force contribution to FRANZ was worth around 
EUR 1 m. a year ($A1.75 m. converted 7 July 2009, Personal communication 2009). 
Australian and French defence cooperation in the Pacific operates within the context of 
close broad bilateral defence relations, outlined in the 2006 Defence Cooperation 
Agreement, which entered into force in July 2009. Cooperation includes regular 
political/military consultations from 2001, defence supply compatibility programs, and 
commercial Australian defence contacts involving French companies, particularly 
EADS. France is the world's fourth largest defence materiel exporter, and Australia is 
one of its biggest customers (see Maclellan 2009b p. 13). In September 2008, after 
meeting the new Australian labour Minister for Defence Joel Fitzgibbon, the French 
Defence Minister Herve Morin announced that New Caledonia would be available to 
give military logistical support to Australia in a Mutual Logistical Support 
Arrangement (Joint press conference Australian and French Defence ministers 17 
September 2008). This arrangement formalized the kind of military support the French 
had provided from New Caledonia on various occasions. For example. New Caledonia 
provided an evacuation point for injured Australian personnel when an Australian 
military Blackhawk helicopter crashed on an Australian vessel, HMAS Kanimbla, 
during an evacuation operation offshore from Fiji during the 2006 Fiji coup, and served 
as a staging point for Australian ships preparing for the eventuality of consular 
evacuations from Fiji (see Fisher 2008c). 
An important bilateral gesture to Australia and New Zealand respectively is made every 
year by France in its commemorations of Anzac Day in New Caledonia. The event is 
commemorated over three days in three different locations. On the first day, usually 
Anzac Day itself, a ceremony is held in the centre of Noumea, in the presence of the 
High Commissioner, New Caledonian President and other dignitaries, and war 
veterans. On the second day, officials travel en masse to participate in similar 
ceremonies at the Commonwealth cemetery at Bourail; and on the third day, to a hilltop 
overlooking the Plaine des Gaiacs in the north, the site where American Seabees laid a 
now overgrown airstrip to Australian design early in World War II. These pilgrimages 
engage the local communities as much as the French representatives, and mark their 
great affection and respect for the ANZACS who fell in metropolitan France and in the 
region during the two World Wars. 
France participates in regular military exercises with Australia and New Zealand from 
its base in New Caledonia, many of which include other Pacific island countries. These 
include the annual Equator naval exercise off the coast of Queensland; the biennial 
Southern Cross exercises in New Caledonia, and Australian regional exercises 
including Pitch Black and Kakadu (DFAT Country brief on France accessed 28 
October 2008; French Embassy in Australia website, www.ambafrance-au.org. 
accessed 11 November 2008). Many training exercises routinely involve Tonga, 
Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea often alongside French, Australian and New Zealand 
troops. French senior military officials visit Papua New Guinea regularly. 
Ship visits and visits by respective senior military leaders both ways between New 
Caledonia and Australia are frequent and have increased in number in recent years (for 
example from around four a year to more than eight from 2001 to 2005). This form of 
cooperation draws France in to the normal defence activity of the region, enhancing 
interoperability, and facilitating close cooperation in times of need. The official French 
approach has been extremely positive, with local French forces undertaking joint 
exercises on French soil working entirely in English, an important symbolic effort 
showing the French defence forces' willingness to adapt to the region. 
Beyond formal agreements and exercises, France has taken great care to support 
Australian regional defence objectives. France was the first regional country to 
respond when Australia called for participants in the UN backed International Force for 
East Timor in 1999, arriving there even before New Zealand, a significant reminder of 
the potential strategic benefits for Australia and the region deriving from France's 
physical presence in the Pacific. France let Australia know that it would be interested 
in participating in the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 
deployed in July 2003, although did not in the end participate given regional 
sensitivities (see section. Regional reactions to French efforts, below). And as 
indicated above, France provided important logistical support for Australian activity at 
the time of the 2006 Fiji coup. 
Mixed reaction in New Caledonia 
Whereas these formal defence Unks are a positive indication of AustraHan-French 
cooperation, local feeling in New Caledonia is mixed. Roch Wamytan has commented 
on the incompatibility of France's bases restructuring in New Caledonia with New 
Caledonia's decolonization process (Maclellan 2009b p. 13). An FLNKS leader has 
commented privately that it was disappointing that the first sign of the new Australian 
Rudd government's interest in New Caledonia was the military pact (status of forces 
arrangements). 
Reforms flowing from France's 2008 Defence White Paper will lead to New Caledonia 
becoming a major French defence logistical base from 2011, literally on the eve of the 
final five-year stage (2013-2018) of the Noumea Accord. Reflecting Kanak 
sensitivities, in a submission to the United Nations Decolonization Committee in 
November 2008, FLNKS leader Roch Wamytan noted the French decision to regroup 
its military forces to New Caledonia violated the obligation of Administering Powers 
not to use non-self-governing territories for military bases or installations (see UNGA 
2008 A/C.4/63/SR.5). 
French-Australian scientific cooperation 
The French Pacific collectivities, particularly New Caledonia, also provide a venue for 
French-Australian scientific and cultural cooperation. 
France and Australia have signed a number of bilateral scientific agreements. These 
include the Scientific and Technological Agreement, October 1988; the Scientific and 
Technological Marine Agreement, May 1991; the Industrial Research Program 
Agreement, May 1991; the French Australian Science and Technology program 
(FEAST), November 2003; and a scholarship program benefitting Australian students 
in France (Fisher 2004). 
Cooperation also flows from France's presence in New Caledonia. There is significant 
contact between Australian research institutions and the many French research 
institutions based in New Caledonia. Australian scientific cooperation is handled by 
Australian tertiary institutions individually, and not the Government as is the case with 
France. It is therefore difficult to idenfify the full range of cooperation. As an 
indicator, in 2004, the New Caledonian based Institut de Recherche pour le 
Developpement, Institute for Development Research, IRD, alone cooperated with more 
than 10 Australian institutions in a number of scientific areas. These included the 
CSIRO (Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization) on 
oceanography, biology and entomology; Geoscience Australia on geology and coastal 
modeling; ANSTO (Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization) on 
radio-chemical applications to the marine environment; the Queensland Museum on 
marine natural substances in Vanuatu; the Sydney Botanical Gardens on algae; the 
Sydney and Victorian Museums on crustaceans; the Universities of Canberra and 
Queensland on climatology; James Cook University and ANSTO on metals in soils; 
Monash University on botany (Personal communications Colin 2004). 
France and Australia co-funded a house of residence for Vanuatu students at the 
University of New Caledonia in Noumea in 2001. 
In the area of educational exchanges, since the Noumea Accord was signed, Australia 
has provided about $A 1 m. per annum to fund scholarships to enable students from all 
three French Pacific collectivities to study in Australia. The take-up has been excellent. 
Despite ongoing problems with the recognition of Australian qualifications in the 
French entities. New Caledonia has made an effort by allowing case-by-case 
consideration of Australian-qualified applicants to its civil service. As the mining 
sector grows, companies are less likely to be concerned about where training occurred 
and employment prospects for Australian-trained New Caledonians will increase. 
There is little or no exchange in the other direction. Indeed, from 2008, New Caledonia 
began to send many young people to train in francophone Canada, suggesting that it 
would prefer French language institutions rather than the regional Anglophone ones 
(see Partir pour mieiix revenir, Nouvelles Caledoniemws 1 August 2008). 
Trilateral Development Cooperation 
Other forms of cooperation in the region with Australia and New Zealand have 
included a tripartite declaration on the surveillance and combating of illegal fisheries 
(April 2006), the PREPARE (Pacific Regional Endeavour for an Appropriate Response 
to Epidemics) program with New Zealand and the WHO on treatment of epidemics, the 
France-Australia prevention of sexually transmissible diseases and HIV AIDS, the 
Santo 2006 project on marine and land-based biodiversity in Vanuatu, and the 
Protection of Coral Reefs in the South Pacific Program (CRISP) from 2002 (see Gazsi 
2009). 
Regional participation by the three French collectivities 
Regional institutions 
Statutory provisions reserve responsibility for foreign affairs to the French State, but 
enable both New Caledonia and French Polynesia to participate in regional contacts in 
their own right. The Noumea Accord, Article 3.2.1, provides essentially for New 
Caledonia to be a member, or associate, in international bodies including specifically 
Pacific regional organizations, the UN, UNESCO, ITU (International 
Telecommunications Union) and a broad "et cetera"; to have representatives in the 
Pacific zone and EU organizations, and to negotiate agreements with these countries in 
areas of its responsibility, which are defined at 3.1.1 to cover external trade, rights of 
foreigners to work, some specified air services, and maritime services. The February 
2004 Organic Law for French Polynesia provides for it to have its own representation 
in any State (although the Constitutional Council has specified this is not full 
diplomatic representation); for the President to negotiate administrative arrangements 
with any Pacific State or territory to advance its economic, social and economic 
development; and to sign cooperation agreements in any area within French Polynesia's 
responsibility (Articles 15 to 17). With the agreement of the Republic's authorities, 
French Polynesia can be a member, associate or observer of international organizations, 
or its President can be associated with work of regional Pacific organizations in the 
areas of its responsibility (article 42). The Law defines French Polynesia as having all 
responsibilities other than those {regalien, or sovereign) functions of the French State 
which are specified (and include foreign policy, defence, entry of foreigners (not their 
access to work), and air services within the Republic (see Faberon and Ziller 2007 pp. 
323-325). 
All three French Pacific entities have participated in the SPC since 1983, although they 
functioned for many years as part of the French delegation and have not been active in 
their own right. 
Membership of the Pacific Islands Forum has been more problematic, since the 
organization is more political in nature and was created as a vehicle of opposition to 
French policies in the Pacific. The Forum allowed only entities on the way to self-
government to become observers. With the signature of the Noumea Accord, New 
Caledonia was seen as having qualified and became an observer in 1999, and French 
Polynesia in 2004 after its Organic Law changes. But in acknowledgement of 
significant efforts by France to develop relations, including by the Chirac government 
hosting a meeting of the France Oceania Summit for Pacific leaders in Papeete in 2003 
and in Paris in June 2006, the Pacific Islands Forum welcomed both in a new category 
of Associate Member in 2006, when Wallis and Futuna became an observer. Since 
then New Caledonia's President Gomes has indicated that he wants full membership 
status for New Caledonia (see Flash d'Oceanie 19 January 2010). 
All three French entities are members of the Pacific Islands Telecommunications 
Association and the Pacific Power Association (PPA) and the South Pacific Regional 
Environment Program (SPREP). New Caledonia and French Polynesia are members of 
the South Pacific Tourism Organization (SPTO), known as South-Pacific Travel; the 
Pacific Islands Development Program (PIDP); and associate members of the South 
Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC). French Polynesia is an Observer 
to the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA). (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
website, at South Pacific regional organizations, www.dfat.gov.au accessed 9 March 
2010). 
Thus the French collectivities are represented in some way on seven of the ten inter-
governmental members of the Council of Regional Organizations of the Pacific 
(CROP), i.e., in the SPC, SPREP, SOPAC, PIDP, SPTO, FFA, and the PPA. There are 
only three CROP bodies in which the French Pacific collectivities are not represented: 
the University of the South Pacific, the Fiji School of Medicine, and the South Pacific 
Board for Education Assessment. The Universities of New Caledonia and of French 
Polynesia (which split apart from the united French University of the Pacific in 1999) 
are not members of CROP. The Universities operate in the French language which 
limits the potential for cooperation. Still, there would be a good argument for closer 
collaboration between France, its regional universities and CROP'S education 
members. 
Table 14 
Participation of French Pacific Collectivities in Pacific regional organizations 
SPC PIF SOPAC FFA PECC SPTO PIDP SPREP PPA OCO 
New 
Caledonia 
M A/M A/M A/M* M M M M M 
French 
Polynesia 
M A/M A/M 0 A/M* M M M M M 
Wallis & 
Futuna 
M O A/M* M M M 
M Member 
A/M Associate Member 
O Observer 
A/M* combined Associate Member with France 
SPC Secretariat for the Pacific Community 
PIF Pacific Islands Forum 
SOP AC South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission 
FFA Forum Fisheries Agency 
PECC Pacific Economic Cooperation Council 
SPTO South Pacific Tourism Organization 
PIDP Pacific Islands Development Program 
SPREP South Pacific Regional Environment Program 
PPA Pacific Power Association 
OCO Oceanic Customs Organization (non-CROP, Council of Regional 
Organizations of Pacific) 
Source: ISEE TEC 2008 p. 13 
France and its collectivities together participate as an Associate Member of the tri-
partite (government, business, academic) Pacific Economic Cooperation Council 
(PECC) through the Paris-based France Pacific Territories National Committee for 
Pacific Economic Cooperation. The collectivities are members of the Oceanic Customs 
Organization which was headquartered in Noumea in 1999 but which subsequently 
moved to Suva. 
Much of the promising breadth of participation by the French collectivities is limited by 
the cultural divide between their senior officials and those of the regional groupings. 
The Noumea Accord specifically states that training will be provided to prepare the 
collectivities for foreign affairs activities (Noumea Accord 3.2.1). However, whereas 
France has been active in overtly campaigning for flill participation of its collectivities 
in the Pacific Islands Forum, and allowing for their participation in their own right in 
Forum activities and those of other regional organizations, it has been less energetic in 
ensuring that local officials are equipped to participate fully in this Anglophone 
organization. Senior New Caledonian leaders have privately expressed their 
expectation that the Forum, made up of the poorest island states that happen to be 
English-speaking, should fund parallel French language interpretation services, an 
unrealistic hope given the dominance of anglophone countries and the cost of 
translation services. Lacking an adequately resourced local secretariat for external 
affairs, New Caledonian leaders and officials are also not conversant with key Forum 
and CROP issues on a regular basis. 
For their own part, the collectivities have been mixed in their attitude to regional 
participation. The Frogier-led government (2000 to 2004) was distinctly 
unenthusiastic, senior leaders complaining privately about the fact that proceedings 
were conducted in English about issues they were not fully briefed about either from 
their own local viewpoints or certainly in the regional context. Chapter 5 noted the 
limited development of an external affairs unit in New Caledonia, which had no 
director by 2009. 
One trend evident in recent years has been greater contact and cooperation between the 
French Pacific entities themselves (see "Franconesie" unity section below). 
President Sarkozy has himself underlined his wish that France's overseas entities 
integrate more closely in their regions (Sarkozy 2009; and he exhorted the French 
territories to open themselves more economically to the countries surrounding them, 
Sarkozy 2010a). To assist the French Pacific collectivities to participate effectively and 
genuinely in their own right, training in English and regional affairs, perhaps through 
exchanges, will be essential. A greater effort needs to be made by France, and regional 
donor countries, Australia and New Zealand, in this area. 
Melanesian Spearhead Group 
As seen in Chapter 3, the MSG was formed to show solidarity with New Caledonia's 
Kanaks and press for their independence. Since the signature of the Matignon/Noumea 
Accords, the grouping altered focus to economic cooperation (see May 2011 p. 2), but 
maintains an interest in the New Caledonian decolonization issue, along with support 
for the autonomist aspirations of West Papuans. The MSG is now made up of the 
independent governments of PNG, Fiji, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands, along with the 
FLNKS. New Caledonia as an entity is not a member. The MSG put in place a Free 
Trade Agreement in 1993, and established a Free Trade Zone in 2006, with limited 
effectiveness. 
France has shown some flexibility towards the MSG. Perhaps with a concerned eye on 
China's funding of a new secretariat building for the body in Vila, which was 
inaugurated in 2007, the French State allowed Noumea to host an MSG meeting in 
2001. French High Commissioner Dassonville met MSG representatives in late 2008 to 
discuss technical issues (address to Colloquium on Melanesian Integration, de Deckker 
and Faberon 2008 p. 10). 
In October 2009, President of the New Caledonian government PhiHppe Gomes told 
the UN Committee on Decolonization in New York that his government wanted New 
Caledonia to become a full member of the MSG (see Flash D 'Oceanie 19 January 
2010). Although such participation would possibly strengthen the effectiveness of the 
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MSG as an economic sub-grouping, the idea was not at all welcomed by some of New 
Caledonia's Kanak leaders. FLNKS spokesman Victor Tutugoro commented that the 
idea of the MSG, formed as part of the Kanak fight for liberation, was that a fully 
independent New Caledonia would eventually become a member in its own right. He 
also noted that New Caledonia, or Kanaky, was not yet fully emancipated (Nouvelles 
Caledoniennes, 19 February 2010). His comments came after a debate at the annual 
FLNKS congress where Palika generally supported developing regional links for New 
Caledonia, while the more ascendant UC defended the traditional objectives of the 
FLNKS within the MSG. In June 2010, an MSG delegation visiting New Caledonia in 
order to assess Noumea Accord implementation, and expressed continuing concern at 
the slow rate implementation of Accord commitments (May 2011 p. 6 and see Regional 
reaction section below). 
"Franconesie" unity 
France has encouraged its three Pacific entities to consult and work together in recent 
years. Rumley (2006 p. 244) referred to France's intention for the three collectivities to 
work together in a kind of "Franconesia", to "reinvigorate a French regional role". 
From 2003, the three take turns to chair the meetings on the allocation of the South 
Pacific Fund. In 2009, the three French collectivities met and agreed to work together 
and meet on a regular basis. In February 2010, the heads of the Assemblies of the three 
French Pacific entities signed a partnership agreement under which they agreed to 
consult and formulate common approaches to French State policy announcements. 
While this grouping is embryonic, when set against long-term objectives of the French 
entities of fuller participation in the PIF and other regional groups, it can be seen, 
potentially at least, as operating as a sub-group of interests within regional bodies. 
Trade engagements 
New Caledonia has used its capability to negotiate, and even sign (on behalf of the 
French State), bilateral agreements in the region in areas of its responsibility (Noumea 
Accord Articles 3.1.1 and 3.2.1). The first country to sign an agreement with New 
Caledonia was Australia (Trade and Economic Relations Arrangement in March 2002); 
followed by Vanuatu (cooperation agreements 2002 and 2006, see French Foreign 
Ministry website, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/countrv-files Vanuatu cooperation, 
accessed 12 January 2011). 
The Australian Arrangement provided for regular bilateral economic officials talks. In 
practice these have been infrequent. By mid 2009 only two had been held, the first in 
Canberra in September 2002, the second in Noumea in November 2005; and in March 
2010, a delegation led by President Gomes visited Australia. 
Bilateral economic links between the collectivities and the region are few. The big 
two, Australia and New Zealand, are unsurprisingly more important for the 
collectivities than the collectivities are for them. New Caledonia, the most 
economically significant of the three collectivities, ranks as Australia's 47"' trading 
partner with two-way trade equal to .1% of Australia's total. It is, however, Australia's 
fourth largest trade destination in the South Pacific. Australia's exports there (mainly 
civil engineering equipment and parts, coal, prefabricated buildings and wheat) 
amounted to $A359 m. in 2007-8, and are on an increasing trend, hnports largely 
consisted of iron ore, and were worth $A 85 m. . Australia was only New Caledonia's 
sixth largest export destination in 2007 (after Japan, the EU, France, Taiwan, and 
China), taking just 5.2% of New Caledonia's exports. Australia was New Caledonia's 
third largest source of imports that year, after France and Singapore (from where New 
Caledonia imports its petroleum), providing only 10.7% of its imports. French 
Polynesia's links with Australia are even slimmer, importing around $A 80 m. worth of 
goods in 2007-8 (mainly fuel and processed and other food) and exporting only $A6 m 
worth of pearls and boats. Australia was French Polynesia's sixth largest import source 
and seventh largest export destination in 2007 (Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, Fact Sheet, New Caledonia, French Polynesia wwvv.dfat.gov.au accessed 2 June 
2009, and ISEE TEC 2008 pp. 90 and 91). 
New Caledonia exported just under $NZ 1 m. worth of goods to New Zealand in the 
year to June 2007 (mainly fruit and vegetables and copper); New Zealand exports 
totalled $NZ 160.8 m. (yachts and vessels, iron and steel products, food). Total 
exports from New Zealand to New Caledonia in the year ending June 2007 were 
NZ$160.8 million - a year on year growth of 31%, with some 60% of this amount 
derived from just twenty export categories. New Caledonia is New Zealand's third 
largest export market in the South Pacific (New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade Country Brief, wvvw. nzm fat, gov.nz accessed 2 June 2009). 
Economic links with the Pacific islands are even more limited and tend to be focused 
on Melanesia. New Caledonia imported some products from Fiji (worth 383 m. cfp or 
$A 4.6 m. converted 19 May 2010), Vanuatu (304 m. cfp), PNG (94 m. cfp) and 
Solomon Islands (52 m. cfp) in 2007 (ISEE TEC 2008 p. 92). In all cases, further 
growth in economic links is affected by the French collectivities' restrictive trade 
baiTiers and reliance on the French and European markets, apart from the relatively 
limited range of imports from other island economies. 
It is therefore unsurprising that there is far to go to engage the French collectivities in 
regional economic activity. Although the French entities have been invited to 
participate in regional free trade programs, the PACER (Pacific Agreement on Closer 
Economic Relations) and the PICTA (Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement), they 
have responded cautiously. There is a strong awareness of the differences between the 
well-off, heavily subsidised economies of the French collectivities and the majority of 
Pacific island states, and of the corresponding economic responsibilities a regional 
economic agreement would impose on the better-off economies. The French 
collectivities have made much of the need to protect local business in order to develop 
economic activity. So, while New Caledonia is studying the two agreements, and 
officially indicated its willingness to enter into negotiations for its eventual 
participation, it is unlikely to move quickly to do so (for an indication of the 
protectionist approach in New Caledonia, see a contribution by the then head of its 
Regional Cooperation and External Relations unit, Laurent Semavoine, in de Deckker 
and Faberon2008 p. 241). 
France, the European Union and the region 
Beyond France's specific bilateral and regional engagement, and that of its 
collectivities in the Pacific, France has led the way for greater EU activity in the region. 
It has done this in two ways, first, by actively leading European support for the 
overseas territories of EU members, including those of France in the Pacific; and 
second, by pioneering the ACP (African-Caribbean-Pacific) program whereby Europe 
assists developing countries in Africa and the Pacific, with France providing a 
significant contribution to funding for this EU development cooperation, including in 
the Pacific. 
Because many aspects of the EU's handling of the French overseas collectivities 
highlight some specific regional concerns and departures from overall EU practice, and 
because their treatment under EU provisions differs to those the EU applies to the 
island Pacific countries, the dispositions of EU treatment of the French Pacific 
collectivities and the Pacific island states will be considered in detail. 
EU and the French Pacific collectivities as European Overseas Countries and 
Territories (OCT) 
From the beginnings of the creation of the European Union (EU) with its origin in the 
European Economic Community (EEC), France led the way for some form of 
association with European members' overseas possessions. This meant that the French 
Pacific entities represented a slice of Europe in the Pacific from the late 1950s in some 
form or other. 
Overseas countries and territories 
The first European treaty, the 1951 Treaty of Paris on coal and steel, made only 
cursory mention of extra-European territories of member states, guaranteeing that any 
preferential measures in those territories would be extended to other member states (art. 
79) (Faberon and Ziller 2008 p. 244.) The 1952 Paris Treaty on a European Defence 
Community made oblique mentions of Algeria and Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. 
But from the 1957 Treaty of Rome, provision has been made for "overseas countries 
and territories" (OCT) to be associated with the EU, which at the time essentially meant 
the French overseas possessions, Belgian and Italian African territories and Dutch 
territories in the Americas. And French influence was the decisive factor ensuring that 
these provisions were included (European Commission 1998, p. 11; Faberon and Ziller 
2007 p. 249; Jorda in Tesoka and Ziller 2008 p. 343). The OCT arrangements have 
broadly remained unchanged since then, and are aimed at advancing economic and 
social development of the OCT and the establishment of close economic relations 
between them and the whole Community (Article 131 of the 1957 Treaty, Faberon and 
Ziller 2007 p. 250). The French OCTs include New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and 
Wallis and Futuna, the French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Mayotte, and Saint-
Pierre et Miquelon. 
The provisions under the 1957 Treaty included the creation of a European Development 
Fund (EDF) from which the French overseas possessions derived considerable financial 
benefits. France has consistently contributed a larger amount than other European 
countries with overseas possessions (Semavoine in de Deckker and Faberon 2008 p. 
240 reported France contributed 19.3% of the EDF but Jorda in Tesoka and Ziller 2008 
noted France contributed 24.3% for 2000 to 2007, well ahead of Britain, Netherlands 
and Denmark, and that this was over 8% of French development aid in 2006). For the 
lO'*' EDF France will become the second largest contributor (19.55% after Germany but 
before Britain, Netherlands and Denmark, Tesoka and Ziller 2008 p. 347). 
Africa-Caribbean-Pacific 
With the decolonization of many overseas European, including some French, 
possessions in the 1960s and 1970s, the EC developed links with the newly 
independent African states and Madagascar in the 1963 Yaounde Convention; and 
preferential trading measures with the new Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries 
under the 1975 Lome Convention. The ACP arrangements were agreed at regular 
intervals, most recently in the Cotonou Agreement of June 2000, applicable for ten 
years. In parallel, arrangements for the OCTs were periodically renewed, initially by 
an agreement of application, then by decisions of association taken by the European 
Council at various intervals. 
Preferential treatment of OCTs relative to ACPs 
Under these agreements, the preferential access to EC members markets was the same 
for ACPs and OCTs until 1991, when the OCTs were accorded free and unlimited 
access to the European market, while the ACPs had to comply with rules of origin and 
transborder requirements. 
Further benefits were accorded to the OCTs in 1997, following the establishment of the 
European Union in 1993, in an annex to the Treaty of Amsterdam. No EU customs 
duties or other charges were payable by OCTs. The arrangements are not reciprocal, 
and OCTs can make their own customs legislation, for example to protect sensitive 
sectors of their economies. By this time, overseas territories of other European 
members had been added to the OCTs (those of the United Kingdom in 1973, Denmark 
in 1986). But the special nature of the French OCTs was accentuated here too by two 
further protocols to the Treaty of Amsterdam, one called the "Protocol on France" 
preserving the privilege of issuing currency in its overseas entities, the other a 
declaration reserving the right of each member state to act separately from other 
member states in the interest of the OCT (European Commission 1998 p. 30). 
Both French Polynesia and New Caledonia have provisions in their respective Organic 
Laws for their governments' executives to be involved in relations and negotiations 
with the EU, and for consultation with their assemblies on proposed acts of the EU 
(Articles 30 and 89 of the 1999 Organic Law for New Caledonia, and Articles 41 and 
135 of the 2004 Organic Law for French Polynesia, see Faberon and Ziller 2007 p. 271, 
and Faberon in Tesoka and Ziller 2008, p. 285 et seq). In practice, the collectivities 
themselves have not been directly engaged with the EU. 
In the Pacific, the French Pacific entities as OCTs have thus held a privileged position 
over other Pacific island states, who are ACPs, in relation to their treatment by Europe. 
French Pacific entities: Implications for citizenship 
The way in which EU provisions apply to the populations in the OCTs is variable, and 
still being worked out. Muller, 1999, noted the differences in application for example 
between Gibraltar and French Polynesia. But the French OCTs retain particular 
privileges relating to citizenship, which impacts on local sensitivities in the Pacific 
collectivities. 
Because of their French citizenship, and its "indivisibility" or supposed non-
discriminatory application to all citizens (Faberon and Ziller p. 253, and Gohin 2002 
point 4), inhabitants of the French Pacific entities who are French can vote for special 
overseas seats in European elections and are entitled to European passports (European 
Commission 1998, p. 15); they enjoy non-reciprocal rights of mobility and settlement 
in EU member countries; and they can protect sensitive sectors of their economies from 
EU imports and can issue their own currency. It is ironic that these benefits derive 
from the "indivisibility" of French citizenship, given the unique status of New 
Caledonian citizenship, the restricted electorate and protective local employment 
conditions provided under the Noumea Accord which seem incompatible with the 
notion of indivisibility and equality of all French citizens (Gohin 2002 points 32 and 
33). The arrangement is yet another example of the creativity of the French State in 
supporting their collectivities even against the background of monolithic Europe. 
Voting Rights 
In view of the controversies surrounding New Caledonian citizenship issues, and to 
some extent French Polynesian employment-protection citizenship issues, the 
association of the French Pacific collectivities with the EU, with its generally reciprocal 
arrangements, not surprisingly touches sensitive nerves (see Chapter 5). 
Faberon and Ziller note that the European Commission Treaty applied fully to all EU 
citizens, and therefore to all French citizens wherever they resided, in metropolitan 
France, in its overseas departments, in its overseas collectivities enumerated in Article 
74 of the French Constitution, or in New Caledonia, despite its sui generis status (2007 
p. 240). All French citizens, including all those French citizens in the French Pacific 
collectivities, have the right to vote in EU elections. They are the only member state 
nationals living outside the EU who may do so (Muller 1999 p. 43; Commission 
Eiiropeenne 1998 p. 15). Three special (members of Parliament) positions 
were created specifically to represent the French overseas collectivities. 
But for the locals in the three Pacific collectivities, this right to vote is seen as a mixed 
blessing, reflected in the low voter turnouts (around 20%, compared to around 70% 
turnout in other elections, see for example Table 9) and general lack of appreciation of 
the benefits, or potential benefits, of European membership. As noted in Chapter 3, 
many in French Polynesia were suspicious about the EU relationship, when they 
effectively boycotted or at best ignored the 1989 EU Parliamentary elections 
(Henningham 1992 p. 163). Local leaders at the time warned that the EU vote risked 
fuelling independentist sentiment and Flosse suggested the EU identity could erode 
local culture and identity (Muller 1999 p. 44). It is possible that the changed status of 
the OCTs relative to the ACPs from 1991 may well have resulted from such 
sensitivities. In New Caledonia, the pro-independence Palika has traditionally opposed 
participation in EU elections on the basis that it would imply integration into a system 
that condoned colonialism in Kanaky (Chappell 1998 p. 443). As Chapter 5 described, 
after the Noumea Accord was signed, France secured special non-reciprocal rights by 
which EU members resident in New Caledonia could not vote in congressional or 
provincial elections. However they remained able to vote in municipal elections, 
which aroused particular concern amongst the pro-independence groups. 
These efforts by France failed to reduce the sense of concern and isolation in its 
entities: in the June 2004 EU parliamentary elections, voter turnout was a low 25.43% 
in New Caledonia, and 39.85% in French Polynesia. In May 2005 Palika, a leading 
constituent of FLNKS, called for a boycott of the French vote on the EU constitution 
(Maclellan 2005b p. 413). This was consistent with its anti-EU election stance noted 
above, and occurred when Palika was challenging the pro-France group's interpretation 
of the restricted electorate for provincial elections in New Caledonia. 
A further effort was made to encourage more active participation in EU elections. 
Until 2009, the three French overseas EU Parliament positions were contested on a 
basis of one electorate and list of candidates on a proportional basis. This meant that 
candidates from the more populous Reunion invariably won all three seats. Again at 
the instigation of France, for the 2009 election, this procedure was changed, with the 
creation of three electorates, enabling the election of one representative from each of 
the Caribbean, Indian Ocean and Pacific collectivities. During the lead-up to the 
election, newspapers reported extensively on the substantial funding the OCT received 
from Europe. But this effort too failed. Voter turnout in New Caledonia and French 
Polynesia was even lower than in 2004 (21.82% in New Caledonia in 2009 compared 
to 25.43% in 2004, and in French Polynesia, 22.59% compared to 39.85%)(see also 
Muller 2010 p. 6). These turnouts are low when compared with the overall turnout for 
France in EU pariiamentary elections (46.76% in 1999, 42.76 % in 2004, and 40.63% 
in 2009 website www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament, accessed 12 January 2011). 
Non-reciprocal rights of travel and settlement 
Again, by virtue of their French citizenship, the French Pacific originating populations 
are able to settle in each of the other 26 European Union member states on the same 
terms as residents of other EU member states (Faberon and Ziller 2007 p. 254). In so 
far as the reciprocal right is concerned, the 1957 Treaty provided for regulation of this 
right by agreements requiring the unanimity of States members, which have never been 
adopted (Faberon and Ziller 2007 p. 255; European Commission 1998 p. 27). 
Therefore the OCTs benefit from the non-reciprocity of the right to travel and settle in 
other EU states. 
In 1985, some countries of the EU, including France, agreed to create an area of free 
movement of peoples, abolishing border checks at internal borders. By 2008, most EU 
countries participated (see The Schengen area and cooperation. EU website accessed 12 
January 2011). At France's request, the French OCTS are not part of the Schengen 
group, since they maintain their own police border controls, unlike countries within the 
Schengen space (Faberon and Ziller 2007 p. 256). 
The special work protection provisions of New Caledonia and French Polynesia are 
allowed for under the EC Treaty. Thus the French OCT can take protective measures 
on employment, so long as incoming workers from European Union members are 
treated no differently to those from third countries (European Commission 1998 p. 27, 
Faberon and Ziller 2007 p. 267). Interestingly, in theory this would provide a means 
for local French collectivities to treat incoming French citizens, as EU citizens, seeking 
employment, just as rigorously as those from third countries, although so far the local 
governments have not taken up this option. Senior French officials acknowledged in 
personal communication in early 2009 that local political parties in New Caledonia 
were pressing for greater controls on French immigrants. The sensitivity of the 
immigration issue means that all applications by foreigners for employment visas are 
individually seen and decided upon in the Executive (or Cabinet) of New Caledonia. 
This is bureaucratically demanding. The criteria for endorsement are opaque (for 
example, even when the officially-approved Goro nickel plant construction project was 
under way in 2003, many Australian contractors did not receive work visas and were 
obliged to travel on tourist visas. Personal communications from Australian contractors 
2003). Faberon and Ziller (2007 p. 267) have noted that while statistics are difficult to 
come by, judicial experience indicates that the EU provisions have resulted in a greater 
influx of EU workers into the French OCTs, particularly French Polynesia. 
Economic benefits 
The French OCTS are given full access to the internal market of the EU, which, as the 
Commission itself points out, is a meaningful privilege given that virtually all of their 
economic activity is geared towards the European community (European Commission 
1998 p. 30). Moreover, the French OCTs can make their own customs legislation 
protecting sensitive sectors, and issue their own currency (which has been a sensitive 
political issue, see Chapter 5). In these respects, it is worth noting that the four French 
overseas departements, Guadeloupe, Guyana, Martinique and Reunion, are not OCTs 
as they are considered an integral part of the European Community by virtue of their 
status as departments of France. As such they cannot make their own customs 
legislation, must apply European customs arrangements to imports and are given 
support from the Structural Fund rather than the EDF (European Commission 1998 p. 
18). 
While the French Pacific collectivities enjoy, and exercise, their right to make their 
own protective customs legislation even against European imports, the reality is that 
their economies are dependent on France and on Europe particularly given habits and 
tastes of the inhabitants, and this, together with strong vested local interests, acts as a 
strong brake on the exercise of this privilege. This means that duties and import taxes 
are more likely to be directed against regional imports, for example from Australia, 
New Zealand, and the neighbouring Pacific states, than against European imports. The 
net result is that the economies of the French Pacific collectivities remain inexorably 
linked to France and Europe, which impedes their integration within their own region 
even given the dramatically higher costs. 
The ambiguities of OCT status for the fledgling participation of the French Pacific 
entities within their own region have led to some misunderstandings. In the early 
2000s, senior New Caledonian leaders would argue publicly that New Caledonia would 
provide a door for Pacific economies (including the large Australian and New Zealand 
economies) to European markets. In practice, this is not the case, as the EU maintains 
local content rules and rules of origin which preclude processing of essentially foreign 
imports in an OCT, for example, New Caledonia, for subsequent preferential entry to 
its markets. 
Development benefits 
The French Pacific collectivities as OCTs benefit from aid flows and projects under the 
Economic Development Fund. Faberon and Ziller (2007 p. 266) notes that these 
benefits are not as favourable to them as the Structural Fund available to EU member 
states. The EDF applies not only to OCTs but also to ACPs. Because New Caledonia 
and French Polynesia are large and enjoy a higher standard of living than many other 
OCTs and ACPs, and because they fall outside some of the specific recent EDF 
programs, they do not receive as much as others (Faberon and Ziller 2007 p. 274). 
However, they nonetheless have access to considerable support. 
A further problem is the time-consuming bureaucratic processes which, when coupled 
with the isolation and distance from Brussels of the French OCTs (despite the presence 
of a resident EU representative in Noumea and Suva), means that the often impressive 
notional allocations are rarely fijlly spent (this problem is one shared by the ACP 
Pacific countries, see EU aid to the region below). From 2000 to 2007, New Caledonia 
was granted support totalling cfp 2.6 billion (EUR 21.5 m. or $A 43.2 m. converted 25 
November 2008), which covered a number of projects including a new aquarium, 
roadworks and professional training. But this figure included 1.6 billion cfp (EUR 
13.8 m. or $A 27.7 m. converted 25 November 2008) for the period, as well as much as 
EUR 7.8 m. ($A 15.6 m. converted 25 Nov 2008) unspent from the previous period 
(see ISEE website, hltp://wwvvJsee.nc/tec/ecofinances/telechargei-nents/16-l-
aideseurop.pdf, accessed 25 November 2008). 
Wallis and Futuna is defined as a least developed OCT and receives special assistance 
as such. For the Ninth EDF (2000-7), it was allocated 2 b. cfp (EUR 16.7 m. or SA 
33.5 m. converted 25 November 2008) of which 630 m. cfp (EUR 5.2 m. or $A 10.4 m. 
converted 25 November 2008) were carried over from the previous period. 
Bearing in mind these difficulties in implementation, the 10*'' EDF (2008-2013) has 
allocated EUR 19.81 m. ($A 34.7 m. converted on 7 July 2009) to New Caledonia, 
again focused on training and infrastructure; EUR 19.79 m. to French Polynesia; and 
EUR 16.5 m. to Wallis and Futuna (Geographical Partnerships EU website accessed 9 
June 2009). 
The OCTs also benefit, as do the ACP countries, from the STABEX and SYSMIN 
systems for supporting agricultural exports and financing mining products respectively. 
They also have access to the European Investment Bank. However, given the level of 
economic development, French Polynesia and New Caledonia do not generally qualify 
over other OCTs (Faberon and Ziller p. 274), although New Caledonia has received 
some training and mining rehabilitation funding from SYSMIN. 
Currency: the Euro 
France would like its three Pacific collectivities to adopt the Euro instead of the special 
French Pacific franc currently in circulation, but has indicated that it will introduce the 
Euro only if all three collectivities agree to do so. Wallis and Futuna has indicated it 
will fall in with such a decision taken by the other two collectivities. French Polynesia 
voted in 2006 to introduce the Euro. Chapter 5 referred to the reasons why New 
Caledonia has so far been disinclined to accept the Euro as its currency, essentially 
seeing such a move as stepping back from the Noumea Accord's stipulation that 
currency would be dealt with as one of the final sovereign matters to be voted upon in 
due course between 2014 and 2018. 
Political benefits 
Importantly too, the OCTs have the right of petition before the European parliament 
mediator, introducing a new area of influence over what happens in their (OCTs) 
territory (European Commission 1998, p. 30). It is notable that New Caledonian pro-
French interests had recourse to the European Court of Human Rights over the 
restricted electorate issue, with that Court judging in favour of local interests given the 
special sensitivities of the New Caledonian simation (see Chapter 5). Thus, the 
political association with Europe provides a potential check to French administration 
practices and a new pressure point to which the French Pacific collectivities can have 
recourse not only on local issues but also on issues of interest to the wider Pacific 
region as well. 
Review of EU-OCT relationship 
The EU is reconsidering its approach to the OCTs. Its 2008 Green Paper noted that the 
emphasis to date on development cooperation, and the relatively high expenditure on 
the OCTs relative to the ACPs (for example, footnote 4, page 6, "Under the lO"' EDF 
(2008-2013), the average per capita level of Community financial assistance to the 
OCTs is approximately six times higher than the average per capita level of 
Community financial assistance to the AC? states) was outmoded. The Paper said the 
approach had been formed when most OCTs had been African colonies, and may not 
be consistent with the contemporary realities of the OCTs. Aspects under 
consideration included whether or not the development cooperation approach was the 
most relevant, given the relatively high standards of living in the OCTs; whether and 
how the OCTs could play a key role as strategic outposts for the EU; whether better 
means could be found for their integration into their geographic regions; and how they 
could better engage in envirormiental protection of their unique biodiversity. The 
Green Paper also raised the special role and influence of other countries in respect of 
the OCTs, in the case of the Pacific, the role of the US, Japan, China, Australia and 
New Zealand (European Commission 2008 p. 13). 
The focus of the Paper, as outlined above, provides insight into how France, a major 
player in the revised approach, sees the French Pacific collectivities. 
EU representation and aid to the region 
The OCTs themselves form an important part of the EU's presence in the Pacific 
region, and are seen as such by the EU. In its 2008 Green Paper on the OCTs, the 
Commission stated that "Indeed, while the OCTs do not form an integral part of the 
EU, they are a part of or at least closely related to an EU Member State, which means 
that they cannot be uncoupled from the EU and, in a sense, are 'part of its ultimate 
frontiers' " (European Commission 2008 p. 7). But apart from the EU's engagement 
with France's three OCTs in the Pacific (and Britain's minuscule Pitcairn), the EU is 
formally represented in the region, contributes to some regional organizations and has 
been involved in assisting the independent Pacific countries through the ACP 
relationship. France has been a major contributor to this process, and to funding. 
The EU has residential diplomatic representation in Australia and New Zealand, a 
regional delegation office in Fiji and a delegation office in Papua New Guinea, 
technical offices in East Timor, Samoa and Kiribati, and offices in Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu. It also has an office for the French OCTs in Noumea. The EU participates in 
post-Pacific Islands Forum dialogue discussions immediately after PIF summit 
meetings. 
The EU launched a new strategy for the Pacific in 2006 (European Commission 2006). 
It noted that its support for regional governments dated from the 1975 Lome 
Convention, revised in 2000 as the Cotonou Agreement, and totalled EUR 1.8 b. (just 
over $A 3 b.) to 2006. It described itself as the second largest aid contributor to the 
region but tended to include in its calculations the separate aid contributions by some of 
its members (France, United Kingdom and Portugal) (European Commission 2006 pp. 
221 
25 and 26). Its assistance focused on governance, regionalism and sustainable 
development of natural resources, elements that corresponded to the Forum priorities of 
economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and security. The 
strategy noted France's regional presence in its three OCXs and its military presence, 
along with the desirability of promoting integration of these entities (as well as 
Britain's Pitcaim) into the region (Op. cit. pp. 4 and 5). 
The Tenth EDF 2008-2013 allocated to Pacific programs an overall envelope of EUR 
293 m. ($A441 m. converted 2 March 2010, or just under SA 90 m. a year) with a 
possible 25% increase if countries demonstrate clear commitments to good governance 
(European Commission 2007, Preface, p. 7). There are regional and bilateral (i.e. 
EU/individual Pacific island states) programs. The regional program allocates EUR 105 
m. over the five-year period ($A 157 m. converted 9 March 2010), within the broad 
objectives of the Forum's Pacific Plan focused on sustainable energy and preservation 
and exploitation of natural resources. Of this amount EUR 45 m. ($A67.4 m.) has been 
earmarked for regional economic integration, EUR 40 m. ($A 60 m.) for sustainable 
management of natural resources and the environment, and EUR 10 m. ($A 15 m.) for 
non-state actors and the Forum (EU website 
wvvw.http/'/ec.europa.eu/devek>pment/geographicaL''regionscountries/'eupacific_en.cfm 
accessed 6 April 2009). 
The EU also on occasion lumps its funding to independent Pacific island countries 
along with that to its own collectivities (for example, "The EC'S Delegation to the 
Pacific: European Union and the Pacific: Overview" at 
http:/7www.delfii.ec.europa.eu/ea eu and country/index.htm, states that the EU has 
transferred financial and technical cooperation worth EUR 1,330 m. over the last 20 
years to the Pacific ACP countries and the overseas collectivities and territories with 
another 400 m. planned over the next five years, my italics). 
Only very little of this funding has been channelled through the SPC. The EU does not 
contribute to the core budget of the SPC. It does provide fiinding for programs, and 
therefore the annual amounts fluctuate widely depending on the timing and pace of 
expenditure in the programs it supports. It averaged contributions of just under EUR 5 
m. ($A 7.4 m.) per annum in the five years to 2007 (SPC 2009). hi 2007, the EU 
contributed EUR 1.8 m. ($US 2.8 m. or $A3.1 m.) in 2007, or 5.16% of SPC income 
(SPC 2007 hicome by Source, SPC Annual Report 2007, Part 2 Annual Accounts). 
France contributed $US 7.1 m. that year, or 12.97% of total income. Since France 
contributes just under 20% of EU EDF funds, it can be assumed it contributed an 
estimated EUR 1 m. ($A 1.5 m.) per year to the SPC via the EU contribution in the five 
years to 2007. 
As for the OCTs, EU funding is limited by the capacity of the bureaucratic processes in 
Brussels to deliver, in a timely way, appropriately tailored projects to the small island 
Pacific states. The capacity for these small states to provide the necessary 
documentation is also an issue, as is the propensity for the Europeans to prefer 
regionwide program approaches, often not suited to the diverse needs of the Pacific 
states. Together, these factors account for the regular underspending of generous 
European allocations in the past. There was a 36% underspend for the 6* EDF 1985-90 
and 49% for the 1990-95, which led to an emphasis in the 9"^  EDF 2000-07 on 
redressing this situation (Mrgudovic 2008 p. 332). 
Other EU links 
Trade between the region and the EU is minute. Although the EU takes 10% of Pacific 
ACP exports, over 90% of these come from PNG and Fiji alone (European Commission 
2006 p. 24). The importance of the EU to Fiji is reflected in its taking half of Fiji's 
major commodity, sugar, at guaranteed prices, until the phase-out of the program in 
2010, although this preferential treatment has been suspended on occasion to sanction 
Fiji's undemocratic practices (most recently, on 18 May 2009 the EU cancelled $A 31 
m. aid to Fiji's sugar industry as Fiji's military dictatorship entrenched itself). It has 
signed fishery agreements with the Solomons, Kiribati and the federated States of 
Micronesia, covering fishing licenses for Spanish and French fishing vessels. The EU 
has acceded to the Western Central Pacific Fisheries Convention. 
From September 2004 the EU has been negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements, 
to replace the preferential Cotonou arrangements. Although Australia and New Zealand 
have not insisted on prior consuhation with them as provided for in the Pacific 
Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER), negotiations have been slow and 
have extended well beyond the original deadline of 2007. No doubt this reflects the 
limited interest for Europe in the Pacific island states as sources of trade or investment. 
Regional reactions to French efforts 
As with its efforts to improve its image in the region in the 1980s, the reaction in the 
region to French overtures in recent years has been mixed. 
On the one hand, regional leaders have responded to France positively. They have 
participated in the France Oceanic Summits. Many (PNG, Tonga, Vanuatu, Fiji) 
participate in defence exercises and exchanges with France, and welcome French naval 
visits. However, just as some Melanesians were uneasy with the Rudd government's 
conclusion of a defence agreement with France over the use of French defence facilities 
(see Cooperation with the United Nations section of this Chapter) so are some island 
leaders cautious about engaging France in regional defence activity. When Australian 
Foreign Minister Downer was putting together the Regional Assistance Mission for the 
Solomon Islands, in 2003, in response to a request to Prime Minister Howard from the 
Solomon Islands Prime Minister, he had in mind French participation.^'* hi the event. 
Downer mentioned the idea to the French Ambassador , at a lunch he was hosting for European 
ambassadors around that t ime. Prel iminary indications were that the French would have responded 
posit ively (Personal comments Downer 2003). 
regional island leaders, sounded out informally in the corridors of a meeting hosted by 
the Australian Government in Sydney to plan the Mission, were not responsive to the 
idea of French participation, and the idea was dropped (Personal communications 
Downer 2009). 
The same hesitation was evident at the time Australia was encouraging Indonesia to 
develop a long-term democratic solution in East Timor. Indonesian President Habibie 
strongly rejected a proposal Prime Minister Howard put to him in a letter on 19 
December 1998, to apply a Matignon Accords-type solution to East Timor. Then 
Ambassador McCarthy reported at the time 'that he (Habibie) found the choice of a 
colonial example unpalatable' (McPhail 2007 p.l 16 and 117). McPhail attributed the 
rejection to "the bitter legacy of Dutch colonization of Indonesia which made any 
suggestion that Indonesia was acting as a neo-colonial power highly offensive to the 
President" (Ibid.). 
The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), despite holding one of its meetings in 
Noumea, has stopped well short of fiill endorsement of France and its presence in the 
region. An example of its reticence towards France is its support for Vanuatu's claim 
to the Matthew and Hunter Island group, drawing on traditional Melanesian links and 
history, in the face of France's continued assertion of its own claim by virtue of its New 
Caledonian presence(see Chapter 5). New Caledonia's pro-France President, Gomes, 
has flagged his wish for full membership of the MSG by the government of New 
Caledonia, as a replacement for the FLNKS {Flash d'Oceanie 19 January 2010). This 
would mean that the collegial, albeit pro-France dominated, government, would replace 
and therefore significantly weaken, the voice of the Melanesian grouping which first 
mobilized the MSG. The idea has been met with a studied silence from the MSG. 
Instead, the MSG sent a visiting mission to New Caledonia in June 2010, which in its 
private report expressed some criticism of progress in the implementation of the 
Noumea Accord so far (Personal communication by senior Pacific island country 
official, 2010 and May 2011 p. 6). While the MSG has been preoccupied with 
economic issues in recent years, it has not forgotten its core concerns about New 
Caledonia's status. 
Pacific Islands Forum stance: a watching brief on New Caledonia 
A certain reserve about France is also evident within the Pacific Islands Forum, 
particularly in responding to the French entities' desire for full membership in 2010. 
Forum membership is confined to "independent and self-governing states" (Forum 
website accessed 27 September 2010). Nonetheless, the Forum welcomed French 
Polynesia and New Caledonia to participate, initially as Observers (New Caledonia in 
1999 and French Polynesia in 2004) and then as Associate Members in 2006, with 
Wallis and Futuna becoming an Observer in 2006. At the time, in 1999, the Forum 
specifically defined Observers as "A Pacific island territory on a clear path to achieving 
self-government or independence" (Pacific Islands Forum Koror, Palau, Communique 
1999). To accommodate the two largest French Pacific entities, the Forum created a 
special category of Associate Member (not defined and subject to Leaders' discretion, 
Article 1, Agreement Establishing the Pacific Islands Forum (revised), 27 October 
2005). The Forum has so far held the line at these forms of association for the three 
French collectivities, while retaining a separate mechanism for engagement of France 
in the post-Forum summit dialogues. 
This creation of a special category for New Caledonia and French Polynesia was 
ambiguous. On the one hand, Forum action suggests that the two collectivities had 
transcended the category of Observer in some way. The granting of Observer status to 
Wallis and Futuna seemingly overlooked the fact that that entity was not particularly on 
a path to self-determination or independence (although other Observers include entities 
as various as Tokelau, the Commonwealth, and the Asia Development Bank, with East 
Timor as a Special Observer). Meanwhile applications by the US dependencies, 
American Samoa and Guam, to be Observers merely remained under consideration. 
On the other hand, assigning a special unique category to these two French entities is 
not inconsistent with ongoing monitoring of the as yet unfolding process of self-
determination. 
The evolution of New Caledonia's status has remained on the Forum agenda since the 
Forum welcomed the Noumea Accord in 1998, but its support for the Accord was not 
unqualified. The Forum at the time specifically recognized New Caledonia's right to 
self-determination (which the Forum has reiterated in subsequent Communiques). The 
1998 Pohn Pei Forum Communique expressed support for continuing contact between 
the Forum and all communities in New Caledonia, and established a mechanism for 
monitoring implementation of the Accord. "Leaders agreed to a continuing future 
monitoring role for the Forum Ministerial Committee on New Caledonia during the 
period of the Noumea Accord, particulariy with respect to the referenda that will be 
conducted pursuant to the Accords'' (my emphasis) (1998 Pohn Pei Forum 
Communique). As noted above, when it admitted New Caledonia as an Observer to 
the Forum in 1999, the Forum took care to define Observer explicitly as a territory on a 
clear path to achieving self-government or independence. At the same time, Forum 
leaders agreed "to continue to bring to the attention of the LTN the question of New 
Caledonia's political future" and called on members to consider making available 
training awards for the Kanak people (1999 Koror, Palau, Forum Communique). 
The Forum sent a Forum Ministerial Committee to visit New Caledonia in 1999, 2001 
and 2004. The 2002 Fiji Communique noted the report of the visiting Ministerial 
Committee (2001), welcomed the establishment of institutions under the Noumea 
Accord, and encouraged all communities to support and implement the Accord, and 
supported se l f determination in New Caledonia. "The Forum also agreed to continue to 
bring to the attention of the UN the question of New Caledonia's political future", and 
agreed to support more Kanak training through a Kanak Training Fund. Forum leaders 
encouraged greater integration and participation of New Caledonia in the Forum region 
and endorsed the continuing monitoring role of the Forum Ministerial Committee. 
The Forum also acts as a conduit for what is effectively a sub-group, the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group (MSG). The MSG representative at the time, Roch Wamytan, secured 
the inclusion in the 2001 Nauru Forum Communique of a reference to Noumea's 
hosting of a summit meeting of the Melanesian Spearhead Group in July that year. In 
an attachment to the 2003 Auckland Communique, the MSG leaders in a statement, 
"noted with concern the lack of implementation of certain provisions of the Noumea 
Accord, in particular the electoral process and issues relating to New Caledonia's 
referendum process". They noted the planned visit by the Forum Ministerial 
Committee the following year, and urged it to focus on these two issues. 
In 2005, after the 2004 Forum Ministerial Committee's visit to New Caledonia, the 
Madang Forum communique welcomed the high degree of political will from all 
stakeholders in the implementation of the Noumea Accord. But it also endorsed the 
Ministerial Committee's "continuing role in monitoring the affairs of the territory" and 
in encouraging closer regional engagement (Madang Forum Communique 2005). 
However a Forum visit has not taken place since 2004. 
The MSG sent its own visiting mission to Noumea in 2010, a mission which was 
critical of some aspects of implementation of the Accord (see Melanesian Spearhead 
Group section above). 
More recently Forum leaders have made clear their ongoing concern about resolving 
the status of New Caledonia. At the same time as he was seeking New Caledonia's full 
membership of the MSG in late 2009 and early 2010, New Caledonian President 
Gomes also pressed for its full membership of the Pacific Islands Forum {Flash 
d'Oceanie 19 January 2010). In response, at their August 2010 Summit, Forum 
leaders, specifically referring to New Caledonia's wish for full membership, noted that 
the Noumea Accord "self-determination" process itself would resolve the question of 
New Caledonia's international standing, and pointedly referred to further engagement, 
including by a visiting Forum mission, which as noted, had not taken place since 2004. 
The Forum simply "welcomed the continuing interest of French Polynesia and Wallis 
and Futuna to deepen their engagement with the Forum" (Pacific Islands Forum 
Communique 5 August 2010). 
So, for the Forum, the first real test of French intentions, and the long-term status of the 
French entities, will be the post-Noumea Accord outcome in New Caledonia. 
Pacific Islands Forum advocates self-determination in French Polynesia 
As the date of the last French nuclear test recedes, the election of pro-independence 
leader Oscar Temaru as President of French Polynesia, and perceived French efforts to 
frustrate his leadership, keep alive a regional focus on developments in that 
collectivity. Temaru has shown a willingness to exploit his longstanding personal links 
with Forum leaders to maintain pressure on the French State. Whereas he has toned 
down his references to full independence at home in French Polynesia, Temaru has not 
been so silent in his comments outside the territory, especially to the Forum itself (see 
also Chapter 6). 
The Pacific Islands Forum has undef ined the importance of self-determination in its 
consideration of French Polynesia. French Polynesia's admission as an Observer had to 
await its constitutional review, and only occurred in 2004 once statutory change had 
been put in place (see the 2003 Auckland Forum Communique in which leaders noted 
constitutional developments in French Polynesia and agreed to pursue a visit there the 
following year). After Temaru 's election in May 2004, with subsequent initial 
uncertainty and then outright frustration of the result, the Forum's response was careful. 
The August 2004 Forum communique expressed leaders' welcome to French Polynesia 
as an Observer "in its own right", and their support for French Polynesia's right to self-
determination; and pointedly encouraged it and France to seek "an agreed approach on 
how to realise French Polynesia's right to self-determination". Moreover, leaders 
asked the Chair to convey their views to French Polynesia and France, and called for 
the Secretary-General to report on "developments in respect of French Polynesia's 
progress towards self-determination". In 2005, the Forum noted the Secretariat's report 
on French Polynesia, again in the context of the entity's "progress to self-
determination" (Madang Communique 2005), i.e., at no time did the Forum judge that 
French Polynesia had attained self-determination. 
At the 2006 Forum Summit, Temaru raised the issue of reinscription of French 
Polynesia on the UN's list of non-self governing territories, to which the French 
responded by publicly saying French Polynesia already had the potential for self-
determination (see Chapter 6). It was at this Summit that the Forum gave Associate 
status to French Polynesia (along with New Caledonia). Temaru once again called for 
Forum support for reinscription of French Polynesia at the 2007 Forum Summit, also 
calling for a "Tahiti Nui" Accord, along the lines of the Noumea Accord of New 
Caledonia. Doubtless because of the constantly alternating leadership between pro-
France groups and the pro-independence Temaru, the 2007, 2008 and 2009 Forum 
Communiques make no mention of French Polynesia's political issues. The 2010 
Communique welcomes French Polynesia's continuing interest in deepening its 
engagement with the Forum, after referring to New Caledonia's self-determination 
process under the Noumea Accord. 
The Pacific Islands Forum's approach to the French collectivities is therefore 
ambiguous, and indications are that its hesitations arise from the inconclusive state of 
self-determination in the French entities, and discomfort with what it sees as France's 
continued colonial presence. Just as Forum leaders were not swayed by the simple 
Flosse-led public relations program of the 1980s, but awaited concrete policy change 
(cessation of nuclear tests in 1996 and the conclusion of the Noumea Accord in 1998) 
before they responded to French overtures, so they are waiting for resolution of the 
long-term status of the French entities before welcoming them as fully-fledged equals 
in relevant regional political bodies (the Forum, the Melanesian Spearhead Group) 
(argued in Fisher 2010b). The Forum's treatment of the French entities, separately to 
the dialogue arrangement with France, suggests that the Forum would not want to see a 
situation develop where the French Pacific entities' participation becomes a guise for 
French participation. The Forum is kept infonned about the statutory evolution in 
French Polynesia, and has recognized, by keeping Wallis and Futuna at a different. 
Observer, level, that the latter is in a category of its own 
All of this suggests that the Pacific Islands Forum, the Melanesian Spearhead Group, 
and the UN Decolonization Committee, while relatively dormant in recent years on the 
French collectivities, maintain ongoing monitoring processes which could be activated 
if necessary to defend particular collectivity interests and focus international attention 
on any issues. 
France "In" or " O f the Pacific: Ongoing ambiguity 
A strand of debate amongst academics, related to France's desire as a global power to 
be present in the Pacific, has been that of whether France is simply "in" the Pacific, or 
whether it is also, or should be, " o f the Pacific (see Fisher 2010d). The distinction is 
not merely semantic, but goes to the heart of how France wants to be seen in the region, 
and in the world. While there is little doubt that, by virtue of its sovereign 
collectivities, France is "in" the region, academic discussion has focused on whether it, 
or even its collectivities, can or should be more " o f the region. 
Tjibaou himself gave France the benefit of the doubt. He told Jacques Lafleur, pro-
France leader, in a televised panel discussion in 1983 that a big difference between 
Lafleur's people and the Kanaks was that "We are from here and nowhere else, you are 
from here but also from somewhere else" {TV 5 Panel Discussion 1983; Fraser 1990b; 
Cordonnier 1995a p. 25). He at least conceded that the pro-France Caldoches were 
indeed from the Pacific. 
The question came under discussion at the height of regional opposition to France's 
nuclear testing in French Polynesia, a time when France's assertion of its presence in 
the South Pacific became a little shrill. Regis Debray, speaking as Secretary General of 
France's High Council for the Pacific in 1987, demanded that France's right "as a 
member of the Pacific family, on an equal footing [to other Pacific states], be 
recognized" (Chesneaux 1987a p.l). At the same time, Herve Coutau-Begarie, while 
noting that France's French Pacific entities returned little revenue to the motherland, 
underlined that a principal benefit was that they "allowed France to be present in the 
Pacific" p. 286). 
While Jean Chesneaux acknowledged the undisputed sovereignty of France in the 
Pacific, its rights over extensive EEZs there and its permanent presence in its 
collectivities, he noted that this seemed inconsistent with its commitment to nuclear 
deterrence, which was at odds with Pacific policies of a nuclear free Pacific. While 
nuclear testing ensured France's status as a nuclear power, he noted that it did not make 
it a Pacific nuclear power (Chesneaux 1987b p. 131). Moruroa was not essential for 
underground testing per se, and the testing presence there had not meant an increase in 
military personnel but in fact had seen a decrease. Chesneaux underlined that the 
motivation of the French Pacific presence at the time was first and foremost political, 
not economic, given the enormous expense of exploiting the nickel resource, and the 
relatively small percentages of trade with Australia and the region (French commercial 
interests were worth less than 3% in Australia and 1% New Zealand markets in 1983). 
He referred to the irony of France's global nuclear strategy, with its objectives defined 
thousands of kilometers away, being based on a technical presence in the Pacific, in 
"splendid isolation" (p. 132). He questioned the reigning ideas France adduced about 
the Pacific: that the Pacific was the centre of the world, the technological Pacific myth 
(nodules, space centres, aquaculture all in foreign or multinational hands), the Pacific 
as a theatre of Soviet-US confrontation, French-Anglo rivalry, and peaceful island 
communities subject to the covetous greed of Australia and New Zealand; all of which 
he said were ghosts and myths and not very coherent by the mid 1980s (pp. 208-213). 
He was suggesting that this idea of the Pacific did not reflect the reality, a reality 
France did not want to confront at the time. 
While depicting France as an outsider in the region, Chesneaux noted that it was 
nonetheless a longstanding outsider, and as such had an ongoing role in the region 
particularly in the provision of aid (1987a p. 17). Indeed, because France is "in" but 
not " o f the Pacific, one could say that France needs to do more than others to provide 
development assistance. And, as noted, its record so far has been, to say the least, 
modest. 
Even after the Matignon Accords were in place, and before the resumption of nuclear 
testing in the Pacific, regional analysts were drawing the distinction of France being 
"in" as opposed to " o f the Pacific. 
In his brief but comprehensive paper on France and the South Pacific island countries. 
Bates clearly saw France as an outsider. As In the past, he believed France's approach 
would primarily be dictated by its own national interests, and its interests within 
Europe. Crucial decisions about the South Pacific would continue to be made on the 
other side of the globe (1990 p. 138). He warned about this, noting that "in any conflict 
between its national security interests in Europe and regional interest in the South 
Pacific, the former will inevitably take precedence (1990 p. 137). Because of this, 
France could do and say things that seemed incomprehensible to people in the Pacific. 
Bates used the example of France during the vexed 1980s, telling the Pacific island 
states to stay out of its internal affairs over New Caledonia and French Polynesia, and 
yet seeing no inconsistency in sending agents to New Zealand to attack a ship in its 
harbour. 
Domoy-Vuroburavu began her 1994 essay on Perceptions of France in the South 
Pacific with the observation that France was "essentially a European power and partner 
with expertise, not a Pacific country" (1994 p. 1). She proceeded to illustrate this by 
examples of Gallicisms, including citing the French Minister for Cooperation in 1975 
saying that France must be present everywhere in the world, "where her thinkers' 
genius has given her a place without any relation to her demography or resources"; 
President Valery Giscard d'Estaing saying "France is what is best"; President 
Mitterrand referring to " this indefinable genius" of France; and de Gaulle himself: 
"our action aims at linking objectives, which, because they are French, answer the 
needs of all men" (1994 p. 1. citing Abelin 1975, and Hearn 1989). Regis Debray is 
once again cited as applying this kind of thinking to the Pacific, saying in 1986 "To 
demilitarise the Pacific would deprive it of Francophonie" (Domoy-Vuroburavu 1994 
p. 3). Domoy-Vuroburavu described Australia as considering itself as a Pacific 
country, and considering France as an external power (Op cit p. 15). 
Isabelle Cordonnier took the debate further, writing in 1995 that, while the French 
collectivities themselves were seen by Pacific island states as part of the region, the 
metropole was not. Taking the cue from Tjibaou's words to Lafleur in 1983 (that the 
latter was from "here but also from somewhere else"), she noted that in South Pacific 
eyes, you are an insider if you come from there and nowhere else, and that by dint of 
geography at least, Australia and New Zealand were from the Pacific and, therefore, 
"legitimate" Pacific countries (Cordonnier 1995a p. 25). Cordonnier saw such 
differences as explaining some of the critical ambiguities in French policy, for example, 
how it could support nuclear testing in the region as an instrument of France's grandeur 
and status as a middle global power, in the face of negative perceptions in the region 
based on fear that testing would provoke a spiral of terror in case of nuclear war (1995a 
p. 20). 
The Gallic-Anglo Saxon distinction often made by France was seen as a factor forever 
condemning it to being an outsider. In 1998, Maclellan wrote about France's tendency 
to attribute opposition to it and its policies, variously to Australian and New Zealand's 
own imperialist ambitions, or even to a 'conspiracy' of customary law of the Pacific 
islands and the Biblical morality of the London missionaries. French leftist Admiral 
Sanguinetti in 1985 wrote that France was motivated by remaining in the region after 
the British had left (Sanguinetti 1985 p. 32). Today it is common for French officials 
and longstanding French senlers in New Caledonia to dismiss the rest of the Pacific as 
"Anglo-Saxon". 
Maclellan saw this kind of defensiveness by France as ignoring the sense of 
regionalism, of belonging to the South Pacific, that made the settler states in Australia 
and New Zealand part of the region, as much as France remained "an outsider" (1998 p. 
194). In 2005, he commented that the "sense of belonging—of looking to the skies, 
seeing the Southern Cross, and feeling at home—underlies much of the regional 
opposition to France's nuclear policy", noting this emotion against "outsiders" from 
Paris rang just as true in Australia and New Zealand as Pacific countries, as in the 
Islands (Maclellan 2005e p. 365). Himself a longstanding opponent to nuclear testing 
in the Pacific, Maclellan described regional opposition to nuclear testing as not so much 
due to quantitative measures of distance but to a qualitative political and cultural unity 
that had developed in the region. The formation of the Pacific Islands Forum (see 
Chapter 3), showed that this unity was largely cemented as a response to the dissonant 
French approach. Maclellan saw it as impossible for France, after nuclear testing, to be 
anything other than an outsider: "After Moruroa, France can intervene in Pacific 
affairs, can make a valuable contribution. But it cannot be part of the region - it can 
only participate from outside the region, as others do ... France can no longer pretend 
to be a power of the Pacific, but must act as a power in the Pacific" (my italics; 
Maclellan 1998 p. 240 ). In 2005 he wrote that the nuclear issue was not closed, with 
continuing issues such as dumping of waste; passage of waste ships; uranium mining; 
testing of missile defence satellite systems threatening the multilateralism of space; and 
issues over the long-term effects of past nuclear testing, where French positions were at 
odds with those of the Pacific (Maclellan 2005e p. 365). 
Another Australian analyst, Graeme Dobell, when writing in 2007 of China's activities 
in the region, lumped France along with China and Japan as external powers or outside 
players who acted as though they wanted a stake in the region (Dobell 2007 p. 9). One 
prominent think tank in 2009 had made tentative plans to convene a regional 
conference on outside powers in the Pacific, specified as France, China and Japan. The 
perception is therefore very strong. 
Nathalie Mrgudovic in her major 2008 work on France in the Pacific noted that while 
France claimed to have been " o f the Pacific until the end of the 1980s, France has 
since pursued a more nuanced approach of claiming simply to be "in" the Pacific 
(Mrgudovic 2008 p. 37), while working for the integration of its entities "in their 
region" (her italics, Op. cit. p. 240). She noted the view of the Pacific Islands states 
that France was not " o f the region (Op. cit. p. 360), and in the context of the RAMSI 
force noted that France was an "extra-regional" power (Op. cit. p. 314). 
Former Prime Minister Michel Rocard wrote in his Preface to Mrgudovic's 2008 work 
that France had moved from the detested colonizing power that detonated bombs in the 
Pacific to a status more like a "big sister" to the region, rejecting arbitrary dominations, 
accompanying "its former territories" in their progress towards autonomy much to the 
"rel ief of the bigger powers Australia and New Zealand (Mrgudovic 2008 pp. 13-14). 
He similarly exaggerated the reaction of regional states, saying that the Forum, 
explicitly created to shun France in the region, had become one "of the firmest 
defenders and even seekers of our presence" (Ibid. p. 15). This idea of being a big 
sister to the region continues a certain ambiguity about its role: France wanting to 
project itself as one of the family, but ever conscious of its larger power status. 
Perceptions that France is not " o f the region are not immutable. It is within the power 
of France, if it so chooses, to change the perception that it is an outsider to the region. 
For example, in 2008, Maclellan analysed one of the ongoing issues, compensation 
over the health of those affected by nuclear testing, in teiins very damaging to France 
(pointing out that France, while professing to be compensating for damages, had 
written legislation which excluded large numbers of potential beneficiaries, see 
Maclellan 2008a). But in April 2009, France announced compensation measures for 
those whose health had been affected by its testing in the Pacific, potentially covering 
150,000 former workers, and on favourable terms which removed the onus on the 
worker to prove cause. Chapter 9 examines areas where France might address aspects 
of its regional involvement. 
When viewed against the current and continuing motivation of France to retain its 
Pacific collectivities, i.e., being able to claim to be a sovereign indigenous power in 
affairs affecting the Atlantic, Caribbean, Pacific and Indian Oceans, and indeed as the 
only such European power, representing "tropical Europe" (Aldrich and Connell 1989 
p. 164 and Chapter 8), it would be important for France to continue to work to alter the 
widely-shared perception amongst non-French and French analysts alike, that it is an 
outsider in the region, so that it truly can project itself partly as a Pacific power. France 
appears to be addressing this issue by repeatedly claiming that it wants its collectivities 
to engage more in the region, perhaps seeing its collectivities as proxies for its own 
interests (a prospect hardly likely to be welcomed by neighbouring Pacific island 
states), but as discussed earlier without giving them the wherewithal to participate 
effectively in the region. However in this area as in many others, it may be that France 
prefers a certain ambiguity in its position. 
Conclusion 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, France has directed considerable diplomatic energy 
towards improving its standing in the Pacific. It has done this first, by developing its 
own range of regional and relevant international links, conducting regular summit 
meetings between French and Pacific island leaders; becoming, selectively, engaged in 
the UN Decolonization Committee; holding regular annual meetings of its senior 
regional representatives; and expanding defence cooperation links. France has 
increasingly drawn senior Australians into this network of activity, or hitched itself 
onto existing Australian and New Zealand initiatives (such as fisheries surveillance), 
boosting the impact at very little cost. Thus for example Defence Minister Herve 
Morin, visiting the region in 2008, is cited by Flash d Oceanic on 15 September 2008, 
as saying "the two main Pacific powers are Australia and France". 
Second, France has said it wants its own Pacific collectivities to participate in the 
region, in both the SPC and the Forum, and some other CROP organizations, albeit 
without providing them the training, regular networking and travel, and resources they 
need to do so effectively. It is encouraging them to work more closely together. 
Third, France has fimded regional activities, although at an extremely modest level, 
primarily through the SPC, the Forum and its small, and decreasing, South Pacific 
Fund. 
Finally France has been a major player in developing EU links with the region, seeking, 
as Karis Muller describes it, to "Europeanise" its geopolitical ambitions in the Pacific 
(Muller 2010 p. 13). Once again, the results have been mixed. Its own collectivities 
themselves have an ambiguous view of their unique EU connection, largely stemming 
from their geographic isolation and local preoccupations and sensitivities, thereby 
leaving the shaping of EU activity to France. In this context, some of the privileges 
France has won for the collectivities, within the EU, have been perceived as dubious: 
their ability to vote in the European parliament is seen as irrelevant, and carrying risky 
reciprocal consequences in terms of voting rights on their territory; freedom of 
movement albeit not completely reciprocal is seen as risking influxes of Europeans 
competing with locals for jobs heightening immigration concerns; economic EU access 
privileges have limited value given the hold of French custom and capture of the 
market; pressure to introduce the Euro is seen as a backward step by pro-independence 
groups, particularly in New Caledonia; and access to EU development cooperation is 
limited by the very prosperity the French collectivities enjoy. Dealing with all of this 
locks the French collectivities into the European system, crowding out the effect of 
tentative forays into integration within the Pacific region, whatever France's rhetoric 
promoting regional "insertion". One benefit from the local perspective is the recourse 
the French collectivities have, through the EU association, to EU mediation and 
political pressure agencies such as the EU parliament and the Human Rights Court. As 
the successful EU Human Rights Court decision on the restricted electorate for New 
Caledonia has shown, these instruments are potentially useful for the collectivities in 
pursuing grievances against the French State. 
The EU's direct engagement with Pacific island countries also has been mixed. While 
funding pledges sound impressive, effective implementation on the ground does not 
have a good record, and is geared through bilateral and other initiatives rather than the 
successful regional organizations such as the SPC. EU attempts at replacing ACP aid 
arrangements with economic partnerships have similarly foundered on their 
inconsistency with other regional ventures and arrangements, such as PACER and 
PICTA which are intrinsically not attractive to France or the French entities. Whether 
these activities are the result of well-intentioned but misdirected largesse, or efforts to 
distract the Pacific island states away from more constructive regional activity under 
way, is not clear. 
The broader response by Pacific island state leaders to France's efforts has not been one 
of unalloyed enthusiasm. The UN Decolonization Committee, the Forum and the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group - all of whom have overlapping Pacific island 
memberships - maintain a watching brief on the implementation of the Noumea Accord 
in New Caledonia. While the Forum has so far stopped short of formally calling for 
reinscription of French Polynesia in the UN Decolonization Committee, its summits 
have underlined the importance of France and local leaders agreeing to work out self-
determination measures, and have provided an opportunity for French Polynesian 
President Temaru to vent his frustrations about his quashed leadership, and to renew his 
calls for reinscription of French Polynesia in the UN decolonization system. 
Just as regional leaders waited for significant policy change (ceasing nuclear testing 
and negotiation of the Noumea Accord in New Caledonia) from the colonial French 
power before accepting the French Pacific entities as guests into their Forum, so they 
are likely to await the outcome of a post-Noumea Accord future in New Caledonia, and 
democratic handling of instability in French Polynesia, before truly welcoming the 
French entities as equal partners within their own political organizations. From the 
regional perspective as much as for France and its three Pacific entities, New Caledonia 
has become the pre-eminent French Pacific collectivity, and outcomes in French 
Polynesia will depend increasingly on solutions in New Caledonia. 
The next chapter will examine France's changing motivations guiding its policies, 
before turning to security risks these may present to the region, along with identifying 
areas of fiarther regional engagement and possible alternative outcomes in New 
Caledonia. 
Part III - France in the Pacific - Present and Future 
Chapter 8 
French motivations in the Pacific 
France has increasingly sought, quietly, to play a greater role in the region, including 
through maintaining stability in its collectivities and contributing to selected regional 
activities, which it has increasingly sought to do in tandem with Australia. For its part, 
Australia has been a willing partner. The peaceful administration of the French Pacific 
entities could be relied upon, as Australia grappled with serious governance 
shortcomings in the Melanesian arc, from Papua New Guinea and Fiji, to Solomon 
Islands and even a fragile Vanuatu. French military assets have enabled regional 
burdensharing in surveillance and emergency assistance across vast areas of the South 
Pacific. So an important question for Australia, and for the stability of the region, is: 
will France stay in the Pacific and if so, why, and how? 
There has been very little recent specific public articulation of French policy on these 
questions. Chapter 5 referred to institutional factors in Paris working against a coherent 
strategic approach. As in most key areas of France's presence in the Pacific throughout 
history, ambiguity is rife. Doumenge et al, when they wrote in 2000 of the French 
overseas presence, stated baldly that "the position of the French government vis-a-vis 
the overseas territories is not always clear" (p. 207). 
Just as so often occurred in the past, today France's European and domestic priorities 
continue to dominate its approach to its Pacific collectivities. Senior French officials 
note the overriding priority of preoccupations within metropolitan France and Europe, 
and variously ascribe State action relating to the Pacific collectivities as based on reflex 
and past approaches, as linked solely to statutory requirements, or as arising purely and 
simply from duties to protect French settlers abroad (Personal communications Paris 
April 2008 and Noumea March 2009). 
Pointers to France's continuing motivations in the Pacific are evident in its past 
motivations, and statements made by the current Sarkozy government about its 
approach to its territories, or Overseas France, in the broad, and its practice and policy 
in the Pacific. 
Past motivations 
"Lfl grandeur'''' 
As noted in earlier chapters, France's very early ventures were based on national 
prestige and grandeur (greatness), to establish its ascendancy as a global power, 
originally based on a quest for knowledge and wealth, accompanied by a competitive 
objective for its cultural influence to prevail {rayomiement and niission civilisatrice, or 
cultural expansion and the civilizing mission) particularly over that of Britain. By the 
late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth century there was also a logistical need to 
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support its missionaries and residents and provide points de reldche (provision and 
supply stops) for the presence of its own navy; and a temporary motivation in the 
nineteenth century to relocate its convicts. For the most part, economic or commercial 
gains were very much secondary motivators (Dunmore 1997; Chesneaux 1992; 
Doumenge et al 2000 p. 59 and especially Ageron 1978 whose major thesis is that 
business interests were notable more for their absence than presence in the France's 
colonial adventures to the twentieth century). 
For most of this time too, France was affected by losses of territory in Europe, 
particularly in the nineteenth century (for example, in 1815, in 1870, Doumenge et al 
2000 p. 59; Coutau-Begarie on New Caledonia post-Trafalgar 1986 p. 26) and sought 
by its overseas empire to make up for these losses. Chapter 3 showed that this kind of 
thinking persisted into the twentieth century, after the two world wars and also after its 
loss of Algeria and Indo-China which shaped its approach to New Caledonia. 
At this time an important motivation was also something a bit vaguer, what Aldrich 
described as " an effort to give France a stake in the region and a bet on later uses of 
the possessions" given the region's potential for the future, its "strategic centrality" 
(1990 pp. 32 and 334). Mrgudovic described this as a "will to be present" Cune 
volonte de presence") rather than a policy of conquest (2008 p. 73). Coutau-Begarie 
noted the importance for France of simply being present by virtue of its Pacific entities, 
despite the lack of revenue they brought for France (1987 p. 286). 
Coutau-Begarie's writings provide some insight into longstanding French beliefs which 
inform its current approaches still. He emphasized the preoccupation of France with 
providing a Gallic leavening to the predominant Anglo-Saxon presence. This was 
extrapolated from Britain towards Australia, to the point of accusing Australia of being 
jealous of France. He enumerated instances where Australia had allegedly sought to 
stymie the French presence: in 1918, apparently succeeding in ensuring France did not 
get any German islands in the reallocation of colonial possessions; alleged efforts to 
"relieve" France of New Caledonia in 1945 and alleged Australian efforts to erase signs 
of the French presence on Vanuatu's independence in 1980 (Coutau-Begarie 1987 p. 
287). This kind of thinking was behind the concerns of de Gaulle's London-based 
supporters in 1941, to get rid of Governor Sautot, who had worked so assiduously with 
Australia and the Americans precisely to sustain a loyal pro-de Gaulle New Caledonia, 
but was thereby suspect (Chapter 2). 
Logistical bases and strategic denial 
Aldrich described the strategic motivators for France as changing in the nineteenth 
century, from supply points for its merchant navy in the 1840s, to coaling stations for 
steamships in the 1880s, and in the early twentieth century to airfields for transpacific 
aviation in the 1930s (1990 p. 334), to which could be added naval support as the 
second world war approached. Generally, as the nineteenth century gave way to the 
twentieth, imperial Pacific powers were motivated more by strategic factors in a global 
context, and focused more on the ocean than on the islands themselves (Alexander 
2001, on Japan). 
During the world wars the Pacific possessions were seen by European powers, 
including France, as important assertions of sovereignty and logistical bases from 
which to defend it. Moreover, during the Second World War, and throughout the Cold 
War, France, along with the western allies, saw its Pacific possessions as an important 
bulwark from which to keep out hostile powers (for example Guillaud 2003, 
Henningham 1992 p. 222). Thus France saw itself, along with the United States, as the 
principal balance to unwanted Soviet intrusion. Chesneaux (1992 p. 91) sketched in 
polemical terms the tendency of France to "only realize its destiny in the Pacific 
through an adversary which it demonized". Again, commercial factors were secondary 
(Guillaud 2003). 
French Polynesia and the independent nuclear deterrent 
By the middle of the twentieth century, an initial post-war impulse to free their 
dependencies gave way to a determination to retain them, albeit within a more 
democratic framework. As Chapter 2 showed, de Gaulle foresaw the role of France's 
overseas empire to bolster its flagging prestige very early in the European war. As 
France under de Gaulle sought to build its own self-reliant defence capabilities after its 
humiliating experiences during the two world wars, the fundamental importance of the 
nuclear deterrent, the force de frappe, meant it was vital to retain testing grounds 
isolated from metropolitan France. Its fevered efforts to retain Algeria in part for this 
purpose failed. These traumatic events all underpinned the strength of France's 
determination to retain the French Polynesian testing site and to continue testing well 
into the closing years of the twentieth century, despite regional and international 
opposition. 
The coincidence of this commitment with independence demands in New Caledonia 
also partly explained France's obstinacy there: if New Caledonia were to become 
independent, it could set a poor precedent for French Polynesia, then the more 
strategically important possession. (Such is the potency of the domino effect argument 
that one senior New Caledonian pro-France leader as recently as March 2009 expressed 
his personal belief that it had been the CIA who had instigated the independence 
movement in New Caledonia precisely to undermine France's nuclear testing in French 
Polynesia (Personal communication March 2009. This thinking is almost 
incomprehensible to an Australian, or any western ally, given US support for France as 
a nuclear power, notwithstanding the latter's desire to be an independent member of the 
nuclear club.) 
France as European '"'"puissance mondiale moyenne" (middle-sized world power) 
In the 1980s, in an increasingly defensive mode, France made much of the global 
dimension of its presence. As former Prime Minister Raymond Barre said, "whatever 
the cost, our overseas possessions assure us [France] of a global dimension which is 
ftindamental to us" (Chesneaux 1992 p. 99). Underlying this thinking at this time was 
France's self-defined role as a puissance mondiale moyenne (middle-sized world 
power), a Fifth Republic concept that grew out of the "grand design" of the Gaullist 
years (see Chesneaux 1991). 
The importance of the French overseas presence, particularly in the Pacific, to this role 
was evident in publications of the Institiit du Pacifique (such as Ordonnaud 1983). A 
seminal work of the time on the subject was a paper by French journalist Philippe 
Leymarie called Les enjeux strategiques de la crise caledonienne ("The strategic stakes 
in the Caledonian crisis", Monde diplomatique 1985). That the work is breathtaking in 
its articulation of a French/Eurocentric perspective, warts and all (he described the 
territorial continuity provided to France by its overseas presence in the Pacific as 
stretching from Australia "in the east" to Easter Island in the "wesf ' (p. 3)), does not 
diminish the contribution Leymarie has made to enunciating French motivations in the 
Pacific at the time. Despite, or perhaps because of, his French chauvinist tendencies, 
his article is particularly illuminating on French motivations, to the modem, non-
French reader. Implicit in his paper is a certain justification or legitimation of the 
French possessions. 
Related domino effect 
Leymarie cited a 1985 French armed forces study stating that, at the dawn of the 
twenty-first century, France was meeting its "destiny as a middle global power" by its 
presence in the Pacific (Leymarie 1985 p.l and see also Chesneaux 1987a p. 4.). He 
expanded on the potential domino effect of a crisis in New Caledonia for France's 
possessions elsewhere (not only in the Pacific but in the hidian Ocean and beyond, 
specifically Guyana, Guadeloupe and Reunion, see Leymarie 1985 pp. 1, 3). In this 
context, he noted that whereas the only questioning {contestation) of French power for 
the other overseas territories was internal, this was not the case in the Pacific, especially 
New Caledonia, where it was the surrounding region that questioned French rule. He 
cited other specific cases where external claims were being made such as to Clipperton 
(by Mexico) and Matthews and Hunter (by Vanuatu). 
Role in defence of France and Europe 
He noted the importance of the Pacific presence for the defence of France and Europe 
including through the leverage France's Pacific Overseas entities provided for the 
western alliance, particularly for action in advance of that of the United States, which 
he noted had proved circumspect on any issue in which its own interests were not 
directly engaged; and for maintaining a role independent of the East-West division in 
the Third World. The idea of the islands as advance "aircraft carriers" or "economic 
shopfronts" in the Pacific was enunciated, as launching points for penetration of 
regional markets, cultural ''rayonnemenf (radiation, or influence) and development 
cooperation as well as sovereign bases from which dissuasion or external intervention 
could be authorized from Paris (Leymarie 1985 pp.1 and 2). 
In a precursor argument for the policies in France's 2008 Defence White Paper (see 
Sarkozy Government Policy below), Leymarie extolled the virtues of upgrading 
Noumea as a defence logistics base, for pre-positioning materiel rather than personnel 
which, he noted, could be landed there in 36 hours. He referred to the value of Noumea 
in protecting access from the hidian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean via the Torres Strait in 
the event of conflict to the north, describing it as the only alternative to sea lanes 
flanked by Indonesian and Malaysian waters (sic, given Indonesia's proximity to that 
Strait). This access, he asserted, would be important to protect the New Caledonian 
nickel resource. Once again he adduced the argument of displacement: France by its 
presence prevented other powers from obtaining a foothold, among which he 
mentioned, revealingly, Australia in company with the then USSR. 
EEZ resource base for Europe 
Leymarie also referred to the foothold the Pacific presence gave France in the 
unexploited economic zone resources, including fisheries and minerals, in an Ocean 
touted as the new centre of the world. He argued that it was only at the level of the 
European Community that this challenge could be met. Still, he noted that the military 
importance of Noumea should not be exaggerated, citing other examples where 
relinquishing a presence did not necessarily mean another enemy moving in 
(Seychelles, Mauritius, Malta, Maldives) and indeed asserting that to leave could better 
ensure a presence ("5 'en aller pour mieux resler ", to go the better to stay) as France 
had done in Djibouti, Gabon, Senegal and the Ivory Coast (Leymarie 1985 p. 4). He 
claimed that even the nickel resource would not be lost, as it would be exploited jointly 
and "France would share the revenue with any new state" as its commercial interests 
made this worthwhile. In any case he noted that France was concentrating its search for 
metallurgic nodules more on Clipperton, than elsewhere in its territories at the time. 
Post-1990s French policy to retain Pacific collectivities within France 
Recent history (see Chapter 3 and 6) shows that successive French administrations in 
Paris have exercised considerable innovation and ingenuity in developing solutions for 
the Pacific collectivities even by changing the French Constitution, confirming that 
they want them to stay with France. They are prepared to underwrite the considerable 
financial costs. At the same time, New Caledonia has replaced French Polynesia in 
primary strategic importance. 
French Polynesia 
Chapter 6 showed that in French Polynesia, there was no question of French departure 
so long as the nuclear testing program had not been completed, by 1996. But, since 
then, France has paid a premium to ensure continued sovereignty there by extending its 
compensation payments to French Polynesia well into the future. It has also invested 
political energy in statutory change and exerted political pressure to entrench its 
interests. 
As in New Caledonia, France has repeatedly wielded the economic carrot, warning that 
payments could be at risk if pro-France forces lost out. This threat is the more effective 
given that French Polynesia has few resources and would be unlikely to survive on its 
own without French aid. Pro-France groups have frustrated the repeated election of 
pro-independence forces since 2004. The French State has so far stopped short of 
extending to French Polynesia the new key powers it has given to New Caledonia (the 
ability to legislate, special citizenship benefits, and the promise of a vote on 
independence). Thus France retains leverage over local parties to maintain French 
sovereignty. 
Ascendance in importance of New Caledonia 
By the end of the 1990s, with the end of nuclear testing and the agreement of the 
Noumea Accord, the relative dominance and importance of the two French Pacific 
collectivities was inverted, with New Caledonia setting the pace in acquiring increased 
autonomy (Chapters 5 and 6). 
Part of the evolving solution for New Caledonia from 1988 included the development 
of its rich nickel resource, in ways designed to distribute the benefits more equitably to 
Kanaks and European New Caledonians alike. The prospect of petroleum reserves in 
New Caledonia's EEZ heightened the stakes. The commitment to an eventual vote on 
New Caledonia's future status was made in an innovative transition formula, through 
the Matignon and Noumea Accords, to buy more time for the French State to build 
confidence and economic prosperity such that few would wish to take on the 
responsibilities of independence outside the French republic. 
But the day of reckoning is yet to come, and developments to 2018 will be critical in a 
peacefiil ongoing resolution of differences in New Caledonia. 
Generally, there was, too, undeniably an element of the legacy of history by which 
France, having held on to its Pacific possessions, had to some extent little choice but to 
implement its stamtory commitments to them. In Wallis and Futuna, for example, there 
was little push for change (indeed, the entity still operates on its 1961 statute), and in 
both New Caledonia and French Polynesia the pro-independence forces have been 
shown to have used their public stances to pressure France for more support for their 
groupings at times. But overall, France maintained a continuing objective to retain the 
three French Pacific collectivities within the French fold. Did France's motivations 
change from the 1990s? 
France's motivat ions post-1990s 
Continuing strategic importance of France's Pacific presence 
While the nuclear deterrent remains a bedrock of French defence policy (see for 
example France's 2008 Defence White Paper), the suspension of the nuclear testing 
program in French Polynesia altered the contribution of its Pacific entities to France's 
global place. France's foothold in the Pacific continued to deliver strategic benefits. But 
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the role of the Pacific was now more indirect. Retaining a presence in the Pacific 
returned for France a boost to it strategic weight (as part of the chain of Overseas 
France possessions); real and potential commercial benefits; a negative benefit related 
to preventing critical public opinion domestically and internationally as had occurred in 
the past; and a claim to new democratic legitimacy and protection of its nationals 
abroad. Each of these elements will be examined in turn, before considering the 
Sarkozy government approach to the French Pacific collectivities. 
Ballast for France's European and global role 
France continues to be motivated by its sense of itself as a global power with special 
privileges and responsibilities. Its leaders no longer use the phrase puissance moyenne 
mondiale in a world where the emergence of China reduces France's status to that of a 
small power rather than a medium sized power. Still, France wants to retain its status 
as one of the elite 5 Permanent Members of the Security Council at a time when the 
composition of that group is under debate. France's presence in every comer of the 
globe therefore remains important. As Chirac so succinctly said, "Without the 
departments and territories overseas, France would be only a little country" (in Aldrich 
andConnell 1989 p. 148). 
In the mid-1990s and early 2000s, France was seen as maintaining its overseas 
possessions to add to its strategic weight (see Firth in Howe 1994 p. 302: "France 
resisted, and continues to resist, the decolonization of its Pacific territories, because 
their loss would undermine France's claim to be a world power and create a gap in the 
global string of French military installations"; Doumenge et al 2000, p. 205: "the 
French overseas collectivities give France a listening post in all the large regions of the 
world"; Berman, 2001 p. 24 "Continued presence in New Caledonia projects France's 
status as a global power"). 
Elements of Chesneaux's analysis, written in 1987, remain true today. He noted that 
France was the only power apart from the US capable of worldwide military basing and 
a communications network firmly based on its sovereign possessions including 
Noumea and Papeete (Chesneaux 1987a, p. 5). A major new listening station was 
opened near Noumea's international airport, Tontouta, in 2004. The EU's Briefing 
Paper on Military Installation lists France's military assets in its Pacific entities (EU 
Parliament 2009). 
Cordonnier in 1995 talked about French military motivations of nuclear dissuasion, 
exploitation of space; freedom of air and naval mobility; a strategic perception that the 
presence in the Pacific balanced France's presence in the Atlantic; and the role of the 
Pacific territories in the rayonnement (influence) of France in its global maritime 
domain, with its vast EEZ deriving from them, its ports, bases and business interests. 
She also referred to the "vacuum filling" objective of preventing colonization of the 
Pacific by hostile Asian states (1995a p. 112). It is partly this concept of denial to 
outsiders that underpinned the diplomatic effort to improve France's image in the 
region as a constructive partner from the 1990s (see Chapter 7). 
As late as 2003, De Deckker wrote (2003b p. 2) that France went against the current in 
maintaining its Pacific collectivities to preserve its strategic mining and military 
interests, the interests of its French nationals, and a nuclear assurance of national 
defence in French Polynesia. 
There was some official acknowledgement of the strategic importance of the French 
entities in the Pacific. In 2003, then Overseas France Minister Girardin wrote that "our 
territorial collectivities of New Caledonia, Polynesia (sic) and Wallis and Futuna enable 
our country to be present in this ocean" (in Cadeot 2003 p. 7). In his Preface to 
Nathalie Mrgudovic's 2008 work on France in the South Pacific, former Prime Minister 
Michel Rocard referred to the South Pacific as a place where France faced the classic 
contradiction between its "generous" principles and "its interests as a great power that 
it claimed at every opportunity" (Mrgudovic 2008 p. 13). 
Since 2007, President Sarkozy's administration has continued to see the Overseas 
France as key to France's global status, which he has described in terms reminiscent of 
de Gaulle's vision for France (see section Sarkozy government policy below). 
Strategic denial/balance 
Since Cordonnier wrote of "vacuum filling" by France in 1995, China has become 
more engaged in the South Pacific, starting from a competitive chequebook flashing 
race with Taiwan but also including aid and other investment activities targeted at 
securing valued fisheries and minerals resources, and simply a strategic presence (see 
Hanson 2008 especially on China's $US 150 m. annual aid program; Dobell 2007, on 
its destabilizing effects; and Firth in de Deckker and Faberon, 2008 p. 174 on the 
increasing presence of workers to reconstruct the business district of Nukualofa in 
Tonga, stadiums and other structures in some island countries including a headquarters 
for the MSG in Vila, and mineworkers to staff a Chinese-owned mine in PNG). France 
retains control in an area currently the object of the attention of a future superpower, 
and contributes to balancing China's presence for the western alliance. 
Firth (1989, p. 75) argued that it is the non-sovereign Pacific states which are of greater 
strategic importance than the independent Pacific states, and the French entities 
themselves are no exception. The US dependencies generally lie north of the Equator 
(the exceptions being the island of Jarvis, the EEZ of Micronesia and Baker Islands). 
For Australia, France's presence in its three Pacific entities south of the Equator 
arguably confers wider strategic returns than relations with the independent states, 
particularly when coupled with the coincidence of France's strategic interests with 
Australia's own (Firth 1989 p. 87). Waddell noted in 2008 that France now shared with 
Australia, New Zealand, and the independent Melanesian states, "a convergence of 
strategic preoccupations, notably the concern to buttress "failed" island states and the 
need to protect the region from what are perceived as destabilizing forces originating in 
Asia" (Waddell 2008 p. 12). Australia's Parliamentary Secretary for Pacific Island 
Affairs Duncan Kerr acknowledged France's contribution in working with Australia on 
issues of mutual security, defence cooperation, control of illegal fishing, and other 
areas when he visited New Caledonia in November 2008 (Kerr 2008). 
By its role in strategic denial alone, France's presence returns strategic benefits not 
only for France, but also for the western alliance, and most importantly for Australia. 
But, as history has shown, these benefits have the potential to turn into negatives should 
France's presence again become destabilizing, for example by virtue of opposition or 
dissent by a significant percentage of its local populations who could turn to 
unwelcome sources of external support as they have in the past (shown for example 
when New Caledonia and Vanuatu turned variously to Libya and the Soviet Union, 
Chapter 3). 
Role in supporting space technology within Europe 
Part of France's role as a global middle power from the second half of the twentieth 
century has been its engagement in space technology. Its overseas possessions are an 
important element of this engagement. Guyana has been the launching site for the 
French Ariadne rocket since 1968, and from 1975 for the European Space Agency 
which co-ftinds the spaceport and launched the European space shuttle Hern^es. There 
has long been a recognition of the importance, or at least the potential importance, of a 
presence in the vast Pacific Ocean in the French space program. On 14 February, 1986, 
Regis Debray, Secretary General of the High Council for the Pacific, told Liberation 
that "the Pacific may provide opportunities for France and Europe to establish control 
and treatment stations for geo-stationery and circulating satellites.. .the space age will 
raise the importance of the overseas territories" (Chesneaux 1987a p. 4). 
And France indeed does derive a leading role within Europe from its role in developing 
space technology. Apart from its hosting the European satellite launching site in 
Guyana, France's extensive presence in the vast Pacific Ocean facilitates space 
sensoring, monitoring and retrieval. While the CEP has closed down, usefial 
infrastructure remains on the French Polynesian islands of Hao and Moruroa (landing 
strips on each, some staff and scientific monitors measuring underground movements 
on Moruroa, Personal communications Noumea, March 2009; also Maclellan 2005e p. 
372). For example, the United States has signed an agreement with France to use the 
Hao landing strip for the American space shuttle (see Mrgudovic 2008 p. 98). 
President Sarkozy acknowledged the role of the Overseas France in France's status as a 
first-rate space power ("w«e puissance spatial de tout premier plan ") in his November 
2009 speech on Overseas France reform (Sarkozy 2009). 
Commercial motivations 
In recent years, commercial incentives for France to stay in the South Pacific, which 
were marginal in the past, have strengthened. 
Resource base and extended EEZ 
France is the second largest world maritime nation owing to the size of its EEZ, the 
largest part of which derives from its Pacific collectivities (see Chapter 3 and Sarkozy 
2009), with all the potential that extensive EEZ offers in unknown economic resources. 
While French Polynesia by its vast extent contributes the largest portion of EEZ to 
France (see Chapter 3), the importance of the EEZ extends to the tiniest element of 
France's sovereign claims. Mrgudovic described France's continuing assertion of its 
claim over the island group of Matthew and Hunter, representing 24,000 sq. km. of 
EEZ, as illustrating the attachment of France to its strategy of territorial presence, as 
one of the elements of its power primarily by virtue of its EEZ rights (Mrgudovic 2008 
pp. 219, 261, 397). France's continued scientific research off the Clipperton Islands is 
another example. 
While analysts no longer talk of manganese nodules as they did in the 1980s, largely 
because of the continued availability of land-based minerals and the relative expense of 
seabed extraction, there is little doubt that the seabed is one of the earth's last 
unexplored frontiers. Almost a third of existing oil deposits come from undersea 
deposits (Mrgudovic 2008 p. 95). Paul de Deckker noted in Cadeot (2003 p. 205), the 
EEZ was not only significant for the resources it may contain, but also in the scope it 
offered for scientific research and technology transfer. This is an important 
consideration for a country like France, which projects itself as a world leader in 
science and technology. Whereas sovereignty is not a necessary condition for scientific 
research, it facilitates research at lower cost than such research in foreign shores. 
President Sarkozy has acknowledged the role of Overseas France in enhancing the role 
of France in space and in biodiversity (Sarkozy 2009). 
As far as the French Pacific is concerned. Garde refers to the various areas of fisheries 
developments, scientific research, space interests, new technologies, and hydrocarbons 
all giving increasing value to the Pacific entities, a value which may be worth much 
more in 20 or 50 years time (Garde 2002 p. 67). De Deckker went so far as to say that 
the first decades of the twenty-first century, because they are more preoccupied with 
the economic over the political, will invalidate the priorities of the past, i.e., economic 
gain will become the major priority unlike in the past (in Cadeot 2003 p. 205). Coutau-
Begarie as long ago as 1986 saw the EEZ and nickel resource potential as likely, in the 
long-term, to outweigh the costly record of the French Pacific collectivities, which were 
then popularly known as "les dameuses qui coiitenl c/?er "(expensive dancing girls) 
(1986 p. 208). 
In the Pacific, New Caledonia provides the pre-eminent interest for France, because of 
its nickel resource and the potential for exploitation of hydrocarbons offshore. Rumley 
refers to France's "geopolitical project" in New Caledonia, which assists in France's 
global status and access to the potentially rich seabed and resources (Rumley 2006 
Chapter 13). As discussed in Chapter 5, New Caledonia's current nickel projects 
represent France's largest mining activities nationally. In December 2008, President 
Sarkozy told the Noumea Accord Signatories Committee that Eramet, France's vehicle 
for participating in New Caledonia's nickel development, was the largest single French 
mining actor, and wielded strategic responsibilities for the country {Noiivelles 
Caledoniemes 11 December 2008). With global energy demands changing, signs of the 
presence of currently unviable, large hydrocarbon and natural gas reserves represent a 
significant potential asset. 
Link with Pacific as new economic hub 
More broadly, reprising the debate of the late 1800s (set out in Aldrich 1988 and see 
also Chapter 3), there is a view that sees France's presence in the South Pacific as 
somehow linking it to the vibrant economic growth of the northern Pacific (for 
example, Ordonnaud 1983; and Lacour 1987, who argued that the centre of the world 
inexorably derived from the Pacific Basin, and France's fortuitous presence gave it a 
chance to take its place amongst the great powers competing for influence there, p. 17). 
The idea of the importance of having a presence in this newly important hemisphere 
persists, despite warnings like that of Chesneaux in 1992 about the risks of confusing 
the two parts of the Pacific in the fashionable concept of the Pacific as the new centre 
of the world (p. 102). Then Overseas France Minister Brigitte Girardin in a forward to 
Cadeot's 2003 volume on the French Pacific overseas collectivities, stated that the 
French Pacific collectivities "enable our country to be present in this ocean which has 
become in the twenty-first century the other Mediterranean. So the Pacific Overseas is 
an opportunity for France: a gangplank to other civilizations, a gateway to a dynamic 
economic zone and the place for innovative policies" (p. 7). 
So for the first time, the collectivities in the Pacific represent a positive economic asset 
for France, notwithstanding France's considerable financial outlay there. This is of 
interest since for Australia and New Zealand, "the importance of the region in defence 
and security terms ... far outweighs its economic importance to them" (Henningham 
1992 p. 219). In a sense, because of these real and potential economic considerations 
attaching to its Pacific collectivities, France has a greater direct economic motivation 
than either Australia or New Zealand to be in the region. 
Investment requires stability 
One consequence of the ascendancy of the economic factor, particularly the importance 
of large-scale projects such as in nickel mining and the potential processing and 
exploitation of hydrocarbons, is that investors are required, in a competitive global 
environment; and investors seek a certain political and economic stability. This has 
injected a new element into the political debates about political independence and 
economic dependence in the French collectivities. It strengthened France's hand with 
its overseas communities, as France is better placed than any local government to 
provide the requisite civil stability and financial inputs. Thus, pro-France leader 
Jacques Lafleur frequently argued that New Caledonia needed France to negotiate the 
big commercial deals it needed in order to develop (Lafleur 2002; Personal 
communications 2002, 2009). On the other hand, in New Caledonia in particular, the 
new players, particularly if they come from metropolitan France, want a say in their 
community, and expect rights such as voting rights (Doumenge et al 2000 p. 207), 
which potentially undermines the special electoral arrangements devised to underpin 
ongoing stability. 
France as leader of the EU in the Pacific 
France's increasing provision of economic and other types of assistance to the region, 
and its role in leading EU contributions there, potentially increases its capacity, and that 
of the EU, to win supportive votes from the numerous Pacific island states in 
multilateral bodies, most notably the UN, on issues of interest to it. At the same time, 
France and Europe need to exercise this leverage carefully. As elaborated on in 
Chapter 7, the Pacific island states are aware that EU and French engagement can be a 
two-edged sword (for example, France threatened access to the EU butter markets by 
New Zealand in the wake of the Rainbow Warrior affair; Europe holds the purse strings 
over sugar with Fiji). 
Public opinion 
Another recent, unstated motivator for France has been the desire to ensure that its 
overseas Pacific presence does not become the subject of negative public opinion, 
either internationally or domestically. One recent senior French official said that his 
brief before departing for Noumea was succinct: '"pas d'ennuis'' (no problems) 
(Personal communication April 2008). 
As noted in Chapter 3, just as French domestic policy and preoccupations have dictated 
the pace and direction of policy applying to the French Pacific entities, so too have 
negative developments in the overseas entities impacted severely on French 
governments. The starkest example was the effect of the Algeria debacle in bringing 
down the Fourth Republic government. Another is the role of the Gossanah Cave affair 
on the French presidential elections of 1988. France's Pacific policy engaged the full 
force of public opinion, not only in France, but internationally, over the nuclear testing 
issue, the Rainbow Warrior affair, and treatment of New Caledonia, with devastating 
effect on France's image. 
So France does not want to have its hand again forced by domestic and world focus on 
what it is doing in the Pacific. On the one hand, this has motivated France to behave 
more responsibly in the region, but on the other it has reinforced a tendency if not to 
secrecy, at least to non-articulation, or ambiguity, of policy and a desire not to draw too 
much attention to itself It has also taken firm preventative action, for example by 
seeking to mute Temaru's influence in French Polynesia after he raised self-
determination and UN reinscription issues in the Pacific Islands Forum (Chapter 6). 
Relative disinterest of French public 
Back home, historically, domestic public opinion neither focused on, nor cared about, 
the French overseas presence in general, and even less about the Pacific presence. 
Chesneaux (1992 p. 91) noted that the French at home were too concerned with their 
own political differences and issues to worry about Overseas France, and that in any 
case France's Pacific Overseas entities received less interest and attention than Africa 
or Indochina. This is true so long as no major disturbance occurs overseas, such as the 
evenements in New Caledonia; or, more recently, protests in the mid-2000s in 
Guadeloupe, spreading to other Overseas Deparlements, about the cost of living. 
Characteristic of the history of France's overseas presence has been the relatively thin 
spread of institutional involvement in the overseas Empire. As described in Part I, 
France's overseas possessions were run initially by the navy (which indeed has taken a 
predominant role right up until the present, see Chapter 5), then by a relatively small 
Overseas France ministry which persists until today. Narrow lobby groups have in the 
past sought to influence policy, including the oceanic lobby of the late nineteenth 
century. But rare has been any broad media or public interest in Overseas France. 
Such disinterest can be explained by relative ignorance about the Overseas France, but 
also by greater substantive interests, for example by business people and travellers, in 
other parts of the world such as Asia. 
More recently, Rene Dosiere, French MP for the Aisne, with the special parliamentary 
role of Rapporteur for the Organic Law of 1999, told the Colloquium marking the 
twentieth anniversary of the Matignon Accords that "The National Assembly shows no 
interest at all in the Overseas, which corresponds to the state of metropolitan public 
opinion" (Regnault and Fayaud 2008 p. 159; also see Coutau-Begarie 1986 p. 40; 
Chesneaux 1987a p. 9 and 1992 p. 144; Guillebaud 1976 p. 29; Victor 1990; 
Doumenge et al 2000, p. 61; Christnacht 2003 p. 5; Diemert in Tesoka 2008 p. 239). 
Public disinterest seems to apply even to the political issues and lavish expenditures on 
the Pacific collectivities (demonstrated by Dosiere in Regnault and Fayaud 2008 p. 
159-163; Personal communication by members of the Senate Finance Committee 
2008). There is no public debate about the collectivities, even when their budgets are 
under consideration (Senator Loueckhote noted that he often had to remind officials 
presenting to the Senate Finance Commission to say something about expenditure in 
the Pacific collectivities. Personal communication March 2009). 
Relatively low cost of French Pacific entities 
Partly, the French public does not take a close interest in the overseas presence because 
the costs are not widely known. Moreover, within the overall context of the French 
budget, the costs are relatively insignificant. The budget for all the overseas entities is 
only .7% of France's GDP, with costs of the three South Pacific entities, totalling EUR 
2.65 b. ($A 4.6 b.) in 2008, only .14% of France's GDP or .95% of the French budget 
(figures provided by French Senate Finances Commission September 2008). 
Doumenge et al writing in 2000 considered that the costs of Overseas France were 
relatively cheap. They noted that costs per head of the population in the French Pacific 
collectivities were lower than those per head of the population nationally (23,300 francs 
per overseas resident ($A 6227) as opposed to 28,800 francs nationally ($A 7700) in 
1999); and they cite an article in Le Figaro, 14 September 1999, showing that Corsica, 
including "subsidies, fraud and tax exemptions", cost the French state 50 times as much 
(10 b. francs or $A 2.6 b.) as French Polynesia (200 m. francs or $A 53 m.) in 1999 
(Doumenge et al 2000 p. 205). 
Chapter 5 described how even reductions in excessive special payments to newcomer 
retirees in the French Pacific collectivities were motivated more by abuse of the system 
by newcomers than by a concern about the costs themselves. 
Lack of political clout of French entities 
Doumenge et al argued that the Pacific escaped much scrutiny partly because the 
population of the Pacific collectivities together represented only around 20% of the 
population of all the overseas entities of France in 1999 ( Doumenge et al 2000 p. 61), 
whereas the four Departments of the Overseas (DOMs) represented over 70% . AH 
together the non-continental French populations totalled only 2.157 m. in the 1999 
census, or a mere 3.5% of the entire population of France, overseas and continental 
(60.9 m.); and according to internet figures for 2006-2007, even fewer: 2.12 m. or 
3.25% of a total population of 63.2 m. (see Faberon and Ziller 2007 p. 6). And from 
these figures, the South Pacific collectivity populations represented fewer than 500,000 
all together, or less than 1% of France's overall population in either 1999 or 2006-2007 
figure. 
These figures underpin the political reality that the French Pacific collectivities 
between them represent limited voting power in the National Assembly and Senate; 
two deputes (MP) and one senator each from New Caledonia and French Polynesia, and 
one depute and one senator from Wallis and Futuna (of a total of 577 deputes and 343 
Senators). 
Doumenge et al argued that this disinterest meant that the future of the overseas entities 
was in question (2000 p. 61) but it could be argued that the converse is tme. As shown 
by their own figures, to the extent the costs were thought about, they are not seen as 
funding an overseas colonial presence, but rather as part of France. And the French do 
not have the Australian/Westminster tradition of extensive, broadly-based public 
sciTJtiny of government costs and efficiencies. The French public is more preoccupied 
with internal and European issues than France's overseas possessions. There is also a 
general feeling that even if the French Pacific entities were independent, they still 
would require French handouts (see for example Coutau-Begarie 1986 p. 208), just as 
the former African colonies do. 
But the lack of a public opinion does not mean there is no potential for such an interest 
should things sour, as shown by the damage to France's international image over the 
Pacific nuclear and decolonization issues. So it can be said that maintaining a low level 
of public interest in itself is a motivating factor and an objective for French 
administrations. 
Democracy and the will of the people 
With the agreement of the Noumea Accord and statutory evolution in French Polynesia, 
France's stated motivations began to reflect the new democratic underpinnings these 
processes had provided for its regional presence. France could now proudly claim, as 
did the Minister for DOM-TOMs, Louis Le Pensec, in 1990, that it retained its overseas 
territories first and foremost because it was the wish of their inhabitants to remain 
French (Henningham 1992 p. 193). But, as Henningham pointed out in the early 1990s, 
Le Pensec did not mention Kanak complaints about the shifts in the population, and 
therefore the electoral balance, against them in previous decades by government-
encouraged immigration, nor that French officials and politicians had worked hard to 
discourage pro-independence sentiments (Ibid.). And, a few years later. Piquet noted 
that the underlying assumption of this approach was the familiar mission civilisatrice: 
that from a republican basis of democratic choice, the civilizing mission was "to 
progress according to a linear pattern towards absolute perfection and refinement", i.e., 
to remain French (Piquet 2000 pp. 9-10). Just as much of its activity in the Pacific in 
the past was hinged upon the presence of its missionaries, France claimed it wanted to 
preserve and advance the interests of its nationals in the Pacific entities (de Deckker 
2003b p. 2, and see next section Protection of nationals). In the same vein, senior 
advisers on New Caledonia indicated that France would proceed to the planned 
referendums simply because it was statutorily bound to do so, as it had committed itself 
to do so by the legal processes set up under the Noumea Accord (Personal 
communications Paris 2008). 
Today, after the extensive modification of statutes and laws to deliver more autonomy 
and democracy to the two largest French Pacific entities, and continued influxes of 
metropolitan French into New Caledonia with a pro-France view, the principal claim by 
senior French officials continues to be that France is present in the Pacific exclusively 
because the people of those entities want France to be there, by their votes in successive 
elections. This claim is made privately by senior officials, to the point of some denying 
any other interest in remaining in the Pacific (Personal communications Paris, April 
2008 and Noumea March 2009). 
And yet there appear to be some inconsistencies in this position. As evident in 
Chapters 3, 5 and 6, since 1958, when both New Caledonia and French Polynesia voted 
to stay with France, the question of remaining with France has been a vexed one, and 
indeed, central to political debate in both places. 
On the only occasion in which the question was put to the people of New Caledonia 
since 1958, in 1987, a strong boycott by pro-independence forces clouded the result 
(see Chapter 3). The 1988 Matignon Accords and the 1998 Noumea Accord were 
specifically designed to defer any referendum on the question of independence or 
staying with France, at least until 2014-2018. 
New Caledonians did vote for what are transitional arrangements in the Matignon and 
Noumea Accords (see chapter 5, although only 57% of the 63% turnout supported the 
Matignon Accords; while with a turnout of three quarters of the population, 72% of 
them voted to accept the Noumea Accord ten years later, but this, after further inflows 
of migrants from France and elsewhere in the French Pacific). Since then, some New 
Caledonians (a restricted electorate, defined precisely as set out in Appendix 1, but 
generally requiring ten years' residence to 1998) have voted on a proportional basis for 
a temporary, local, collegial government of transition in provincial elections. The 
majority of even these restricted electorate voters in these successive provincial 
elections indeed have supported pro-France parties, but as noted in Chapter 5, many of 
these pro-France parties have increasingly adopted policies shared with pro-
independence partners. And 2009 provincial elections showed an overall reduction in 
the pro-France vote, with a clearer polarization of the pro-independence vote in the 
Loyalty Islands, where the pro-France groups could not win even one seat, even as the 
pro-independence groups won more representation than in 2004 in the mainly pro-
France South (see Chapter 5). 
All New Caledonians (i.e. not just a restricted electorate) have been able to vote in 
French national parliamentary elections (the '^legislatives") and have returned, every 
time, pro-France deputes (MPs) but in the exceptional transitional period this can 
hardly be pointed to, as commonly French officials privately do, as a vote to remain 
with France. The two legislative districts returning a depute each, both include 
substantial proportions of Noumea and therefore more pro-France voters (as opposed to 
the provincial electorates, two of which are predominantly Kanak). Moreover, in 2007 
legislative elections, the pro-France R-UMP's Gael Yanno won easily in the first 
district (including Noumea proper and small outer islands), whereas Frogier won in the 
second district (which includes Noumea suburbs and the interior) with a closer margin 
(54% as opposed to 46% for his UC competitor Charles Pidjot). 
In a referendum or referendums on the status of New Caledonia after 2014, there will 
be a broader electorate than that voting in provincial elections. In addition to the latter, 
i.e. those with ten years residence to 1998, the referendum electorate will include voters 
with twenty years residence to 2014, i.e. those arriving in the collectivity up to 1994 as 
opposed to those who had arrived by 1988 (see Chapter 9 and Appendix 1). As such, 
that electorate may be expected to include more pro-France newcomers. 
In French Polynesia too, the picture is mixed. Frequent floor-crossing and support-
bartering between individuals mask the true political affiliations of elected 
representatives. However in entity-wide votes, in 2004, voters twice returned a leader 
who propounded independence, and the results were only overturned through 
procedural means with the complicity of France. 
Protection of nationals and the demonstration effect: the "red line" of 
independence 
In a strand of argument related to the "will of the people" assertion, French officials 
claim that France remains in order to do the right thing by its citizens. Although this 
contention covers all of its citizens, indigenous and otherwise, some senior players 
point specifically to the responsibilities of protecting longstanding French settlers. 
Once again, in this respect, they claim that New Caledonia remains key to continuing 
French motivations in the Pacific because there is a larger France-originating settler 
population there than elsewhere (Personal communication Paris March 2008 and also 
Henningham 1989, referring to the "political ballast" of the majority settler population 
in New Caledonia not present in French Polynesia, p. 31). 
Linked to this idea of defending the interests of its nationals, particularly its settlers, in 
the overseas collectivities is the idea of preserving the indivisibility of the French 
republic, to head off a domino effect throughout its entities. Because New Caledonia 
has been granted the most autonomy of France's overseas possessions, the future fate of 
New Caledonia is seen as having specific importance as a demonstrator effect for other 
French collectivities. Thus, a principal motivator for France to succeed in New 
Caledonia is to retain its possessions elsewhere. Specifically these include French 
Polynesia, which, as noted in Chapter 6, looks to New Caledonia as a model for its own 
status; but also Guyana, the vital launching pad site for France's space program; and 
Mayotte (Mrgudovic notes parallels between New Caledonia and Mayotte in France's 
access to control of petrol-supply routes, 2008 p. 96). 
Closer to home in metropolitan France, the demonstration effect is particularly feared 
for troubled Corsica. AustraHan analysts Bates (1990) and Aldrich (1989) referred to 
French concern at the implications of actions in New Caledonia for Corsica, with Bates 
quoting then Interior Minister Charles Pasqua as describing the defence of Bastia 
(northern Corsica) beginning in Noumea (1990). 
But the domino effect operates both ways: what happens in other possessions also has 
an effect on the French Pacific collectivities. French handling of the riots and protests 
in Corsica are equally salutary for New Caledonia. The mainstream New Caledonian 
newspaper Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes throughout the early 2000s regularly reported 
news of Ajaccio as if to remind the French reader in New Caledonia of the importance 
of maintaining the French presence there. 
The outbreak of violent protests against la vie chere (high cost of living associated with 
being tied to the French economy) in Guyana, led to similar protests in Guadeloupe, 
Martinique and Reunion in February and March of 2009. The speedy chain reaction 
throughout its West Indies territories and ultimately as far away as Reunion, in the 
Indian Ocean, confirmed France's fears of the contamination effect of events in one 
possession influencing developments in the others. In the French Pacific, after the 
outbreaks on the other side of the globe, arrangements were speedily set in place for 
local consultations to head off similar reactions. The Sarkozy government response 
was firm. It included clamping down on violent protests, a major reform of its 
provisions to Overseas France, and a clear indication of an "unbreachable" line, that of 
independence (see Sarkozy government policy section below). 
Sarkozy government policy 
Strategic importance of Overseas France but declining interest in French Pacific 
Sarkozy, elected in early 2007, has taken little interest in the French Pacific 
collectivities. More broadly, he came late to fonnulating a policy towards the Overseas 
France, only personally addressing the subject when trouble broke out in the French 
entities in the Caribbean and Reunion in 2009 over the high cost of living. As a new 
style of President, of a new generation and with an immigrant background, Sarkozy's 
views were relatively unknown. His predecessors had all held firmly to the important 
role of France's overseas possessions in defining the international prestige of France, 
from de Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard d'Estaing, and Chirac on the right; to Mitterrand 
who, although from the left, had served as Overseas France Minister. Sarkozy's early 
priorities were cultivating a special relationship with the United States, and 
consolidating France's role in Europe, including by returning France to the high table 
of NATO by rejoining the High Command. In attending to these national priorities, the 
strategic role of France's string of overseas possessions became clear, as the evolution 
of thought in official statements shows. 
Contribution of Overseas France to France's international status 
The early view of the Sarkozy administration about Overseas France emerged over a 
number of statements by his Overseas France Secretary, Yves Jego. Speaking to a 
France-EU seminar in Paris in June 2008, Jego highlighted the importance of the OCT 
(overseas collectivities) for Europe, through which, he said, "Europe has become the 
first world maritime power" {Flash d'Oceanie 1 July 2008). In an interview in October 
2008, he said that few people understood what the overseas presence meant, for 
example, that it provided 80 % of France's biodiversity, that it made France the second 
largest maritime power in the world, and that France was present in the three oceans by 
virtue of its overseas presence. He said the overseas presence was "an opportunity for 
France and for Europe in a globalized world" {Le Parisien 14 October 2008). 
In his response to the troubles in the Overseas Caribbean territories, President Sarkozy 
built on these statements. He made two important speeches on the Overseas France, 
one in November 2009 and the other as a New Year message to the Overseas France, in 
January 2010. In his November speech, he referred to France's status as the second 
maritime nation of the world with an EEZ equal to that of the United States; as a 
premier space and nuclear power, and one with major diplomatic influence over oceans, 
and unrivalled biodiversity, all owing directly to the Overseas France. "La France 
sans I'Outre-mer", he said, "ce ne serait phis la France" (France would not be France 
without the Overseas France)(Sarkozy 2009). Similarly, in his January 2010 speech, he 
said that it was because of Overseas France that France was '"France des trois oceans " 
(France of the three Oceans). It was Overseas France that contributed to France's 
identity, "a notre rayonnement, a notre grandeur et a notre puissance " ("to our 
influence, our grandeur and our power") and "The inclusion of all, across the thousands 
of kilometers that separate us, in the same national community is one of the multiple 
facets of the French genius" (Sarkozy 2010a). These are the words of de Gaulle (see 
de Gaulle 1947). Sarkozy's use of them seem to suggest that, two years into his 
Presidency, he was convinced, as de Gaulle had been, of the role of France's overseas 
possessions in bolstering France's claim to international status and power. 
Sovereignty reinforced: no tolerance for violence or independence 
In his speeches, Sarkozy reinforced France's intention of continued sovereignty over its 
possessions, if necessary backed by force; and announced areas of reform, even 
innovation, in the governance of its various possessions but always stopping short of 
independence. His November 2009 speech was designed to announce a number (137 in 
total) of reforms primarily targeted at the Caribbean possessions, providing for 
institutional change including more local participation; and greater economic 
engagement by entities in their geographic regions. But at the same time, Sarkozy 
reaffirmed that his government would not tolerate violence or independence. 
In his 2009 speech, his comments were focused more on the West Indies ("To be 
perfectly clear, the question to be put to voters in January will be the appropriate degree 
of autonomy of Martinique and Guyana in the Republic, and not that of independence. 
I restate this very simply, but firmly: the question of independence of Martinique and 
Guyana will not be put. These territories are, and they will stay, French lands", 
Sarkozy 2009). But in his early 2010 New Year speech to the Overseas France, 
Sarkozy was more general. He said he was prepared to countenance a range of options 
for France's overseas territories (as opposed to collectivities, as in the Pacific), 
provided that the unity of the Republic was not called into question. He then noted that 
the French constitution allowed considerable flexibility, of which he intended to make 
use, with respect for the will expressed by the relevant populations, "with only one red 
line which I will never accept to be breached: that of independence. The Overseas 
(France) is and will remain French " (my italics). This language, i.e., "the Overseas", 
includes all French Overseas possessions, including the French Pacific entities. 
View of the French Pacific 
Specific statements and approaches to the French Pacific territories are rare. Sarkozy's 
comments on the strategic role of France Overseas in the foregoing section can be 
expected to apply to the French Pacific as well, particularly in view of the vast expanse 
of the Pacific entities. 
French white papers on Foreign Affairs (July 2008) and Defence (November 2008) 
commissioned by Sarkozy do not provide much insight into the administration's view 
of the Pacific, surprising given France's sovereign presence there. There is no 
reference to the Pacific region in the Foreign Affairs paper. The Defence White Paper 
simply referred to changing domestic logistical dispositions within its French Pacific 
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entities, which it treated entirely as domestic appendages (see Noumea becomes 
preeminent base for France's Pacific military presence below). Apart from a general 
reference to Australia being a valued partner, no Pacific regional defence priorities or 
perspectives were identified as stemming from France's resident Pacific presence. 
Rather, it emphasized exclusively the priority for France of the arc stretching from 
Mauritania in Africa across the Middle East to the Indian Ocean (Fisher 2008c). 
Indeed, the Paper spoke of the '^tloignement" or isolation of Asia, hardly the 
perspective of a resident Pacific nation (Defense 2008). 
Chapter 5 analysed institutional arrangements and senior appointments Sarkozy has 
made which suggest a continuing declining importance of structures and attention 
devoted to the French Pacific collectivities. Funding allocated to the small South 
Pacific Fund has declined (see Chapter 7). Sarkozy decided not to head the French 
delegation to the third Oceanic Summit, in Noumea in late July 2009, the first time the 
French President did not chair that meeting. He had not visited the Pacific by mid 
2011. 
New Caledonia: commitment and ambiguity 
Sarkozy and members of his government say that they are committed to ftilfilling the 
obligations of the Noumea Accord, that their preference is that New Caledonia remain 
with France, and, somewhat ambiguously, that the French State should take an active 
but impartial approach as the Noumea Accord comes to its end. 
The earliest indication of Sarkozy's thinking was set out in a letter he wrote to New 
Caledonians in March 2007, while he was still a presidential candidate (Sarkozy 
2007a). In the Gaullist tradition, his letter began by recalling that New Caledonia was 
the first overseas territory to rally to Free France and noted "your desire to continue to 
live within our Republic", which he shared. He expressed the hope that, at the 
appropriate time, New Caledonians would indicate by free choice their wish for a 
"French destiny". He quoted de Gaulle saying "New Caledonia must be part of a 
bigger whole. Of what whole could it be part, if not the great French whole?" 
Implicitly affirming his commitment to the scheduled referendum, he noted that in the 
term after the next presidential term, New Caledonians would be called upon to make a 
decisive vote as foreshadowed in the Noumea Accord. He wrote that some New 
Caledonians believed that independence could be a solution for the fijture, but stated 
that while he respected their choice, "it is not mine". Nonetheless, he reaffirmed the 
importance of respecting the Noumea Accord, listing his belief in a policy of 
consensus, the role of the Provinces, the collegia! government, and, somewhat oddly 
given his earlier statement of viewpoint, the impartiality of the French State. 
He then proceeded to seek to "persuade" the independentists that staying with France 
was possible with a "very large autonomy" for New Caledonia relative to the 
metropole. Further, he said that if Noumea Accord partners wanted New Caledonia to 
evolve and engage in new perspectives within the Republic, then they could count on 
his support. He pledged innovative judicial solutions to guarantee the personality and 
powers of New Caledonia within France. 
He then listed French State responsibilities in New Caledonia (justice, public order, 
defence, foreign affairs, currency, part of national education, tertiary education, 
immigration control) in all of which he said he would apply the same commitments to 
French people in New Caledonia as he had made to those elsewhere in the Republic. 
He emphasized particularly security measures which he had introduced as Interior 
Minister since 2002 (which had represented a firm hand on disturbances, and hence a 
reminder of the firm control of the French State). And he pledged the State's respect 
for commitments on development and economic rebalancing under the Noumea 
Accord, noting support for the nickel project in the South and that of Koniambo. 
Finally, he wrote that he wanted to be President of all the French people (i.e. not just 
those from the metropole) and of the Republic, which would defend with energy and 
conviction the place of New Caledonia within France. 
That he had gone a little too far in expressing a preference for New Caledonia within 
France quickly became apparent. The local R-UMP President, Pierre Frogier, 
apparently taking his cue from the UMP presidential candidate back at home in 
metropolitan France, proceeded to write his own "letter to young Caledonians" on 16 
May 2008 (Frogier 2008). He noted that it was the independentists who had chosen the 
path of violence 25 years before, and described the Ouvea events as an attack on the 
police brigade in the Loyalty Islands, noting the killing of four policemen without 
mentioning Kanak losses, and affirming that there was no need for shame at what 
France had done at that time. He underlined the suffering and memories of that time 
which had not healed. He referred to the importance of the Lafleur-Tjibaou handshake, 
the foundation of the Matignon and Noumea Accords. He then said that it was 
legitimate to question the intentions and motivations of those who wanted to reopen 
these wounds, and to refuse a "partisan, erroneous and deformed" vision of histor\'. 
This letter was seen by the pro-independence groups as provocative. 
By December 2007, newly installed as President, Sarkozy shifted tack. In his message 
to the Committee of Signatories to the Noumea Accord, he reaffirmed his commitment 
to respect the letter and the spirit of the Noumea Accord (Sarkozy 2007b). He re-stated 
the paradoxical active role of the French State "not only the role of an arbiter", with the 
State conducting impartially (my emphasis) in the search for consensus which 
must prevail in the application of the Accord as it comes to its conclusion. Bearing in 
mind the caution of Tjibaou on the primacy of the State's role as an actor rather than 
judge (see Chapter 3), this reference was one calculated to appeal to both sides He 
noted economic rebalancing, social cohesion, and cooperation with the South Pacific 
countries as essential questions for the fumre of New Caledonia. He said the principle 
of the transfer of responsibilities was provided for in the Noumea Accord, and there 
was no room for debate about that (putting paid to hopes Frogier had raised that there 
could be a turning back of the clock). The task remained to devise a timetable and the 
modalities, while preserving the quality of public services for all Caledonians. He 
indicated that the State would intervene financially, with tax exemption measures, to 
support the Northern nickel project, and did not mention that of the South. 
But once again Sarkozy reiterated that, when New Caledonians made their choice with 
the end of the Noumea Accord, his preference was to continue its path with France, in a 
new relationship yet to be defined. This "personal and transparent expression of this 
preference naturally was not at all contradictory with respect for the Accord and its 
deadlines in all impartiality. 1 commit myself to that personally". He then urged 
participants not to lose sight of what was at stake in the dialogue process, which was 
not the victory of one side over the other, but the construction of a common destiny. 
More recently, at the seventh meeting of the follow-up committee to the Noumea 
Accord in December 2008, Sarkozy once again reaffirmed that the French Government 
would respect its commitments although reiterating that it was an active player despite 
claims of impartiality: "We will go to the completion of this processs. The State will 
not shy away... and will play an active role in this phase of our history, it will not just 
be a passive referee" {Flash d'Oceanie 10 December 2008). High Commissioner 
Dassonville re-stated this approach in his 2009 new year message, saying "I will work 
to represent a State as much a participant as arbitrator, firm in the exercise of its 
powers, but always ready to invite dialogue, a State present without being 
overbearing...," {""Je m 'efforcerai d'etre lepatron d'un Etat acteur aiilant qu 'arhitre, 
ferme dans I'exercice de ses competences, mais toujourspret aprivilegier le dialogue, 
un Etat present sans etre pesant..." New Caledonian government website 
wWW.nouvelIe-caledonie.gouv.fr accessed 4 February 2009). 
In his New Year's address to Overseas France in January 2010, as outlined in the 
Sovereignty reinforced section above, Sarkozy drew a red line at independence for 
"Overseas France", which, in its application to New Caledonia, was at the least 
ambiguous, and at worst, begged questions about just how he was to implement fully 
the commitments of the Noumea Accord relating to a self-detennination referendum on 
the future status of New Caledonia (see Fisher 2010a). 
In the same speech, Sarkozy made some specific comments about New Caledonia 
which were also ambiguous. He noted that transfers of responsibility were under way, 
and that the vote "o/? self-determination' (my italics) would be organized after 2014. 
In a new and refreshing note of impartiality, he said the State would be faithful to all 
partners of the Accord, whether they were in favour of retaining New Caledonia in 
France or were independentist. But he said that it was essential that all Caledonians 
begin discussion so that the vote foreshadowed in the Accord "translated into a result 
approved by a very large majority of voters" (my italics). Since Sarkozy had ruled out 
independence, his words suggest that he does not have in mind a vote directly on the 
independence issue, as envisaged by many pro-independence parties and as implied in 
the Organic Law (relevant articles appear under the heading "Vote on the accession to 
full sovereignty" Titre IX, Organic Law 1999). Sarkozy went on to say that, while the 
discussions should be between Caledonians, the State would help them and assume to 
the end its role as signatory to the Accords (Sarkozy 2010a). In March 2011 (at the 
time of finalization of this thesis), the French hosted a Colloquium in Noumea on the 
Destinies of the Pacific Political Collectivities, examining alternative models for the 
future, which assumed continued sovereignty with France. 
Through his appointments to key positions in New Caledonia, Sarkozy has also sent 
mixed messages. He appointed close advisors Estrosi and subsequently Yves Jego as 
Secretaries for Overseas France, suggesting the importance he attached to the positions. 
Estrosi did not last long in the job, partly because of heavy-handed handling of a local 
protest in Noumea during his first visit there (Chapter 5). But Sarkozy's subsequent 
appointment of his collaborator Jego as Overseas France Secretary, and of a senior 
advisor to Estrosi, Jean-Yves Dassonville as High Commissioner in Noumea, 
underlined his intention to handle protests firmly, hideed Dassonville said as much on 
his arrival, when he indicated that the disturbances betrayed an underlying need for 
better social dialogue (i.e. handling industrial disputes), which the French State would 
become involved in although it was not strictly its responsibility, and that it would do 
so with firmness (Nouvelles Caledoniennes 10 November 2007). In his own public 
statements following violence in the Caribbean territories and Reunion, Sarkozy stated 
unequivocally that he will not tolerate violent protest in Overseas France (Sarkozy 
2009, 2010). 
Noumea becomes preeminent base for France's Pacific military presence 
The Sarkozy government's Defence White Paper, issued shortly after assuming 
government, defined significant overarching defence reforms based on reducing 
personnel, sharpening equipment priorities and enhancing intelligence-gathering 
(Defence White Paper 2008). The few references to France's South Pacific 
collectivities imply that their continued possession by France is a given. The Paper 
specified that it would be New Caledonia which would provide the principal base for 
France's military presence in the Pacific, including the capacity, mainly aero-maritime, 
for rapid intervention at times of crisis. 
The assignation of this role expressly to New Caledonia was a significant change, in 
that the entire Pacific naval presence had until then been commanded from Papeete. 
The changes would take place gradually until 2015. The presence of the strongest 
contingent of the French regional military presence in New Caledonia would therefore 
coincide with the most important transition period spelled out by the Noumea Accord, 
that from 2014 to 2018 when votes would be taken on the fiiture, including specifically 
defence. 
A related development has been the construction of a large complex in a central 
location in Noumea to house French military headquarters, and to bring together for the 
first time the main services under one roof The building is a large, impressive and 
expensive structure, discreetly located at the end of a winding road surrounded by 
vegetation, but strategically sited at the naval dock not far from central Noumea. 
The shoring up of a defence presence, including construction of expensive French 
military headquarters in Noumea, with responsibility for the entire French Pacific 
military presence, well before the vote on the final five sovereign powers, of which 
defence is one, as provided for under the Noumea Accord, reaffirms Sarkozy's 
commitment to meet violence or protests with a firm hand, and raises questions about 
France's commitment as an Accord signatory (see Chapter 5). 
French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna 
In his 2010 New Year comments to Overseas France, Sarkozy referred to the "vast 
comedy" of French Polynesia's political representatives "where yesterday's enemies 
become today's allies". He noted that political stability had still not been found, and 
that this was intolerable for Polynesians. He foreshadowed a flirther reform of the 
voting and institutional system to guarantee more stability to majority elected 
representatives. In March 2011, draft reforms were submitted to the French Polynesian 
Assembly for its consideration. The draft provisions maintained an electoral "bonus" 
for the majority party; fixed the term of the Speaker of the Assembly, to exclude the 
position from changing when the government changed; increased the minimum number 
of votes required for a no-confidence vote; and increased the minimum percentage of 
votes required for a party to proceed to the second round of votes in an election {Flash 
d'Oceanie 18 March 2011). 
Sarkozy announced he would consider, from 2010, proposals to modernize the 
organization of the territory of Wallis and Futuna. No indication of these proposals 
had been released by mid 2011. 
From the foregoing France clearly wants its collectivities to remain French, and 
continues to be prepared to back this objective through force. And France derives 
sufficient strategic benefit, including more recently, actual and potential economic 
benefit, from its resident presence in the Pacific to continue to pay for them to remain 
French. Will it continue to do so? 
Future motivations 
Possible future policy motivations can be proposed, drawing from past practice and 
policy reviewed earlier in this Chapter. These are likely to derive from strategic 
interests, commercial factors, and the protection of domestic interests, including the 
protection of French citizens. 
Strategic motivations 
France is likely to see continued strategic advantage deriving from its Pacific presence. 
First, a Pacific presence will continue to provide justification for its claims to retain its 
seat as one of the elite Permanent Members of the UN Security Council. In this 
respect, presiding over a successful decolonization of New Caledonia under the 
auspices of the UN would be important. France has already signalled a more 
forthcoming approach to the Committee of 24. 
Second, France through its Pacific presence will be able also to retain its status as the 
second largest sovereign EEZ in the world, second only to the United States. Third, a 
continued sovereign presence in the Pacific will facilitate France's maintaining a self-
reliant defence posture within the EU and NATO, based on the nuclear deterrent. 
Retaining the South Pacific collectivities facilitates the presence of French naval and 
other armed forces in the region. It also keeps vast areas of the Pacific Ocean under 
French control, including infrastructure at Moruroa and Hao, all of which are 
potentially usefiil contributions to Europe's space program. 
Fourth, France will also see its Pacific presence as bolstering its status as a member of 
the western alliance beyond that of NATO and the EU in Europe. By virtue of its 
Pacific presence, France can contribute to prevent or at least balance foreign forays in 
the region, notably by China. It can also provide a balance to the predominantly 
Anglo-Saxon influence in the South Pacific. Its military presence supplements those of 
the allies, including by providing refiaelling and rest and recreation stops, protecting 
access to sea lanes in the event of blocking of the Malacca Straits; enabling emergency 
assistance, cooperative disaster relief and sharing of regional marine resource 
intelligence. Its presence also contributes to western (as distinct from European, 
mentioned earlier) capabilities for tracking missiles and satellites in space. Finally, 
France's resident regional presence enables it to promote scientific and technological 
research in the region (Hage identifies many of these points, Hage 2003 pp. 86-87; and 
De Deckker and Faberon 2008 p. 278). 
Commercial interests 
Whereas commercial returns were secondary for France in its early history in the 
region, more than ever before, France stands to gain specific future commercial 
benefits, in the context of global concerns about renewable energy and sustainable 
development, well into the twenty-first century, as known reserves of key resources 
decline. 
It is here that France's status of sovereignty over the second largest global EEZ is 
relevant. The extent of economic resources accruing to France by virtue of its 
extensive EEZ in the Pacific Ocean is as yet unknown. However, its intensive research 
into suspected hydrocarbons offshore from New Caledonia and specific investigations 
in waters around Clipperton suggest that these resources are of some interest to France. 
More immediately, France is expanding exploitation of the nickel resource in New 
Caledonia. Having incorporated the idea of extending nickel production into the 
formula for responding to Kanak concerns, and having supplied important fiscal 
backing and private investment from metropolitan France into the massive nickel 
projects in New Caledonia, France is already a major producer of a valuable global 
resource, poised for greater production. 
Protection of domestic interests and French settlers globally 
France shows a continuing commitment to protect the presence and security of its 
overseas residents, specifically its overseas settlers from metropolitan France, notably 
in New Caledonia, the French overseas collectivity where they are the most numerous. 
France is likely to continue to show a desire to head off a potential domino effect on its 
chain of other overseas possessions, particularly important in Guyana (its space 
launching site), and Corsica close to home but also, in principle, important to all of its 
other collectivities. It is likely to continue to ensure a low level of domestic 
metropolitan public interest in the overseas possessions. It is likely to continue to do 
this through a policy of'"pas d'ennuis'' (heading off trouble) in the Pacific entities, 
backed by military force; through a program of consolidating relations with Pacific 
island neighbours; and through appropriate responsible behaviour in the international 
arena (for example, as UN administering authority in New Caledonia; and meeting its 
nuclear compensation commitments in French Polynesia). It will continue to claim a 
desire to meet its statutory commitments, particularly in New Caledonia, without 
prejudicing its other objectives 
Future policy implications 
On the basis of these motivations, and its past practice, French policy approaches are 
likely to include continued efforts to meet its legal commitments in New Caledonia 
under the Noumea Accord. It is likely to seek to do this within UN decolonization 
principles (i.e., by offering a genuine choice, including an independence option), with a 
minimum of violence. This is likely to be a challenge, given the strong possibility of 
rejection of the independence option, with possible accompanying violence by pro-
independence elements. France can be expected to urge local parties to agree on 
imaginative and innovative solutions including post-Accord arrangements maximizing 
autonomy within the French republic. 
France can be expected to continue to provide lavish expenditure in all three of its 
Pacific collectivities, both to encourage their continued commitment to French 
sovereignty and to head off domestic public interest back home in metropolitan France 
which might result from opposition or instability in overseas France 
France is likely to continue its long-term pursuit of the most valuable of the economic 
resources in the Pacific, particularly exploitation of nickel, and potentially 
hydrocarbons, in New Caledonia, and the conduct of aquatic scientific research around 
all of its Pacific possessions, including the remote ones such as Clipperton. 
France will continue to maintain a regional military presence consistent with its other 
objectives, and the will to exert military pressure when necessary to ensure law and 
order. It will continue its defence cooperation with large regional powers and selected 
island states, especially focused on disaster response and the protection of fisheries. 
France will continue to use its capacity as a western ally to head off intrusion by 
foreign powers, and this is likely to be accompanied by a tendency to overplay the 
significance of activities in the region by foreign powers. 
France is likely to continue with the institutions handling its Pacific collectivities in a 
way not commensurate with the strategic return they deliver to France. The domestic 
affairs of the collectivities will continue to be managed by the Interior Ministry and its 
France Overseas France Secretariat, and military institutions; with the Foreign Affairs 
and Defence ministries responsible for policy in the wider region. It is not certain that 
the day-to-day coordination of these various ministries will improve. 
France's aid efforts in the wider region are likely to continue to be low-key and modest, 
multilaterally through the SPC and PIF, and through selective bilateral programs; and 
through the EU. There is likely to be continued lip-service to encouraging the regional 
participation of its Pacific entities, without building the capacity for them to do so 
effectively. 
Conclusion 
France derives significant strategic advantage from its resident, sovereign presence in 
the South Pacific, Apart from providing continued credibility to France as a 
democratic, global power bolstering its claims within the UN, EU and NATO, the 
Pacific presence now represents a real and potential economic asset, and a resource in 
fiature space exploration and exploitation, all of which bring a particular contribution by 
France in these organizations. These are strong motivations leading to France's desire 
to remain present in the region, even at considerable financial cost and diplomatic and 
political investment. 
Having established France's likely motivations and strategic returns from its Pacific 
presence, and pointed to likely future policy directions, the next chapter will examine 
elements of risk undermining its ability to continue to pursue these interests and 
policies, with the potential to undermine regional stability; and identify actions which 
might be taken to minimize these. 
Chapter 9 
France's Future Role in the Region 
France has a long history in the Pacific region, and derives strategic benefits from being 
there. In recent years, France has exerted innovation and flexibihty backed by mihtary 
force, along with significant economic and political investment in its collectivities, and, 
to a lesser extent, the region, to maintain its presence. 
As explored in Chapter 3, between just twenty and thirty years ago, France's behaviour 
created serious disruption and instability in the region. Its resistance to Vanuatu's 
independence left an early legacy of suspicion, resentment and violence, and was an 
indicator to Pacific neighbours of what might follow should similar circumstances arise 
in its other Pacific entities. France initially withdrew financial and other resources, 
supported rebellious forces, and intervened politically in the aftermath of Vanuatu's 
independence, despite the democratic vote in favour of independence. 
Chapter 3 also showed how France's nuclear testing program, which persisted to 1996 
despite regional opposition, strengthened negative feeling in the region towards France 
and, together with its veto of discussions of non-development problems in the SPC, 
resulted in the region forming a new regional grouping, the Pacific Islands Forum, in 
1971. France's mismanagement of Melanesian independence demands in New 
Caledonia alienated Melanesian and broader Pacific opinion further, resulting in the 
formation of the Melanesian Spearhead Group in 1984, potentially dividing hard-won 
South Pacific cooperation and consultation mechanisms. France's policies in New 
Caledonia also brought on violence, and introduced destabilising extraneous terrorist 
factors such as Libyan links with Melanesian political parties. 
Despite overtures in the 1980s to improve its image (set out in Chapter 4), it was only 
after France changed its policies, by suspending nuclear testing once and for all, and by 
concluding the Matignon and then Noumea Accords to address Melanesian 
independence concerns peaceftilly, that regional leaders responded more positively 
towards France (Chapter 7). 
As Australia and its immediate Pacific region confront the consequences of failures in 
governance within the region, against the background of global economic and 
environmental pressures, and a tectonic shift in power relationships between the two 
great Pacific powers, the US and China, they may well welcome the energy and 
resources of France, a significant western ally present in the region, with similar values 
and interests here. 
But the history of France's presence, its motivations and recent practices in the Pacific, 
point to areas of risk to future stability, both within the French collectivities, and the 
wider region. These risk areas potentially undermine France's ability to achieve its 
objectives in the region, i.e., to remain present, and to integrate its collectivities there. 
At the same time, they potentially threaten regional security. 
The uncertainties centre around two main areas: continued acceptance of the French 
presence by Pacific island leaders; and the continued peaceful, workable, democratic 
status of France's Pacific collectivities, particularly New Caledonia, on which wider 
regional acceptance hinges. 
Regional acceptance 
Chapter 7 showed that, at the broadest level, France has succeeded in establishing itself 
as an accepted presence in the region as a major bilateral partner, albeit with some 
continuing unease, and certainly with perceptions that it is an outside power. In the 
wider Pacific, France moved beyond its activity, initiated in the 1980s, simply to alter 
perceptions in the region about itself, by working to change its unpopular policies and 
to support concrete regional and bilateral aid programs relevant to the region's own 
needs. It has buih up regional credit by stopping nuclear tests, continuing to address 
some of the lingering issues related to the tests, and introducing responsive change in 
New Caledonia. It has also engaged itself more productively in regional bodies, 
including the Pacific Islands Forum, SPC, SPREP, and in selected bilateral activity. It 
has presented itself as a close partner of Australia and New Zealand. It claims to want 
its collectivities to integrate more in the region. 
With its double role as a major western power and a vehicle for a greater EU presence 
in the region, France as a presence in the South Pacific is a strategically important 
partner to other Pacific powers, notably the United States, Japan. Australia and New 
Zealand. France supports and complements their own strategic presence in the Asia-
Pacific region, and reinforces the balance to the forays China is making into the region. 
Facing the heavy demands of governance failure, particularly in the Solomon Islands, 
and ongoing needs of development cooperation in the region, Australia and New 
Zealand in particular welcome the stability and burdensharing that have flowed from 
the French presence (see Chapter 8). 
But France has yet to achieve full acceptance of its presence within the region. Partly 
this derives from its own ambiguous presentation of its interests. As discussed in 
Chapter 8, there is relatively little high-level articulation beyond its own borders of 
France's strategic interest in being in or staying in the South Pacific. The rare 
references to the South Pacific, or even the French Pacific, in strategic documents such 
as the 2008 Foreign Affairs and Defence White Papers, underline that the priority areas 
for France lie elsewhere in the immediate geographic vicinity of metropolitan France, 
and that key policy advisers undervalue the strategic returns the Pacific presence 
delivers. The language France uses when talking about the Pacific is at best ambiguous 
over whether it sees itself as an outsider or as a resident South Pacific power with 
strategic interests stemming from that presence (Chapter 7). Despite France's 
proclaimed interest in enmeshing its collectivities more in the life of the region, there is 
uncertainty, and wariness, about whether France's three collectivities speak for 
themselves or only channel French views and policy. So, as Chapter 7 showed, perhaps 
it is not surprising that others in the region do not see or welcome France clearly as a 
resident power. 
In Australia's 2009 Defence White Paper, France was mentioned along with other 
NATO countries such as Spain, Germany, Italy and Sweden, as a cooperative European 
partner, with a brief reference to practical cooperation in the Pacific and Southern 
Oceans and Afghanistan; and as a donor in the South Pacific to support capacity 
building (Defence White Paper 2009 pp. 98 and 100). No mention of France was made 
in sections on interoperability, intelligence, and science and technology, nor even when 
the Paper discussed coalitions with others in military operations, disaster and 
humanitarian relief in the Pacific and Timor Leste, where France has specifically 
played a role (in FRANZ and in INTERFET, International Force for East Timor) 
(Australian Defence White Paper 2009, pp. 50, 54 and 105). There was no indication 
from Australia's Defence White Paper that France was considered other than as a 
cooperative European partner and donor, and certainly not as a regional Pacific power. 
Chapter 7 suggested that many regional island country leaders remain cautious about 
France. Some remember the period of French opposition to, and frustration of, 
Vanuatu's independence process: French nuclear testing; and the long refusal to 
respond to Kanak independence demands. Their caution is not allayed by France's 
assertion of its claim to the Matthews and Hunters, contested with Vanuatu (Chapter 5). 
France's own efforts in the region have been well received, but remain modest in 
financial terms, fitfijl (for example, Sarkozy's non-attendance at the French Oceanic 
Summit, the desultory holding of bilateral talks between Australia and New Caledonia 
under the 2002 Trade Arrangement, Chapter 7), and generally involve hooking on to 
existing longstanding initiatives by Australia and New Zealand. While working for an 
accepted role for its collectivities within the Pacific Islands Forum, which the Forum 
acceded to, France has only reluctantly acquiesced in the Forum mechanisms to 
monitor its policies, such as the regular Forum ministerial committee visits to New 
Caledonia to 2004. French officials privately claim that Pacific island leaders 
themselves are no models of good governance and should not be judging France's 
performance in the Pacific. But they overlook the fact that regional leaders have been 
fair and balanced in their conclusions from these visits, and restrained in responding to 
calls by French Polynesian and New Caledonian indigenous pro-independence leaders 
for the Forum to take positions on French policy. At the same time regional leaders 
expect more of a Western sovereign power and will judge French action in its 
collectivities by higher standards than they apply to themselves, however unfair this 
might seem. 
So long as France sees itself as an outside power in the region, regional countries know 
that ultimately France will pursue its own national interests, to which their interests, 
and those of the French collectivities located in the Pacific, will always be secondary. 
The bigger states, Australia and New Zealand, know that France sees them as useful 
regional allies and information sources, but only up to a point, the point where France's 
overriding national interests as a UN, EU, NATO and global player become engaged. 
France seems to undervalue the leverage these regional relationships can provide in the 
pursuit of its own interests, for example with China and the United States. Thus France 
can probably not expect to do much more with the big Pacific countries in the defence 
and intelligence area than participate in exercises and exchanges to promote 
interoperability, and exchange intelligence in practical areas such as fisheries, as it is 
currently doing. The regional powers will continue to be wary of closer cooperation in 
sensitive areas such as intelligence exchanges so long as they perceive France may use 
these resources to further interests and relationships different to those of the region. 
Island leaders have successfully used regional and international mechanisms to 
influence French policy in the past. The UN Decolonization Committee, the Pacific 
Islands Forum and the Melanesian Spearhead Group were all useful and remain 
potential instruments should differences with France arise. In May 2008, UN Secretary 
General Ban Ki-moon urged administering authorities to discharge the UN's mandate 
on decolonization, arguing that "Colonialism has no place in today's world"' (Ban Ki-
Moon 2008). The UN Decolonization Committee has the mandate to send visiting 
investigatory missions to New Caledonia, although it has not exercised this mandate to 
date (early 2011), not even when the Committee agreed to host its regional Pacific 
seminar there in May 2010. Through the Pacific Islands Forum, regional leaders have a 
watching brief on how France deals with Melanesian and Polynesian demands for 
independence (see Chapter 7). They have an ongoing mandate to send visiting 
missions to the French collectivities should they wish to do so. The Melanesian 
Spearhead group has remained active, reminding the Forum of Kanak concerns related 
to New Caledonia such as French handling of the restricted electorate and the ethnic 
category of the census, and supporting New Caledonia's Melanesians on important 
issues such as Vanuatu's Matthew and Hunter claim. All three mechanisms remain 
safety valves for the expression of Kanak and French Polynesian frustrations (for 
example, Roch Wamytan continues to make submissions to the UN Committee; Oscar 
Temaru and the MSG have respectively raised self-determination concerns recently in 
the Forum, see Chapter 7) and are tools that remain available to Pacific leaders should 
France transgress (see also Mrgudovic 2008 p. 390). 
Chapter 7 showed how France has sought to insert itself and its supporters into these 
mechanisms in recent years, presumably in order to neutralize their potential to be used 
again against it. Having secured a special status of Associate Membership for the two 
larger Pacific French entities in the PIF, France and its pro-French supporters are now 
seeking ftill membership, even before the full status of New Caledonia is decided. The 
pro-France President of New Caledonia is now calling for New Caledonia to become a 
full member of the Melanesian Spearhead Group, in a bid to displace or weaken the 
voice of the current member, the Kanak coalition FLNKS. And France has begun to 
report as Administering Authority for New Caledonia to the UN Decolonization 
Committee, and has hosted Committee's May 2010 regional Pacific seminar in 
Noumea, thereby diluting the effect of petitions to the Committee by Kanak groups. 
Whether France is successful in its efforts to head off future criticism firom these 
various organizations remains to be seen. 
More broadly, the adoption by the UN General Assembly in October 2007 of a 
Declaration on Indigenous Rights (A/Res/61/295 of 2 October 2007) has set the stage 
for another avenue of pursuit of grievance by aggrieved Melanesian people. The 
Declaration specifically provides for the right of indigenous peoples to self-
determination (Declaration on Indigenous Rights, Article 3, and enshrines their right to 
control their education (Article 14) and not to be forcibly displaced from their lands 
arbitrarily (Article 10). It is too early to assess the significance of this avenue of 
redress. 
In the international and Pacific regional context, debate is under way over the rights of 
indigenous peoples to self-determination, as distinct from rights of non-self-governing 
territories. Jan Furukawa, Guam's Decolonization Commissioner, has argued that the 
right of Guam's colonized people, however few they might be, to "forge their own 
permanent, political identity" was not dismissable but "inalienable" (Furukuwa 2003) 
and US-administered Guam has prepared legislation for a future self-determination 
referendum for the minority indigenous Chamoru people. 
New Caledonia's own Sarimin Boengkih in 2010 made a distinction between the voting 
rights of the "colonized peoples" as opposed to immigrant settlers in New Caledonia 
(Boengkih 2010), referring to the requirements of UNGA 35/118, which, as noted in 
Chapter 7, calls for member states to discourage the systematic influx of outside 
immigrants and settlers into Territories under the Committee's auspices. 
Against this background, whatever bilateral arrangements France works out within its 
sovereign borders, indigenous peoples may, in theory, continue to raise their grievances 
and receive support in an international context. Given the untested nature of the 
relatively new Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, there may be 
considerable scope for differences to arise in New Caledonia over indigenous rights. 
Within the region, France may need to continue to work hard to build confidence in the 
Pacific in its policies and presence. 
Facil itating closer links in the South Pacific 
The history of France's presence in the South Pacific suggests that there remain ways in 
which France could improve its regional links. 
Institutional factors in Paris 
From an outside observer's perspective, aspects of France's inchoate institufional 
arrangements in Paris relating to its Pacific collectivities do not seem compatible with 
the best management of its own strategic interests, many of which are shared by 
Australia and New Zealand, deriving from France's presence in the Pacific. 
France's wish to remain as a sovereign presence in the South Pacific suggests there 
would be value in continuing to build expertise on the Pacific within its bureaucracies 
which deal with the Pacific region (Foreign Affairs, Defence Ministries, offices of the 
President and the Prime Minister) and those dealing with its Pacific collectivities (the 
Overseas France Secretariat and its posted officials in the South Pacific from the 
Interior Ministry); and to provide for sound ongoing coordination between the two, and 
between them and the rest of the French domestic bureaucracy (Environment, Heahh, 
Education and other Ministries). 
As the disastrous, but relatively recent, experiences of the Gossanah Cave crisis and the 
Rainbow Warrior affair show, maintaining the most effective Paris-based decision-
making apparatus relative to the Pacific entities is critical to France's international 
image and prestige. As these incidents and the evenements themselves recede in 
history, and as new challenges arise (see New Caledonia outcomes section below), the 
idea of continuing to administer the French Pacific entities on the basis of past policy 
reflexes, is risky. 
This thesis has shown how, from its first foray into the region, France's policy on the 
South Pacific and towards its possessions there has been subject to the ebbs and flows 
of its domestic and European preoccupations. It goes without saying that France's 
direct national interests must come first for France. Given recent talk of reorganization 
of the French Overseas structures (such as Jego's suggestion to abolish the Overseas 
France Secretariat itself, Chapter 5), retaining a distinct, effective instimtional unit for 
the French Pacific Overseas collectivities will be all the more important to ensure their 
particular political, cultural and regional circumstances are understood and not 
subsumed in large domestic bureaucratic structures. 
In view of the strategic value of the French Pacific entities, and the desirable ongoing 
engagement of the most senior of the Ministries such as Defence and Foreign Affairs, it 
would seem anomalous that the Overseas France Secretariat is only a junior ministry. If 
the office is to remain headed by a Secretary of State or junior Minister as has been the 
case to date, then moving the Office to the office of the Prime Minister, or the 
President, would enhance its bureaucratic weight relative to the ministries it needs to 
consult. Its senior officials should desirably have a history and experience in Overseas 
France, particularly in New Caledonia, as critical deadlines fall due for New Caledonia. 
Specific ongoing inter-agency steering committees in Paris on the Pacific French 
collectivities, coordinated by an appropriately senior Overseas France Minister or 
Secretary reporting direct to the Prime Minister or President, as New Caledonia's 
deadlines approach, would keep communication lines open and minimize the potential 
for a repeat of past disasters. Such a committee would desirably include, apart from the 
Pacific unit of the Overseas France Secretariat; the Foreign Affairs Ministry, especially 
its Oceanic Division; the Defence Ministry; and from time to time, the Paris-based 
offices of the French Pacific entities, and other ministries such as Environment, Health 
and Education. Whether the broader, temporary Interministerial Committee for 
Overseas France, established by Sarkozy for the 2008-9 review of Overseas France (see 
Chapter 5), will take on such a function is not yet clear. What we do know from the 
past subsuming of France's Pacific collectivities into the Overseas France structures 
(whether an Overseas France Ministry or Secretariat under the Interior Minister) is that 
French Pacific issues can get lost. 
Policy ambiguities 
The policy ambiguities enshrined in France's behaviour, sometimes as a power "in", 
and sometimes as a power " o f , the Pacific outlined in Chapter 7, reflect to some extent 
the inadequacies of the inter-agency consultation process. They also reflect the 
understandably Eurocentric character of French policy-making, which have generally 
served French interests well, albeit on occasion leading to disruption in the Pacific. In 
recent years, France is both " o f the region, by virtue of its collectivities, and "in" the 
region as a European country with sovereignty in the Pacific. France can in some ways 
be all things to all interests: European to Europe, French to its citizens in the region, a 
helpful, but not extravagantly so, external donor to the Pacific, a benign supporter to its 
collectivities" regional engagement, all without much cost. 
The dualities of this position will probably not fully be resolved until New Caledonia 
has expressed itself democratically on the question of independence. The 
implementation of credible democratic principles in French Polynesia will also be 
important, and the impartiality of planned fiirther statutory reforms there will be a 
signal of French intent. If New Caledonia were to endorse staying with France by a 
vote before 2018, without dissension, and if French Polynesian electoral outcomes are 
respected, then France could consider identifying itself more as a rightful regional 
presence " o f the Pacific, with a unique identity, similar to that of Australia and New 
Zealand. France might then reasonably expect that it and its collectivities be accepted 
fiilly into regional organizations. Even in this case, it is not clear that France would be 
prepared to project itself unambiguously as a resident regional player, for example in 
playing its full role as an aid and trade partner. 
If however, there is political opposition and unrest in New Caledonia as the Noumea 
Accord application period comes to a close, and/or if France's role in French Polynesia 
appears to be partisan with associated political instability and disturbance, then regional 
leaders may well continue to be hesitant to embrace a more fulsome French/French 
collectivity presence in their regional structures. This hesitancy would be compounded 
should such instabilities again lead to the engagement of external powers hostile to 
western alliance interests. 
France supporting its collectivities in regional engagement 
France's effectiveness in engaging constructively for its own benefit in the region 
would be enhanced not only by more financial support to the region, but by more 
concrete practical assistance to the three French Pacific collectivities to participate in 
the region in their own right, an objective which France openly espouses but to which it 
has devoted few resources. 
Fundamental to regional integration of the French collectivities is a letting go of any 
idea of cultural competition in the region. 
History has shown how emphasizing the "Anglo-Saxon" distinction has contributed to 
misunderstanding and instability in the region. Just as France has made large gestures 
towards the indigenous people in its collectivities and in the region, French authorities 
could lead a change in how it views what is undeniably an anglophone neighbourhood. 
Accepting the realities of the anglophone region around the French collectivities means 
accepting at face value that the bigger regional governments, Australia and New 
Zealand, are no longer mere ciphers for their former British colonizers, and indeed, that 
they have not been so for most of the last century. Even in recent years, both in 
Canberra and in the French collectivities, European diplomats and officials in private 
communications continue to assume that Canberra's policies reflect British policy. 
French analysts have made revealing references to Australia and New Zealand as 
"dominions" in their academic writings, a quaint throwback to pre-federation (1901) 
status in the case of Australia (see for example Cordonnier 1995 a). Broadsweeping 
comments that Australian and New Zealand policy positions are "Anglo-Saxon" mean 
little in these countries built on immigration from all over the world, with multicultural 
populations and leadership. France has taken great pains in recent years to cement 
closer relations with Australia and New Zealand. Better efforts to understand regional 
positions on their own terms would ensure continued partnership within the region on 
an equal basis. 
Equipping the leaders and officials of its own collectivities with the appropriate 
language training would enable them to participate confidently, in ongoing 
communication with neighbouring governments. In the Pacific, as elsewhere, France 
has handicapped itself with its insistence on the use of French when English is the 
international language. Despite the SPC having provided full interpretation facilities for 
the benefit of the three French entities and France for over sixty years, it is not realistic 
to expect the South Pacific region, with all its underdevelopment and multiplicity of 
languages of its own, to provide French language interpretation to facilitate integration 
of the French Pacific collectivities in the many CROP bodies and working committees. 
The practice, implemented when the full New Caledonian government delegation 
visited Australia in March 2010, of French Pacific delegations travelling in the region 
with their own interpreters and portable interpretation equipment is an impressive sign 
of genuine willingness to participate in the region. 
Such an approach would not undermine the important process of retaining, and indeed 
promoting, the exquisite and unique French language and culture at home in the 
collectivities. For the collectivifies, there is nothing to be lost, and much to be gained, 
by actively engaging with the wider region in the English language. Regional island 
country leaders, most of whom are multilingual themselves in indigenous languages, 
would recognize and welcome the gesture. One could envisage very useful exchange 
programs whereby indigenous Pacific island state officials and researchers work side 
by side with their French collectivity counterparts in work exchanges in the 
collectivities, in Pacific island states, and in Australia and New Zealand. 
A key element contributing to regional stability and understanding is the capability and 
effectiveness of a professional regional affairs unit in each collectivity, appropriately 
resourced and staffed with personnel trained in diplomacy and the English language, to 
provide day to day guidance for the collectivities' participation in regional affairs, to 
monitor and participate actively in regular regional meetings. Provision for exchanges 
between the regional affairs unit staff and diplomatic officers of the island governments 
would substantially boost understanding in both the collectivities and Pacific island 
governments of their respective contributions and potential contributions to the region. 
An active role by the English-speaking Pacific governments, including Australian and 
New Zealand, in funding and supporting such inter-Pacific Islands Forum exchanges, 
and funding expanded English-language training for personnel of the French 
collectivities, perhaps with co-funding by France, would maximize the benefits of such 
regional cooperation between the French and independent Pacific governments. 
Such a unit would simplify interactions by foreign interlocutors with the French 
entities. Currently, in New Caledonia alone, outsiders such as officials from 
neighbouring foreign governments and regional bodies, need to deal with three critical 
layers of government: the French state authorities, in areas of their power and also for 
courtesy's sake; the New Caledonian government; and the provincial governments in 
their areas of responsibility. Australia and New Zealand, and to a lesser extent, 
Indonesia, as countries with resident representation in Noumea, understand this. But 
other governments, particularly Pacific island governments with their own capacity 
constraints; regional organizations; and other potential interlocutors such as non-
governmental organizations, do not. Simplifying the government structures through an 
effective, professional, one-stop regional affairs unit would facilitate interchange with 
neighbouring governments. The unit could provide valuable support for officials and 
leaders of the collectivities when they travel throughout the region. It would facilitate 
integration of the French entities in the region. It would also enhance understanding by 
island governments of French motives and actions in the region. There is currently very 
little knowledge in the region of innovative French practices of potential interest 
elsewhere in the Pacific, such as the involvement of customary indigenous authorities 
in judging civil law cases, the presence of central officials in remote areas, the 
application of gender parity law which has significantly boosted the representation of 
women in the assemblies and Congress (Berman 2005), and the implementation of 
collegial government in a multi-ethnic society. 
Visits by metropolitan, collectivity and island government leaders and politicians 
The regular regional meetings of senior French officials in the region (French regional 
ambassadors, High Commissioners of the collectivities, and Paris-based officials) are a 
valuable input into informed policymaking in Paris. More visits by young French 
politicians from the hexagon to the Pacific collectivities, and to the Pacific region; and 
by Pacific leaders from the collectivities and the Island countries to Paris to meet 
French politicians and officials, could assist in informing members of the French 
National Assembly and the Paris based French administration about issues, history and 
preoccupations, and in enabling the appointment of responsible ministers or permanent 
secretaries with a background knowledge of the region. A tailoring of the rhetoric 
during these visits could be useful, with senior French officials, visiting the 
collectivities and the wider region and receiving regional visitors in Paris, emphasizing 
less the fact of French sovereignty but rather focusing on the particular needs and 
experiences of the islanders. 
Development cooperation, economic engagement and investment 
France's development assistance to the region has grown in recent years, and it has 
strongly contributed to increased assistance by the EU. But France's annual financial 
contributions to the region outside its own sovereign territory remain minuscule 
(Chapter 7 noted that figures are vague but totalled at most EUR 103 m. or SA146 m. 
(converted May 2010) in 2008, of which about half may be through EU development 
aid and not identifiably French aid). This compares poorly to its expenditure in its own 
Pacific collectivities ($A 4.6 b.), and its expenditure elsewhere (it is 2% of its overall 
aid effort compared with 43% to sub-Saharan Africa; and compares to its spending of 
$A 1 b. in the Maghreb in North Africa alone). And it compares poorly to the aid 
expenditure in the region by Australia ($A 1.092 b. in financial year 2009-10 Minister 
for Foreign Affairs press release 12 May 2009) and New Zealand ($NZ 205.5 m. in 
2007-08, or half of its total aid overseas of $NZ 429 m., source, NZAID website 
accessed 25 June 2009). 
Its relatively low expenditure in the region reinforces the view that France, with a 
sovereign presence in the Pacific, does not see the region as part of its own area of 
responsibility. 
One could argue that France's own effort to engage more in the region in the last few 
years itself increases expectations, and the potential for misunderstanding and old 
thinking, towards France. Its encouragement of exchanges and visits to its entities by 
regional figures, which is desirable, while impressing them with the prosperity in the 
French collectivities and in Paris, heightens expectations about potential aid in the 
minds of officials from countries, almost all of whose entire GDP is less than what the 
French spend in one collectivity each year (see Chapter 7). It would be helpful if such 
visits were matched by more visits in the other direction, by leaders and officials of the 
French collectivities, and French officials from Paris, to other island countries. 
The EU activity France has encouraged, although welcome, is not large, averaging a 
planned $A 90 m. per annum for the five years to 2013, of which about 20% comes 
from France and is included in France's regional aid figure above (see Chapter 7). 
While some changes are being made, in the past this aid has proven at odds with 
existing mechanisms. The EU process of shifting from an aid donor/ACP basis to new 
trade partnerships through EPAs, was complicated by initial disregard for the region's 
own evolving trade arrangements. Despite its proclaimed 2006 Strategy for the Pacific, 
the EU's endemic bureaucratic requirements and a tendency to a one size fits ail 
approach in a varied and disparate group of archipelagos has resulted in delayed and 
inefficient aid delivery, generally outside of existing regional mechanisms such as the 
SPC. These efforts are complicated by the growing gap between the way the EU treats 
its OCTs (overseas collectivities, including the French Pacific collectivities) and the 
way it treats to ACPs (Chapter 7). Pacific leaders remember, too, that EU aid is a two-
edged sword, bringing with it unflinching human rights standards and the threat of 
economic sanction. The EU has used its muscle to sanction Fiji, and France threatened 
to cut off New Zealand's access to EU markets in the post-Rainbow Warrior period 
(see Chapter 3). 
The increased presence of the EU in the region has the further strategic consequence for 
France that any opprobrium attaching to France amongst regional leaders will by 
extension also attach to the EU, and vice versa. Whereas in the past, pressure on 
France came from the regional island countries and the UN, in any future situation of 
concern to the region, France is likely also to come under pressure from the EU itself 
(as indeed it did when the European Court of Human Rights endorsed the restricted 
electorate in New Caledonia). Thus, France's European engagement can act as a helpful 
brake in its wielding of power within the region. On the other hand, action by the EU, 
for example in its dealings with Fiji, which might be perceived as negative, will also 
have an accompanying residual effect on regional attitudes to France. 
In the grand scheme of things, the reality is that the Pacific islands are low in the 
pecking order of Europe's foreign policy priorities. In this context, as a major EU and 
Pacific power, France is in a privileged position to promote the regional economic 
efficiencies which the Pacific Islands Forum countries aspire to, enunciated in the 
Pacific Plan. It can facilitate better information flows between the Pacific island states, 
the French Pacific collectivities, and Paris and Brussels, on trade matters to ensure the 
EU in pursuing its Pacific strategy works within the Pacific Plan, PACER and PICTA 
(for example, in implementing its EPA arrangements); and to ensure better 
communication and understanding between its Pacific EU OCTs and the Pacific island 
ACP states. Again, equipping local officials in its collectivities with training and a 
working external affairs secretariat will be important (see France supporting its 
collectivities in regional engagement section). 
Apart from increased ftinding more commensurate with the needs and status of the 
Pacific island states as neighbours to France in the region, France could also encourage 
the EU to work more through regional mechanisms which are proven to be effective, 
such as the SPC, the Council of Regional Organizations of the Pacific (CROP) 
organizations, and bilaterally particularly in consultation with the government and non-
goemment aid organizations of Australia and New Zealand who are experienced in 
working in the small remote communities of the Pacific islands. 
Just as France devotes considerable expenditure to supporting commercial activity 
within its Pacific collectivities, regional integration of its collectivities would benefit 
from France providing funding to examine economic links between the Pacific island 
states and the French Pacific collectivities, and to promote private French investment in 
the Pacific island states. So long as the collectivities' dependence on European and 
French imports is unlikely to change substantially given tastes and preferential tariff 
arrangements, true economic integration is unlikely to occur without a re-examination 
of the high tariff protection the French collectivities maintain against regional imports. 
Whereas full PICTA and PACER participation might be too large a concession to make 
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by the French collectivities, some review of their extremely high tariff walls would be a 
welcome gesture. President Sarkozy's announcement in November 2009 of reform 
measures relating to the Overseas France, including measures for French collectivities 
to become more economically engaged in their own regions, may be a good start. 
One of the most valuable targets for any increased expenditure by France and the EU 
would be increasing people-to-people links, both ways, between the French entities and 
the rest of the region. Apart from promoting training exchanges in the field of 
diplomacy to address the desire of France to integrate its collectivities into the life of 
the region, such exchanges could take place in areas of regional trade, engaging for 
examples the officials of ADECAL {Agence de Developpement Economiqiie de la 
Noiivelle-Caledonie, New Caledonia Economic Development Agency), New 
Caledonia's trade promotion arm, with those of neighbouring counterparts. Exchanges 
involving regional organizations could also be helpful. 
Greater funding and engagement by France and its national and regional experts could 
build on France's solid start in focusing on the big challenges for the Pacific region, 
those of sustainable development, food security and the protection of the environment, 
particularly marine resources and fishing stock management, in which France has 
expertise. 
There is scope for France to engage regional neighbours more in its technological and 
scientific activities, which are second to none within the region but often little known 
about and under used. Instimtions such as the IFREMER {Institut Francois de 
Recherche pour I' Exploitation de la Afer, French Research Institute for Marine 
Exploitation), IRD {Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement, Development 
Research Institute), and agricultural institutions {Institut Pasteur, Institut Agronomique 
de Nouvelle-Caledonie) are represented in the French entities and have a valuable role 
to play in the region in hosting more workshops and exchanges at the grassroots, 
working level, which would be welcomed, if language issues are seriously addressed. 
The cultural context of exchanges needs to be recognized. Pacific island researchers 
themselves have valuable expertise. Many good intentions, and considerable financial 
expenditure, can be wasted by seminars in the European tradition, for example the idea 
of ''Assises'', or stocktakes of existing European research, which is an alien idea for the 
Pacific island researcher, and involves presentation formulas that can appear to be 
talking at, rather than talking with, regional experts. 
As indicated in Chapter 7, France or its collectivities have formal links with all the 
CROP organizations except the three specifically involving tertiary instimtions. 
Whereas there are systemic differences in the operation of French education 
institutions, with changes in the European tertiary system of the last few years, aligning 
European degrees more closely with those of the anglophone system, there may be 
opportunities for flirther collaboration between the two French Pacific universities and 
regional tertiary institutions. 
France has supported ongoing cultural links between the indigenous peoples of its 
collectivities and their neighbouring peoples. New Caledonia will take its turn to host 
the Melanesian Arts Festival in 2011, held every four years under the auspices of the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group. It supported the meeting of Polynesian royal families in 
Tahiti in 2007. It promotes sporting participation by the French collectivities in 
regional sporting events which is valued in the region. The Pacific island state 
participants could benefit from more training funds to ensure more equal competition 
with the well-funded French athletes who have tended to scoop most events. 
In the cultural context, France has understood the need to proceed gently. The explicit 
use of expressions and concepts such as rayoimement, or the national mission to 
expand cultural influence, have notably been reduced in recent years, perhaps a 
response to the sensitivities of the small island states. The role of French culture is a 
unique idea to French people. The justified pride and emotion with which the French 
approach their culture and intellectual heritage, and their feeling of the responsibility to 
share it, can be misunderstood. Introducing others to a body of literature, culture and 
thought not accessed without an understanding of the French language and thinking, is 
a valuable contribution to the region that only France can make. It can be achieved 
through more two way exchanges, visits, scholarships, sport sponsorships, promotion of 
Alliances Frangaises (French clubs) and other study opportunities, building on existing 
programs France is funding. France is also in a unique position to expand exchanges to 
enhance understanding of the indigenous Pacific cultures in its collectivities, for 
example exhibitions and visits to highlight Kanak and Polynesian culture in other parts 
of the Pacific, including Australia and New Zealand. 
Further French underwriting of the tourist industries in its Pacific collectivities would 
enhance regional understanding of its presence. New Caledonia, French Polynesia and 
Wallis and Futuna each represent unique cultural show-cases, and yet are considerably 
more expensive tourist destinations than other Pacific islands and therefore out of reach 
for travellers from most other Pacific countries. 
Building on France's own development cooperation, and on EU activities, its cultural 
links, and its investment and trade links, would balance France's projection of itself as 
a defence player along with Australia and New Zealand, an aspect which Pacific 
leaders find disquieting (as evidenced in their unease over France participating in the 
Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, see Chapter 7). 
Successful outcomes in French collectivities 
By far the most important medium term outcome France can continue to provide for the 
region is continued democracy, stability and economic prosperity in the French 
collectivities. France faces particular challenges in achieving this outcome within the 
next ten years. The key to France's success lies in New Caledonia, to whom the other 
French collectivities, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna, look as a guide to their 
future. 
Within the Melanesian "arc of instability". New Caledonia has in a sense been a 
shining light of democratically-based stability, at least for much of the period of the 
Matignon and Noumea Accords (marred by the assassination of Tjibaou in 1989 and 
ongoing ethnic problems in Saint-Louis). The critical deadlines under the Noumea 
Accord fall due from 2014 to 2018, as new uncertainties arise within the Melanesian 
arc. Transitional arrangements in Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, which were 
themselves based partly on the Noumea Accord model, fall due from 2011 to 2016 (see 
Maclellan 2005e p. 369). In Indonesia, West Papuan issues remain a potential trouble 
spot, and West Papuan independence leaders have links with New Caledonian 
counterparts. The Solomon Islands will be conceivably reconsidering the mandate for 
the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands which will have been in 
operation for a decade. Fiji is a military dictatorship. Democracy in Vanuatu is also 
fragile. 
Against this background, Pacific island leaders and Australia and New Zealand will be 
alert to any new difficuhies or instabilities in the French Pacific collectivities, 
particularly in New Caledonia where the terms of continued French control are yet to 
be agreed. 
French Polynesia 
In French Polynesia, democratic expression in a personality-dominated political culture 
with an economy bankrolled generously by France has led to constant changes of 
leadership, and shifts of alliances around increasingly French Polynesian local interests, 
as distinct from pro-France interests. This coalescence of local interests has in part 
been brought about as a reaction to the French State's own intervention, through 
statutory and other means, to favour pro-France political outcomes (Chapter 6). Such 
actions, with the accompanying corruption and frequent changes of government, hardly 
help French credibility in the region. 
In real terms, such instability has had a low level of impact locally since it is the French 
sovereign power that delivers budgetary support, all services, and a flow of high quality 
consumer goods. And France controls law and order. The lack of any substantial 
economic resource means that few see long-term benefit in pushing for true 
independence. So long as that continues, and France is prepared to pay, stability is 
assured. However, the implementation of the latest reforms of French Polynesia's 
statute applying to elections will be a test. If the reforms are used to favour the pro-
France group, as has occurred in the past, they may exacerbate rather than reduce 
political volatility. 
In the best of times, it is a difficult, expensive, and thankless task for French authorities 
to foster democratic processes, while maintaining first world standard services and civil 
law and order in the remote archipelagoes of French Polynesia. If there were a 
significant downturn in French economic support, local protests and heavy handed 
responses by French security services could create further instability. With global 
financial pressures, French systems and processes, already under pressure from shifting 
local groupings, may be tested further. 
French Polynesia, like New Caledonia, has a record of recent violence (1987, 1991 and 
1995). The influence of Flosse, who through his personality and close relationship with 
the now departed Chirac had been able to secure increasingly favourable autonomy 
measures, has faded. Young French Polynesians are well aware that the big changes 
occurred in New Caledonia only after the violence of the 1980s. A French Polynesian 
participant at a Colloquium on New Caledonia in Paris in May 2008 noted that there 
had been no Rocard-type mission to French Polynesia because there had been no 
violence there (Comments to Colloquium 2008). Mrgudovic (2008 p 244) signalled 
that of the many statutory changes applying to New Caledonia since 1958, only the last 
was negotiated, suggesting that it was violence which was the factor leading to a 
negotiated outcome. In a contracting global economy which inevitably impacts on the 
one resource employing French Polynesians, tourism, the possibility of French 
Polynesians seeking further political autonomy through violence cannot be ruled out. 
Unlike Flosse, whose record in the region was mixed, Oscar Temaru has a strong 
network amongst regional island leaders, many of whom have supported his cause. 
This can be an asset for France. Respect for Temaru has meant some regional 
tolerance even for his recent alliances with Flosse, and the dilution of his independence 
demand. But should Temaru up the ante on independence or autonomy issues, he 
would find ready support in the Pacific Islands Forum and the region. He has shown he 
is prepared to use the Forum card, calling for reinscription of French Polynesia on the 
UN decolonization list regularly in recent years (and meeting strong French official 
reaction) and advancing ideas on further autonomy at the 2007 Forum Summit (Chapter 
6), including his idea of a Tahiti Nui Accord for autonomy for French Polynesia, based 
on the Noumea Accord. His quiet but protesting presence outside the SPC headquarters 
Noumea venue for the UN Decolonization Commmittee's Regional Pacific Seminar in 
May 2010 reflects his continuing determination to use UN avenues to put his case 
where possible. 
French Polynesia will continue to look to the treatment of New Caledonia as a model 
for its own future. An unstable long-term outlook for New Caledonia will therefore 
have repercussions there. 
Wallis and Futuna 
For the time being, there are few forces for change in Wallis and Futuna. France has 
done virtually nothing to connect the collectivity with its near neighbours. Despite its 
location neighbouring Fiji and Samoa, Wallis and Futuna remains isolated, with more 
flights to and from New Caledonia, 2500 km. away, than from Fiji, 800 km away and 
none from Apia, just 500 km. away. There are no ferry services to any of these places. 
The archipelago has little infrastructure, including roads, shipping and air services, both 
within the collectivity and to other parts of the Pacific. The potential for tourism has 
not been developed. 
Sarkozy's promise of a review of the 1961 Statute (Sarkozy 2010a) that still governs 
the collectivity has not provoked major opposition. The dependence and remoteness of 
the archipelago suggest few problems for the French administering authority. 
However, agreeing on a successor to the King of Wallis, one of the three kings in 
Wallis and Futuna, after his 40-year reign, in 2008 was a time-consuming and initially 
divisive exercise, which suggests that old systems are not necessarily up to future 
challenges. Moreover, prosperity and peace in Wallis and Futuna rest largely on the 
continued ability of the bulk of its citizens to find work in New Caledonia. So what 
happens in New Caledonia matters in a real sense for Wallis and Futuna. 
Long-term solution for New Caledonia 
In New Caledonia, the first test for France will be in fiilfilling its Noumea Accord 
commitments, and being seen by Kanak and regional leaders alike to be doing so. This 
is a critical prerequisite given France's history of dealing with autonomy provisions, 
revising and often breaking promises from 1956 to 1988 (Chapters 3 and 5). The 
current generation of Kanak and regional leaders are aware that the most recent, post-
1988 French promises, were obtained under the strict duress of civil war and loss of life 
on both sides for and against independence. Tjibaou was murdered within a year of 
negotiating the Matignon Accords, by Kanaks who felt he had sold them out and 
succumbed to France's manipulation, just twenty years ago. Already the Noumea 
Accord, deferring the vote promised by the Matignon Accords for a further ten years, 
has been seen by some as simply a delaying tactic. In the years to come, the test for 
France will be to respond to the frustration expressed by Kanak leader Roch Pidjot in 
his last speech to the National Assembly in Paris, in 1984, when he said: 
"France's sole preoccupation is to maintain its presence in the Pacific. In order 
to do this, it privileges the interests of Europeans and of other 
immigrants...convinced that New Caledonia must be governed at the center, you 
play into the hands of the most reactionary elements in this country and those of 
small political groups, thereby providing an unexpected chance for them to 
appear much more important than they are in reality....it is a classic strategy: 
you divide to rule....Our human dignity is profoundly wounded by declarations 
to the effect that Kanak independence would be racist.... Our wish is that the 
referendum be held and that New Caledonia becomes independent.... You have 
hurt us too many times. So we have become skeptical, and we will judge the 
Government not on its declarations but on its actions'' (my italics, Waddell 
2008 p. 128). 
For his part. President Nicolas Sarkozy when he addressed the Overseas France in 
January 2010 repeatedly underlined that "the State would keep its word" in 
undertakings that it made ("If we say something, people believe it. If people believe it, 
we don't just say something, we do it" Sarkozy 2010a). But in the same speech, he 
opposed independence (see Chapter 8). 
And the record of the French state in keeping its commitments under the Noumea 
Accord has been mixed (Chapter 5). It has a positive report card in the areas of setting 
up relevant institutions, innovative democratic systems and financial support for 
increasingly autonomous government, engaging all political groupings, Melanesian and 
Caldoche, pro-independence and pro-France alike. These are themselves major 
achievements. But it has recorded serious minuses in its handhng of the sensitive 
restricted electorate promise; allowing if not encouraging continued immigration of 
French nationals from elsewhere; altering the basis of entity-wide censuses; and raising 
one of the five sovereign powers, currency, and entrenching its presence on another, 
defence, well before the Noumea Accord deadline. There have also been delays in the 
scheduled transfer of important responsibilities such as education, and even in meetings 
of the Noumea Accord Signatories Committee. 
Moreover, on sensitive economic rebalancing promises, despite all of France's 
considerable inputs to facilitate better production and distribution of the nickel asset 
across the peoples of New Caledonia, international and local circumstances have 
contrived to limit the pace of progress, such that to date the only producer of the 
valuable commodity remains in French hands and in the European-dominated south, 
and there has been increasing French control of investment in the critical northern 
project. 
France itself faces difficult dilemmas, injecting their own uncertainties into the 
situation, as it shepherds New Caledonia to its next stage. It claims to be impartial 
arbiter at the same time as it is an active participant in the transition process (Chapter 8, 
comments by Sarkozy and Dassonville). But it was this dual and conflicting role that 
impeded implementing the Pons and Pisani proposals in the mid 1980s, a role that led 
to Tjibaou's prescient warning that France was not a judge but an actor (Chapter 3). 
Despite these early lessons, France has been open in its support for New Caledonia 
remaining within France, and supporting the pro-France political groups, undermining 
any claim to impartiality. Its record in French Polynesia, of blatant partiality for 
particular pro-France groupings (Flosse-led in the 1980s and 1990s, and Tong Sang in 
the mid 2000s, see Chapter 6), despite electoral outcomes supporting the pro-
independence groups, with serious effect on political stability, suggests what lies ahead 
for New Caledonia if the final stages of the Noumea Accord are frustrated by pro-
independence activity. 
A practical problem for France on a daily basis arises from statutory arrangements 
which provide for the French state to be responsible for law and order in New 
Caledonia, while many of the decision making powers underpinning stability are in the 
hands of the New Caledonian government. For example, it is the Congress which 
decides the regulations and legislation which may give rise to workers' grievances 
leading to strikes and disruptive barricades and burning of tires; but it is the French 
authorities who are responsible for imposing order. Procedurally, the common link 
between development of the policies (in many key areas the responsibility of the New 
Caledonian government) which will impact on security, and the security responsibility 
of the French State is the French High Commissioner, who is present at all meetings of 
the New Caledonian Executive and the implementer of law and order as senior 
representative of the French State. But since the Noumea Accord, he no longer has 
executive power in the areas of responsibility of the New Caledonian and provincial 
governments. These considerations become more relevant with the emergence of the 
Labour Party and its capacity to stage violent industrial protest, and the tendency, 
particularly since Sarkozy's presidency, for the French State to treat protest with a firm 
hand. 
Possible radicalization of pro-independence demands 
As New Caledonia looks ahead to the final denouement of the Noumea Accord 
processes, local political forces are divided, not only between the pro-France and pro-
independence groups, but within each side as well. There has been some effort on the 
part of the pro-France groupings to unite around the idea of holding discussions on the 
future of New Caledonia after the Noumea Accord (/ 'apres Accord), but divisions 
persist. And the pro-independence groups include a raft of viewpoints within the 
mainstream FLNKS grouping that signed on to the Accord. The mainstream FLNKS 
itself, the more influential because of its status as signatory to the Accord, has 
responded mutely to pro-France overtures to consider an "association with France" 
style outcome, and has accused the French State of meddling. One of its constituents, 
the UC, has frustrated the signature of a framework for the further transfer of 
responsibilities and called for a review of progress in transfers to date (Chapter 5), 
while playing into the hands of divided pro-France groups over the flag issue. These 
are hardly promising signs for the future. 
Many analysts have signalled that a major risk to the continued stability of New 
Caledonia in its transition phase under the Accord would arise from the rift between the 
young and the older generations, with the emergence of a new, possibly young, 
idealistic Kanak leader to lead a new push for fiill independence (see Maclellan 2005b 
p. 412 , Faberon 2002 p. 57, Donroy-Vurobaravu 1994 p. 28; Christnacht 2003 p. 10; 
Personal communication, senior official May 2008). The emergence and effect of the 
avowedly pro-independence, mainly Kanak, Labour Party, with a capacity to mobilize 
large numbers of people, including the young (see Chapter 5), and with a record of 
violent strategic protest, including blocking flights at the international airport, create 
worrying uncertainty and the potential for instability and even violent protest. Whether 
the Labour Party will provide a radical leader, or whether the pro-independence 
mainstream groups will become radicalized, remains to be seen. Much will depend on 
the inclusiveness and realism of the negotiation process. As Rumley warned in 2006, 
the "'status quo, or the no-change" option "will heighten the intensity of that [Kanak] 
resistance and lead to increasing local and regional instability" (Rumley 2006 p. 241). 
Another, related, question on which future stability will rest in New Caledonia is 
whether or not, given a certain commonality of interest between long-term European 
residents and Melanesian leaders, social, economic and generational cleavages might 
assume greater importance than ethnic ones. Such divisions have the potential to bolster 
the support for the traditional pro-independence group and break down traditional pro-
France loyalties, as has been evident in the political realignments of the early 2000s 
(see Chapter 5). 
Next steps for New Caledonia 
Chapter 5 sketched the next steps under the Noumea Accord process, which include the 
continued transfer of responsibihties followed by the holding of a referendum on three 
questions: the transfer of the sovereign responsibilities, access to an international status 
of "full responsibility" for New Caledonia, and organization of citizenship into 
nationality (Noumea Accord Article 5), described as a vote on "accession to full 
sovereignty" in the Organic Law (Titre IX). As noted in Chapter 5, the scheduled 
transfer of specified responsibilities has already slipped, and the Signatories Committee 
which oversees them had a large gap in its meetings, from December 2008 to mid 2010. 
Uncertainties therefore continue to surround the transfer of some significant 
responsibilities including education and aspects of civil law. 
Non-acceptability of deferring a referendum beyond 2018 
The holding of a final referendum specifically on the independence issue, became a 
contentious issue during the 2009 provincial election campaign. Chapter 5 outlined the 
demographic and psephological pointers to any vote on independence probably being 
rejected. The unique electorate for the final referendum suggesting more pro-France 
voters (as it includes more newcomers, i.e. those with 20 years residence to December 
2014, than the electorate for provincial elections, who have residence from 1988), the 
decline in relative numbers of Kanaks (from whom the largest numbers of pro-
independence support come) and the record of the greater weight of the pro-France vote 
in provincial elections to date, suggests that the likelihood of any pro-independence 
outcome is slim. The most recent provincial election in 2009 nonetheless showed a 
sizeable, and growing, part of that electorate supported the pro-independence groups. 
Recent history has shown that holding a vote on independence, which would probably 
resuh in a "no" vote, would be likely to rouse sensitivities on the part of extreme pro-
independence voters, with the risk of violence and civil war once more. It was for these 
reasons that the Matignon Accord deferred a vote for 10 years from 1988, and that the 
Noumea Accord deferred a vote yet again for 20 years. 
As Chapter 5 noted, it was this thinking that led pro-France leaders Jacques Lafieur and 
Harold Martin to propose yet another deferral of a vote. In early 2009, seasoned leader 
Lafieur, who was a signatory to the Accords and who had a strong memory of the civil 
war of the 1980s, proposed a deferral by up to 50 years this time, reflecting the gravity 
of his concern. But these proposals did not meet with general approval. Indeed, the 
results of the 2009 provincial elections showed that not proceeding to a referendum as 
provided under the Noumea Accord was not an option. In that election, parties arguing 
for an early referendum (from amongst the pro-France and pro-independence groups 
alike) attracted strong support, highlighting the paradoxical polarization around the 
issue. 
Arguably, one reason why the deferral option was not viable related to the poor record 
of the French State over the years in delivering on its promises. Its early track record 
was one of successive statutory measures bestowing then revoking various powers 
(Chapter 3), and delays in meeting the deadlines of its own complex scheduled transfer 
of responsibilities under the Noumea Accord, generous though the promised transfers 
might be (Chapter 5). In particular, the French State's perceived early reneging over 
the central "fixed" restricted electorate issue, allowing continued inflows of migrants 
from other parts of France and frustrating the census process applying to ethnic 
categories, was not well received by pro-independence groups. Deferring a vote would 
raise the difficult question of the continued application of a restricted electorate beyond 
2018. It is inconceivable that the pro-independence side would accept abolishing the 
hardwon concept of a restricted electorate for the final vote, given the swelling of the 
non-indigenous population. At the same time, it is difficult to see the pro-France side 
agreeing to prolong the application of the restricted electorate after 2018, given the 
influx of many pro-France supporters in recent years who, as French citizens, would 
expect the right to vote. 
So in a sense, either choice, that of deferring a referendum as in the past, or proceeding 
to a referendum resulting in the rejection of independence, risks serious negative 
reactions and possibly violence. While it is impossible to predict the fiiture, 
developments to date, outlined in Chapter 5 and 8, suggest that the French State will 
encourage all parties to agree to a referendum focused on a result that will be 
acceptable to all in the long-term. The stakes in ensuring stability in coming years by 
seeking to promote a successful, peaceful referendum are high. 
A referendum, on what? 
With the idea of deferring a referendum, or not holding one at all, ruled out by the May 
2009 provincial election result, by late 2009 and early 2010 political debate began to 
focus on the subject of the referendum. 
Thus, as set out in Chapter 5, pro-France leader Frogier shifted from a position 
advocating an early referendum to floating a proposal for an "in association with 
France" option in October 2009. He received a mixed response even from within the 
pro-France camp, the Avenir Ensemble supporting him with Gomes' Caledonie 
Ensemble preferring discussions on a more general idea of "shared sovereignty". The 
pro-independence group too were divided. Palika aligned itself more with Gomes' 
ideas, and the mainstream FLNKS chose not to make a public comment specifically on 
the "association" idea, and instead questioned the motives of the French state. 
By January 2010, the French State acknowledged the growing importance of the terms 
of the referendum itself President Nicolas Sarkozy exhorted both sides to hold 
discussions, so that the result of the vote "for self-determination" provided for by the 
Noumea Accord would translate into a result approved by "a very large majority of 
voters" (Sarkozy 2010a, and Chapter 8). As pointed out in Chapter 8, Sarkozy was 
vague and ambiguous as to the subject of the referendum. He had, earlier in his speech, 
ruled out independence for the Overseas France, so his comments exhorting a resuh 
approved by a large majority suggests he was not expecting the vote to focus on an 
independence option. And yet the Organic Law implementing the Accord specifies a 
vote "on the accession to full sovereignty" ( l i t re IX), and pro-independence signatories 
expect that the independence option would be put. 
The terms in which a referendum question is cast, and careful inclusive negotiation, 
will be the more critical, since the Organic Law provides for repeated votes, up to three, 
from 2014 to 2018, if the initial vote results in a "no" vote (Article 217). Three 
successive votes against independence over three years would conceivably heighten the 
potential for prolonged violence. No doubt Sarkozy calculated that it would therefore 
be preferable to pose a different question, in such a way as to receive an overwhelming 
endorsement the first time round. 
Despite the flexible interpretations of some of the mainstream pro-independence 
coalition about what true independence and sovereignty mean (Chapter 5), not all pro-
independence forces may be convinced to set aside the specific option of independence. 
For some pro-independence supporters, a vote on independence per se would alone be 
seen as fully implementing the spirit and letter of the Noumea Accord. Supporters of 
the new Labour Party would fall into this category, and that Party and the Union which 
forms its base have a record of violent disruption. 
A fiarther note of caution arises from the conclusion by one senior legal advisor to the 
French government by March 2011 that technically, given the Organic Law provisions 
for up to three referendums with associated specified time frames, a referendum could 
be held as late as 2023. He noted that this would entail an added complication of 
election of another Congress in 2019 (Christnacht 2011). This writer notes that such a 
further Congressional mandate was not foreseen by the Accord or Organic Law. 
Options and risks for New Caledonia's future 
The Noumea Accord specifies that the final "vote will be concerned with the transfer to 
New Caledonia of the regalien [sovereign] responsibilities, the access to an 
international status of fiill responsibility, and the organization of citizenship into 
nationality" (Article 5). These matters will be the subject of debate and negotiation 
between the various parties. 
By recommencing its reporting responsibilities as Administering Authority from 2004, 
France has seemingly committed itself to working within the context of the UN 
decolonization provisions. The language of many of the pro-independence groups has 
also begun to centre on "decolonization" as opposed to "independence" (see Chapter 
5). As noted in Chapter 7, relevant UN General Assembly Resolutions provides that a 
non-self-governing territory may reach a full measure of self-goveminent in one of 
three ways: emergence as a sovereign independent state, free association with an 
independent state, or integration with a metropolitan state (for example, UNGA 
Resolution 1541 (XV) 1960). Within the Pacific region itself, there exist already all of 
these three plus numerous other models. Examples include fully independent states 
(the independent Pacific island states), total integration in another state (Hawaii), 
attachment to another state while retaining significant autonomy (Norfolk Island., 
Marianas), and association (Cook Islands, Palau) (see Robert Aldrich, in Regnault and 
Fayaud 2008 p. 199; Firth 1989; New Pacific Review 2003). 
For New Caledonia, using the UN decolonization framework as a basis for comparison, 
some of the options might include, in ascending degrees of retained links with France: 
formal independence. France's commitment to retain its Pacific collectivities, 
its economic support and careful management of grievances of pro-
independence forces since 1988, recent voting patterns in New Caledonia, and 
ultimately France's control over immigration and law and order backed by civil 
and military power, reduce the likelihood of an independence scenario. In an 
independence outcome, substantial support by a number of donors, no doubt 
including France, would be required. The new state would be vulnerable to the 
same factors the other Pacific island countries face; reduced economic 
resources, inadequate defence forces, weak governance, shifting alliances, 
rapidly changing governments, and pressure from foreign benefactor 
governments. This outcome is not favoured by France. It would deliver new 
vulnerabilities to the region, negatively affecting security and economic 
development. On the basis of the Vanuatu experience, it could demand an input 
of economic support from Canberra, an idea unwelcome to Australia given 
Australian commitments elsewhere in the region. 
some kind of free association with France, as loosely mooted by Frogier, 
although perhaps under another name such as "partnership" in view of the 
tainted nature of this option under the Pisani proposal. Various models already 
exist in the Pacific region: 
- compact of free association such as Palau has with the US, with its own 
UN seat, and defence taken care of by the US for 50 years 
- compact of free association as in Federated State of Micronesia, and the 
Marshall Islands, which has its own UN seat, with defence taken care of 
by US 
- "in association" option of Cook Islands with New Zealand, with full 
participation in regional organizations but no UN seat. Freedom to vote 
to change its status 
- "commonwealth" option of the Northern Marianas with the US, or Niue 
and Tokelau with New Zealand, with no UN seat, no responsibility for 
foreign relations, and the status loosely of an unincorporated dependent 
territory 
A form of integration, perhaps either 
- federation within France. New Caledonia could become a federated 
"state" or province of France (see arguments on this possibility by 
Faberon, L 'idee federate en Noiivelle-Caledonie, in Regnault and 
Fayaud 2008 Chapter 2). This would require amendment to the French 
constitution. New Caledonia would retain its rights acquired under the 
Noumea Accord, for example, to foreign relations with its immediate 
region, some civil aviation matters, etc. 
- entrenching the provisions of the Noumea Accord and the Organic Law 
so that the status quo at the time, i.e., 2018 or before, becomes 
pennanent. This would mean a continued consultative collegial 
government, with ultimate majority (pro-France) votes on important 
legislation. Since the restricted electorate would be unlikely to continue, 
the government would be elected on a basis of proportional 
representation, with declining influence of the Kanak ethnic group over 
time. 
(Note: A fiarther theoretical option would be that of partition, under which conceivably 
the generally pro-independence Northern and Loyalty Island Provinces could attain full 
sovereignty; while the Southern Province, dominated by pro-France supporters, could 
remain with France. This option has been specifically ruled out by the Noumea 
Accord, which provided at its Article 5 that the results of any final referendum will 
apply globally to New Caledonia, spelling out that one part of New Caledonia cannot 
accede to full sovereignty or preserve different links with France on the basis of 
different results in different parts of the electorate.) 
Each of the above options provides a basis for implementing the provisions of the 
Noumea Accord (Article 5) to focus on the five remaining sovereign powers (justice, 
public order, defence, currency and foreign affairs), international status, and 
citizenship and nationality. The way in which these issues might be handled is also 
guided by the Noumea Accord provision that "so long as the referendums provided for 
do not result in new political arrangements, then the political arrangements set in place 
by the 1998 Accord will remain in force, in its last iteration, without possibility of 
regression, this 'irreversibility' being constitutionally guaranteed" (Article 5). That is. 
New Caledonia will never revert to what it was before 1998; it will retain the powers 
transferred by 2018 under the Accord. 
Under the Noumea Accord, it is assumed that all but the five regalien or sovereign 
powers would be transferred to New Caledonia before 2018 (even though experience to 
date shows considerable slippage in these transfers). Of the options set out above. New 
Caledonia would take over all five remaining sovereign powers in the independence 
option. France would retain all these powers under an integration option, although New 
Caledonia would retain those elements of foreign affairs that it received under the 
Noumea Accord (for example, regional representation, see Chapter 5). In the "in 
association" option, negotiations would centre on elements of the remaining sovereign 
powers which might be traded, for example, responsibility for certain foreign relations 
and civil law and enforcement elements. Apart from these five powers specified in the 
Accord, for any non-independence scenario, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, important 
questions remain about the future responsibility for control over external immigration 
and mining, central issues which have been blurred in the Accord. 
With respect to the access to international status, in all three options New Caledonia 
would retain the responsibilities it has already been accorded under the Accord to 
representation in regional organizations. Under the independence option. New 
Caledonia would clearly as an independent country take over all foreign affairs powers 
and gain full membership of international organizations such as the UN. Under the 
integration option, France would retain these responsibilities. Negotiations for an "in 
association" option can be expected to focus on the nature of New Caledonia's regional 
relations and representation in regional and other bodies, i.e., factors such as whether 
New Caledonia could set up its own diplomatic representation in regional countries, 
and whether it would have delegations of its own as opposed to being subsumed in 
French delegations. A central question would be whether or not it could be a member 
of the UN, as are the Pacific island states in forms of association with the United States. 
New Caledonia would clearly take over entire responsibility for citizenship and 
nationality questions in an independence option. For the other options, discussion of 
these questions is likely to be thorny, since it is here that the question of immigration 
from other parts of France, non-continuation of the restricted electorate beyond 2018, 
and the application of employment protection and preferences, would be addressed, all 
of which have been core elements of the Kanak pro-independence groups' claims. And 
any negotiation will need to include questions of the control and ownership of mines 
(currently mainly in French hands), distribution of benefits from mining (especially 
between the North and the South), clearer delineation of powers over minerals and 
hydrocarbon resources, along with difficult sustainable environment issues. 
In the integration option. New Caledonia would presumably retain those citizenship 
protections it has currently, and will have attained by 2018, such as employment 
protection for long-term residents, begging the question of continued application 
beyond 2018. France's commitments to comply with UN decolonization principles 
also come into play. UN decolonization principles provide for equal status and rights 
of citizenship between the peoples of the erstwhile territory and the independent 
territory to which it is to become integrated (United Nations Resolution 1541 December 
1960, Annex). But the Noumea Accord, by its "non regression" provision, ensures no 
turning back to the status quo ante for any of its provisions, including on citizenship 
questions. 
Likewise, in an "in associafion" option, the status as at 2018 would be simply the 
starting point, suggesting difficult discussions about preserving the rights of 
longstanding New Caledonian residents over newcomers, and about the distinctions 
between New Caledonian citizenship and French nationality. France would also need to 
address implications for the non- reciprocal arrangements it has negotiated with the EU. 
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It is unlikely that pro-independence forces, who have sacrificed much on these 
particular issues, would agree to dispense with immigration controls, the restricted 
electorate and employment protection for long-term residents without significant 
progress in their other expectations (international status, but especially the mining 
dividend). Differences over these questions between newly arrived residents and 
longstanding Caldoche residents and the indigenous people; and between pro-France 
and pro-independence groups may be exacerbated. This would be a factor for ongoing 
instability. 
In all but the independence option, it is likely the Euro would be speedily introduced, 
and that inflows of French settlers from other parts of France would continue and 
probably increase. 
From all the foregoing, the most likely direction for the future would seem to be 
discussions centring on some kind of fiature "in association" with France. The violent 
history of the referendum issue and the expectations of the pro-independence group 
about a referendum, suggest that these discussions, and the holding of a referendum in 
coming years, are likely to be painstaking and sensitive processes, with risks of 
violence and disruption. The discussions initiated by the French authorities, in the 
March 2011 Colloquium on the Destinies of the Pacific Political Collectivities, were a 
start, albeit seeming to concentrate exclusively on sovereignty-within-France options. 
Whatever the subject of the referendum, because of the sensitivities and potential for 
disturbance, France, and New Caledonian leaders, including FLNKS leaders like Paul 
Neaoutyine and Roch Wamytan, would benefit from keeping regional leaders informed, 
through the UN, PIF, and MSG mechanisms, about the processes under way. 
Conclusion 
France has earned a long and respected place in the South Pacific region. Its presence 
has been characterized variously by a sense of enquiry, mission and adventure; strategic 
interest, national pride and global power; the imposition and maintenance of its military 
weight; and more recently, commercial interest. In the past, France's presence has 
brought strong elements of stability, but also some elements of instability, to the Pacific 
region. 
This thesis has sought to identify the elements of risk to stability which remain. 
The challenge for France is to respect its own commitments to its entities and the 
international community, and its responsibilities as a resident neighbour to regional 
governments and leaders, particularly as it handles difficult governance issues in 
French Polynesia, and the working out of a long-term status for New Caledonia 
acceptable to all of its people. France's Pacific neighbours understand the complexities 
of this process, one with which they are themselves constantly grappling in their own 
ways. They will continue to welcome and support genuine, unflinching democratic 
effort on the part of France and its collectivities. 

Appendix 1 
Wording of Noumea Accord and 1999 Organic Law on Restricted Electorates 
Relating to local (provincial and Congress) elections 
Article2.2.1 of the Noumea Accord: 
"/<? corps electoral aux asseniblees des provinces et an Congres sera restreint: il sera 
reserve aux electeurs qui reniplissaient les conditions pour voter au scrutin de 1998, a 
ceux qui, inscrits au tableau annexe, rempliront une condition de domicile de dix ans a 
la date de I 'election, ainsi qu 'aux electeurs atteignant I 'age de la majorite pour la 
premiere fois apres J 998 et qui, soit justifieront de dix ans de domicile en 1998, soit 
auront eu un parent remplissant les conditions pour etre electeur au scrutin de la fin de 
1998, soit, ayant eu un parent inscrit sur un tableau annexe justifieront d'une duree de 
domicile de dix ans en Nouvelle-Caledonie a la date de I 'election." 
"The electoral body for the assemblies of the provinces and the Congress will be 
restricted: it will be confined to voters who fulfilled the conditions to vote in the 1998 
vote, to those who, registered in the annex table, would fulfil the residency requirement 
of ten years at the date of the election, as well as voters who have reached majority age 
for the first time after 1998 and who, either with ten years residency in 1998, or with a 
parent fulfilling the conditions to vote in the election at the end of 1998, or, having a 
parent registered on the annex table would be resident for ten years in New Caledonia 
at the date of the election." 
Article 188 of the 19 March 1999 Organic Law: 
congres et les asseniblees de province sont elus par un corps electoral compose des 
electeurs satisfaisant a I'une des conditions suivantes : 
(a)Remplir les conditions pour etre inscrits sur les listes electorates de la Nouvelle-
Caledonie etablies en vue de la consultation du 8 novembre 1998 ; 
(b) Etre inscrits sur le tableau annexe et domicilies depuis dix ans en Nouvelle-
Caledonie a la date de I'election au congres et aux assemblees de province ; 
(c) Avoir atteint I'dge de la majorite apres le 31 octobre 1998 et soit justifier de dix ans 
de domicile en Nouvelle-Caledonie en 1998, soit avoir eu un de lews parents 
remplissant les conditions pour etre electeur au scrutin du 8 novembre 1998, soit avoir 
un de lews parents inscrit au tableau annexe et justifiier d'une duree de domicile de dix 
ans en Nouvelle-Caledonie a la date de I'election" 
"The Congress and the provincial assemblies are elected by an electoral body 
composed of voters satisfying one of the following conditions : 
(a) Fulfilling conditions to be registered on the electoral role of New Caledonia 
established for the referendum of 8 November 1998; 
(b) Being registered on the annex table and resident for ten years in New Caledonia 
at the date of the election to the Congress and the provincial assemblies; 
(c) Having attained the age of majority after 31 October 1998 and either with ten 
years residence in New Caledonia in 1998, or having had one of their parents 
fulfilling the conditions to be a voter in the 8 November 1998 vote, or having 
one of their parents registered on the annex table and with ten years residence in 
New Caledonia at the date of the election." 
Relating to the final referendum(s) 
Article 2.2.1 of the Noumea Accord : 
" Le corps Sectoral pour les consultations relatives a I 'organisation politique de la 
Nouvelle-Caledonie intervenant a I 'issue du delai d'application du present accord 
(point 5) comprendra exclusivement: les electeurs inscrits sur les listes electorales aux 
dates des consultations electorales prevues au 5 et qui ont ete admis a participer au 
scrutin prevu a I 'article 2 de la loi referendaire, au qui remplissaient les conditions 
poury participer, ainsi que ceux qui pourront justifier que les interruptions dans la 
continuite de leur domicile en Nouvelle-Caledonie etaient dues a des raisons 
professionnelles ou familiales, ceux qui, de statut coutumier ou nes en Nouvelle-
Caledonie, y ont eu le centre de leurs interets materiels et moraux et ceux qui ne sont 
pas nes en Nouvelle-Caledonie mais dont I 'un des parents y est ne et qui y ont le centre 
de leurs interets materiels et moraux. 
''Pourront egalement voter pour ces consultations les jeunes atteignant la majorite 
electorate, inscrits sur les listes electorales, et qui, s 'Us sont nes avant 1988 auront eu 
leur domicile en Nouvelle-Caledonie de 1988 a 1998 ou, s 'Us sont nes apres 1988, ont 
eu un de leurs parents qui remplissait ou aurait pu remplir les conditions pour voter au 
scrutin de la fin de 1998. Pourront egalement voter a ces consultations les personnes 
qui pourront justifier, en 2013, de vingt ans de domicile continu en Nouvelle-
Caledonie. " 
"The electoral body for the referendums on the political organization of New Caledonia 
at the end of the period of application of this agreement (Point 5) will include 
exclusively: voters registered on the electoral role at the dates of the referendums 
foreshadowed at 5 and who would be able to vote in the vote foreshadowed at Article 2 
of the referendum law, or who fulfilled the conditions to vote in this vote, and those 
who could prove that interruptions to their continued residence in New Caledonia were 
due to professional or family reasons, those who, by customary status or bom in New 
Caledonia, have the centre of the material and moral interests there, and those not bom 
in New Caledonia but for whom one parent is bom there and who has the centre of their 
material and moral interests there. 
"Also able to vote in this vote in these referendums are young people of majority age, 
registered on the electoral role and who if bom before 1988 would have their residence 
in New Caledonia from 1988 to 1998 or if bom after 1988, have a parent fulfilling or 
who could fulfil conditions to vote in the vote at the end of 1998. Also able to vote in 
these referendums are people who can prove, in 2013, twenty years of continued 
residence in New Caledonia." 
Article 218 of the 19 March 1999 Organic Law: 
''Sont admis a participer a la comultation les electeurs inscrits sur la liste electorale a 
la date de celle-ci et qui remplissent I'lme des conditions suivantes : 
a) Avoir ete admis a participer a la considtation du 8 novembre 1998 ; 
b) N'etant pas inscrits sur la liste electorale pour la consultation du 8 novembre 1998, 
remplir neanmoins la condition de domicile requise pour etre electeur a cette 
consultation ; 
c) N'ayant pas pu etre inscrits sur la liste electorale de la consultation du 8 novembre 
1998 en raison du non-respect 
de la condition de domicile, justifier que leur absence etait due a des raisons familiales, 
professionnelles ou medicales ; 
d) Avoir eu le statut civil coutumier ou, nes en Nouvelle-Caledonie, y avoir eu le centre 
de leurs interets materiels et moraux ; 
e) Avoir I'un de leurs parents ne en Nouvelle-Caledonie et y avoir le centre de leurs 
interets materiels et moraux ; 
f ) Pouvoir justifier d'une duree de vingt ans de domicile continu en Nouvelle-Caledonie 
a la date de la consultation et au plus tard au 31 decembre 2014 ; 
g) Etre nes avant le ler Janvier 1989 et avoir eu son domicile en Nouvelle-Caledonie 
de 1988 a 1998 ; 
h) Etre nes a compter du ler Janvier 1989 et avoir atteint I'dge de la majorite a la date 
de la considtation et avoir eu un de leurs parents qui satisfaisait aux conditions pour 
participer a la consultation du 8 novembre 1998. 
Les periodes passees en dehors de la Nouvelle-Caledonie pour accomplir le service 
national, pour suivre des etudes ou ime formation ou pour des raisons familiales, 
professionnelles ou medicales ne sont pas, pour les personnes qui y etaient 
anterieurement domiciliees, interruptives du delai pris en consideration pour apprecier 
la condition de domicile.'' 
"Those allowed to vote in the referendum are voters registered on the electoral role at 
the date of the referendum and who fulfil one of the following conditions : 
a) Having been able to vote in the referendum of 8 November 1998; 
b) Not being registered on the electoral role for the referendum of 8 November 
1998, but fulfilling the residence condition required to vote in that referendum; 
c) Not having been able to be registered on the electoral role for the referendum of 
8 November 1998 because of not fulfilling the residence requirement, by 
proving that the absence was due to family, professional or medical reasons; 
d) Having had customary civil status or, bom in New Caledonia, having there the 
centre of their material and moral interests; 
e) Having one of their parents bom in New Caledonia and having there the centre 
of their material and moral interests; 
f) Being able to prove a continual residence of twenty years in New Caledonia at 
the date of the referendum and at the latest to 31 December 2014; 
g) Bom before 1 January 1989 with residence in New Caledonia from 1988 to 
1998; 
h) Bom after 1 January 1989 and having reached majority age at the date of the 
referendum and having had one parent fulfilling conditions to participate in the 
referendum of 8 November 1998; 
Periods passed outside New Caledonia to complete national service, to pursue studies 
or training, or for family, professional or medical reasons are not, for persons with prior 
residence, deemed to interrupt the period taken into consideration to fulfill the 
residence requirement." 
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Appendix 2 
Principal Statutory Measures and Proposals - New Caledonia and French 
Polynesia 
Year Title 
New Caledonia 
Key Features 
1957 
1963 
Defferre Law Administrative autonomy. Territorial Assembly 
based on universal suffrage, Council of 
Government of 6-8 ministers 
Jacquinot Law Reduced autonomy. Removed title of 
Ministers; Governor the unequivocal head of 
territorial services 
1969 Billotte Law Reduced autonomy. Local municipalities 
replaced by communes run by Paris; confined 
control over tax exemption for minerals, and 
other controls over minerals, to French state 
1976 Stim Statute Increased autonomy. High Commissioner shares 
control of government with Assembly. 
Status 
Law 56-619, 
23 June 1956 
Decree, 
22 July 1957 
Law 
21 Dec 1963 
Laws (3) 
3 Jan 1969 
Law 
28 Dec 1976 
Members of government council have responsibilities. 
1979 LoiDijoud 
1985 Pisani Plan 
Law 
6 Sept 1984 
Law 
23 Aug 1985 
Not 
implemented 
Weakened autonomy. Minimum threshold 7.5% Law 79-407, 
for parties to win seats in assembly. Council of 24 May 1979 
Government elected by majority rather than 
proportional vote; Council can dissolve Assembly 
1984 Lemoine Law Internal autonomy. Referendum within 5 years 
Allows distinctive identity signs. Local President 
of the Territorial Assembly who controlled administration 
Consultative mine and credit councils; Assembly including 
customary representatives 
Independence-in-association 
Referendum July 1985, if yes: 
transfer of sovereignty January 1986 
Citizenship of new state for all 
Non-Kanaks rent from traditional Kanak owners 
Retention of French nationality 
France to provide defence, expertise, funding for 
development and training 
Reduced autonomy. Introduced regionalization. Law 
French High Commissioner takes on executive 23 Aug 1985 
power aided by smaller Council. French Government 
takes ordinance issuing powers. Customary Council created 
Referendum on independence-in-association 
to be held by 31 December 1987 
1986 Pons I Statute 3-year residence rule for self-determination vote Law 
in September 1987; powers of regions weakened; 17 July 1986 
new Land Agency created 
1985 FabiusPlan 
1988 Pons II Statute Revised demarcation of regions, more autonomy Law 
Executive Council of 10 members, 22 Jan 1988 
High Commissioner participates without right of Never 
vote. Territory freely determines identity signs implemented 
1988 Statut Rocard Matignon/Oudinot Accords Created three Law 
provinces, each with assembly; a Congress 9 Nov 1988 
including representatives from the provinces, a Consultative 
customary council; referendum on self-determination 
in 1998 by restricted electorate of voters resident in 
1988 and descendants; direct rule from Paris for one 
year; French State takes control of Land Agency and 
French High Commissioner assumes executive control 
1998 Noumea Accord Collegial government and Congress based on Agreement 
proportional vote in provinces by one restricted to 2018 
electorate; phased handover of all but five Organic Law 
sovereign powers by 2018; up to 3 votes No 99-209 
between 2014-2018 on these powers, on 19 Mar 1999 
international status and on citizenship, by different 
restricted electorate; work for agreed identity signs; 
protection of employment for defined New Caledonian citizens 
French Polynesia 
1957 Defferre Law Application of the Defferre Law to French Law 56-619 
Polynesia (not now EFO), providing more 23 June 1956 
autonomy 
1958 Ordinance Reduced autonomy and local freedoms Ordinance 
Reaffirmed pre-eminence of French Governor 58-1337 
Removed individual ministerial responsibility 23 Dec 1958 
in favour of collegial responsibility 
Reduced Governing Council from 6-8 to 5 members 
1977 Management Some increased autonomy in management Law 77-772 
Autonomy Reinstates Vice-President of Governing Council 12 July 1977 
Law with some collegial management powers 
French Governor becomes High Commissioner with 
executive power 
1984 Law More internal autonomy, executive power Law 84-820 
devolving to the Assembly rather than French 6 Sept 1984 
High Commissioner; Tahitian flag and official language 
Local President created. French State sovereign 
responsibilities but some shared responsibilities, 
return to territory of some responsibilities (post and telegraphs, 
secondary education) taken by State in 1960s 
1990 Law Modifies internal autonomy Law 90-612 
More powers to Territory over direct foreign 12 July 90 
investment budget; exploration and exploitation 
of seabed, marine and subterranean resources; 
and regional relations; consultative committee on immigration 
and foreign residence 
1996 Organic Law Statute of autonomy Law 96-313 
12 April 1996 
2004 Organic Law Reinforces 1996 Law after constitutional review Law 2004-193 
27 Feb 2004 
2007 Organic Law Modifies Organic Law as it applies to election Law 2007-223 
21 Feb 2007 
2007 Law Modifies the February 2007 Law applying to Law 2007-1720 
elections 7 Dec 2007 
Sources: Faberon and Ziller, 2007; Henningham, 1992; www. legiFrance.gouv.fr 
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